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Preface  
 
It was sometime in the eighties of the last century that I - by sheer coincidence - saw 
Stanley Kubrick’s film: ‘2001: a space odyssey’. I found it a fascinating film, especially 
because of the unusual combination of an intriguing story with classical music - which at 
that time  I did not particularly like - and science fiction images - which I did not like 
particularly as well. Years later I found out that the score of the opening scenes was 
Richard Strauss’ musical poem ‘Also sprach Zarathustra’. I bought the compact disc and 
enjoined listening to it. A few years later it occurred to me that Zarathustra also referred 
to a book; which I then bought and read. This was the first book of Wilhelm Friedrich 
Nietzsche I read and than another and another. Next I started with Schopenhauer and 
before long I was seriously interested in philosophy. The question what to do after my 
retirement - after serving for 35 years as a cavalry officer - was therefore easily 
answered: I would study philosophy. 
 
I entered the Utrecht University in 2003 as a part-time student and after two years I felt 
confident enough to become a full time student. I graduated as a bachelor in December 
2007 and the next year entered a master course in applied ethics which I accomplished 
in 2009. During these years I was impressed and motivated by my teachers. I am 
especially grateful to dr. Jan Vorstenbosch in the way he taught and inspired me. Also dr. 
Marcel Verweij of the ethics institute proved an inspiring tutor and companion. 
 
When I finished my bachelor and master studies the question arose: ´What next´? After 
some serious deliberation I decided to try and achieve a PhD degree. My aim was to 
combine my philosophical ambitions and my involvement in the military profession of 
which I had been a proud and committed member. I found professor dr. Desiree Verwey 
- a tutor in philosophy and ethics at the Netherlands Defence Academy - willing to 
support my plans. She proved not only a supporter, but also a highly stimulant tutor. I 
owe her much! Furthermore I am very grateful to the Ministry of Defence, especially the 
then commander in chief of the armed forces, general Peter van Uhm: without his 
support and the help from many others in the armed forces of all services and ranks, I 
would not have been able to achieve my goals.  There is one other party that deserves 
special praise and that is the library of the Netherlands Defence Academy and the 
librarians, under the direction of Mirjam Kruize. They never failed me in their highly 
professional support. Last but not least I would like to thank my friend André Hartslief, 
originally from South Africa, who took it on to oversee and when necessary to correct 
my use of the English language. 
 
Finally I would like to thank my wife Anneke, our children and all our friends who never 
tired - at least pretended so - when I again started talking of my schemes, ideas, plans 
and ambitions! At times I must have been a very tiring companion. I thank you all for 
your patience and support. 
 
Amersfoort, 2013 
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Abstract 
Nowadays democratic constitutional states seldom go to war because survival of the 
nation state is at stake. They mostly participate in ‘new wars’ in order to maintain the 
international rule of law. This means that they must fight these wars in accordance with 
the tenets of the Jus in Bello traditions. If they do not they will lose their moral high 
ground. However, ‘new wars’ are far more complex than old wars. New wars are fought 
by often isolated small units against a foe who is not always recognizable as such. These 
circumstances make it difficult for the soldiers involved in the fighting to uphold the 
tenets of the Jus in Bello traditions. The question then is how to fortify the moral attitude 
of the soldiers who have to fight these wars? In my opinion virtues rather than rules 
could provide the required moral strengthening.  
The classic Aristotelian concept of virtue ethics is based on the idea of an overarching 
goal in life living a good life. Living such a ‘good life’ requires virtues. These virtues 
enable a man to flourish in life and thus live the ‘good life’ in which he realizes his 
capabilities and talents. Alasdair MacIntyre states that in modern times the shared 
notion of an overarching goal in life is lost. Nowadays there are just too many opinions 
and convictions about what is the aim of human life. These convictions are based on 
religion, nationality, other elements of cultural background and individual personality.  
However, mankind participates in activities, many of which are shared and many of 
which are enjoyable. Men enjoy these activities when done well. They enjoy them even 
more when they go better and most of all when they are done best. Men enjoy excelling 
in what they like to do. The more complex the task, the more challenging it is to achieve 
it and the more enjoyment one experiences at its successful accomplishment of the task 
at hand. To excel in all kind of activities is a goal that anyone can recognize and accept. 
MacIntyre states that the aspiration to excellence in activities one enjoys results in the 
development of dispositions tailored to the practice, which enhance the excellence of the 
activities conducted in the practice. These dispositions are the modern virtues. This 
means that those virtues can be identified by analyzing the practice and why it is 
enjoyed and which dispositions enhance the enjoyment by setting standards of 
excellence. MacIntyre’s theory promises a clear understanding of specific practices and 
the relevant virtues. It explains the role of institutional structures and the difference 
between these with their practice. The theory relates how narrative provides a method 
to imbue virtues and it entails the necessity of a close link with the wider moral tradition 
in which the virtues specific to a practice are embedded.  
 
The central aim of my thesis is to develop the outline of a policy on how to apply virtue 
ethics in military practice in order to ensure that individual soldiers will uphold 
adequate moral standards in their actions in ‘new wars’. The question is how to achieve 
this aim. My hypothesis by which I aim to answer the central question is that the theory 
of virtue ethics as elaborated by Alasdair MacIntyre in his book ‘After Virtue’ provides a 
suitable instrument to identify, develop, instil and uphold the required moral standards 
in the military. In my thesis I attempt to prove my hypothesis by developing a model for 
application of the virtue ethical theory of MacIntyre on military practice. 
 
Application of this assumption to the military lead to the following findings. The military 
practice is characterized by the following constitutive elements: task, arms, cooperation, 
enemies, danger, an undetermined time and place, and rules that govern the practice. In 
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relation to these constitutive elements, I identified the reasons why soldiers enjoy 
military activities. These are: satisfaction in accomplishing tasks, pride in wearing an 
uniform and bearing arms,  a feeling of belonging as a result of close cooperation in a 
primary group, contentment in overcoming the enemy, excitement and thrill in facing 
danger, the challenge and adventure of strange places, and the structure and stability 
provided by clear rules. Based on the findings so far, I then proceeded to identify 7 
virtues of military character and 1 virtue of military intellect. The virtues of military 
character are: sense of responsibility, military competence, comradeship, respect - for 
fellow soldiers, civilians and even the enemy - , courage, resilience, and discipline.  These 
virtues of military character are a prerequisite to establish what needs to be done, both 
practically and morally. How to achieve what needs to be done, is a matter of 
deliberation which requires the virtue of intellect: practical wisdom. This virtue-ethical 
framework is tangible; the virtues accommodate the pursuit of excellence and provide 
clear goals - and also yardsticks - for military education and training and personal 
development. The acquisition of these dispositions allows a soldier to be truly virtuous.  
MacIntyre also argues that these virtues can be developed and in this process of 
becoming a virtuous person narrative plays an important role. It provides the necessary 
context in practices, supports the development of the virtues and creates a unified 
identity. Stories provide practical clues about what to expect and what is appropriate to 
do in a specific context. Over time - by instruction, training, exercising, education, the 
examples set by role models and experience, all activities involving stories - being a 
member of the military will evolve into a typical military bearing. Eventually this 
bearing becomes part of one’s identity. Narrative also creates flexibility for 
interpretations which suit specific ‘tribes’ within the military: services, corps, regiments, 
units etc. However, building such a military character will require a strong and 
continuous effort, based on a clear policy. 
After having identified the constitutive elements of the military practice, the reasons 
why soldiers enjoy serving, I established which dispositions enhance the enjoyment of 
serving and support the aspirations to excellence. Then I investigated the role of 
narrative in the development of a military identity. Next I conducted a reality check by 
interviewing a number of soldiers with proven operational combat experience. To 
further validate my findings I also interviewed healthcare workers and civil servants. 
The outcomes of these interviews corroborated my findings.  
Furthermore, MacIntyre explains that a practice needs an institution to support it. The 
institution provides the practice with a context, means and secures continuity. The 
armed forces serve as the institution that sustains military practice. The armed forces 
embody the purpose of military practice. The institution also provides benefits for those 
who serve in them. These generic benefits are money, status and power. The benefits 
gained by means of working in the institution are not the same as the enjoyment gained 
in participating in the practice. Modern activities often show a combination of these 
factors. However this distinction can grow into a gap: the institutional objectives 
become separated from the needs of the practice.  Managerial ethos and institutional 
instrumentality gain in weight at the expense of the excellence of the practice. This 
development can be noticed in several branches of Dutch society, for example in 
education, healthcare and also in the military. In this instrumental approach rules are 
the means which are used to try to direct activities; not only in a practical sense but also 
pertaining to morals.  A code of conduct is such a rule based institutional instrument 
ix 
 
aiming at securing morality. Comparing the actual Dutch military code of conduct with 
the virtue-ethical framework I developed shows that the framework finds more support 
in the field and is better suited to the military practice than the present code. An 
international comparison adds weight to this conclusion. 
The last issue which MacIntyre addresses is that the virtues of a practice need to be 
founded in the wider moral traditions. The lasting characteristics of Dutch moral 
traditions are: freedom and equality, political and religious tolerance, cooperativeness 
and solidarity, (the latter also in international orientation). These characteristics are in 
line with the virtue-ethical framework I developed for the military. However, the 
perspective from tradition also allows for another question:  how to reconcile the needs 
of the nation on the one hand with the liability of the soldier to get wounded or killed 
over issues in which he has no direct personal interest on the one hand with on the 
other. This kind of bond cannot be captured in a modern contract, but requires a 
covenant. A covenant binds the community and the individuals over time and implies a 
strong moral obligation even in difficult times and in the face of danger. A covenant is a 
‘fiduciary relationship’ which rests on lasting mutual trust and confidence. This means 
that the parties to the covenant must be aware of the responsibilities this involves. It 
seems that currently this awareness is lacking  in the Netherlands. This awareness could 
be improved by reaffirming the character of a practice of the military. 
All in all there are good reasons which support the conclusion that the virtue-ethical 
theory as developed by Alasdair MacIntyre in his book After Virtue provides a suitable 
instrument to develop a virtue-ethical framework which is suited to the military 
practice. Application of this framework in the Dutch armed forces would solve a number 
of the present problems and could contribute to a better understanding of the military in 
wider Dutch society. 
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Samenvatting 
 
Democratische rechtstaten raken heden ten dag niet verwikkeld in nieuwe oorlogen, 
omdat het voortbestaan van de natiestaat in gevaar is. Meestal nemen zij deel aan 
nieuwe oorlogen teneinde de internationale rechtsorde te handhaven. Dit betekent 
onder meer dat de oorlogvoering moet plaatsvinden in overeenstemming met de 
waarden van de traditie van het Jus in Bello. Als zij zich daar niet aan houden verliezen 
ze de morele grondslag waarvoor ze deelnamen aan een gewapende  interventie. 
Tegelijkertijd moeten we constateren dat deze nieuwe oorlogen veel complexer zijn dan 
oude oorlogen. De nieuwe oorlogen worden vooral gevoerd door kleine - veelal 
geïsoleerd optredende - eenheden, tegen een tegenstander die vaak niet als zodanig is te 
herkennen. Deze omstandigheden maken het erg ingewikkeld voor de soldaten om de 
waarden van het Jus in Bello hoog te houden. De vraag is dan ook hoe onder deze 
omstandigheden morele ontsporingen zijn te voorkomen en het morele bewustzijn te 
versterken van de soldaten die deze oorlogen moeten uitvechten. Naar mijn mening is 
dit morele bewustzijn beter te bewerkstelligen met behulp van deugden dan met 
reglementen. 
 
De klassieke Aristotelische opvatting met betrekking tot deugdethiek is gebaseerd op 
één uiteindelijk doel in het leven, te weten een goed leven te leiden. Een goed leven 
leiden vereist deugden. Deugden stellen de mens in staat een goed leven te leiden 
waarin hij zijn vermogens en talenten tot bloei brengt. De kardinale deugden zijn 
rechtvaardigheid, moed, matigheid en wijsheid. Alasdair MacIntyre stelt dat in de 
moderne tijd er niet langer sprake is van eenheid van opvatting over het uiteindelijke 
doel van het leven. Met betrekking tot deze kwestie bestaan vandaag de dag vele en 
uiteenlopende opvattingen. Deze overtuigingen zijn gebaseerd op religie, nationaliteit 
andere vormen van culturele achtergrond en ook de persoonlijke identiteit. Dit betekent 
dat er geen eenheid van opvatting bestaat met betrekking tot de noodzaak van deugden 
en welke dat zouden moeten zijn.  
 
Tegelijkertijd nemen mensen allemaal deel aan verschillende activiteiten, vaak samen 
met anderen en vaak ook met plezier. Mensen vinden het leuk dingen goed te doen, en 
het wordt veelal nog leuker als het beter gaat en het grootste plezier is gelegen in de 
dingen op hun  best te doen. Alle mensen vinden het leuk te excelleren in dingen die ze 
graag doen. Dit plezier in een succesvolle prestatie neemt toe naarmate de activiteit 
complexer en veeleisender is. Het willen uitblinken in allerlei activiteiten is een doel dat 
door iedereen kan worden herkend en aanvaard. MacIntyre stelt dat het streven te 
willen slagen in activiteiten die men leuk vindt, leidt tot de ontwikkeling van op de 
praktijk afgestemde houdingen die het prestatieniveau bevorderen. Deze houdingen 
vormen de moderne deugden. Dit houdt onder meer in dat deze deugden kunnen 
worden geïdentificeerd door de praktijk te analyseren, na te gaan welke 
aantrekkingskracht ervan uitgaat, waarom die praktijk leuk wordt gevonden en welke 
houdingen die vreugde vergroten doordat daarmee een kwaliteitseis wordt neergezet.   
 
De theorie van MacIntyre MacIntyre’s belooft een inzicht te bieden in de verschillende 
praktijken en de daarbij behorende  relevante deugden. De theorie verklaart voorts de 
rol van instituties en in welk opzicht deze verschilt van die van de praktijken. De theorie 
beschrijft verder de rol van narrativiteit bij het internaliseren van deugden en geeft 
voorts aan hoe belangrijk het is dat de deugden van specifiek praktijken passen binnen 
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de morele tradities van de samenleving. Het centrale doel van mijn dissertatie is aan te 
geven op welke wijze deugdethiek kan worden toegepast  in de militaire praktijk 
teneinde de morele weerbaarheid te verhogen van soldaten die in deze nieuwe oorlogen 
moeten optreden. Ik wil deze centrale doelstelling realiseren op basis van de hypothese 
dat voor het hooghouden van de morele standaarden van de militaire praktijk een 
geschikt instrument wordt gevonden in de deugdethische theorie van Alasdair 
MacIntyre, zoals hij deze heeft uiteengezet in zin boek ‘After Virtue’ en waarin hij 
aangeeft hoe deugden kunnen worden geïdentificeerd, gevormd en eigen gemaakt. In 
mijn dissertatie wil ik deze hypothese staven door een raamwerk te ontwikkelen voor 
de toepassing van de theorie van Alasdair MacIntyre op de militaire praktijk. 
 
De toepassing van deze theorie op de militaire praktijk heeft geleid tot de volgende 
bevindingen. De militaire praktijk heeft de navolgende samenstellende kenmerken: een 
taak, een wapenuitrusting, samenwerking, een vijand, gevaar, een onbestemde plaats en 
tijd en er gelden regels. Als een van deze elementen ontbreekt is er geen sprake van een 
militaire praktijk. In samenhang met deze samenstellende delen heb ik een aantal 
verlangens geïdentificeerd die een rol spelen in de aantrekkingskracht van de militaire 
praktijk. Dit betreft: tevredenheid over het volbrengen van taken; trots op het dragen 
van een uniform en bewapening;  je thuis voelen als onderdeel van een nauwe 
samenwerking in een primaire groep; voldoening over het verslaan van een vijand; de 
spanning en sensatie van een dreigend gevaar; de uitdaging en het avontuur van 
vreemde plaatsen; de structuur en duidelijkheid die worden geboden door heldere 
regels. Vervolgens heb ik op basis van het vorenstaande zeven militaire 
karakterdeugden en een militaire intellectuele deugd vastgesteld. De militaire 
karakterdeugden zijn: verantwoordelijkheidsbesef, militair vakmanschap, 
kameraadschap , respect - voor mede militairen, burgers en zelfs de vijand - moed, 
veerkracht en discipline. Deze militaire karakterdeugden stellen militairen in staat vast 
te stellen wat vereist is, wat moet worden gedaan, zowel in praktisch als in moreel 
opzicht. Hoe daaraan inhoud moet worden gegeven vereist de militaire deugd van het 
intellect: praktische wijsheid. Dit deugdethische raamwerk is tastbaar, de deugden 
ondersteunen het streven naar voortreffelijkheid en vormen duidelijke doelen - en 
maatstaven - voor militaire opleidingen, training en vorming. De verwerving van deze 
deugden stellen de militair in staat werkelijk deugdzaam te zijn. 
 
MacIntyre stelt ook dat deze houdingen kunnen worden aangeleerd en ontwikkeld en 
dat in dit proces narrativiteit een grote rol speelt. Het schept de context waarin een 
praktijk plaatsvindt, het ondersteunt de vorming van deugden en draagt bij aan de 
ontwikkeling van een identiteit. Verhalen geven praktische aanknopingspunten voor 
wat men mag verwachten en wat in een bepaalde situatie het juiste is om te doen. Na 
verloop van tijd - door opleiding, training, oefening, vorming, de voorbeelden van 
rolmodellen en ervaring, allemaal zaken die verhalen vormen - zal het deel uitmaken 
van een militaire organisatie - een militaire familie - leiden tot de ontwikkeling van een 
typisch militaire houding die deel wordt van de identiteit. Narrativiteit schept ook 
flexibiliteit, doordat de interpretatie kan worden aangepast aan de tradities van 
specifieke verbanden in de krijgsmacht, te weten: krijgsmachtdelen, korpsen, 
regimenten en eenheden. We moeten ons daarbij wel realiseren dat het vormen van een 
militair karakter een voortdurende inspanning vergt die moet zijn gebaseerd op 
krachtig leiderschap gesteund door een helder en krachtig beleid. 
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Na te hebben vastgesteld wat de samenstellende delen van de militaire praktijk zijn, 
welke elementen de aantrekkingskracht van die praktijk vormen en welke deugden het 
plezier in de praktijk verhogen en bijdragen aan het nastreven van voortreffelijkheid, 
heb ik door middel van interviews getoetst in hoeverre mijn bevindingen in de praktijk 
worden gesteund. Om de betrouwbaarheid van mijn toetsing te vergroten heb ik behalve 
militairen ook personen geïnterviewd die werkzaam waren in de gezondheidszorg en 
als gemeente ambtenaar. De uitkomsten van deze interviews gaven aan dat mijn 
bevindingen door het veld worden onderschreven. 
 
Voorts stelt MacIntyre dat een praktijk niet kan voortbestaan zonder de steun van een 
institutie. De institutie voorziet de praktijk van een context, verschaft benodigde 
middelen en stelt de continuïteit veilig. Voor de ontplooiing van militaire activiteiten 
vormt de krijgsmacht de geëigende institutie. De krijgsmacht geeft inhoud en vorm aan 
het doel van militaire activiteiten. De institutie verschaft haar leden ook beloning. In 
algemene termen gaat het hierbij om geld, macht en status. Dit geldt ook voor de 
militaire institutie. De beloning die wordt verkregen door voor een institutie te werken, 
is niet dezelfde als het plezier dat wordt verworven door deel te nemen in een praktijk.  
Dit onderscheid kan uitgroeien tot een kloof; de institutionele doeleinden raken los van 
de behoeften van de praktijk. Het instrumentele gedachtegoed van managers en 
institutionele belangen krijgen de overhand, veelal ten koste van de praktijk en het 
daarin verankerde streven naar kwaliteit. Deze ontwikkeling kan in een aantal branches 
in de Nederlandse samenleving worden opgemerkt, bijvoorbeeld in het onderwijs, de 
gezondheidszorg en ook in de krijgsmacht. In een instrumentele benadering vormen 
regels het favoriete middel activiteiten te sturen; niet alleen in praktische zin, maar ook 
in moreel opzicht. Een gedragscode is zo’n instrument waarmee de institutie tracht 
moreel correct gedrag te bevorderen. Vergelijking van de huidige militaire gedragscode 
met het door mij ontwikkelde deugdethische raamwerk laat zien dat het raamwerk 
meer wordt gedragen door het veld en beter is afgestemd op de militaire praktijk dan de 
huidige gedragscode. Een internationale vergelijking (met F, de BRD, het VK en de US) 
verleent deze conclusie extra gewicht. 
 
Het laatste punt dat MacIntyre aan de orde stelt, betreft  de noodzaak dat de deugden 
van een praktijk zijn verankerd in de bredere morele tradities. De duurzame kenmerken 
van de Nederlandse traditie zijn: vrijheid en gelijkheid; politieke en religieuze 
verdraagzaamheid; gemeenschapzin en solidariteit, zowel in intern gerichte als in 
internationale zin. Het militaire deugdethische raamwerk dat ik heb ontwikkeld past 
goed in deze tradities. Maar het perspectief vanuit de traditie vestigt de aandacht op nog 
een zaak die in dit verband aan de orde moet worden gesteld en dat is de wijze waarop 
vorm en inhoud wordt gegeven aan de band tussen de maatschappij en haar militairen. 
Hoe verzoenen we de belangen van de staat met het risico dat militairen lopen om 
gewond te raken of zelfs te sneuvelen in conflicten waarin ze zelf geen enkel direct 
belang hebben? Deze band kan niet worden vastgelegd in een arbeidscontract, maar 
vergt een verbond. Een verbond bindt de gemeenschap en de individuele leden daarvan 
over een lange preiode, zelfs eeuwen, en impliceert een sterke morele verplichting zelfs 
in moeilijke tijden en ten opzichte van een dreigend gevaar. Een verbond vormt een 
duurzame relatie die is gebaseerd op wederzijds vertrouwen. Dit houdt in dat de 
partijen van het verbond zich bewust moeten zijn van de verantwoordelijkheid die het 
verbond met zich meebrengt. Het heeft er alle schijn van dat dit bewustzijn in Nederland 
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ontbreekt. Erkenning van de krijgsmacht als praktijk zou dat bewustzijn kunnen 
verbeteren. 
 
Al met al zijn er goede argumenten die de conclusie rechtvaardigen dat de 
deugdethische theorie zoals deze door Alasdair MacIntyre is ontvouwd in zijn boek 
‘After Virtue’ zich uitstekend leent om een deugdethisch raamwerk te ontwikkelen dat is 
afgestemd op de (militaire) praktijk die het beoogt te steunen. Toepassing van dit 
raamwerk zou een aantal actuele problemen binnen de Nederlandse krijgsmacht 
kunnen wegnemen en zou ook kunnen bijdragen in een bredere verankering van de 
krijgsmacht in de maatschappij.  
  
xv 
 
xvi 
 
 
1 
 
Chapter1 : introduction.  
 
Preface. 
1.1.  War is a phenomenon as old as the human race and there is no real prospect that 
the phenomenon of war will become obsolete. 1 Conflicts go with being human and war 
is the ultimate conflict, as it involves the wilful killing of fellow humans. 2 War and 
violence have many causes and manifestations.3 As a result it is the subject of a vast 
quantity of explanations, analysis and controversy. The concept of war as a phenomenon 
can for example be explained in strategic, economic, sociological, legal and many other 
terms. It is my purpose to investigate war from an ethical point of view: the ethics of war 
as a social practice; the ethics of those that wage war.4 In the last decades however, the 
face of war has changed considerable. These changes do not only pertain to strategy, 
tactics and implements of war, but also to its moral aspects. There are many 
developments that have an impact  on the moral aspect of war.  For the sake of brevity I 
will limit a discussion of these developments to three main features which have direct 
moral consequences: just war, new war and the density and intensity of war. 
 
Just war. 
1.2.1.  For good reasons war is considered an anomaly, a disruption of the normal 
peaceful cooperation between nations and peoples. War involves violence, destruction 
and killing and is rightly considered a means of last resort. Therefore the  decision to go 
to war is a profound one, a decision that is not taken lightly and needs careful 
justification; both to the international community and the own nation. The need for 
justification of war gave rise to the development of the tradition of just war. This 
tradition aims also to limit the occurrence of war and to lighten the consequences of 
war. This long tradition resulted in a collection of modern laws. However, war is a 
complex and dynamic phenomenon and the law  is always slow to catch up with actual 
developments.  Furthermore the law covers only those issues that are incorporated in 
the law itself and these are never complete. Therefore the moral tradition of just war is 
still a powerful argument in discussions about morality and war.5  
 
This is especially the case in western democratic and constitutional states. Nowadays 
these states are not involved in wars in which the survival of the own nation state is at 
                                                          
1 Arendt, H. (1970). On violence. San Diego, Harcourt, Brace & Company. P5 ‘The chief reason warfare is 
still with us is neither a secret death wish of the human species nor an irrepressible instinct of 
aggression…but the simple fact that no substitute for this final arbiter in international (and intra-national) 
affairs has yet appeared on the political scene.’(Italics added by the author). 
2 See also Hobbes, T. (1996). Leviathan. Oxford, University Press. P 59 ‘…men are continually in 
competition for honour and dignity … and consequently amongst men there arises on that ground envy, 
hatred and finally war…’ and P 85-86 ‘…during time that men live without a common power to keep them 
all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war…’. 
3 The Dutch philosopher Hans Achterhuis identifies six possible causes of violent conflicts: violence as a 
rational option to solve problems; mimetically desire, emulation; tension between morals and politics 
which results in the legitimisation of violence;  lack of recognition as an equal partner; an aggressive 
human nature as the result of a evolutionary and genetically development; the ‘we’ and ‘they’ antithesis. 
See Achterhuis, H. (2008). Met alle geweld. Rotterdam, Lemniscaat. 
4 Walzer, M. (1977). Just and unjust wars. New York, Basic books. P 30 ‘Hence the peculiar horror of war: 
it is a social practice in which force is used by and against men as loyal or constrained members of states 
and not as individuals who choose their own enterprises and activities.’ 
5 Ibid, P 288: ‘Moral argument is especially important in wartime because the laws of war are radically 
incomplete.’  
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stake. Presently these states participate in war in order to: restore the international rule 
of law, to stop the horror of extreme internal strife and lately even to achieve a regime 
change.6 The governments of these states that want to participate in war have to 
convince the international community and their citizens that they made a right decision, 
even when there is no direct danger to the own state. They have to convince their 
constituency of the necessity to go to war, or face the danger of being ousted in the next 
elections. And they have to convince the  people that will have to pay the price in 
reduced prosperity, increased taxes and relatives killed or maimed.  However, as the 
survival of the nation state is not at stake, there remain in fact only a few arguments to 
go to war. Although these arguments may fit well in the  standard ‘state criterion’, they 
do not necessarily  have any public credibility or support. Often there is only one 
credible public justification and that is morality. In this claim on a moral obligation to go 
to war, the tradition of just war plays a significant role, both in the moral justification of 
the cause for which we go to war, and - also as a consequence thereof -  in the 
justification of the morally responsible way in which we will conduct the war. What this 
implies requires a short introduction of the main tenets of the tradition of just war. 
 
1.2.2.  Morality and war, as embedded in the tradition of just war, is based on two 
aspects: the legitimacy of war as such and the actual conduct of the war: the first kind of 
judgement is adjectival in character: we say that a war is just or unjust. ‘The second is 
adverbial: we say that a war is being fought justly or unjustly. Medieval writers made the 
difference a matter of prepositions, distinguishing jus ad bellum, the justice of war, from 
jus in bello, justice in war. Jus ad bellum requires us to make judgements about 
aggression and self-defence; jus in bello about the observation or violation of the 
customary and positive rules of engagement. The two sorts of judgement are logically 
independent.’7 But although there is no logical relation between jus ad bellum en jus in 
bello, there is still a political relation. When a state claims the moral high ground in its 
justification to go to war, it cannot at the same time allow an immoral conduct of the 
war, as this would undermine its moral presumptions; even - if not especially - in the 
face of an enemy that does not endorse the tradition of just war.  
 
1.2.3.  The political relation between the just cause of the war and the just conduct of the 
war is also a matter of the perception of war; both in the international and national 
political community and by the wider public. In this respect media play an important 
role.  Even when the public support of a war is already weak, and there are serious 
misgivings on the morality and legitimacy of participating in an armed conflict, media 
can - and often do  -make the difference. Nowadays war is covered by all kind of media, 
even including video footage by those who actually participate in the fighting or by 
accidental bystanders.8 Events on the battlefield may reach the wider public in a matter 
                                                          
6 There is still some controversy about the claim that regime change is a legitimate cause for war. See the 
introduction to the 2006 4th edition of Walzer, M. (1977). Just and unjust wars. New York, Basic books. P x: 
“It isn't only aggressiveness, then but also the murderousness that makes a political regime a legitimate 
candidate for forcible transformation. Still, the primary aim of the intervention is to stop the killing: 
regime change follows from that purpose.”  
7 Ibid, P 21. 
8 On November 19th 2005 US marines killed 15 civilians. The tragedy of Haditha may have been left at that 
- just another statistic of "war-torn" Iraq - a place too dangerous to be reported properly by journalists. 
The US command at that time reported an incident at Haditha, but did not refer to any civilian casualties. 
The following day a self-styled local journalist and human-rights activist, Taher Thabet al-Hadithi, got his 
video camera out and filmed scenes in which were shown the  bodies of women and children, still in their 
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of days, even hours. For this reason a cover up of war crimes is seldom effective, 
although the incentive to try to do so is high. Media coverage of ‘bloody events’ or even 
war crimes committed, may well trigger public outrage. This public outrage could 
undermine public and political support  for the war and even lead to an early end of the 
commitment.  
 
1.2.4.  In short, the concept of Just War - both Ad Bellum and In Bello - has become an 
even more important issue than it already used to be. And because of this increased 
interest in the appropriate conduct of war - by the political community and public  
opinion - an extra moral weight is put on the shoulders of those who wage war. This 
weight is added to the personal moral misgivings a soldier may have about the conduct 
of the war and is further increased by the direct visibility in the media coverage of the 
conduct of the war.  
 
New war. 
1.3.1.   War as a human activity, a social practice, is characterized by the repetitious use 
of coherent patterns, methods and rules. But as human social patterns are not static, war 
is also subject to the internal dynamics of social behaviour: patterns change, other 
methods are introduced and new rules develop. Each era has its own kind of war and in 
the present time we have to deal with modern types of warfare. The overall feature of 
these modern wars is asymmetry. After the fall of the Soviet bloc and faced with the 
overwhelming military force of western nations, especially the United States, a new type 
of warfare has started to develop. Some characteristics of this new kind of asymmetric 
warfare  are: focus on the rear of the opponent instead of on the front, including 
psychological warfare exploiting the openness of western societies as a vulnerability; 
using a non-national or transnational base like ethnicity or religion instead of a 
geographical powerbase; direct attack of the cultural base of a nation, e.g. by drugs 
trafficking, radicalizing malcontents, infiltrating institutions and conducting cyber 
attacks on the financial systems, etc.9 But apart from this very broad characterization  of 
this new kind of warfare, we still lack a proper theory that covers all aspects of this type 
of warfare and how to cope with it. Several attempts have been made to develop a 
common theoretical framework of these new wars, but no consensus is reached yet.10 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
nightclothes, apparently shot in their own homes; interior walls and ceilings peppered with bullet holes; 
bloodstains on the floor. Some time later, Mr Hadithi's tape was passed to the US newsmagazine Time, 
which published an account based on the footage. Source: Asser, M. (2008). “ What happened at Haditha?” 
BBC news. London. Another example is the documentary ‘Fokking Hell’ by the Dutch journalist Peter ter 
Velden, which is largely  based on video footage shot by Dutch soldiers serving in the province of Uruzgan 
in central Afghanistan. Velden, ter, P. (2010). Fokking Hell. The Netherlands, Nederlandse Omroep 
Stichting. 
9 See Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui  (2002). Unrestricted Warfare. Los Angeles, Pan American Publishing 
Company. The authors, both colonels in the Chinese peoples liberation Army, sketch an extensive if rather 
dismal picture of these kind of ‘asymmetric’ attacks. 
10 See i.e. Smith, R. (2008). The utility of force. New York, Vintage Books, in which general Rupert Smith 
introduces the concept of ‘war amongst the people’. Another author is Robb, J. (2007). Brave new war. 
Hoboken, New Jersey, John Wiley & sons, who claims a role for globalization and coined the term ‘open 
source war’. Yet another term is ‘hybrid warfare’ to indicate the blurring distinction between military and 
police action and regular and irregular warfare; see Wilkie, R. (2009). "Hybrid warfare." Air and Space 
Power journal 23(4): P 13-18 and Hoffman, F. G. (2007). Conflict in 21st century: the rise of hybrid wars. 
Arlington, Potomac institute for policy studies. 
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However these  ‘new’ wars11 share one common factor which is that the ‘new’ 
belligerents : ‘…deliberately violate all the conventions of ‘old’ war, as well as the new 
body of human rights legislation that has been built up since World War II.’12  These new 
wars share a total disregard of the tradition of just war and the international and 
humanitarian laws.13  
 
1.3.2.  And these ‘new’ wars are no small affairs. Despite the fact that these ‘new’ wars 
are sometimes labelled as  ‘limited’ conflicts, the amount of casualties in such conflicts 
can be appalling. The intrastate ethnic conflict in 1994 in Rwanda cost the lives of 
approximately 800.000 people14. Estimates as to the number of people killed in the 
armed conflicts endemic to the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the last 20 years 
vary from 900.000 to 5.500.000. A ‘safe’ guess is that this Congolese intrastate and 
trans-national conflict cost 3 million victims of which 1 million were killed by violence 
and 2 million succumbed to malnutrition and disease.15 But also in Europe in the Balkan 
trans-national wars raged from 1991 to 1996 and despite extensive UN commitment a 
sordid number of approximately 110.000 people were killed. The 2003 war in Iraq cost 
an estimated 35.000 coalition casualties and some 200.000 Iraqi civilian casualties, after 
President Bush on May 1st 2003 made his ‘Mission Accomplished’ speech in which he 
declared that major combat operations in Iraq had ended.16  The Afghan war resulted - 
from its start in 2001 until the end of 2010 - in approximately 15.000 casualties suffered 
by the coalition forces, an estimated 30.000 insurgents killed or captured and some 
25.000 civilian casualties.  The after-effects in territories laid to waste by herbicides, 
poisonous gas, landmines and unexploded ordnances still cause casualties long after the 
hostilities ended.17 The violent activities of international terrorist networks, pirates and 
plain criminally inspired narcotics entrepreneurs add further complications to this 
already extremely complex picture of violence and war in which the only rule seems to 
be: ‘no rules’. 
 
1.3.3.   So, while constitutional states aim at waging war in accordance within the 
tradition of just war, they are mostly faced with opponents who do not even pay lip 
service to the rule of law. This fact, this asymmetry,  of course creates an extra moral 
pressure on the soldiers who face these totally ruthless fighters. They often experience 
this unbalance as fighting an enemy with one hand (or sometimes even two hands) tied 
behind their back.18 This unbalance is sometimes enhanced by the complications that 
result from being part of an international military involvement.  
                                                          
11 This term ‘new war’ is coined by Kaldor, M. (2005). "Old wars, cold wars, new wars and the war on 
terror." International politics 42(4): 491-493.  
12 Ibid. 
13 Ignatieff, M. (1997). The warrior's honor: ethnic war and the modern conscience. New York, Henry Holt 
and Cy.  P6: ‘War used to be fought by soldiers; it is now fought by irregulars. This may be one reason why 
postmodern war is so savage, why war crimes and atrocities are now integral to the very prosecution of 
war.’ 
14 van der Veen, R. (2004). Afrika. Van de koude oorlog naar de 21e eeuw. Amsterdam, KIT Publisher. P 
201-203 
15 Ibid, P 232 
16 Burnham G., L. R., Doocy S., Roberts L., (2006). "Mortality before and after the 2003 invasion of Iraq: a 
cross-sectional cluster sample survey." The Lancet 368 (9545): 8.  
17 Tyner, J. A. (2010). Military legacies: a world made by war. New York, Routledge. 
18 This characterization pertains most strongly to land warfare, but not exclusively. Dutch Naval 
commanders during the 1991 Gulf war were required to call the Minister of Defence in person before 
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1.3.4.   The UN is authorized by the international community and by international law to 
apply military force. 19 Under chapter VII of the charter the UN are authorized to conduct 
peace-enforcement operations and under chapter VI peace-keeping operations can be 
mounted. 20 However,  the UN depend on the member states to provide the military 
means necessary. The deployment of UN forces has created a new complication to the 
already complex character of war. UN peace-keeping troops are supposed to be 
impartial and even-handed. This is not always an easy task for the troops involved; a 
difficulty that is enhanced by unappreciative belligerents. Nevertheless the UN 
succeeded in creating an international touchstone for the legitimacy of the 
(inter)national use of violence. The UN Security Council has the power to condemn or to 
condone the use of violence. And although the UN lack the means to enforce the 
resolutions promulgated by the Security Council, these carry authority. As a result 
nations seek approval of the council in case of international use of violence. However, 
this development has only limited value as also non-state parties have made their 
violent appearance on the international stage and the UN Security Council holds no 
(formal nor material) jurisdiction over these non-state actors.  Consequently UN 
military operations suffer from a number of shortcomings. Many of these shortcomings 
have a direct impact on the military capabilities and feasibilities. Which nations are 
prepared to contribute a contingent to the international force? And although the UN can 
state what is necessary in order to be able to conduct a successful campaign, ultimately 
the campaign has to be conducted with the assets which are contributed by the nations 
and within the nations’ political constraints that are imposed. The assets pertain to the 
number of troops and equipment as well as to the international composition of the force. 
The constraints depend on the chapter under which the operation is mounted and the 
exact political mandate. The mandate and the ensuing  Rules Of Engagement (ROE)21 can 
seriously limit military options. More limitations can occur because of caveats by nations 
that contribute to the force. Furthermore, the limitations involved  and the operational 
options that are open to the UN force are well known to their opponents and they can 
orchestrate their resistance accordingly. These facts and circumstances create a 
problematic context for UN, or UN condoned international,  military operations.  
 
1.3.5.   In short, because of the asymmetric attitude of the belligerent parties regarding 
the applications of rules, ‘new’ wars create a morally very difficult context for waging 
war. This problematic context could be further enhanced by  the shortcomings that are 
often the case in an international intervention, such as: an inadequate force, an 
insufficient mandate, and  a lacking unity of command and effort. 
  
The density of war. 
1.4.1.  Apart from the very different opponents who face each other in ‘new’ wars there 
are other features that characterize this type of war.  Fighting in ‘new’ wars is not as 
dense as in old wars. In old wars the armed forces involved conducted military 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
taking operational decisions. See: de Wijk, R. (1998). Vechten met een hand op de rug? 
Vredesondersteuning in escalerende conflicten. Clingendael notities. Den Haag,: 61. P 33. 
19 Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice (1985), United Nations, 
Department of Public Information. P 80. 
20 Ibid. 
21 For every mission a set of Rules Of Engagement is established which reflects the mandate under which a 
mission is executed and addresses the limitations to the violence that is allowed in a number of specified 
‘standard’ cases. See: Army, R. N. (1996). Military doctrine. The Hague, Army staff. P 97. 
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operations in defined combat zones with large units and formations that fought their 
campaigns and battles in close coordination, which resulted in a dense kind of warfare.  
‘New’ wars , which are mainly land wars, do not involve set battles of armed hosts; 
basically this type of war is fought in a large number of small fights often spread over a 
large territory. Consequently these wars are fought in a large number of relatively small 
engagements. The majority of these armed contacts take place at the level of small units: 
platoons and groups (sometimes even on a smaller scale). The relatively small number 
of troops involved in the operation, the often large size of the area of operations and the 
‘modus operandi’ by the opponents prohibit large scale combat operations. In ‘old’ wars 
military units were deployed and manoeuvred in relatively compact formations. Units 
were visibly and often even physically in touch with each other and there were always 
officers present to lead units at all levels. Although an operation may be conducted at 
battalion level, in ‘new’ wars soldiers will not see a battalion, mostly not even a 
company; at the most they will see their own platoon.22 This means that small unit 
leaders and even mere individual members of small units carry responsibilities that are 
substantial larger then they used to be in ‘old’ wars. This responsibility is not limited to 
their capability to execute their mission skilfully, independently and self reliant, but also 
to independently upholding their moral standards. In ‘new’ wars small units are 
dispersed over relatively large areas with no direct physical, visual or other contact with 
other units or the higher echelon. As a result supervision by  senior officers is often 
missing and relatively large responsibilities are delegated to junior leaders. 
  
1.4.2.  Another feature of the reduced density of new war is  the variety in the kind of 
armed confrontation. It can be a  well set ambush, involving a  large number of fighters. 
But it can also be a relatively small affair of  a pot-shot by a hidden gunman.23 It can be a 
herdsman waving in the field who can pick up a rifle and shoot at the soldier once he 
turns his back. Sometimes ‘child soldiers’ are employed. Is the pedlar just trying to make 
a living, or is it a suicide bomber on the prowl? It is often impossible to distinguish a 
fighter from a peaceful member of the local society. Furthermore the fighting is not 
continuous. Heavy fighting alternates with relatively peaceful periods. These 
circumstances can create anxiety, uncertainty and stress for the soldiers involved in 
these operations. This anxiety is often enhanced by the fact that these ‘new’ wars are 
fought far away from their homes in rough terrain, an exhausting climate and amidst 
foreign strange peoples whose language they do not speak. In short, soldiers deployed in 
‘new’ wars with low density and varying intensity face new challenges. They must rely 
on themselves, or at best the small unit of which they are a member, to cope with the 
problems and anxieties of fighting. A kind of fighting in large areas that is unpredictable 
                                                          
22 A Dutch armoured infantry battalion had in the ‘old’ war on average an area of responsibility (AOR) 
with a front of  approximately 5 kilometres and a depth of 8 kilometres (= 40 square kilometres). The 
strength of the battalion counted on average 900 PAX and some 110 armoured vehicles. See: Koninklijke 
Landmacht, Ed. (1986). Voorschrift 2-1386: Gevechtshandleiding. Den Haag, Koninklijke Landmacht and 
Commando Opleidingen Koninklijke Landmacht, Ed. (1990). VS 2-217: het manoeuvrebataljon. Den Haag, 
Koninklijke Landmacht, par. 3126. Nowadays a similar unit, the Battle Group of the Dutch Task Force 
Uruzgan, numbers approximately 700 PAX and 40 armoured vehicles (as well as an array of soft top 
vehicles) and has an effective AOR of approximately 800 square kilometres. 
23 There are lots of books, newspaper articles, etc. that describe the nature of ‘new’ war fighting. Some of 
the more extreme stories are published in Filkins, D. (2008). The forever war. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 
P128, 129 and Junger, S. (2010). War. London, Fourth Estate, P63, 254-260. See also, Barnes, C. and 
Leavitt, K. (September 2010). "Moral disengagements. When will good soldiers do bad things?" Military 
Review 2010 (special edition: ethics reader): P 46-51. Another example is the Iraq, U. N. A. M. I. (2006). 
Human rights Report,1 may - 30 June 2006. Baghdad, United Nations Organization: P 22. 
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in intensity, frequency  and location. Fighting against an enemy who is unpredictable in 
its manifestation and not constrained by any rules. These characteristics create 
additional moral pressures and vulnerabilities.  
 
Inferred effects.  
1.5.1.  When soldiers from western democratic states get involved in these kinds of ‘new’ 
wars, pressures are apt to arise. First of all their expeditionary deployment is - at least 
partially - based on the notion of a just war and the moral superiority this entails: ‘We 
participate in this operation for the sake of restoring the (international) rule of law and 
make the world a better place to live in.’ This argument is not only valid at the political 
and institutional level but is also relevant as a moral justification for the individual 
soldiers and the support they receive from their relatives and friends at home.24 But in a 
warzone it is sometimes very difficult to keep track of this ideal.25 This difficulty could 
be enhanced by doubts as to the relevance of the moral arguments for participating in a 
war, and if the fighting is not merely about economic interests and plain power broking.  
 
1.5.2.  Secondly, the pressure this fact entails could be added to because their conduct in 
war is often under strict scrutiny. Supervision, not only by the Ministry of Defence in 
order to ensure that moral standards are strictly upheld, but also by other stakeholders, 
is perfectly legitimate. Some ‘opens source’ scrutiny however is often based on 
commercial (public or private)  considerations and easily overlooks the sometimes very 
difficult circumstances under which the soldiers have to operate.26 This kind of 
extensive media coverage may well add to the pressures. Soldiers could feel 
misunderstood and not properly supported;   sentiments that could affect their 
motivation and eventually their moral standards. 
 
1.5.3.  Participating in ‘new’ wars adds to these pressures and this creates a third source 
of tension. For many soldiers it is certainly a ‘clash of civilisations’ 27,  as these soldiers 
come from a background in which the rule of law is not an anomaly but a cornerstone of 
society, in which men and women are basically equal and in which people generally are 
literate. They come from a society in which violence is not only illegal but also morally 
rejected unless within the bounds of police or military use. On the battlefields of ‘new’ 
war these soldiers are confronted with almost every form of brutality and horror and 
sometimes on a scale which does not in anyway fit into their frame of reference. The 
harsh circumstances,  the brutal fighting and the often lacking local support, may well 
increase the risk of ‘retaliating in kind’ and a slipping of moral standards. 28 
                                                          
24 Holmes, R. (1985). Acts of war. London, Wellington house, P 270-290. 
25 Rielly, R. (2010). "The inclination for war crimes." Military Review 2010 (special edition: ethics reader): 
52-58. 
26 On January 12th 2008 two Dutch soldiers were killed and one soldier seriously wounded by friendly fire. 
This incident was investigated by the military judicial. They concluded that the incident was the result of 
an unhappy conjunction of circumstances; there was no question of reproachable negligence. 
Nevertheless the parents of the deceased soldiers filed a complaint against two fellow soldiers (a NCO and 
an officer). The complaint was eventually rejected by the court. See: Ed. (2008). Onderzoek naar dood 
militairen door eigen vuur. NRC. Rotterdam; Ed. (2010). "Onderzoek doden door eigen vuur." NRC and Ed. 
(2010). Strafvervolging in "eigen vuur"- incident afgewezen. Rechtennieuws.nl, Gerechtshof Arnhem. 
Retrieved December 4, 2010, from http://rechtennieuws.nl/30757/strafvervolging.html. 
27 Huntington, S. P. (1996). The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order. New York, Simon & 
Schuster. 
28 One of the incidents that attracted  widespread attention, was the Haditha massacre in which 24 Iraqi 
men, women and children were killed by a group of United States Marines on November 19, 2006. It has 
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1.5.4.  Isolation may well be a fourth factor that adds to the already increased pressure.   
The absence of their habitual cultural and moral background in their everyday 
operations could erode - albeit slowly - their values and normative framework. The 
variety in the nature and intensity of armed confrontations  add further to anxiety and 
stress. The vulnerability for this process is enhanced by deployment in small groups and 
in isolated places. In these small and isolated units supervision, moral support and when 
necessary correction by superior officers are often lacking. Large responsibilities are 
shared by few and mutual moral support could be failing  and a lowering of moral 
standards could be the result.29 
 
1.5.5.  So while soldiers are confronted with circumstances in which morality could well 
be undermined, there is also a strong necessity to uphold moral standards. Most of all in 
order to maintain the moral sanity of the soldiers involved. In order to cope with the 
cruelties on the battlefield it is a first prerequisite not to retaliate in kind and to 
participate in committing similar cruelties. These kind of retaliatory actions do not only 
constitute a criminal breach of military law, but also create a burden to which eventually 
morality - if not the soldier in person - will succumb.30 But also will the intervening force 
lose its moral high ground if it is known that its members indulge in savagery and 
cruelties. If the intervening force would allow the rule of law to be ignored, it would 
place itself outside the community of civilized nations.31 The intervening force would 
also lose much of its credibility and public support, both in the warzone and in the 
international and national context. Therefore maintaining a high moral standard is 
important, both from an institutional and from an individual point of view. How to 
secure these moral standards on both the individual and the institutional level is the 
subject of this thesis. 
 
Definitions and delimitations 
1.6.1.  Within the context of this thesis I will focus on the moral aspects of the actions of 
those who wage war, both on an individual as on an institutional level. I will aim my 
investigation on soldiers (combatants) who participate in war as members of an 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
been alleged that the killings were retribution for the attack on a convoy of Marines with an improvised 
explosive device that killed Lance Corporal Miguel Terrazas. On December 21, 2006, eight Marines from 
3rd Battalion, 1st Marines were charged in connection with the incident. As of June, 2008, charges against 
seven of the eight Marines had been dropped. On October 3, 2007, the Article 32 hearing investigating 
officer recommended that Staff Sgt Frank Wuterich be tried for negligent homicide in deaths of two 
women and five children, and that charges of murder be dropped. See, Knickmeyer, E. (2006). In Haditha, 
memories of a massacre. The Washington Post. Washington, The Washington Post Company and 
Wikipedia, t. f. e. (2008) Haditha killings retrieved November 28, 2010 from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haditha. 
29 Another telling example of slipping of moral norms is the  so called Somalia Affair. In 1993 a Somali 
teenager  was brutally beaten to death by two Canadian soldiers participating in humanitarian efforts in 
Somalia. The soldiers in question were posted at a relatively  isolated outpost and the Canadian troops in 
Somalia had until then not suffered any casualties or extreme stress. The only provocation that the 
Canadians on that base faced, was petty theft from their compound.  See: Winslow, D. J. (2002). The 
parliamentary inquiry into the Canadian peace mission in Somalia. Strengthening Parliamentary Oversight 
of International Military Cooperation and Institutions. Brussels, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control 
of Armed Forces (DCAF): P 3-5. 
30 French, S. E. (2003). The code of the warrior: exploring warrior values past and present. Oxford, 
Rowman and Littlefield. P 4-7 and P 232-241. 
31 Bellamy, A. J. (2004). "Motives, outcomes, intent and the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention." 
Journal of military ethics 3(3): P 216-232. 
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international intervention force.32  I reserve the term ‘soldier’ for combatants, members 
of an international intervention force that come from constitutional democratic nation 
states. When I use this term soldier I mean all kind of military personnel, male or female, 
officers and other ranks and of all services.  ‘Soldiers’ are lawful combatants. 
 
1.6.2.  In the context of this thesis I use the term war as a generic concept that includes 
any type of armed conflict: intra-national, transnational and international, including 
peacekeeping operations, non combatant evacuation operations, humanitarian 
interventions, etc. This implies that I will focus my investigations on these primarily 
operational tasks for the military.   
 
1.6.3.  I will not delve into the legal definitions of combatant, unlawful combatant  and 
non-combatant or privileged belligerent and unprivileged belligerent and all its 
ramifications.33 I will reserve the generic term of ‘fighter’ for all those  who oppose  
‘soldiers’ by violent means.  
 
1.6.4.  For practical reasons my primary frame of reference are the Dutch armed forces 
and their wider context in Dutch society. However, I will refer to the situation in other 
western constitutional democratic nations whenever this seems appropriate to provide 
a clearer view on the issues I address. 
 
1.6.5.  I will base my investigation on virtue ethics. I will justify my choice, but I will not 
elaborate on other ethical theories. I will use elements of these other theories, only to 
clarify and explain positions in my virtue ethical approach.  
 
Maintaining moral standards. 
1.7.  My assumption is that virtue ethics can provide a strong foundation for military 
moral standards and will add to the possibility to secure these standards even in the face 
of serious challenges. First of all because virtues are attainable for all soldiers and can be 
further developed and maintained by education, training and living up to exemplary 
fellow humans. A virtuous attitude is relevant for all members of the armed forces, not 
only officers. Furthermore, such virtues can be personalized to fit an individual’s 
personality and character. A person’s character involves more than reason, but entails 
background, emotional make up, ideas and intuitions and forms a relatively stable part 
of the psychology of a person as a whole. Virtues embedded in character share that 
stability and therefore are less liable to erosion. In the second place virtue ethics is 
closely connected to the concept of a practice in which to acquire and demonstrate the 
relevant virtues. This provides a context to develop a morality that is especially suited to 
the military practice and the demands this practice entails. A set of morals that is easily 
recognized as being relevant to military practice is more readily accepted and 
                                                          
32 Formally only the members of armed forces have the legal status of combatant as far as they are not 
part of the medical corps or chaplain. All other are non-combatants. Combatants heave the legal right to 
participate directly into the fighting if and only if they distinguish themselves from the civilian population 
by carrying their weapons openly and wear a uniform. Furthermore combatants must be organized, lead 
and subjected to a internal system of disciplinary law.  See: Landmacht, (2003). Landmacht Doctrine 
Publicatie II deel C, gevechtsoperaties tegen een irregulier optredende tegenstander. Den Haag, 
Landmachtstaf. P 461,462.  
33 For an extensive discussion on the definition of unlawful combatant, etc. see Otto, R. (2011). Targeted 
killings and international law. Heidelberg, Springer. P 234-243. 
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internalized, than an external set of rules. A third consideration is that virtue ethics aims 
at attaining excellence in participating in a practice while abiding by the rules of the 
practice in order to attain a goal. This goal is always also related to the others that 
participate in a practice. In this way virtue ethics is also well suited to military practice 
as excellence in handling the implements of war, abiding by the rules and close 
cooperation between soldiers are essential parts of the military practice. A conduct 
based on virtues enhances the overall quality of the practice and thus improves the life 
expectancy of soldiers on the battlefield. In short there are strong indications that virtue 
ethics is indeed especially suitable to develop, impose, support and maintain a military 
body of ethics. 
 
Research question 
1.8.1.  The central aim of this thesis is to develop the outline of a policy on how to apply 
virtue ethics in military practice in order to ensure that individual soldiers will uphold 
adequate moral standards in their actions in ‘new’ wars? The question is how to achieve 
this aim that provides both a sound theoretical foundation and practical relevance. My 
secondary aim is thereby to contribute to the body of theory on virtue-ethics and its 
practical application. My frame of reference will be the Dutch armed forces. The 
Netherlands are a traditional democratic constitutional state which frequently deploys 
its armed forces in expeditionary operations and as such the Dutch armed forces are 
well suited to serve as a vehicle for my research. My third aim consequently is to assist 
the Royal Netherlands Armed Forces - in which I served for 35 years - in upholding the 
moral character of their military personnel.  
 
1.8.2.  My hypothesis by which I aim to answer the central question is that the theory of 
virtue ethics as elaborated by Alasdair MacIntyre in his book ‘After Virtue’ provides a 
suitable instrument to identify, develop, instil and uphold the required moral standards in 
the military.34 This theory is based on an interconnectedness of practice, narrative and 
wider moral traditions and claims to provide an objective method to establish which 
virtues are relevant for a practice. The theory promises a clear understanding of a 
specific practice and those virtues that are relevant to that practice. It explains the role 
of institutional structures and the difference of these with the practice as such. The 
theory relates how narrative provides a method to imbue virtues and it entails the 
necessity of a close link with the  wider moral tradition in which the virtues specific to a 
practice are embedded. I will attempt to prove my hypothesis by developing a model for 
application of the virtue ethical theory of MacIntyre on military practice. However, in my 
attempt I will limit myself to the application of his theoretical framework only; I will not 
elaborate on his introductory considerations and arguments. The overall aim of my 
delving in applied ethics is to come forward with a model that provides tangible means 
to address practical issues in military ethics. As Aristotle in his endeavours, I want ‘to 
work within and to defend a method that is thoroughly committed to the data of human 
experience and accepts these as its limits.’35 
  
1.8.3.  As for my research I will critically analyze MacIntyre’s theory and add to that 
when deemed necessary.  Than I will  apply MacIntyre’s theory on Dutch military 
practice and identify relevant military virtues and how to imbibe these in the military . 
                                                          
34 MacIntyre, A. (2007). After Virtue. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. 
35 Nussbaum, M. (1986). The fragility of goodness. Cambridge, University Press. P 245. 
 
11 
 
In order to have a reality check on the concepts I develop, I will interview a number of 
veterans who have been in action and have suffered serious wounds and/or have been 
awarded honours for valour. In order to validate my findings I will also interview 
members of two other professions:  one with clear characteristics of a practice (medical 
care) and one with a less  apparent resemblance to a practice (municipal civil servants). 
Furthermore I will investigate what policies on military morality are presently 
developed in the Netherlands and a number of other democratic constitutional states in 
order to establish similarities and differences and whether these countries use virtue 
ethics for a theoretical background of their military morality. These other states will 
include the German Federal Republic, the United Kingdom, the United States and France. 
Finally I will investigate how a concept of specific military ethics could be part of the 
wider notion on ethics within Dutch society.  
 
Key issues and outline of the thesis 
1.9.1.  In will realize my ambition in the following steps. After this introduction (chapter 
1), I will elaborate on virtue ethics in general in chapter 2.36 I will also point out what 
are the main differences with an approach based on utilitarianism or deontology.  I will 
state the relevant differences and explain why these theories are less well suited as a 
foundation of military morality. Next I will critically analyze the theory of Alasdair 
MacIntyre. Criticisms will be discussed and if necessary elements of the theory of 
MacIntyre will be adapted.  
 
1.9.2.  In chapter 3, I will investigate war as a (military) practice. How can we define the 
practice of waging war and which are the constitutive elements of this practice? Than I 
will identify which are the internal goods related to this military practice. Hereafter - in 
chapter 4 - based on these constitutive elements I will apply the theory of MacIntyre and 
identify which virtues are relevant to soldiers in war as a practice. I will elaborate on 
these military virtues and how they can be substantiated.  
 
1.9.3.  Next, in chapter 5, I will explore the role of narrative and its potential as a means 
to implement a firm moral posture in the military.  I will discuss the role of narrative in 
developing and sustaining one’s personality and which are the implications for the 
development of a policy on moral education. In this discussion I will also look into the 
possible contribution of tradition to this effect. 
 
1.9.4.  I will also present and discuss - in chapter 6 - the results of the interviews with 
Dutch soldiers (and others) with operational experience. I will compare these findings 
with the results of interviews with employees from other professional organizations and 
backgrounds.  Based on these comparisons I will evaluate the virtues I identified in the 
preceding chapter.  
 
1.9.5.  In chapter 7, I will investigate the role of the military institution. I will elaborate 
on the nature of the institution with regard to the practice, and the benefits the 
                                                          
36 Aristoteles (2005). Ethica Nicomachea. Budel, Damon and van Tongeren, P. (2003). Deugdelijk leven. 
Amsterdam and Sun and Nussbaum, M. (1999). "Virtue Ethics: a misleading category." The journal of 
Ethics 3(3): 163-201. 
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institution provides for those who participate in the practice. How does the institution 
safeguard the moral standards of the practice. I will discuss the Dutch moral policy at 
the level of the Ministry of Defence. I will elaborate on the main product of this policy, 
the code of conduct. Next I will compare this Dutch code with other relevant 
international codes on military morality. As stated I will focus on the policies of the 
armed forces of the German Federal Republic, the United Kingdom, the United States and 
France. I will identify and discuss differences and similarities.  
 
1.9.6.  Chapter 8 will start with a review the role of the armed forces as an institution in 
society in general ; what exactly is the moral responsibility of the institution from the 
perspective of the morality of society as a whole. How can we define the moral 
responsibility of the armed forces on a institutional level ?  In addition, how does the 
general morality relate to the specific morality of the  military institution. I will continue 
by exploring  the relationship between on the one hand  the morality of the practice of 
war and the moral responsibilities of the armed forces as an institution and on the other 
hand the wider civil morality. I will explore similarities and differences and seek ways as 
how these differences can be explained and tension overcome. 
 
1.9.7.  Finally, in chapter 9, I will discuss the overall results of the research and provide 
an outline of a policy for the moral education in the military. Furthermore, some 
suggestions will be made on the implementation of such a policy and the necessary 
further research. 
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Chapter 2 : virtue ethics 
 
Introduction. 
2.1.   Soldiers of constitutional states are deployed to defend the values of life, property 
and peaceful social interactions of the people who sponsor them.  The moral cord 
between the people and their military implies that the military upholds the same set of 
core values, which reflects the people they serve. Violation of these values will strain this 
moral cord. This is one of the main reasons why the military has to conduct operations 
within the bounds of moral constraints.1 The other main reason why moral constraints 
are necessary is to protect the soldiers as moral agents. Throughout the course of their 
duty, they will face  fundamental moral choices. They must be able to bear that 
responsibility and to justify their actions, in order to reinforce themselves morally when 
engaged in their mission, which may well involve killing other people.2 There are other 
reasons as well, but the aforementioned already underpin the need for a specific military 
morality. However what kind of morality is required? Should this morality merely have a 
functional goal and aim at producing good soldiers who do their job efficiently and 
within the formal bounds of the rules that apply? On the other hand, should it aspire at 
creating self relying, morally responsible soldiers whose actions are governed by the 
rule of law and the ethical considerations these imply?   
 
Function and utilitarianism. 
2.2.  Wolfendale argues that there are two kinds of approaches to military ethics: a 
functional and an aspirational approach. 3 The functional approach, - which is in many 
aspects similar to the alleged Sword approach4 - sees ethics as a means to secure an 
efficient military force that fights by the book, and does not violate the laws of war. In 
this approach the outcome, the results, the consequences count. How these results are 
realized is of less importance. Developing self-reliant moral agents is not required. 
However, the laws of war and other rules are static and reality - especially the reality of 
war - is dynamic. Therefore laws and rules can never cover all possible situations.  Thus, 
rules require interpretation and this necessarily involves moral considerations. To 
deliberate on moral considerations requires moral agents who are able to determine 
whether a rule applies unequivocally or whether there is some leeway. This kind of 
ethical deliberation requires an approach of ethics and ethical training that goes beyond 
mere efficiency.5 In short, a strictly functional approach to military ethics has some 
serious drawbacks, as ethical deliberation boils down to a matter of efficiency. From the 
perspective of the functional approach in which the result counts, this approach could 
well be linked with a utilitarian or consequential theory of ethics, as in this ethical 
                                                          
1 Mosely, A. (2008). The ethical warrior: a classical liberal approach. Ethics education in the military. D. L. 
P. Robinson, N., Carrick,. Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing Limited: P 178, 179. 
2 French, S. E. (2003). The code of the warrior: exploring warrior values past and present. Oxford, 
Rowman and Littlefield. P 242:  ''Come back with your shield or on it. “The (Spartan) mothers who spoke 
this line were not heartless monsters. They wanted their children to return with their sense of self-respect 
still with them...To come back with their shields was to come back still feeling like warriors, not like 
cowards or murderers.” 
3 Wolfendale, J. (2008). What is the point of teaching ethics in the military? Ethics education in the 
military. Robinson, D.L.P. ; De Lee, N. and  Carrick, D. Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing Limited: P 161-173 
4 Toner, C. (2006). "Military Service as a Practice: Integrating the Sword and Shield Approaches to Military 
Ethics." Journal of Military Ethics 5(3): 183-200. P 184. 
5 French, S. E. (2003). The code of the warrior: exploring warrior values past and present. Oxford, 
Rowman and Littlefield. P 9. 
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theory the consequences of an act determine whether the act in itself is morally right or 
wrong.  In classical utilitarian thought, a morally right act promotes happiness for the 
greatest number of people. 6 The common good is the leading factor. Hitherto a lot has 
been said and written about the feasibility of utilitarianism and consequentialism. 
Criticisms are voiced about the (im)possibility to provide a simple unitary notion of 
what happiness entails. Questions are raised on how to foresee - let alone predict - the 
consequences of an act a priori. Other criticisms pertain to the absence of any 
consideration regarding the intention of individual actors and how to justify the sacrifice 
of the individual’s interest to the common good and how to define this common good. 
More criticism is aimed at how to apply a calculus solely based on reason, where other 
motives may play an important role as well.  These criticisms gain extra weight when 
applied in war. War is unpredictable in its exact course and consequences, and decisions 
in war are seldom based on rational and careful considerations only.  Therefore, it is no 
surprise for the comment of Berntsen that: ‘…there seems to be a general agreement 
that utilitarian ethics do not work well in the military setting.’7  
 
Aspiration and duty ethics. 
2.3.   The aspirational approach aims at creating independent moral agents who are 
responsible for their behaviour and effective fighters as well.8  The similar Shield 
approach argues that a sound ethical background is necessary to protect the soldier 
against the moral after-effects of his, in some respects brutal, handwork. 9  The emphasis 
on soldiers, who are also independent moral agents, seems to allow for a theory based 
on duty ethics (deontology), as in these theories the intention and autonomy of the 
agent play an important role. Kant is the founder and an important representative of 
duty ethics. In his theory, the morality of an act is determined by the intention of the 
autonomous individual to abide by the moral law under all circumstances and whose 
decisions are shaped by this categorical imperative.10 This categorical imperative is 
founded in reason and in reason only. This results in a very strict conception of duty and 
how one ought to act; no matter what the circumstances are. This rational strictness 
creates a very clear and strict conception of duty. However, it is precisely this 
unequivocal strictness that is the source of the main criticisms that are passed on duty 
ethics. This theory leaves little room for the role of emotions in our decisions how to act, 
as for the situational context in which we make our decisions. As stated before, war is a 
complex affair in which situational pressure can be extreme and can create an emotional 
‘roller coaster’. In war, soldiers will often be faced with a number of options, often all of 
them bad, and the difficulty arises out of the fact that it is seldom obvious which of these 
options is the ethically responsible correct one to follow.11 In other situations, a soldier 
                                                          
6 Mill., J. S. (1998). On liberty. Oxford, University Press. P 137,142. 
7 Berntsen, A. R., R. (2008). Ethics training in the Norwegian Defence forces. Ethics education in the 
military. Robinson P., De Lee, N., Carrick, D. Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing Limited: P 100. See also 
Norman, R. (1995). Ethics, Killing and War. Cambridge,  University Press: P 11 and Nathanson, S. (2010). 
Terrorism and the ethics of war. Cambridge, University Press: P 162-165. 
8 Wolfendale, J. (2008). What is the point of teaching ethics in the military? Ethics education in the 
military. Robinson, P., De Lee, N., Carrick, D. Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing Limited: P 171. 
9 French, S. E. (2003). The code of the warrior: exploring warrior values past and present. Oxford, 
Rowman and Littlefield. P 242:  See also: Toner, C. (2006). "Military Service as a Practice: Integrating the 
Sword and Shield Approaches to Military Ethics." Journal of Military Ethics 5(3): 183 – 200. P 184. 
10 Kant, I. (1996). Practical philosophy (Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals). Cambridge, University 
Press. P 82 and Ibid (Critique of practical reason) P 166-167 and P 69. 
11 Nussbaum, M. (1986). The fragility of goodness. Cambridge, University Press. P 14-47. 
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could be faced with a decision where he knows which is the ethically responsible option 
to choose, but where there is considerable (situational) pressure on him to choose 
another - not necessarily the ethically responsible - option.12 In these kind of 
circumstances it is hard - if not impossible - to apply the categorical rules of duty ethics. 
Not only because of the strictness of the rules, but also as there is often hardly any time 
for careful and rational deliberation that is exempt from emotions. However, apart from 
these practical considerations, there is also a theoretical problem. Duty ethics is 
categorical. The categorical rules of duty ethics apply always under any circumstance.13 
It is hard to see how these categorical rules (which imply that thou shall not kill) can be 
adapted to apply in war (where killing often is inevitable). The question is how to 
reconcile theoretically the categorical nature of duty ethics with the exceptional 
situation of war? Such reconciliation is still lacking.  In addition, there is another, 
practical, consideration as well. As I stated before, war is dynamic and the challenges of 
war can be extreme. Rules are static and do not always provide guidance on extreme 
situations. So also with duty ethics, the question remains whether a rule-based theory 
provides the kind of guidance that is required in the extremes of war. There is also 
another issue: doing ones duty suffices. In this respect one could argue that duty ethics 
aims at nothing more than an ethical minimum.14In other words, it seems that an 
aspirational approach based on duty ethics has serious drawbacks as well.15 On the 
other hand, it is obvious that all soldiers need ethical education and training, as all 
soldiers on all levels will be faced with ethical problematic situations in which they have 
to make their own decisions. The question is how to achieve this goal?  
 
Function and aspiration in virtue ethics. 
2.4.  In virtue ethics the central question is not ‘what ought I to do’, but ‘how should I 
live’. In this conception, one aims at ‘living a good life’, which means striving after 
excellence in the practice of living.  Striving for excellence makes the difference between 
man-as -he-happens -to-be, and man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realizes-his-potentiality, his 
natural goal (Telos).16 To make the best of your life is considered an inherent goal of 
living, of human nature.17 From this perspective virtue ethics could be described as a 
                                                          
12 Cullens, J. (2008). What ought one to do? Ethics education in the military. Robinson, P., De Lee, N., 
Carrick, D. Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing Limited: P 83. 
13 Kant, I. (1996). Practical philosophy. Cambridge, University Press. In his ‘Groundwork of the 
metaphysics of morals’. Kant introduced three formulations his categorical imperative: 1, (P 73) ‘Act as if 
the Maxim of your action were to become by your will a universal law of nature’; 2, (P 80) ’So act that you 
use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other always at the same time as an 
end, never merely as a means.’; 3, (P 84) ‘To act only so that the will could regard itself as at the same time 
giving universal law through its maxim.’ 
14 Oltshoorn, P. (2011). Military Ethics and Virtues. Abingdon, Routledge. P 5. 
15 Marlantes, K. (2011). What it is like to go to war. New York, Atlantic Monthly Press. P 60; ‘There is no 
foolproof formula for choosing the right side; there are only guidelines. The warrior operates in extreme 
zones. The more removed a situation like combat gets away from everyday life, the less applicable the 
guidelines get. This is why we must rely so much on character rather than rules when discussing and 
experiencing extreme conditions like war. 
16 MacIntyre, A. (2007). After Virtue. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 53 and P 148. 
17 Even Kant - who is critical of the notion of the virtues - supports this idea; albeit from a different 
perspective, see Kant, I. (1996). Practical philosophy. Cambridge, University Press. P 518 (The 
metaphysics of morals). ‘When it is said that it is in itself a duty for human beings to make his end the 
perfection belonging to a human being as such, this perfection must be put in what can result from his 
deeds, not in mere gifts for which he must be indebted to nature; for otherwise it would not be a duty. This 
duty can therefore consist only in cultivating one's faculties (or natural predispositions), the highest of 
which is understanding, the faculty of concepts and so too of those concepts that will have to do with duty. 
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‘Bildung Moral’.18 Living a good life also implies living in a society. So living excellently 
includes all others that participate in the practice of living together. Moreover, to excel 
in living a good life, requires abiding by the rules and intent of the social practice of 
living and acting together (Dikē). The quality, which enables one to participate in a 
practice in an excellent way, is called virtue (Aretē).19 This means that the concept of 
what it is to live a good life (Agathos) must precede the identification of the virtues. The 
same goes for the standards of excellence by which the virtues are defined. The virtues 
and the standards they imply, define the moral values of the practice.20 Morally 
responsible conduct confirms the goal of living the good life, immoral conduct (Kakos) 
opposes this inherent goal. Living virtuously is a matter of attitude rather than obeying 
to a rational set of imperatives or an inventory of consequences.21 This virtuous attitude 
can be acquired by education and contemplation; learning from role models (heroes) 
and imitating their behaviour; and exercise in participating in the practice: experience.22 
Eventually virtuous conduct thus becomes a habit.23 Acquiring this virtuous attitude 
thus requires active involvement in a practice. It is this involvement that leads the way 
to a morally responsible conduct, which is in accordance with the conception of the 
good, which is defined in a tradition of which the practice is a part. This morally 
appropriate conduct is not just based on reason, but also on emotion, intuition, 
experience and tradition. In this respect, virtue ethics is definitely different from the 
aforementioned rule based moral theories. Martha Nussbaum refutes this.24 She argues 
that virtue ethics do not deserve a separate theoretical status, as both deontology and 
utilitarianism see virtue, as well as the role of the agent as important elements in their 
theories. In her article, she furthermore argues that both deontology and utilitarianism 
aim at a universalizing theory, while virtue ethics do not. However, the latter argument 
determines the attractiveness of virtue ethics. In this concept, there is more room for 
different evaluations of the context in which the agent acts: what is the actual situation 
and what are the agent’s beliefs regarding the good life? Charles Taylor characterized 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
All the same this duty includes the cultivation of one's will (moral cast of mind), so to satisfy all the 
requirements of duty. A human being has a duty to raise himself from the crude state of his nature, from 
his animality, more and more towards humanity by which he alone is capable of setting himself ends; he 
has a duty to diminish his ignorance by instruction and to correct his errors.’ 
18 Dohmen, J. (2010). Brief aan een middelmatige man. Amsterdam, Ambo. P 140, 141. 
19 Van Tongeren, P. (2003). Deugdelijk leven. Amsterdam, Sun. P 21-33. See also Aristoteles (2005). Ethica 
Nicomachea. Budel, Damon. Par. 1094b11-1095a11; 1106b23-28 and MacIntyre, A. (2007). After Virtue. 
London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P149. 
20 MacIntyre, A. (2007). After Virtue. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co.  P 187-189. 
21 Aristoteles (2005). Ethica Nicomachea. Budel, Damon. Par. 1105b19-1106b34, as well as MacIntyre, A. 
(2007). After Virtue. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 150. For a modern articulation see: Sloterdijk, P. 
(2009). Du musst dein Leben ändern. Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp. P 290: ‘Tatsächlich ist es möglich, 
schon die klassische Habitus Lehre als Trainingstheorie zu lesen. Wer richtig geübt hat, überwindet die 
Unwahrscheinlichkeit des Guten und lässt die Tugend wie eine zweite Natur erscheinen. Zweite Naturen 
sind Könnensdispositionen, dank deren sich der Mensch als Artist der Virtus auf der Höhe zu halten 
vermag. Er tut das fast Unmögliche, das Beste, als sei es das Leichte, Spontane, Natürliche, das sich nahezu 
von selbst einstellt.’ 
22 Ibid, book II (1.1-3) and also Sloterdijk, P. (2009). Du musst dein Leben ändern. Frankfurt am Main, 
Suhrkamp.   P 231: ‘...um einem Übenden klarzumachen, es komme darauf an die Übung auszuführen und 
nicht über sie zu räsonieren. Einen Diskuswurf bringt man nur zustande, indem man den Diskus wirft - 
und keine Gerede über Diskusse und über die richtige Art sie zu werfen, kann den Wurf ersetzen.’ See also 
Aristoteles (2005). Ethica Nicomachea. Budel, Damon. Par. 1099b9-10 and 1103a31-1103b21. 
23 Aristoteles (2005). Ethica Nicomachea. Budel, Damon. Par. 1103a14-25. 
24  Martha Nussbaum however, argues that classical virtue ethics is overtaken by enlightenment theories 
and deserves no longer a separate status.  Nussbaum, M. (1999). "Virtue Ethics: a misleading category." 
The journal of Ethics 3(3): 163-201. 
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the difference between virtue ethics and enlightenment ethical theories as between 
substantive and procedural moral theories.25 The characteristics of virtue ethics allow 
accommodating both a functional and an aspirational approach. The idea of striving for 
excellence in a practice could as well apply on military practice, which would serve the 
former. The overarching idea of living a good life and acquiring the virtuous attitude that 
enables such a life provides the moral attitude, which is aimed for in the latter. Virtue 
ethics is not merely about what to do, about choice: it takes the agent into account as 
well.26 The notion of an agent includes his personal mental make-up, as well as his 
origin, the community and the tradition he belongs to. Furthermore, virtue ethics 
explicitly take as well the situational context into account: which actions are feasible, 
which actions are within my grasp.27 This does not mean though that in virtue ethics 
there is no deliberation, on the contrary.28 However, this deliberation is primarily aimed 
at finding practical solutions that are morally justified.29 Another feature is that virtue 
ethics provide a perspective for personal growth: one can learn to be virtuous. Specific 
education and training, augmented by relevant experience can result in a virtuous 
disposition. The practical orientation of virtue ethics, the perspective of personal 
development as well as its foundation in a community and its tradition fit well with the 
general characteristics of military practice. Therefore, virtue ethics seem the most 
promising theory for founding a moral groundwork for the military.30 The question is 
how? 
 
Virtue ethics according to Alasdair MacIntyre.  
2.5.1 The theory on virtue ethics as developed by MacIntyre is based primarily on 
Aristotle. As I explained in the preceding paragraph 2.4., Aristotle argues that everything 
in nature has an inherent goal (Telos). For human beings this involves being part of a 
community and a very special community at that namely the polis, the Greek city-state.31 
Moreover, being a free citizen of the polis implies the obligation to be a good member of 
the polis, to live a good, a flourishing life. Living a good life requires excellence, and a 
                                                          
25 Taylor, C. (1994). Justice after virtue. After MacIntyre. Horton, J and Mendus, S. Cambridge, Polity Press. 
P 27. See also Taylor, C. (2007). Bronnen van het zelf. (Sources of the self) Rotterdam, Lemniscaat. P129. 
26 Toner, J. H. (2000). Morals under the gun. Lexington, University Press of Kentucky. P 149: ‘There are 
three classic focus point for morality: the outcome (teleological ethics: a good result), the act 
(deontological ethics: a dutiful deed) and the agent (an actor of good character).’ 
27 Aristoteles (2005). Ethica Nicomachea. Budel, Damon. Par. 1113a9-12. 
28 Wortel and Bosch argue that deliberation and a critical attitude are among the prerequisites of being a 
professional soldier. Wortel, E., Bosch, J. (2011). "Strengthening moral competence: a 'train the trainer' 
course on military ethics." Journal of military ethics 10(1): 17-35. Bieri argues that every action as 
expression of the will of an actor requires deliberation, as well as a decision on which realistic course of 
action an actor embarks. Bieri, P. (2011). Het handwerk van de vrijheid. (Das Handwerk der Freiheit) 
Amsterdam, Wereld bibliotheek. P153-169. 
29 Aristoteles (2005). Ethica Nicomachea. Budel, Damon. Par. 1142b28-33 
30Kem, J. D. (2006). "The use of the ethical triangle in military ethical decision making." Public 
administration and management 11(1): 22-43. See also Toner, J. H. (2000). Morals under the gun. 
Lexington, University Press of Kentucky.  P 150: ‘Armies exist to win battles and wars. Military ethics is 
thus teleological, for is necessarily utilitarian and consequentialist. But military ethics is also 
deontological, for soldier can and must be taught principles and learn duties. The very nature of the 
profession of arms - which entails killing or preparing to kill, destruction or preparation for wreaking 
destruction - involves soldiers in the ethical anguish of what I have called duelling duties. Decision 'logic 
trees', moral checklists, ethical flow charts - none of these things can help soldiers resolve some of the 
most pressing problems they confront (often without benefit of much time for reflection and analysis). We 
can now see why virtue ethics is indispensable to the profession of arms.’ 
31 Aristotle (1995). Politics. Oxford, University Press. Par. 1253a18-29. 
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virtuous disposition enables achieving excellence. Aristotle discerns two types of virtue. 
These are the virtues of character, and the virtue of practical wisdom, prudence. The 
former pertain to dispositions that direct actions , and the latter enables a person to 
deliberate on his choices 32  The overall result is that an agent will act rightly in affect 
and conduct.33 The ancient Greek virtues of character are courage, temperance and 
justice. Aristotle identifies several more virtues of character: generosity, greatness, 
truthfulness, modesty and friendship.34 However, the virtues of courage, justice and 
temperance, together with practical wisdom (prudence) are the four cardinal (cardo 
means pivot) virtues. All these virtues are connected to the overall concept of the good 
life. MacIntyre on the other hand, makes another connection. He argues that the good life 
is not a holistic notion, but is made up of all kinds of practices (family, school, work, 
leisure, etc.) He then argues that the notion of a virtue does not only pertain to the 
holistic concept of the good life, but to these specific practices as well.  Furthermore, in 
his view, it is possible to identify the specific virtues that are relevant to the different 
practices!35 It is this powerful interpretation by MacIntyre, which - in my opinion - 
provides a solid foundation for a specific application of virtue ethics for the military.  I 
will develop this idea further in the following pages of my thesis, but first I will give a 
short description of the main content of MacIntyre’s theory, after which I will elaborate 
on - and sometimes criticize and complement - the concepts he uses.  
 
2.5.2.  MacIntyre derives the notion of virtue from the concept of a practice. A practice is 
valued for internal reasons, inherent to the practice. MacIntyre calls these internal 
reasons internal goods.36 Virtues are required to participate in a practice in an excellent 
way. Acquiring the relevant virtues enhances the pleasure, the internal goods, someone 
gain in a practice. Aspiration for excellence is a feature of humanity and of living a good 
life. He then states that the specific virtues of the different practices one participates in, 
need to be a consistent entity. This notion cannot come as a surprise, as all virtues aim at 
achieving excellence and therefore, there is little chance virtues could be mutually 
counterproductive. Only by adhering to one consistent overall set of virtues, man can 
achieve wholeness, constancy of character, integrity: permanent traits which will 
explain why someone acts in a particular way. Thus, character gives a special sort of 
accountability and pattern to action. This wholeness requires (or shapes) of course a 
unique and unified identity.37 It is hard to conceive a person who internalizes a 
consistent entity of virtues who at the same time lacks identity. A virtuous person, 
therefore, is necessarily a person with a well-established identity.  This identity also 
                                                          
32 All in all Aristotle discerns 12 virtues of character and five virtues of intellect. Aristoteles (2005). Ethica 
Nicomachea. Budel, Damon. Par:1107a31-1108b10, 1139b15-17. 
33 Sherman, N. (1989). The Fabric of Character: Aristotle's Theory of Virtue. Oxford, Clarendon Press. P2. 
34 Aristoteles (2005). Ethica Nicomachea. Budel, Damon. Par: 1107b8-15, 1107b21-1108a4,1108a19-24, 
1108a30-35, 1108a25-29. 
35 MacIntyre, A. (2007). After Virtue. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 186-187. 
36 MacIntyre in later writings also uses the term ‘goods of excellence’ . MacIntyre, A. (2003). Whose 
justice? Which rationality? Notre Dame (Indiana), University Press. P 30-36. 
37 Ibid, P 201. MacIntyre does not elaborate on the concept of identity, which is a subject of a discussion in 
which widely divergent positions are argued for. In this thesis I will use the term ‘identity’ in a practical 
meaning as mentioned in Parfit, D. (1986). Reasons and persons. Oxford, University Press. P 203-209. 
“Identity has two criterions. First there is a physical criterion: a continued existence of a whole body. 
Second there is a psychological criterion: the continued existence of a mental entity, which has strong and 
overlapping psychological connections that involve ‘the doings of our deeds, the thinking of our thoughts 
and the occurrence of certain other physical and mental events’.  A person’s identity requires that these 
criteria coincide.”  
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implies membership, and this is not necessarily a chosen membership. We are thrown 
into a family, a community, and there our identity is primarily shaped. Narrative plays 
an important role in this process. Our identity is shaped by narrative: stories by others 
in which we figurate, as well as stories by one self in which others figurate.  These 
stories - result in a human identity, which encompasses a past, a present and a future 
and therewith constitutes the concept of a life. That life is lived with others, which 
means that one is a subject of narrative as well as an object. Even so, this also means that 
participating in practices add to the narrative. These mutual stories do not only create 
an individual identity, but they create solidarity and thereby define a practice, a 
community as well. Moreover, in order to form and sustain a practice and a community, 
there must be some shared concept of the good, a moral tradition. These moral 
traditions in their turn provide a substance and a context for the identification of the 
good life, the ‘telos’ of man. In MacIntyre’s words: ‘…man is in his actions and practice, as 
well as in his fictions a story-telling animal. He is not essentially, but becomes through 
his history, a teller of stories that aspire to truth. But the key question for men is not 
about their authorship; I can only answer the question “What am I to do?” if I can answer 
the prior question “Of what story or stories do I find myself a part?” ’38  
 
2.5.3.  Another issue MacIntyre addresses is the difference between a practice and an 
institution. Institutions are necessary to support practices and to guarantee their 
continuity. Institutions provide organisation, procedures and officials to realize a 
practice.  They provide so-called external goods for those who are employed in an 
institution. These are money, power and status. An individual can own these external 
goods, while internal goods that pertain to a practice cannot be owned. Institutions are 
also part of the wider social fabric, and this means that institutions too, are part of a 
wider tradition.  
 
2.5.4.  MacIntyre then starts his criticism of modernity, by stating that in modern 
societies there is no consensus on a conception of the good life and neither is there a 
coherent moral tradition. The individual, therefore, lacks a context in which he can 
develop a unified character; an enterprise that is altogether hardly feasible, because of 
the fragmented concept of modern selfhood and individuality. His implicit conclusion is 
that under the present circumstances we will not be able to reinvent an Aristotelian 
society based on the virtues. We must bear in mind that MacIntyre wrote the above in 
1981, at the height of the cold war and a worldwide financial crisis: an era, which left 
little room for optimism. After the demise of the Soviet empire in 1990 there was more 
room for optimism. However, this initial optimism has since then evaporated under the 
influence of other developments in the world.39 So, one might argue that MacIntyre’s 
criticism is still valid. The question is whether this appreciation of the state of affairs in 
the world, disqualifies the practical value of his theory. In my opinion, the opposite is 
true. Where are we to find a collective moral foothold if there is no shared 
comprehensive conception of the good? If society as a whole no longer legitimates and 
sustains a collective frame of moral reference, people will look elsewhere, in  smaller 
entities, families, clubs, work, etc.40 It is from this perspective that MacIntyre’s theory 
                                                          
38 MacIntyre, A. (2007). After Virtue. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co.  P 216. 
39 Verhaeghe, P. (2012). Identiteit. Amsterdam, Bezige Bij. P 111-212. Dohmen, J. (2010). Brief aan een 
middelmatige man. Amsterdam, Ambo. P 15,16. 
40 See also Schneewind, J. B. (1982). "Virtue, narrative and community: MacIntyre and morality." Journal of 
Philosophy 79(11): 653-663. 
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has actually gained relevance, as it provides a means to identify the virtues, which can 
assist in meeting standards of excellence and create flourishing practices! Experiencing 
the benefits of being a virtuous member of a flourishing practice, could well lead to the 
virtuous disposition in other practices as well. In such a way, the virtues of the practices 
could contribute to the quality of larger social entities. Therefore, there are ample 
reasons why MacIntyre’s theory - in spite of his social criticism - still provides a 
worthwhile method to identify the virtues relevant to a practice. 
 
2.5.5.  His idea of narrative as an instrument in shaping an individual’s character, could 
provide a relevant and tangible link between educational means and methods and  long 
existing military traditions. His other notion that the morality of the individual must fit 
in a wider moral tradition of society seems more than interesting too, especially for the 
military, as I explained in the first paragraph of this chapter. A necessary moral cord 
exists between the people and the military that defends the interests of the people. This 
moral cord between the people and their military implies that the military upholds the 
same set of core values, which reflects the people they serve. Therefore, it is worthwhile 
to investigate the nature of this cord. In short, in spite of the social criticisms, MacIntyre 
connects to his theory: it provides ample starting points for my further research and 
investigation. In this chapter, I will be further elaborate on MacIntyre’s concepts of a 
practice, internal goods and the virtues. The issues of identity and narrative and the 
relation of these with a moral tradition will be discussed in chapter four and five 
respectively.  
 
Concepts in MacIntyre’s theory on practice and virtues. 
2.6.1.   As I have explained above, virtue ethics is centred around the conceptions of 
practice, inherent goals and virtues. However, Aristotle, the founder of virtue ethics, 
does not use explicitly the notion of a practice. 41 Van Tongeren explains why and 
provides a broad definition of the concept of a practice. First, he states that the term 
practice refers to the object of ethics, human conduct. 42  Then he explains this 
conception further by using the Greek term of ‘poiesis’ and ‘praxis’. ‘Poiesis’ refers to 
manufacturing, an activity in which the goal of the activity lies beyond the activity in 
itself. The activity serves as  a means towards other ends. It is an activity that results in a 
product, an object that is external to the actual activity. ‘Praxis’ refers to practicing an 
activity in which the ultimate goal lies in participating in the activity itself. Only by 
participating in the practice and abiding by the rules that govern the activity will one 
attain the pleasure the activity entails.43 The goal of the practice is internal to the 
activity.44 Alasdair MacIntyre - in the first part of his theory - defines the notion of a 
practice in a more elaborate way, as: ‘any coherent and complex form of socially 
established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of 
activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence 
which are appropriate to, an partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result 
that human powers to achieve excellence and human conceptions of the ends and goods 
                                                          
41 Aristoteles (2005). Ethica Nicomachea. Budel, Damon. 
42 Tongeren van, P. (2003). Deugdelijk leven. Amsterdam, Sun. P21. See also: Achterhuis, H. (2008). Met 
alle geweld. Rotterdam, Lemniscaat. P 134-136. 
43 Nussbaum, M. (1986). The fragility of goodness. Cambridge, University Press. P 125. 
44 A similar distinction between the homo faber and the homo ludens is used by Huizinga in Huizinga, J. 
(1938). Homo ludens, proeve eener bepaling van het spel-element der cultuur. Amsterdam, Universiteit 
Pers. P 10. 
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involved are systematically extended.’ 45 This definition is long and complex, but 
nevertheless there are some similarities with the elements Van Tongeren addresses. 
Both Van Tongeren and MacIntyre speak of participating in a practice with others, and 
for reasons that lie within the activity itself. Both address the necessity of rules and the 
opportunity to enhance the pleasure one finds in participating. However, a further 
explanation and interpretation of some of the notions MacIntyre uses, is desirable as any 
inconclusiveness could hamper my further proceedings.  
 
2.6.2.   According to MacIntyre, a practice is a human activity that people engage in 
together. This implies that human life consists of many practices. During their life people 
participate in many different practices, like: family life, school, playing, work, etc.46 The 
definition MacIntyre provides, states further that a practice is a complex activity, it is 
socially established and requires cooperation. The practice is part of an existing social 
fabric and tradition, and participants must adapt to those traditions.47 The notion that a 
practice must be socially established is ‘translated’ by Van Tongeren in the explicit 
notion that rules constitute the very practice: without rules that are internal to the 
practice, there would not be any practice.48 Taylor goes even further and argues that 
practices articulate patterns of what the participants ought and ought not to do.49 The 
terms of the definitions further imply that neither individual activities that do not 
require cooperation, nor very simple activities that do not require any special expertise 
are considered as a practice. People participate in a practice, because they like it, and 
they benefit from it. These benefits MacIntyre refers to as internal goods. When one can 
speak of a practice in which individuals are engaged together, the quality of the 
engagement is measured by standards of excellence. By aspiring towards a better 
performance, one can increase the amount of benefits, internal goods, gained. This again 
means that not just any activity can be qualified as a practice. The idea of cooperation 
and rules require a longstanding status: a past in which rules developed, a present with 
a specific form and a future in which the practice will further develop to meet the needs 
of the community.  However, in spite of MacIntyre’s extensive definition, it is not a 
simple affair to determine exactly which activities qualify as a practice and which not. In 
this respect, MacIntyre himself is rather vague, and he even goes so far as to state that 
the question as to the precise range of practices is not of the first importance. He states 
that a further explanation of the notions he uses in his definition will provide the 
appropriate insight into the defining qualities of a practice.50 He then elaborates on 
internal and external goods and the notion of virtue. In this thesis, I will use the 
definition as given by MacIntyre and the criteria that arise from this definition. After 
having elaborated on the notion of a practice, I will next address the notions of internal 
goods. 
 
2.6.3.   As to the conception of internal goods, MacIntyre states that a practice is self-
contained: it is autotelic. This means that the activities central to the practice are 
primarily exercised for the sake of acquiring the internal goods that are specific for the 
                                                          
45 MacIntyre, A. (2007). After Virtue. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 187. 
46 MacIntyre, A. (1990). Three rival versions of moral inquiry. Notre Dame (Indiana), University Press. P64 
47 Ibid, p 194. However, this does not mean that practices are static per se; they can and will develop and 
change over time.  
48 Tongeren van, P. (2003). Deugdelijk leven. Amsterdam, Sun. P21-22.  
49 Taylor, C. (2007). Bronnen van het zelf. (Sources of the self) Rotterdam, Lemniscaat. P 285. 
50 MacIntyre, A. (2007). After Virtue. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 187,188. 
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particular practice.51 The aim of a practice seems to be the participation in the activity as 
such, rather than to achieve a goal at which the activity aims.52 The internal goods to be 
gained pertain to the pleasure one finds in a good performance, to the stimulation of 
imagination that is needed to grasp the possibilities of the practice and to the pleasure 
one experiences in acting as a skilled practitioner together with others. In order to enjoy 
fully these internal goods we must excel in the activity, which is central to the practice. 
John Rawls articulated this notion as the Aristotelian principle, which he defines as 
follows: ‘…other things equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of their realised 
capacities (their innate or trained abilities), and this enjoyment increases the more the 
capacity is realised, or the greater its complexity.’53 Sloterdijk articulates a similar 
notion.54 According to MacIntyre, internal goods can only be acquired and experienced 
by participating in the practice itself, but are also only to be specified in terms of the 
practice. It is participating in e.g. a game of rugby that counts and not necessarily 
winning the game. In participating as such, one finds the pleasure and fulfilment that are 
inherent to the game. The game can only be explained in terms that are specific for that 
game, like ‘scrum’, ‘knock on’, ‘line out’, ‘off side’, etc. Rules are another feature of a 
practice. These rules are designed to allow each participant a fair opportunity to exhibits 
his excellence.55 Not abiding by the rules of the game - e.g. in rugby throwing the ball 
forward and not paying any attention to the dimensions of the playing ground - would 
ruin the game (Agon) and annul the possibility of gaining internal goods and eventually 
even destroy the practice as such. Another internal good MacIntyre indentifies, pertains 
to the benefits gained from experiencing to be an excellent practitioner. By participating 
in a practice, one joins a specific community and thus becomes a member of that 
community. This specific community in its turn is part of a larger social fabric and 
indirectly one becomes a member of this larger community as well.  
2.6.4. However, MacIntyre does not provide any clue on the meaning of an internal good. 
How are we to interpret that concept? MacIntyre states that it is a good that cannot be 
acquired in any other way than by participating in the practice.56 However, why would 
we want those goods? Why do people want to participate in a practice? Some people are 
able to answer this question quite easily. They want to be a medical practitioner because 
it is a family tradition or because they want to help and cure people. The former is a 
matter of family tradition (or pressure); the latter indicates some attraction to the 
medical practice, an aspiring to the internal goods of that practice. Especially in socially 
accepted practices, a justification for participating in a practice is easily found and 
accepted. Others find it hard - or even impossible - to answer the question: “Why?” Some 
of them are not able to come up with anything more than “I just want to do it.” Especially 
with practices that are not readily socially accepted, people find it sometimes hard to 
explain (and justify) their attraction and choice. However, what is an internal good, how 
                                                          
51 Ibid, p 188-191. MacIntyre also uses the term ‘goods of excellence’, See MacIntyre, A. (2003). Whose 
justice? Which rationality? Notre Dame (Indiana), University Press. P32-35. 
52 Aristoteles (2005). Ethica Nicomachea. Budel, Damon. Par.1099a27-28. 
53 Rawls, J. (2006). Een theorie van rechtvaardigheid. (A theory of justice) Rotterdam, Lemniscaat. P 432. 
See also MacIntyre, A. (2003). Whose justice? Which rationality? Notre Dame (Indiana), University Press. 
P 31 
54 Sloterdijk, P. (2009). Du musst dein Leben ändern. Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp. P 502: 
´Alle Erweiterungen der Könnenskreise, alle Steigerungen bis zum den letzten Höhen  der Artistiek 
vollziehen sich auf der Basis von Selbstformung durch Übung.´ 
55 MacIntyre, A. (2003). Whose justice? Which rationality? Notre Dame (Indiana), University Press. P 27. 
56 MacIntyre, A. (2007). After Virtue. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co.  P 188-189. 
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to define this notion? MacIntyre does not provide any further theoretical interpretation 
of internal goods and until now neither did other philosophers address this specific 
notion. Therefore, an interpretation has to be looked for elsewhere. As this notion is 
closely related to action, it is a subject of practical reasoning.57 An internal good is a 
reason for action, and the action aims at satisfying a desire: the internal goods. This is 
inherent to MacIntyre’s definition of a practice: ‘activity through which goods internal to 
that form of activity are realized ’. Bieri points out that desires are dependent on what 
the world has to offer - the external circumstances - and  on how we think and feel as 
persons with a specific history and character - the internal circumstances.58 An internal 
good therefore can be described as  characteristics of a specific practice which cause 
persons to develop a desire - a specific mental state - to participate in that practice. 
According to Searle59, actions aimed at  satisfying  desires require a mental state that has 
a direction of fit from the world to the mind. This means that by acting on the intention 
of this mental state, the state of affairs in the world is changed in order to meet the 
conditions of satisfaction of this intentional mental state. In other words: the intention 
to participate in a practice requires action and by doing so, we meet the appropriate 
condition of satisfaction of the mental state in question. Therefore, internal goods seem 
to be desires.60 Desires are fulfilled or frustrated; they are not true or false. Believes are 
true or false. Believes are a part of theoretical reasoning, which is aimed at investigating 
states of affairs in the world. Their direction of fit is from the mind to the world: in order 
for believes to be true there must be a state of affairs in the world that corresponds with 
these believes. A desire, on the other hand, can already be satisfied when the behaviour 
of the agent comes to match his intention.61 However, intentionality as such requires 
some kind of deliberation prior to the intention.62 Nancy Sherman articulates a similar 
idea in her interpretation of the Aristotelian notion of desire. According to her Aristotle’s 
account of desire suggests that it is because something seems good to us that we desire 
it and that it is good because we desire it. She hereby implies some kind of ex ante  
deliberations.63 As to the nature of this kind of prior deliberation, Charles Taylor 
introduces some concepts that might clarify the notion of prior intentional deliberation.  
He identifies weak and strong evaluations of desires.64 Weakly evaluated desires pertain 
primarily to the outcome of our actions, while strongly evaluated desires also refer to 
the quality of our motives to act in order to satisfy these desires. In this perspective, 
some internal goods could be labelled as weakly evaluated desires. The desire is largely 
contingent: I just want it. Often, there are no further reasons. Other internal goods could 
be labelled as strongly evaluated desires. These require deliberations, which often 
involves reflections on values, personal as well as social. This kind of deliberation 
                                                          
57 The notion of practical reason is also a subject of much philosophical controversy and I do not intend to 
participate in this discussion. My sole purpose is to provide a reasonable explanation of the concept of 
desire, which can be useful in this thesis. By doing so, I do not intend to take a stand in the ongoing dispute 
on rationality, action and identity.   
58 Bieri, P. (2011). Het handwerk van de vrijheid. (Das Handwerk der Freiheit) Amsterdam, Wereld 
bibliotheek. P 220-221. 
59 Searle, J. R. (2001). Rationality in action. Cambridge (Massachusetts), MIT Press. 
60 Ibid, P 7. 
61 Ibid, P 34-37. 
62 Ibid, P 47-49. 
63 Sherman, N. (1989). The Fabric of Character: Aristotle's Theory of Virtue. Oxford, Clarendon Press. P 63-
65 and 87. 
64 Taylor, C. (1985). Philosophical papers 1: human agency and language. Cambridge, University Press. P 
1- 44 (chapter one: what is human agency). See also Taylor, C. (2007). Bronnen van het zelf. (Sources of 
the self) Rotterdam, Lemniscaat. P 60, 67. 
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appeals to the identity of the agent. Taylor’s argument leads to a more or less similar 
conclusion as Searle’s in his explanation of desire-independent-reasons-for-action.   
According to Searle it is possible to impose conditions of satisfaction on conditions of 
satisfaction. For example, in joining the military, I satisfy my conditions of satisfaction of 
wanting to be a member of the armed forces. However, when I state that I do so, because 
I want to help humanity, this evaluative statement imposes further conditions of 
satisfaction on the already satisfied condition of satisfaction of joining the military. Also 
by doing so, a desire-independent-reason-for-action is created.65 The agent thereby 
takes responsibility for satisfying this imposed condition of satisfaction (helping 
humanity).  In this way to evaluative notions are imposed on desires. However, whether 
the desires are weakly or strongly evaluated, or constructed as desire independent, they 
are all satisfied by participating in the practice at which the intentionality is directed. 
The choice to act on a desire does not necessarily require any moral evaluation, as the 
direction of fit is from the world to the mind.  From this perspective, internal goods, as 
an element in MacIntyre’s theory, can be labelled as desires.  
 
2.6.5. However, still another questions remains that MacIntyre does not address , which 
is how to identify the internal goods of a practice. He seems to claim that internal goods 
can only be identified by participating in a practice. Only than will we know what the 
characteristics of a practice have to offer. In my opinion, this is not enough. Some 
theoretical underpinning is necessary in order to establish whether all relevant internal 
goods of a practice are properly identified. Such an investigation requires, first of all, an 
analysis of the practice involved: what elements constitute a practice? In particular, 
which elements necessarily constitute a practice, which means that if one of them would 
be missing there would not be a practice?  A proper investigation should therefore start 
by analyzing a practice in order to establish the constitutive elements. Analysis of these 
constitutive elements could provide an insight in the kind and number of internal goods 
to be gained in a practice. As the appeal of a practice is also a matter of personal 
appreciation this side of the matter also has to be investigated.  Personal experience in 
the practice, or accounts of such experiences, could provide additional evidence on the 
relevance of the internal goods thus identified. In this way, we could add weight to the 
significance of internal goods related to a practice, instead of merely referring to 
individual experience and intuition. This is important, as according to MacIntyre, the 
virtues supervene on internal goods, which means that there can be no virtues without 
the appropriate internal goods.  
 
2.6.6.  Central to the notion of virtue ethics is of course the concept of virtue. Aristotle 
defines a virtue as a state that enables us to do what is best pertaining to pleasure and 
pain. The opposite of what is doing the best is a moral vice.66 Virtues are neither 
emotions nor capacities,  so they must be defined as dispositions, attitudes.67 They are 
desirable characteristics of individuals and are not be understood as values which 
notion refers to ideals that are cherished by a community.68 With Aristotle, these notions 
refer to the goal of living a good life and the character needed to achieve that goal.  
                                                          
65 Searle, J. R. (2001). Rationality in action. Cambridge (Massachusetts), MIT Press. P 172-175. 
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67 Aristoteles (2005). Ethica Nicomachea. Budel, Damon.  Par. 1107a1-3. 
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Modern philosophers, like Sloterdijk, confirm this idea.69 Sloterdijk even goes as far as to 
state that we have a duty to improve the way in which we live our life.70 Foot adds that: 
‘… virtues are in some general way, beneficial.  Human beings do not get on well without 
them.’71 Van Tongeren defines a virtue as ‘the quality which is required to perform 
excellently in a practice.’72 He limits the notion of a virtue to the practice and does not 
include any specification of living a good life. MacIntyre, in his definition of a virtue, also 
ties virtues to practices, but he also introduces a link with internal goods to be gained in 
a practice. He defines virtue as ‘an acquired human quality the possession and exercise 
of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods that are internal to practices and the 
lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods.’73 In this definition, 
virtues are the qualities that enable us to achieve the internal goods of the practice by 
participating in a most excellent way in the activities that are central to the practice. By 
improving our effort we increase our gain in the internal goods of that practice. 
MacIntyre implicitly claims that by identifying the internal goods of a practice one can 
also identify the virtues needed to reap the benefits of these internal goods. This is an 
important conclusion. Because once we have established what kind of internal goods can 
be gained in a practice, we also could analyse and argue which virtues are necessary to 
excel in that particular practice. By this method, we would not have to depend on mere 
intuition. 
 
2.6.7.   In his definition MacIntyre seems to have in mind a singular idea of a virtue, 
whereas Aristotle distinguishes two types of virtue: the virtues of character and the 
virtue of intellect.74 Both are indispensable for becoming a virtuous person. However, 
MacIntyre does acknowledge both types, but he considers their common properties as a 
virtue more important than their differences.75 In short, both Aristotle and MacIntyre 
start form the principle of two types of virtue. The virtues of character refer to the 
dispositions of a moral nature. According to Aristotle, this kind of virtue is largely a 
matter of conditioning in and by the (extended) family and the community, resulting in a 
disposition that enables an agent to perceive a situation and its moral implications. This 
perceiving the moral implications of a situation requires an emotional disposition as 
well as cognitive faculties.76 Emotions enhance moral perceptions.77 Without emotions 
we would not fully register the situational facts and context.78 On the other hand, 
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emotional impressions do require critical deliberation as well in order to assert the 
impact of the emotions at hand.79 Virtues require right action as well as right feeling.80 
The virtues of character allow us to identify the appropriate mean between two kinds of 
moral anomaly, two kinds of vice. For each virtue therefore there are two corresponding 
vices: the vice of excess and the vice of defect.81  A virtuous attitude manifests itself in 
morally responsible choices resulting in a sensible course of action, which avoids the 
extremes. However, as I have explained circumstances play an important role in 
establishing what kind of conduct could be considered virtuous.  Also the agent is a 
factor: what is good for one agent might not be good enough for another.82 This practical 
directedness of the virtues, which manifests itself in a practice, means that virtues 
cannot be defined in absolute terms.83 However, it is possible to describe virtuous 
conduct in general terms. It is clear that a certain kind of conduct is preceded by the 
decision to act in a certain way, and that the decision in its turn is preceded by 
deliberation. It is logical to assume that consistently virtuous conduct can only be the 
result of decisions that are preceded by deliberation in which moral considerations are 
taken into account.  Eventually the overall conduct is a matter of having a virtuous 
disposition.84 Therefore, Aristotle distinguishes besides  the virtues of character  also 
virtue of the intellect (Phronēsis), practical wisdom. This virtue is described as ‘an 
acquired disposition to know what is virtuous in a given situation and act accordingly’.85 
This practical wisdom is indispensable, as a virtuous attitude requires deciding what to 
do and as deciding requires moral deliberation, a virtuous person cannot dispense 
without this practical wisdom.86 Phronēsis is essential: not only in order to know what 
to do - to meet the moral standards of excellence of the praxis -, but also how to act 
accordingly - to choose the appropriate practical  means of effectiveness, poiesis, to 
achieve the required end.87 Practical wisdom is therefore the prerequisite for all other 
virtues (of character).88 Thus, practical wisdom also provides a check on uncritically 
following customary (and supposedly virtuous) habits. According to Aristotle: ‘it is not 
possible to be fully good without having practical wisdom, nor practically wise without 
having excellence of character.’89 The virtue of character enables the agent to determine 
the goal he sets for himself and practical wisdom directs his actions to attain that goal.90 
The virtue of practical wisdom is a disposition that allows us to choose the appropriate 
mean between two kinds of moral anomaly, two kinds of vice. Consequently, by its 
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essence, virtue occupies the middle, but as to the result, the virtues lead to the best 
possible course of action.91  
 
2.6.8.   Another issue that is not addressed by MacIntyre is the number of virtues. How 
many virtues are there? Is it possible to count or calculate the  exact number of virtues?  
Aristotle distinguishes quite a number of virtues of character.92 However this does not 
mean that there are no more. Aristotle explicitly states that the foundation of virtues of 
character lays in growing accustomed to what is right and what is wrong in and by the 
family and the community. This process of habituation should start early in life.93 
However, every community, every society, every practice has its own standards of 
excellence to aspire at and as a result the virtues that enable realizing these aspirations 
may vary as well. Besides these standards develop and change over time.94  And there is 
another complicating factor as well. According to Van Tongeren, a virtue is an attitude 
that manifests itself in all kind of circumstances.  Therefore, in order to cope with all 
these different circumstances, a virtuous person has to have several virtues that can 
manifest themselves in these many and different contexts.95 These contexts include the 
practices a person participates in. Also in these different practices different standards of 
excellence are provided and is established which different virtues are relevant in order 
to achieve excellence in a specific practice. It would be hard , if not impossible, to 
establish a generic list of  virtues that would accommodate all practices. Sherman states 
that virtue ethics: ‘As a theory it remains inexact, awaiting the more determinate 
operations of practical reason in its perceptual and decision-making roles.’96 However,  
according to MacIntyre it is possible to establish which virtues are relevant in a specific 
practice. Each practice has specific standards of excellence which require equally 
specific virtuous dispositions to achieve the pleasure inherent to meeting these specific 
standards. These standards must be tangible in order to present attainable goals and 
provide a focus for developing the required virtuous disposition. In short for every 
practice it is possible to establish which virtues are relevant to that particular practice. 
These virtues must provide focus within the wider context of the practice. This means 
that the virtues must meet the requirements of the practice: specific enough to enable 
focus and wide enough to fit within the context of the overall practice.97 Bieri supports 
this approach: he states that these kind of notions are invented for practical use. And in 
his opinion this means that the outlines of this notions are as sharp as required by their 
practical use. And because of this relation with a practical use, there will always be a 
domain of blur and twilight.98 In the rugby analogy: technical skill is important, but must 
be brought to bear in a play with team spirit. 
 
2.6.9.   The problem of an - in principle - indeterminate set of virtues has given raise to 
the notion that there is only one virtue and that is being virtuous. In this respect there 
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seem to be two interpretations of the virtues. I will use the terms narrow and broad to 
distinguish the different perspectives. A narrow interpretation links virtues primarily to 
a specific practice. The development of these specific virtues of character could be 
considered as a first stage in the development of an overall virtuous lifestyle. This  
second stage in which this overall virtuous lifestyle is developed, could be seen as a 
broad interpretation  of the role of the virtues in life in general.99 MacIntyre seems to use 
both conceptions.100 He uses the narrow conception in order to establish which virtues 
are relevant for a practice. He than makes a connection by stating that these virtues 
must be internalized by means of narrative which in itself must fit in the wider moral 
tradition. The notion of a moral tradition assumes a broad interpretation of what is 
virtuous.101 It assumes a connection between the virtues and a shared ‘comprehensive 
conception of the good’.102 These conceptions may be valuable at a theoretical level, but 
on a practical level there are several arguments that oppose the notion of one single 
virtue. In order to become a virtuous practitioner an individual must get acquainted 
with the standards of excellence of the practice he participates in. This requires a clear 
understanding of the content of these standards. These standards therefore should  be - 
and mostly are - tangible. Furthermore standards differ for each practice. It would be 
hard, if not impossible to imbue a - necessarily - abstract knowledge of standards that 
suffices for a successful participation in different practices. Also on a conceptual level 
the idea of a single virtue is problematic. Knowledge of and the skill to apply rules and 
standards is a prerequisite to reap the internal goods inherent to the practice. These 
internal goods too differ by practice and the individual participants. It is hard to see how 
a single virtue could enhance the delight in different internal goods related to 
participating in different practices in which different individuals participate. For 
example playing a game of chess would not produce the appropriate internal goods for a 
rugby player, which would inspire him to aspire at excellence and thus to develop the 
appropriate virtues. On the other hand it is hard to imagine that a player of chess could 
find pleasure in physical prowess and team spirit - internal goods typical of playing 
rugby - while playing chess. As virtues are closely related to a practice, an overall 
singular abstract notion of virtue would not be very helpful in acquiring the disposition 
appropriate to excel in a specific practice. 
 
 2.6.10.   However accepting the idea of several virtues for each and every practice, leads 
to the next question: how to establish what is virtuous conduct? How could a virtue - like 
temperance - be interpreted in such a way that it is clear what is meant by it instead of it 
being used as a kind of portfolio concept that can hold any kind of conduct.  This is a 
hard question to answer, as virtue ethics is a substantive theory rather than a 
procedural theory.103 In procedural theories it is relatively easy to establish what kind of 
conduct is morally appropriate in a given situation. It is matter of choosing starting 
points, adapting or developing an axiology and going through the prescribed theoretical 
procedure . This will result in a moral verdict on the motives of an act (deontology) or 
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on the moral nature of  consequences of an act (utilitarianism). Virtue ethics lacks a 
fixed procedure that can be applied in any situation. Sherman articulates the inexact 
character of virtue ethics as follows: ‘The choices the virtuous agent makes require 
refinements of more vaguely grasped ends, as well as their assessment in terms of 
overall fit within a coherent conception of good living.’104 Virtue ethics does have a 
method though. To start with, a virtuous agent must perceive a situation and realize the 
moral issue(s) at hand. This kind of situational perception is by definition personal and 
therefore subjective. At first it will be difficult to perceive a situation clearly and to 
decide on an appropriate course of action. However, experience will enable the 
practitioner to build a capacity which will assist him to correct his perception for bias 
and other distortions. This capacity to appraise a situation critically requires 
deliberation. Thus, in order to determine what is virtuous, the agent must first realize to 
what he is attracted in order to realize pleasure and to avoid pain. Then he must force 
himself to disengage his thoughts from this attraction and deliberate on the extreme 
opposite position.105 Aristotle uses antonyms, pairs of contrasting notions. By distancing 
himself from the extremes of vicious conduct, the agent will find the right mean, the 
virtuous position.106 However, this mean is not the arithmetic average; it is the 
appropriate balance in a particular context.107  The virtuous person establishes what is 
virtuous by choosing the mean between the vice of excess (too much) and the vice of 
defect (too little). He does so by first establishing what would be his first choice of 
action. Than he must imagine what would be the opposite course of action. By doing so, 
he will be able to discern the antonyms. Next, he will establish what would be the mean: 
the best possible course of action, which is within his power.108  It is important that in 
this deliberation real opposing positions are established from which to choose.109 The 
choice between killing and torturing a prisoner of war will necessarily result in bad 
conduct, as both options are bad in themselves. In this case, a correct opposition of 
choices would be either killing the prisoner or setting him free. A correct mean would 
than be to detain the prisoner in accordance with the rule of international law.  The 
virtuous person deliberates on the basis of his knowledge, and the conclusion of this 
deliberations must direct his actions. The action must be in accordance with the 
conclusion of the deliberation.110 And as to the right way to act, we should only consider 
those options that are within our power.111  Aristotle emphasizes that apart from our 
choice being well considered and limited to feasible options that are within our power, it 
must also be a voluntarily choice.112 An indication for the correctness of our choice of 
the virtuous position is found in the support or criticism by others (endoxa) and the 
arguments they put forward.113 Actions that are in accordance with the virtues will be 
applauded and those that divert from the virtues will be criticised.  In short the content 
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of an abstract notion - like temperance - is limited by  the situation in a specific practice 
in which the term is used. The rules and the standards of excellence that apply in the 
practice further limit the content. The fact that the action must be feasible and  within 
the power of the agent further constraints what is within the limits of temperance as a 
virtue. Virtue ethics: ‘As theory, it remains inexact, awaiting the more determinate 
operations of practical reason in its perceptual and decision-making roles.’114 However, 
knowledge of the virtues will have great influence on our lives. ‘And like archers who 
have some target to aim at, with this knowledge we shall be more likely to hit upon what 
is right.’115 
 
2.6.11.   A question that is closely connected with the preceding issue of what 
determines the virtuous nature of an action, is: which virtue is relevant in a specific 
situation? The rugby player who attempts a drop goal  when the game is almost finished 
and practically lost, can do so from divergent dispositions.  It could be a courageous act. 
He made the attempt in spite of the odds involved, and the reproaches of his teammates 
in case of failure. It could also be a matter of resilience. In the face of defeat he got a grip 
on himself and made a last attempt to change defeat into victory. It could also be 
interpreted as the paramount of team spirit. For the love of his team he made a 
desperate attempt in order to prevent a bitter defeat that would bring disappointment 
to the whole team.  Which of these virtues made the player do what he did?  It is 
doubtful that even the player himself knows the right answer. This does not necessarily 
mean that  is impossible to discern virtues. On a theoretical level this is feasible as I 
intend to demonstrate.  Also in a practice it is possible to discern different virtues. 
Otherwise the notion of  virtues would have lost its meaning long ago. What is 
problematic though, is to establish which virtue settles the action. In the example it is 
feasible that all virtues are involved in his action: resilience, courage and comradeship. It 
is even possible that the virtues were mutually supportive in bringing about the action. 
A virtue is a disposition to aspire to meeting the standard of excellence inherent to a 
practice and a practice requires several skills and dispositions, the combination of which 
leads to an overall successful performance in the practice. The question than is whether 
it matters which virtue was the ultimate determinant. As the overall excellence in the 
practice is the accepted goal of any practice it seems irrelevant which virtue was 
ultimately determining in achieving this success; more virtues could - even 
simultaneously - contribute to meeting the standards of excellence. This does not mean 
that - on second thoughts - a practice could do with a single virtue after all.  All virtues 
that are relevant to a practice are important, the amount in which they contribute to the 
overall success may vary though. The different virtues derive their relevance by 
providing tangible  standards of excellence inherent to the practice. The virtue of 
practical wisdom serves to mediate among all such virtues, telling the agent which of 
them should primarily govern his action in a particular situation an what that requires 
of him.116 
  
2.6.12.   The question which virtue is relevant also presumes that we are able to make a 
clear distinction between the relevant virtues. From this perspective virtues should have 
a singular denotation. A denotation that enables to distinguish specific virtues without 
                                                          
114 Sherman, N. (1989). The Fabric of Character: Aristotle's Theory of Virtue. Oxford, Clarendon Press. P11. 
115 Aristoteles (2005). Ethica Nicomachea. Budel, Damon. Par. 1094a22-24. 
116 Zagzebski, L. T. (1998). Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical 
Foundations of Knowledge . Cambridge, University Press. P 222-224. 
31 
 
any overlap with other virtues. This is a problematic presumption.  As I explained in 
paragraph 2.6.10 above, virtuous conduct is not the result of following a moral 
procedural theory, it is the result of a substantive method.117 This method is applied by 
different individuals in different circumstances resulting in conduct which may vary 
greatly in direction. From this perspective it seems very hard to discern the boundaries 
of the specific virtues that are relevant in a specific situation. It would be equally hard to 
establish  when a specific virtue dominant in shaping an individual’s conduct is taken 
over by another dominant virtue, etc.118 For example consider a soldier helping his 
wounded comrade to return to their own lines. Surely this would be considered a fine 
example of comradeship. Now imagine that it takes hours and hours to reach the own 
lines and the soldiers have nothing to compensate for their dwindling forces: no food 
nor water. Nevertheless the able bodied soldier continues his struggle to bring his 
wounded comrade into safety. Of course comradeship is still a driving disposition but 
also resilience seems to become of some importance. Without the virtue of resilience the 
soldier would perhaps have given  up on his attempts to safe his comrade.  Has 
comradeship become irrelevant? Has resilience become more relevant?  Or is resilience 
underpinning comradeship, and/or vice versa? After a while  the enemy spots the two 
soldiers and sets up an ambush. The soldiers are not aware of these proceedings and 
continue their  combined struggle; still a matter of comradeship and resilience only. 
Than the enemy opens fire and the soldiers do not give up but continue their struggle. Is 
this still a matter of comradeship and resilience only, or do other virtues become 
important too, like courage? How do comradeship, resilience and courage relate to each 
other in this example? It seems possible to discern these virtues. But is it possible to 
define these virtues in such a way that they can be discerned as separate entities? Is it 
possible to discern where these virtues overlap? These are hard questions to answer, if 
such an answer is possible at all, especially as with virtues there is always a perceptual 
component.119 However some conclusions can be drawn. In a specific situation several 
virtuous dispositions can be active to effect an individual’s conduct. It is also possible to 
identify these virtues. This is a matter of identifying the appropriate standards of 
excellence and establishing to what extent these are realized. Furthermore, it is 
plausible that these dispositions can be mutually invigorating. However, to ascertain to 
what extent  the one or the other virtue is dominant in directing the agent’s conduct, or 
to establish to what extent virtues overlap in bringing about specific conduct, seems 
virtually impossible. Even the agent himself might be unaware of any mutual influence 
or overlap. Any attempt to define specific virtues in strict terms would unacceptably 
narrow down the complexities involved in expressing virtuous conduct in a wide range 
of circumstances. 
 
2.6.13.   The last issue that needs to be addressed is how to become virtuous. According 
to MacIntyre’s definition, virtues are acquired, and this means that they are at first 
taught, then put into practice together with others and eventually - by experience - 
embedded in the individual’s character.120 However, this process of habituation must 
not be mindless or uncritical. It should be an earnest process, in which the agent 
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seriously tries to improve his performance.121 When learning a new skill, uncritical 
repetition of rote steps would never allow one to learn from one’s errors or to improve 
upon prior attempts. Every conscientious student is always monitoring himself and his 
performance.122 The notion of virtue as an acquired disposition is shared with Aristotle, 
Rawls and Sloterdijk too.123 According to Aristotle acquiring virtues requires a 
willingness to listen to arguments,  the presence of a certain kind of intellect which will 
enable proper education. The foundation for this kind of intellect and willingness is laid 
in the family. Appropriate parental guidance will result in the prerequisites for a 
successful education.124 Next living together with friends and sharing arguments and 
thoughts is required to further develop moral consciousness.125 Nancy Sherman 
interprets this as follows: ‘In Aristotle’s view we become moral agents in response to 
and through the help of others whom we deeply care about an whose lives intertwine 
with ours. Through the early attachments and affections of philia we are made ready for 
the sorts of friendships and associations which will sustain the good life.’126 When, in 
this process,  arguments fail a certain - moderate - amount of parental coercion is 
permissible. Furthermore, all education should be governed by rules which aim at 
creating the appropriate circumstances for acquiring knowledge and skills: ‘learning by 
doing’.127 Training and learning skills aim at creating familiarity to act in a certain way in 
a wide range of circumstances. But this kind of training in itself is not enough, also a 
disciplined desire is required, as well as the appropriate motive: the values instilled in 
prior education.128 Improved skills do result in increasing the pleasures gained in 
performing well.129 The desire to participate in the activities of the practice together 
with other participants whom we appreciate - if not admire - creates a stimulating 
environment in which aspiring at excellence comes naturally. Copying the conduct of 
admired fellow practitioners - role models - is an important feature of  acquiring a 
virtuous disposition.130 Giving and receiving esteem plays an important role in this 
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process.131 Experience adds to this kind of education.132 An important aspect of learning 
by experience is how to cope with disappointments. Disappointments are important 
elements in educating the young and inexperienced as they will knock them out of their 
naïve trust in others and overconfidence in their abilities.133 This also induces modesty 
as a feature of virtue ethics.134 In this Aristotelian perspective practices provide a pre-
eminently  appropriate environment for developing virtues. Even than, acquiring the 
appropriate virtues will take time.135 When I return to the example of playing a game of 
rugby, it means that playing rugby requires preparation, training! Playing well enhances 
the pleasure one experiences in the game and in being a rugby player. Playing rugby 
better will increase this pleasure. Technical ability to handle the ball and team spirit are 
some of the virtues that enable the rugby-player to increase the pleasure he experiences 
in participating in the game. By improving his realization of these virtues, the participant 
will achieve greater joy in the practice. To strive for excellence is an essential feature of 
virtuous conduct. This strives for excellence, is shared by those who participate in the 
practice and as a result there is a certain kind of relationship between the 
participants.136 It is within the bounds (and bonds) of this relationship, they 
characterize themselves and others as virtuous. In this relationship, mere skills needed 
in a practice are enriched and transformed as extensions of human powers needed for 
the achievement of the internal goods of the practice.  
 
2.6.14.   An aspect that requires some elaboration, is the  relation between values and 
virtues. Values are abstract notions used in theoretical reasoning. Values refer to goals 
or duties that people aspire at, founded on their ideas of good and evil.137 Values also 
often articulate a maximum.138 Values are a part of morality and pertains to ideals 
worthwhile to strive after.139 Morality is an integrated part of the culture of a society in a 
certain time and space. Values are a part of a tradition and as such  can be sources of 
inspiration for the developing of virtues.140 The direction of fit of values is from the mind 
to the world: in order for an ideal, a value - or believes in general - to be true, there must 
be a state of affairs in the world that corresponds with these believes. 141 Virtues on the 
other hand pertain to a disposition to act in a morally appropriate way. Virtues play an 
important part in practical reasoning. Virtues are dispositions that inspire an agent to 
aspire at excellence: the best what is within his power. The virtues of character enable 
an agent to identify the moral issue(s) at stake in a specific situation and establish the 
requirement to act: what to do. The virtue of intellect, practical wisdom, enables the 
agent to deliberate and choose an appropriate course of action: how to do it. The 
direction of fit is from the world to the mind. Action is required in order to meet the 
conditions of satisfaction of the agent’s mental state.  Wisdom is not the same as 
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cleverness. Cleverness is the ability to take the right steps to any end, whereas wisdom 
is related only to good ends.142 One might say that a man who lacks wisdom has ‘false 
values’. 143 
 
Conclusions. 
2.7. According to MacIntyre, it is possible to identify the virtues that are related to a 
specific practice. Virtues are those dispositions that enable the practitioner to gain the 
internal goods related to the (specific) practice.  Therefore, by first identifying the 
internal goods of a practice we can next establish which virtues enhance the pleasure 
participants experience in a specific practice.  MacIntyre does not touch on the meaning 
of virtues, but these can be established by using the method Aristotle used. The virtuous 
course of action can be identified by finding the mean between two related opposing 
notions of vice; the vice of excess and the vice of falling short. This - narrow - 
interpretation of the virtues requires intellectual deliberation, practical wisdom, and the 
development of virtues of character. These virtues of practical wisdom and character 
can be acquired by education, exercise and experience. How to interpret the nature of 
the virtues, in relation to developing a virtuous identity, which is embedded in a moral 
tradition, requires another - broad - interpretation of the virtues, not directly linked 
with a specific practice. This pertains to the connection between virtue and identity, and 
the link with society and its wider moral tradition, which I will cover in chapter 7 and 8. 
In the next chapter 3, 4 and 5, I will apply MacIntyre’s theoretical framework on military 
practice. 
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Chapter 3: military practice. 
 
Introduction. 
3.1.  In this chapter I will apply the theoretical framework I discussed in the preceding 
chapter on military practice. Although this application is of a generic nature, I will use 
the Dutch military practice as a primary frame of reference. In order to answer the 
central question of this thesis, whether  the theory of virtue ethics as elaborated by 
Alasdair MacIntyre in his book ‘After Virtue’ provides a suitable instrument to identify, 
develop, instil and uphold the required moral standards in the military.  In this chapter I 
will attempt to establish  how his theory fits the military practice.1 I will do so by first 
arguing why military operational activities qualify as a practice. Next I will address  the 
constitutive elements of that practice. Based on these, I will try to identify relevant 
internal goods served by the practice. These internal goods should provide the key to 
establish which military virtues are related to the military practice, which will be 
addressed in the next chapter. 
Military Practice 
3.2.1.  MacIntyre defines a practice as: ‘any coherent and complex form of socially 
established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of 
activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence 
which are appropriate to, and  partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result 
that human powers to achieve excellence and human conceptions of the ends and goods 
involved are systematically extended.’ 2 However, in spite of this extensive definition he 
is rather vague as to what kind of activities qualify as a practice.3 The question is 
whether practice (praxis)- as opposed to mere production (poièsis)- really exists. To 
what extent is this classical distinction still valid in modern society? As noted before 
there is a difference between practises (praxis) and production (poièsis).  On the one 
hand there are practices in which the aim of the activities is to participate in the practice 
and satisfaction is primarily found in participating in the activities of the practice. On the 
other hand there is production (poièsis) in which satisfaction is found in the indirect 
results of the activities; the practice serves as a means to attain other goals.4 Although 
our present society is much more complex than that of ancient Greece, this distinction 
still can be made. My assumption is that almost all modern activities share aspects of 
both praxis and poièsis. We can visualize this by using the figure of the double wedge 
which shows that in some activities the criteria of a practice are dominant and at in 
other that of production, while between these extremes the dominance of the practice 
former gradually makes way for that of the latter.5 In less abstractive terms, the 
activities of a member of an amateur rugby team would be found at the practice end of 
the scale, while the activities of an unskilled employee on an industrial assembly line - 
whose primary aim is to provide for the sustenance of his family - would be found on the 
production end of the scale. In a practice satisfaction is primarily found in the activities 
of the practice as such, while in more production like activities the satisfaction is 
primarily found in the indirect results of the activities, such as an income, power or 
status. The question is whether the military qualifies as a practice and if this is the case 
                                                          
1 See paragraph 1.8.2 above. 
2 MacIntyre, A. (2007). After Virtue. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 187. 
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4 As I noted in paragraph 2.6.1. above. 
5 See appendix A. 
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what the implications are. Does military practice meet the criteria of the definition and 
to what extent is satisfaction primarily found in participating in the activities of that 
practice, or are other - indirect results or purposes - also or even more important? 
3.2.2  In the definition of MacIntyre military activities form without a doubt a  ‘coherent 
and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity.’ Military  activities 
are conducted within an institutional setting that is part of the larger state institution. As 
such the military is socially established. Military activities are complex because of the 
many aspects that are involved in the activity: mission, men, materiel, time, space and 
doctrine. Coherence is required in order to produce the overall result aspired at. 
Because of the complexity of the activities, cooperation between the members of the 
military is a ‘conditio sine qua non’. From these perspectives, military activities do 
qualify as a practice.  
3.2.3.  Whether ‘goods internal to that form of activity are realized’ is less obvious. 
However, there are some strong indications that this is indeed the case. When young 
men and women voluntarily join the military, they often refer to their expectations on 
with regard to the challenging, adventurous and thrilling nature of working within the 
armed forces. The comfort and support of comradeship and teamwork are mostly 
mentioned as well.6 These characteristics that are attributed to the military  and which 
are positively appreciated by those who consider joining the military can be interpreted 
as internal goods. Goods that can only be realized by participating in the practice. These 
findings underpin the notion of the military as a practice. Education and career 
opportunities - typical of an external orientation to a military job - are often mentioned 
as well, but mostly not in the first place and often with a lower priority.7  Which internal 
goods could be involved in military practice will be investigated later in this chapter, in 
relation to my further analysis of military practice. 
3.2.3.  The element of MacIntyre’s definition of the virtues as ‘trying to achieve those 
standards of excellence which are appropriate to, an partially definitive of, that form of 
activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence and human 
conceptions of the ends and goods involved are systematically extended.’ is part and 
parcel of military education, training and exercise. Achieving standards of military skill 
is definitively appropriate, if not definitive of military practice. If these standards are not 
met, there is hardly a question of a military practice as such. Soldiers willingly submit 
themselves to the regimen of intensive education and sometimes harsh training and 
exercise in order to achieve these standards. The value of the skills and drills taught, 
relate directly to qualities that are needed on the battlefield in order to act like a close-
knit team in fulfilling the mission and survive.8 The last element, survival, implies the 
danger of bodily harm, even death. The very real danger of being hurt,  strongly 
underpins the need for meeting standards and achieving excellence. Soldiers realize this 
need for excellence in all aspects of military practice. This awareness is enhanced  once 
they actually experienced the challenges of  real battle and find out that excellence is 
                                                          
6 Gelooven, R. M. W. v. (2009). Basisstudie Imago en Belangstelling. Afdeling Gedragswetenschappen. Den 
Haag, Ministerie van Defensie: 41. P 31.  
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21. See also chapter 6. 
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indeed a force multiplier and improves their chance of surviving this experience 
unscathed.9 
3.2.4.  According to Van Tongeren the notion of a practice not only refers to the kind of 
activities that are part of a practice, but also to how the activities are executed and how 
the participants experience the practice.10 Also from this perspective does the military 
qualify as a practice. Not only are the activities of the practice typical for the military, the 
way to do things and the standards of excellence involved, are part of the practice as 
such, as is experience.11 The idea of military activity as a practice is also supported by 
Huizinga.12 He argues that military activities when practised within the constraints of 
rules do qualify as a kind of game - and thus as  a practice - albeit of a very intense and 
energetic nature. According to Huizinga the nature of a military confrontation as a sort 
of match (agon) is introduced from the very moment the competitors consider each 
other as opponents who compete for a cause they both consider just or entitled to. He 
states further that within this nature of a match it is required that the contenders 
respect each others as equals. In the case this respect is lacking, contenders can still act 
within the rules of a game by voluntarily (and even one-sidedly) abiding to restrictions 
in order to maintain their honour.13 And although this notion is put under pressure in 
new wars, the idea of a military confrontation as a match still has important moral 
implications with regard to the standards and constraints the contestants (voluntarily) 
impose on their activities in trying to achieve their goals. All in all, there are good 
arguments to qualify the military as a practice in the meaning MacIntyre attaches to this 
concept. 
Analyzing military practice 
3.3.1.  To establish  which internal goods and virtues are connected to the military  
practice - according to MacIntyre’s theory - further analysis is required. I will continue 
this analysis by dissecting military practice in its constitutive parts. When we first look 
at the present military as a practice and try to dissect it, we can discern several elements 
that are typical of that practice. Without these elements there would be no military 
practice as such. First of all, the practitioners are aiming at something, a goal that is 
inherent to participating in the practice: they have a task to accomplish. The general task 
of the military in any democratic and constitutional state is articulated in the 
constitution.14 The task  refers to the vital interests of the state and the international 
community and implies the threat with or the actual use of (lethal) force. This task 
requires not only an appropriate armament for the soldiers, but also the skills to use this 
armament in adverse conditions involving bodily danger. These capabilities enable 
soldiers to perform other, sometimes secondary, tasks as well, such as disaster relief, 
development missions, etc.  This notion is often captured in the expression: ‘It’s not a 
                                                          
9 This notion is supported by the results of the interviews that were conducted, the contents of which will 
be discussed in chapter 6. 
10 Tongeren van, P. (2003). Deugdelijk leven. Amsterdam, Sun. P20-22. 
11 Ibid. 
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Universiteits Pers.  P130-150  
13 Ibid, P 130-131. 
14  Bovend'eert, P. P. T., Ed. (2009). Grondwet voor het koninkrijk der Nederlanden Deventer, Kluwer.  
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soldier’s job, but only soldiers can do it.’15 The issue of the actual (changing) content of 
present military  tasks and the influence  on the mental outlook of soldiers will be 
addressed in chapter 7.  But no matter what the actual task is, whether it involves 
attacking an enemy stronghold or assisting civilians in overcoming the  effects of a 
tropical storm, it still is a task which is executed in a military context by soldiers who 
wear a uniform and bear arms. To fulfil these primary and secondary tasks the military 
is deployed by the government - which has the legitimate authority to do so. This 
governmental decision to deploy the military will result in more specific operational 
tasks for the military. These specific operational tasks will be disseminated into many 
minor tasks that underlie military practice. The notion of a task involving the possible 
use of force is definitely a constitutive part of military practice. In general there would 
be no military practice without an (authorized) task to perform. 
 
3.3.2.  Next the military practice implies the use of weapons. It is not for nothing that the 
military is denoted as the nation’s ‘power of the sword´. We cannot picture a modern 
armed force without arms. It would be a conceptual inconsistency. These arms involve a 
vast array of weapon systems and related special equipment, including a uniform to be 
worn. It also involves the organization and shops to maintain weapon-systems, the 
vehicles to transport spare-parts, fuel and ammunition, as well as clothes, food and 
water for those who operate the weapon-systems. All these elements are necessary to 
bring to bear the capacity for violence. So we can conclude that the wielding of arms, of 
specialized equipment, is an integral part of military practice.  
3.3.3.  Another aspect of military practice is the involvement of a large number of people 
in executing complex activities, which necessitate close cooperation. Without this 
cooperation the military could not function in any coherent way. This cooperation takes 
place at all levels: between services, formations and units  and most direct and intense 
on the individual level. It is hard, if not impossible to conceive military practice as a 
random collection of individual activities. Therefore cooperation between those who 
participate in military practice is most certainly a constitutive part of this practice.  
3.3.4.  There are still other elements that determine military practice. The military is 
used to secure the vital interests of the state through the threat or actual use of violence. 
This means by definition that there is some kind of opposing force as well. This opposing 
force, the enemy, will equally defend its vital interests and is often willing to use violence 
as well. The potential mutual use of violence could ultimately result in (mortal) danger 
for those who participate in the military practice. Military practice is unequivocally 
connected with operations against an enemy. And as the enemy has lethal weapons as 
well, there can be no military practice without danger. 
3.3.5.  A practice is always related to a specific time and place. This time and place is 
often strictly confined:  a medical operating theatre during working hours or a sports 
playing ground in leisure time. The confined time and place in which military practice is 
realized, is called a theatre of operations. This is a certain space at sea, on land and in the 
air where the military practice of threatening with, or actually wielding violence is 
realized. Of course, there are training areas where the military prepares for their tasks, 
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but these are not the places where military practice finds its ultimate realization, its 
‘raison d’ être’. A theatre of  operations, a battlefield, used to be  - and sometimes still is – 
determined in time and space. It is that space in which the battle would take place (like 
the Northern German Plain of the cold war) or has taken place (like the air battle over 
The Hague). Its duration used to be predictable as well (like the  Dutch Republic’s Navy’s 
raid at Chatham), or is determined post hoc (like the Dutch eighty year war of 
liberation). It is typical of modern military practice that the space (a theatre), and the 
time (a period of conflict) could be anywhere and anytime. This feature of relatively 
confined battle space in an undetermined time and place in which the practice takes 
place, is very much a constitutive feature of modern military practice.  
3.3.6.  If a specific practice is to be recognized as such, it must be similar in appearance, 
even at different time and places. There must be some internal structure that enables 
the recognition of a practice as an activity we have experienced before. These repeating 
features are captured in some kind of basic rules. Rules are often also the determining 
factor in setting the goal that is central to the practice. Without some kind of rules it 
would be hard, if not impossible to recognize a practice as such. And there are certainly 
rules that are inherent to military practice. These rules are meant to safeguard the moral 
conduct of the war and are based on the ‘jus in bello’. The rules include (inter)national 
laws and (inter)national military regimen. One of its main tenets refers to the absolute 
prohibition on killing innocent (non combatant) civilians. This is one of the touchstones 
on the moral worth by which the war is conducted. At the same time, it is clear that it is 
impossible to wage war without killing any innocent bystanders.  This fact is 
internationally recognized, and in order to reconcile the absolute prohibition on 
attacking non-combatants with the legitimate conduct of military activities; the concept 
of double effect was introduced.16 Other rules are meant to control large numbers of 
people who live and fight together under sometimes extreme circumstances. These rules 
constitute the military regimen, the formal embedding of military discipline. Therefore 
rules are a constitutive part of all practices - the military included - and specific rules 
determine military practice. Many of these rules are set by either the international 
institutions or the highest authority of the realm: the national government.17 This means 
that the military is not autonomous in setting the rules that govern the practice. The 
military has only a limited autonomy to establish rules that are necessary to enable 
                                                          
16 The concept of double effect is part of the tradition of just war. Its argument runs as follows. It is 
permitted to commit an act that is likely to have evil consequences (the killing of non combatants) 
provided the following four conditions hold: (1) the act is good in itself or at least indifferent, which 
means it is a legitimate act of war; (2)  the direct effect is morally acceptable - the destruction of military 
supplies, for example the killing of enemy soldiers; (3) the intention of the actor is good, that is, he aims 
only at the acceptable effect, the evil effect is not one of his ends nor is it a means to his ends (in his effort 
to minimize evil he even should accept increased risk for himself. Civilians have a right that due care is 
taken.); (4) the good effect is sufficiently good to compensate for allowing the evil effect, it must be 
justifiable under the proportionality rule. And proportionality in the tradition of just war means, that in 
the conduct of hostilities it is not permissible to do: ‘any mischief which does not tend materially to the 
end (of victory), nor any mischief of which the conduciveness to the end is slight in comparison with the 
amount of mischief.’ See: Walzer, M. (1977) Just and unjust wars. New York, Basic books. P 129 and 158. 
Italics added by the author. 
17 Nowadays parts of the sovereign power of nations is transferred to international institutions. E.g. many 
of the members of the EU transferred their authority to distribute a national currency to the EU which 
issues the Euro; European laws are of a higher judicial level than national laws; European agricultural 
rules and regulations dominate national policies; etc. Also according to Dutch laws the obligations under 
international treaties have preference over the national constitution.  
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practicing the practice in an orderly way. One thing is abundantly clear however: rules 
too define military practice. 
3.3.7.  Are the aforementioned constitutive parts really characteristic of the military as a 
practice? Of course there are other practices that require special equipment and 
necessitate cooperation with others and in some way are dangerous as a result primarily 
of the opponent’s conduct: for example in ice-hockey. But this is a practice which does 
not involve the intention of deliberately harming the opponent. Also the police practice 
is different, although many features of that practice seem similar to the military. The 
police also have a task that may involve the use of violence and has to abide by rules. 
The use of lethal violence by the police is however only admissible as a means of self-
defence in response to a clear and present danger. Cooperation is also a feature of police 
practice, albeit on a smaller scale. The purpose is however totally different; the purpose 
of the police practice is aimed at maintaining law and order in the realm. The use of 
violence to enforce law and order is a means of last resort and the danger that ensues 
from policing is an exception rather than a defining characteristic. In consequence there 
are no enemies, only fellow citizens, some of which break the law and need correction. 
This correction sometimes requires a ‘strong arm’ especially in the face of serious - even 
armed – criminal activities. Furthermore, the citizens are (including those committing 
misdemeanours and crimes) often living in the same area the police officer lives in as 
well. This means that the area of responsibility of participants in the police practice is 
often also the area they live in. However, the main difference between police practice 
and military practice is the feature of the potential use of violence. For the military the 
threat with or use of violence is the primary task and as such a ‘means of first resort’ 
that aims at inflicting harm - or worse death. This is typical for the military, and is 
lacking in any other practice. But violence alone does not typecast military practice in 
full: the other elements (task, arms and cooperation as well as rules) are also 
constitutive. Without all these characteristics, military practice could well refer to an 
activity of individual psychopaths or banditry instead. The former has no conscientious 
barrier against killing and are not known for their willingness and capacity to cooperate 
while the latter lack legitimacy as to the rules they are subject to and in the goals they 
aspire at.  
3.3.8.  Thus the constitutive elements of military practice I identified, define that 
practice. These elements can be summarized as follows: the military has a task to 
perform that involves  the wielding of arms and other special equipment and requires 
close cooperation between soldiers on a battlefield in an undetermined time and space, 
while abiding by rules in facing an enemy and danger. Together these elements make up 
the characteristic features of military practice. They are all part of a whole and if one 
part is missing the entity of military practice as such will be lost. From this perspective,  
of connectivity of the constitutive elements, it also follows that is virtually impossible to 
establish a priority or hierarchy between these elements and the further elaboration in 
the following paragraphs does not suggest one. 
Internal goods 
3.4.1.  Related to these constitutive parts, I will try to discern the internal goods which 
are related to military practice. This is not an easy task, as internal goods - as I explained 
in the preceding chapter - are a combination of the characteristics of a practice  and 
personal desires, expectations, mental states.  I will try to discern the internal goods by 
interpreting the constitutive parts of the practice as its main characteristics. The 
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influence of mental states is by definition a very personal affair and therefore hard to 
fathom. On the other hand, specific practices do attract people with similar mental 
dispositions. So there seems to be a shared notion of  the internal goods related to a 
specific practice. Insight in these shared notions can be gained from military (auto) 
biographies and research on motivations for young people to voluntarily join the 
military. I will try to discern the internal goods by combining the interpretation of the 
constitutive elements of the military with the expectations of those who join.  Thus, I aim 
at giving a plausible argument on the internal goods of military practice. However, by 
aiming at the expectations of people considering joining the military, I run the risk of 
introducing idealistic notions that are not corroborated in the reality of the practice. 
Internal goods experienced could be appreciated higher or lower than the expectations 
beforehand. I will address this issue in chapter 6 in which I will investigate to what 
extent my findings are supported by soldiers whom I interviewed. 
3.4.2.   To start with, having a task to accomplish implies the actual realization of the 
task involved. The accomplishment might be relatively easy or very difficult because of 
adverse, even sheer impossible circumstances, let alone obstruction by others, e.g. an 
enemy. It is plausible however, that the accomplishment  of a task results in a sense of 
fulfilment and achievement over a responsibility shouldered and living up to one’s self-
esteem.18 There is evidence that the nature of the task could also be relevant. The 
deployment of the military in missions for operations other than war also seems to have 
an inherent attraction.19 Also the complexity of the task is of influence on the amount of 
satisfaction gained.20 Satisfaction over tasks accomplished - especially as complex as in 
the military - could be therefore identified as an internal good related to the constitutive 
element of a task as a defining part of military practice.   
3.4.3.  Carrying  arms, wearing a uniform and wielding other specialized equipment is 
often accompanied by a feeling of excitement21 and pride22 as well as a sense of power 
and deep felt satisfaction over the skilful and professional mastery of these powerful 
systems that can wreak havoc and death. This feature and the notion of being a member 
of a special group that is authorized to use this power - if necessary - may well result in 
an added sense of pride.23 I, therefore consider excitement, pride and satisfaction to be 
internal goods related to the notion of arms as a constitutive part of military practice.24 
                                                          
18 Marlantes, K. (2010). Matterhorn. London, Corvus. P 476: ‘His only choice being whether or not too play 
his part with heart and courage. He ran because fate had placed him in a position of responsibility and he 
had accepted the burden. He ran because his self-respect required it.’   
19 C.D.P.O. (2000). Een baan als militair. Afdeling Gedragswetenschappen. Den Haag, Ministerie van 
Defensie: 66. P 21, figure 4.1 Some 23% of potential soldiers refer to ‘helping people’ and doing 
‘something useful’ as reasons to join the military. 
20 Rawls, J. (2006). Een theorie van rechtvaardigheid (A theory of justice). Rotterdam, Lemniscaat. 
P432,433. 
21 Mullaney, G. M. (2009). The unforgiving minute; a soldier's education. London, Penguin books. P 239: ‘I 
was uneasy with the excitement I felt about shooting. Shouldn’t I have felt remorse at aiming live rounds 
at other people?’ 
22 Marlantes, K. (2010). Matterhorn. London, Corvus.  P401: ‘Nice shot Mellas said. You gonna try for 
another one? Beats humping, was the answer.’ 
23 For one of he many stories on the care soldiers put in their weapons see Herr, M. (1978). Dispatches. 
London, Pan Books. P 117: ‘The M-79 had been cut down and fitted with a special stock. It was obviously a 
well loved  object; you could see the kind of work that had gone into it by the amount of light caught from 
the flares that glistened on the stock.’  
24 An average of 58% of young people considering joining the armed forces state that  their expectations 
are primarily based on the assumed content of their job as a soldier. The other main incentives are:  
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3.4.4.  The enemy is a necessary element of military practice. This could be  real enemy 
who aims at killing soldiers, it could be a merely hostile population or even it could 
include non-human threats like an immediate natural danger (floods, volcano’s, disease) 
that a population needs protection from.  The aim of military operations, of military 
practice, is to overcome the enemy - no matter the nature in which it manifests itself. 
Succeeding in this can or will result in deeply felt contentment and tranquillity, as well 
as pride and satisfaction  when the enemy is indeed overcome and over the way the 
enemy fighter is treated after he has been overcome, without brutality and without 
contempt and brazen superiority.25  In addition to pride and satisfaction, contentment 
over an enemy overcome could well be considered an internal good of military practice 
too.  
3.4.5.  The wielding of lethal arms, the undetermined nature of the battlefield and the 
presence of an enemy all result in danger as part of the military practice. Facing danger, 
real physical, even mortal danger, brings excitement, elation and joy over being alive 
and completing a successful action in the face of sometimes heavy odds.26  This feature 
gives an extra dimension to the agonal nature of the practice. The excitement and thrill 
this involves may qualify also being among the internal goods of military practice.   
3.4.6.  Cooperation with others in the military results in the comfortable feeling to 
belong and the warmth of a very special human relationship as a result of shared 
hardship and (mortal) danger. Also there is the warmth and comfort in being valued, 
esteemed and admired as a member of a very special group, as well as in expressing 
admiration and esteem for others.27 This notion is often found in military (auto) 
biographies and novels.28 A sense of belonging and the comfort this brings is plausibly 
an internal good of the practice.29 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
personal development (39%); purpose (25%); conditions of employment and atmosphere (11%). The 
most important notions pertaining to the content include: ‘variation’(20%); ‘excitement’ (15%); 
‘challenging’ (15%) and ‘sportsmanship’(11%). C.D.P.O. (2000). Een baan als militair. Afdeling 
Gedragswetenschappen. Den Haag, Ministerie van Defensie: 66. Figure 4.1 P 21. See also Gelooven, R. M. 
W. v. (2009). Basisstudie Imago en Belangstelling. Afdeling Gedragswetenschappen. Den Haag, Ministerie 
van Defensie: 41. P28. 
25 Holmes, R. (1985). Acts of war. London, Wellington house. P 373; ‘No personal hostility whatever. 
Indeed an enemy position had been taken, one tended to take the same attitude of care and welfare to 
their dead and wounded as if they belonged tot our own side. There was an abhorrence of any 
maltreatment of prisoners… especially when they had put up a good fight.’ 
26 Jünger, E. (2003). Storm of steel (In Stahlgewittern). London, Penguin books. P 88: ‘…when I was lying 
on my pallet (after the first day of the Somme offensive) in my dug out, teeth chattering and quite unable 
to sleep. Rather I had the sensation of a supreme  awakeness – as if I had a little electricity bell going off 
somewhere in my body.’ (italics added). 
27 Marlantes, K. (2010). Matterhorn. London, Corvus. P 476: ‘He ran because his self-respect required it. 
He ran because he loved his friends…’   
28 An early mentioning of these feelings can be found in Curling, H. (1970). The recollections of rifleman 
Harris. London, Portland House. P 112. (a biography of a British soldier in the Peninsular war in the early 
eighteenth century. Originally published in 1816) and Crane, S. (1994). The red badge of courage. Ware, 
Wordsworth Editions. P 11 and 66 (An autobiography of a soldier of the American civil war. Originally 
published in 1895). An example of a recent account is found in Junger, S. (2010). War. London, Fourth 
Estate. P 79. (A story of an American outpost in the Afghan war in the early twenty-first century). 
29 C.D.P.O. (2000). Een baan als militair. Afdeling Gedragswetenschappen. Den Haag, Ministerie van 
Defensie: 66. P 21,Figure 4.1. An average of 14% of those considering joining the armed forces state that 
the notion of an atmosphere of ‘good fellowship’ is one of the attractive features of the military.  
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3.4.7.  The requirement to act in a theatre of operations undetermined in a time and 
space produces the thrill of participating in an adventure the outcome of which is unsure 
and where the stakes are high.30 This experience and the tension it involves adds to 
feeling of being alive.31 This feeling is enhanced by a sense of relieve and satisfaction of 
having accomplished what you were expected to, especially after being brought to 
exhaustion. This exhaustion is the result of sheer physical effort, lack of rest and sleep 
and stress created by uncertainty and danger. The notion of adventure - both in a 
physical and a mental sense - captures these features and adventure appears to be an 
obvious internal good of military practice. 
3.4.8.  Rules create stability and certainty in a for the rest chaotic environment. Adhering 
to the rules, discipline,  helps to overcome the sometimes bewildering experiences of the 
battlefield. They provide comfort in difficult situations and result in contentment having 
lived up to them.32 Abiding by rules and the stability these provide and the resulting 
structure of responsibilities and military regimen are part of the expectations juveniles 
have of the military.33 Structure and stability seem therefore part of the internal goods 
of the practice as well.34 
3.4.9.  Looking at the nature of the internal goods, I have discerned in the preceding 
paragraphs the following remarks can be made. Some of the internal goods seem to be 
connected to more than one constitutive part, a characteristic of the military practice,  
and vice versa. The challenge of adventure could be related to the experience of wielding 
arms, joining a fraternity , going to unexpected and strange places and facing danger as 
well. Pride could also refer to tasks accomplished, wearing a uniform, being a member of 
a special group and facing danger successfully, etc. Moreover, as internal goods are also 
a matter of individual expectations and desires it is not easy - if not virtually impossible - 
to discern exactly what is one kind of volition and what is another. But this many-
sidedness of the different internal goods also creates an interconnectedness that 
enhances the overall coherence and inherent value of the internal goods. This kind of 
coherence mirrors the interconnectedness of the constitutive parts and adds to the 
overall identity of military practice.  A second deduction that can be made, is that it is 
hard to ascertain to what extent these internal goods are appreciated in a similar way. I 
refer to the distinction between weakly and strongly evaluated desires which I 
introduced in the preceding chapter.  The notions like satisfaction, contentment, 
excitement, etc. can preponderant be identified as weakly evaluated desires, as they  - 
for the most part - do not imply moral deliberation. Some people have (some of) these 
                                                          
30 Ibid, 30% of those potentially enlisting mention adventure and challenge as a reason for joining the 
military. Another 5% refers to physical challenges and personal development. 
31 Holmes, R. (1985). Acts of war. London, Wellington house. P 272: ‘Basically I enjoined Vietnam, recalled 
one veteran. It was the most vivid part of my life… You were so aware of time you could taste it.’ 
32 Keegan, J. (1978). The face of battle. Harmondsworth, Penguin books. P 175: ‘For a crowd is the 
antithesis of an army, a human assembly animated not by discipline but by mood, by the play of inconstant 
and potentially infectious emotion which,  if it spreads, is fatal to the army’s subordination.’ 
33 Junger, S. (2010). War. London, Fourth Estate. P 123: ‘They were both highly trained and entirely in 
control  of their own fate, and that allowed them to ignore the statistically reality that they had only o fifty-
fifty change of surviving their  tour.’ 
34 C.D.P.O. (2000). Een baan als militair. Afdeling Gedragswetenschappen. Den Haag, Ministerie van 
Defensie: 66. P 21,Figure 4.1. An average of 21% of potential members of  the armed forces state that the 
notion of an discipline is one of the attractive features of the military. An additional 14% mention further 
education as well. 
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desires, while others have not.35 Other notions, like ‘wanting to do something for other 
people’ and ‘making the world a safer and better place to live in’ can be considered as 
strongly valuated desires, as they imply moral deliberation. However, there is evidence 
that many of these notions,  the internal goods to be gained in a practice - either weakly 
or strongly evaluated - are shared by those who are interested in joining the military.36 
Applicants for a job in the military also refer to other incentives for joining.  However, 
these pertain to extrinsic characteristics like a steady job, a regular income, education 
opportunities or ‘to get away from it all’.37 These considerations do not qualify as 
internal goods as with these the military is seen as a means to obtain other benefits. On 
balance my claim seems justified that I identified the relevant internal goods related to 
military practice.  
Conclusions 
3.5.1.  Based on the notion of internal goods as forwarded by MacIntyre, I have in the 
preceding paragraphs made clear why the military  activities qualify as a practice. I 
proceeded by analyzing the practice and identifying the constitutive elements of military 
practice: task, arms, cooperation, enemies, danger and an undetermined time and place. 
Next I made a first attempt to identify which internal goods are inherent to the military 
practice. The goods I identified are based on the constitutive elements - which I 
described as the characteristics - of military practice and the expectations of those who 
join the military. There is evidence that the internal goods I discerned are indeed those 
that attract people to participating in military practice.38 Almost always it is a 
combination of some internal goods that appeal to those who want to join the military. 
Corroborations can be found in military (auto) biographies and other military non-
fiction publications, including research papers.39  And lastly, it is founded on my 
personal experience as a (former) participant in the practice. However, there still 
remains one problematic issue and that is the relation MacIntyre assumes between 
internal goods and virtues.  This assumption could not be explicitly corroborated, as I 
did not find conclusive evidence of a one to one relation between a specific 
                                                          
35 Taylor, C. (1985). Philosophical papers 1: human agency and language. Cambridge, University Press. P 
1- 44 (chapter one: what is human agency). 
36 Rees Vellinga, N. van (2006). Belangstellingsonderzoek 2005-2006, Een baan als militair. Afdeling 
Gedragswetenschappen. Den Haag, Ministerie van Defensie. P10: The reasons for considering a job in the 
armed forces in the survey were: interesting in general 17%;  adventurous 15%; challenging 15%; 
physical demanding 12%; diversity 9%; action 6%; see the world 3%. All in all 77% of the responses were 
internally job oriented. 
37 Ibid, Externally oriented responses totalled 23%: salary 4%; education 6% and 13% miscellaneous. 
38 Rees Vellinga, N. van (2006). Belangstellingsonderzoek 2005-2006, Een baan als militair. Afdeling 
Gedragswetenschappen. Den Haag, Ministerie van Defensie and 38 C.D.P.O. (2000). Een baan als militair. 
Afdeling Gedragswetenschappen. Den Haag, Ministerie van Defensie: 66. 
39  Some examples of these are: Gelooven, R. M. W. v. (2009). Basisstudie Imago en Belangstelling. Afd. 
Gedragswetenschappen. Den Haag, Ministerie van Defensie: 41; Blaschke, P. H., Gramm, R., Sixt, W., Ed. 
(1986). De officio: zu den Herausforderungen des Offiziersberuf. Hannover, Lutherisches Verlaghaus; 
Broesder, W. A. (2011). Soldiers wielding Swords and Ploughshares. Psychology. Leuven,  Katholieke 
Universiteit Leuven. PhD: 114; Cook, M. L. (2008). Ethics education, ethics training and character 
development in the US air force academy. Ethics education in the military. Robinson, P., De Lee, N., Carrick, 
D. Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing Limited: 57 – 66; Dixon, N. F. (1984). On the psychology of military 
incompetence. London, Jonathan Cape; Crane, S. (1994). The red badge of courage. Ware, Wordsworth 
Editions; Curling, H. (1970). The recollections of rifleman Harris. London, Portland House; du Gard, R. M. 
(1999). Lieutenant-Colonel de Maumort. New York, Knopf; Graves, R. (1976). Goodbye to all that. London, 
Penguin books; Jünger, E. (2003). Storm of steel (In Stahlgewittern). London, Penguin books; Marlantes, K. 
(2011). What it is like to go to war. New York, Atlantic Monthly Press. 
45 
 
characteristic of military practice and a particular internal good; these connections are 
more complex. In the next chapter I will continue my elaborations on military practice 
by identifying  and discuss military virtues. 
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Appendix A to chapter 3: praxis and poièsis 
Activity A: preponderant characteristics of a practice 
Activity B: characteristics a balance of both practice and poièsis 
Activity C: preponderant characteristics of poièsis 
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Chapter 4: military virtues. 
 
Introduction. 
4.1.  In the preceding chapter I identified the constitutive elements of military practice 
and the internal goods of that practice. Based on these findings, I can now argue what is 
required to excel in the military practice. A collection of real examples of excellent 
practitioners may be one way of completing this picture. Every practice has its plethora 
of heroes and villains, of ‘the good’ and ‘the bad’, and it will be no trouble to form an 
opinion on who are  ‘the virtuous’.  The cogency of this approach often depends on 
whether the results reflect personal presuppositions or coincide with well established 
intuitions. The advantage of MacIntyre’s interpretation of Aristotelian virtue ethics is 
that his theory aims at establishing analytical standards to identify which virtues are 
relevant to a practice. Therefore I will proceed by trying to forgo all preconceived ideas 
and attempt to follow the logic of his theory, in which MacIntyre  defines a virtue as: ‘an 
acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to 
achieve those goods that are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively 
prevents us from achieving any such goods.’ 
Virtues and the military 
4.2.1.  Before arguing which virtues can be identified as ‘military’, I first want to address 
the meaning of this adjective. Clemenceau famously observed that military justice is to 
justice what military music is to music.1 He obviously meant to say that the adjective 
military infers to a limited practical purpose with instruments of limited scope and 
nuances. Military virtues aim at ‘bolstering the wavering man’.2 I will elaborate on this 
by means of the following three examples. The first example pertains to a soldier. During 
an attack, a group of soldiers takes cover in a kind of earthwork they captured. Suddenly 
a hand grenade is lobbed into their temporary hideout. The soldier who spots the 
grenade can do several things. He can jump out of the hole and take cover, thus saving 
his life. The other soldiers who have not seen the grenade land and remain in the 
hideout are seriously wounded. The soldier in question could also have done another 
thing: that is, grab the grenade and throw it out of the hideout.  In the former action he 
saved his own life and could continue the fight; that the other soldiers did not take 
evasive action is their misfortune for which some of them paid dearly. In the latter 
action he took a serious risk that the grenade would explode before he had a change to 
throw it away, causing serious injury to him or even worse, but he would have saved his 
comrades. There is no doubt that we would consider the second course of action an 
almost perfect example of the military virtue of courage. In the second example  a 
civilian paramedic is the main actor. On his way home he witnesses a serious traffic 
accident. Of course he immediately offers assistance. One man is seriously wounded and 
is choking. No matter what the paramedic does, the victim does not get any air and loses 
consciousness. The paramedic knows that an extended lack of oxygen will cause damage 
to the victim’s brain, if not worse. Although he is not licensed to do so, he performs an 
improvised tracheotomy, consequently saving the victim’s life. The paramedic did not 
risk his own life in this action, but he ran the risk of serious problems for performing an 
unlicensed intervention. However, there is little doubt that we would consider this 
intervention a courageous act. In the third example, there is a female civil servant 
                                                          
1 Clemenceau apparently offered the comment orally, but is universally attributed to him. 
2 Wintle, J., Ed. (1989). The dictionary of war quotations. London, Hodder and Stoughton. Homer, The 
Iliad. 
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working in the town social welfare department. One day a notoriously aggressive client 
is at one of the counters. On former occasions he abused a fellow (male) civil servant 
who served him, and he had even tried to hit him. As it is his client, he is the one who has 
to deal with him, but it is obvious he is terrified. Without saying another word the female 
civil servant goes to the counter and says: ‘My colleague is indisposed, can I help you?’ 
She only runs the risk of being abused or an attempt at assaulting her. Nevertheless, it is 
obvious that the terrified colleague considers her a woman of courage. I have described 
three courageous acts, but only one of them can be labelled as  military courage as it was 
displayed by a soldier in a specific context. A military virtue applies to the disposition of 
soldiers to act in an excellent way in a military context only. The adjective ‘military’ does 
not mean that virtues - like courage - are only found in the military, or that there are 
virtues that can only be found in soldiers. 3 
4.2.2.   MacIntyre’s defines the virtues as acquired qualities that enable the participant to 
achieve the internal goods that are inherent to participating in the practice. The fact that 
it is an acquired quality means that virtuous conduct is at first taught and then put into 
practice . Further education will help to internalize the appropriate disposition.4 
Eventually - by experience - being virtuous becomes a habit.5 This does not mean that  a 
virtue is a mere rote. As I explained in chapter 2, a virtue, an Aristotelian habit, requires 
deliberation as well. The frequent deliberation adds quality to the habit and as such the 
disposition to act virtuous becomes embedded in the individual’s character.6 A virtue 
than is a disposition, an attitude of understanding what ought to be done, and to act 
accordingly. The content of the ‘ought’ is the result of practical wisdom: what is 
appropriate and feasible in the situation and context given. From this perspective 
soldiers could do with only one virtue: practical wisdom. However, according to 
Aristotle, practical wisdom is essential in deliberating on the appropriate course of 
action. According to him, practical wisdom is the virtue of the intellect. The disposition 
to act in moral matters is a matter of the virtues of character.7 The spheres in which 
these moral actions are displayed are of a different nature and refer to the complexities, 
the different ‘spheres’ of life, the different practices and the different aspects of a 
practice.8 As I explained in chapter 2, we therefore need both virtues of character as well 
as the virtue of practical wisdom.9  
4.2.3.   The question then is which spheres are determinant in military practice and 
which specific virtues of character are needed.  MacIntyre refers to the internal goods to 
be achieved. This provides a first hint as to appropriate military virtues. The internal 
goods of military practice are a combination of the characteristics of the practice and the 
attraction these characteristics have for those who - want to - join the military. In the 
preceding chapter I tried to identify these internal goods. The characteristics of military 
                                                          
3 ‘But the military virtues are not a class apart: they are virtues which are virtues in every walk of life… 
nonetheless military virtues being jewels set in iron and blood.’ Hackett, J. (1983). The profession of arms. 
London, Sidgwick and Jackson. P 141. 
4 Baarda, T. A. van, Verweij, D.E.M., Ed. (2006). Military ethics, the Dutch approach. Leiden, Koninklijke 
Brill N.V.  P 11. 
5 Aristoteles (2005). Ethica Nicomachea. Budel, Damon. Par. 1103a23-24 
6 Verweij, D. E. M. (2010). Geweten onder schot. Amsterdam Boom. P 99. See also  van Tongeren, P., 
Becker,M., Hoekstra, A., Karssing, E., Niessen, R. (2010). Deugdethiek en integriteit Assen, van Gorcum. P 
22- 25. 
7 Aristoteles (2005). Ethica Nicomachea. Budel, Damon. Par.1103a1-10. 
8 See par.2.6.3. above. 
9 See par 2.6.9. above. 
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practice were established clearly. The expectations and desires involved - as the other 
aspects of the internal goods - were less clear. Similar desires and expectations could 
refer to different characteristics.  This has to do with the inherent subjective character of 
these desires and expectations. Due to the subjective nature of desires and expectations, 
it seems problematic to ascertain which desires and expectations result in which specific 
choices and actions by an agent. Virtues suffer from a similar indeterminateness - as I 
explained in chapter 2.10 It seems problematic to define virtues in such a definite way as 
to establish a distinct objective notion that is completely separate from other closely 
related notions.11  However, it is possible to identify the characteristics of a practice and 
which standards of excellence pertain to these characteristics. In practice, it would then 
still be possible to establish to what extent conduct meets these standards of excellence 
and deserves to be qualified as virtuous. Hackett puts it thus: ‘Thus while you may 
indeed hope to meet these virtues in every walk of life, and a good deal of educational 
effort is spent on developing them as being generally desirable, in the profession of arms 
they are functionally indispensable.’12 However, even then it is hard to ascertain which 
virtue is dominant in a virtuous course of action.13 On the other hand,  this 
indeterminateness could also allow for a certain degree of flexibility. Given the 
development of a situation the dominance of one virtue could be superseded by another, 
adding to the overall virtuous character of the conduct in question. This flexibility 
between virtues could be seen as an asset of the concept of military practice as it adds to 
the internal coherence of the standards of excellence that define the practice. So I will 
proceed by trying to establish which standards of excellence are relevant in military 
practice. Aspiring at these standards should result in acquired human dispositions that 
will enhance the experience of the internal goods of military practice I identified in the 
preceding chapter. As I aim at establishing practical applicable concepts, the virtues I 
identify must be tangible in order to appeal to soldiers as relevant and worthwhile to 
aspire at. The concept of the virtues as such - a disposition and not a set of rules -  should 
provide the flexibility required by the very dynamic circumstances in which the virtues 
are to be displayed.  Thus, by identifying tangible military virtues I aim at establishing 
practical and morally relevant notions, which will enhance the overall excellence of the 
practitioners. The moral notions aim primarily at enhancing the excellence of the moral 
components of the practice: what is required, what is to be done. This is a matter of the 
virtues of character. The practical notions aim at enhancing the excellence of the 
primarily technical aspects of the practice: how to do what is required. This is a matter 
of practical wisdom.  
4.2.4.   After having established what is a relevant virtue in a military sense, the question 
that also needs to be addressed is how to describe  these virtues in a way that provides 
tangible clues for soldiers which kind of conduct is appropriate. As explained before this 
is not an easy task.14 However, some kind of defining argument is required, in order to 
provide tangible standards of excellence that can be aspired at. However, we must 
acknowledge that although a virtue is indicated by a generic term, this does not imply a 
generic meaning. The first limitation of its meaning is found in the context,  the specific 
                                                          
10 See paragraph 2.6.10. - 2.6.12. above. 
11 Sherman, N. (1989). The Fabric of Character: Aristotle's Theory of Virtue. Oxford, Clarendon Press. P 11: 
‘As a theory it remains inexact, awaiting the more determinate operations of practical reason in its 
perceptual and decision-making roles.’ 
12 Hackett, J. (1983). The profession of arms. London, Sidgwick and Jackson. P 141. 
13 As I explained in paragraph 2.6.12 above. 
14  See paragraph 2.6.10. - 2.6.12. above. 
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practice in which the virtue is expressed. For example, resilience has a different meaning 
in rugby than in chess. In the former, it is primarily a matter of physical endurance, 
while in the latter it is first of all a matter of staying mentally alert. A second limitation is 
found in the practical orientation and value of a virtue. Resilience is not merely an 
abstract notion used in the deliberations of theoretical wisdom. It is a notion used in 
practical wisdom that finds its meaning in its application in actions in the context of a 
practice. The third limitation is that the meaning of a virtue is also a matter of the 
situational circumstances.15 How to come to a decision on what is an appropriate action 
in a specific situation? Different agents could easily come to different conclusions. The 
method of Aristotle, using  antonyms (choosing between the vice of deficiency and the 
vice of excess) already implies some kind of indeterminateness. Therefore, it is hardly 
possible to articulate an exact prescription on how to appreciate and interpret the 
virtuous character of human conduct. A further exploration will result in establishing 
which virtues are relevant in military practice and in providing a broad description that 
aims at providing insight into the meaning of the respective military virtues. Based on 
the characteristics of military practice and the internal goods involved I will successively 
address responsibility, competence, comradeship, respect, courage, resilience and 
discipline.16 
Responsibility 
4.3.1.  When I look at the notion of a task involving the threat or use of violence as one of 
the constitutive parts of military practice, I have identified as the connected internal 
good: a sense of a sense of fulfilment and achievement over a responsibility shouldered 
and living up to one’s self-respect. Now we must have a closer look on what this entails. 
The execution of a military task is, first of all, a matter of duty. Soldiers have sworn an 
oath to stand by their duty.  Dutch soldiers swear loyalty to the king, as the institutional 
head of state, obedience to the law and submission to the military regimen.17 Most of the 
time military tasks come in the form of orders to be executed. As long as these orders 
are within the bounds of the law and given by a lawful authority, the soldier has the 
obligation to adhere by his oath and to obey. However, I have argued that duty alone is 
not a very practical moral yardstick in military practice.18 Duties and the rules they 
imply are static whereas the situations in which these rules must be applied are very 
dynamic and situations may occur in which it is hard to establish which rules apply, if 
any.19 On the other hand, the pressure duty exerts should not be underestimated. Duty 
has a strong obligatory value:  to neglect one’s duty is not a matter of indifference. 
Especially holding a public office requires discharging the duties of that office. The wider 
public expects this and often it is required by law. Furthermore, holding a public office 
                                                          
15 Aristotle (2004). The Nicomachean ethics. London, Penguin books. Par.1106b1-5. The middle should 
not be interpreted as a matter of arithmetic, because: ‘Supposing that 10 pounds of food is a large and  2 
pounds a small allowance for an athlete, it will not follow that a trainer will prescribe 6 pounds; for even 
this is perhaps too much or too little for the person to receive it – too little, but to much for one who is 
only beginning to train.’  
16 A schematic representation of the relationship between the characteristics of military practice, the 
internal goods involved and the ensuing virtues is found in annex A to this chapter. 
17 Huntington, S. P. (1957). The soldier and the state. Cambridge (Massachusetts), Harvard University 
Press. P8-18. 
18 See par. 2.3. before. 
19 Toner, J. H. (2002). A letter to Garcia: leading soldiers in moral mayhem. The future of the army 
profession. L. J. Matthews (ed.). Boston, McGraw – Hill. P 333. 
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and the discharge of public duties this office requires, is open to public scrutiny.20  
Holding a public office therefore requires a firm commitment to just institutions and 
laws. But there is more; in not doing what one is supposed to do the self esteem of the 
agent is under pressure. Especially In the case of holding a public office, as the soldier 
does.21 Johnson states that: ‘self estimation is a crucial element in establishing a moral 
balance between goodness and harm.’ He continues with: ‘the moral character of office 
holders is necessary for a moral limit to be placed on their actions.’22 Johnson argues 
that moral character is required, which suggests that the notion of duty alone does not 
suffice. This sounds plausible as duty is imposed. Duty has an external source and it is 
not an internal disposition. Besides, duty is minimalistic: it suffices to do one’s duty and 
to adhere merely by the rules that duty prescribes. In a case in which the dynamics of a 
situation creates a state of affairs beyond the call of duty, supererogative actions are not 
required. This latter argument could be countered by appealing to a wider sense of duty 
that will compel one to continue and complete the task at hand and thus fulfil the wider 
obligation one is under.23 However, this argument does not address the problem that the 
notion of duty involves when compared with a virtue: duty has an external origin while a 
virtue refers to an internal disposition.  
4.3.2.   So there still lacks a notion that covers this internal disposition to act 
appropriately in the accomplishment of a military task. Bieri forwards a powerful idea 
which seems to fit MacIntyre’s theory.24 According to him, an action first requires a 
desire, which is then deliberated upon. Next the agent reaches a decision as to the 
realization of this desire. Only then the notion of the personal will is added, which 
results in an action by the agent. The agent is willing to act. The agent has a free choice 
on how to act, which makes him accountable for his action: he has to bear the 
responsibility of his action.25 This does not mean that the agent is completely free is his 
choices and his actions. First of all, his desire must be feasible to satisfy.26 Other, internal 
and external, factors can play a role as well. Self-esteem, peer pressure  and  duty too can 
constitute compelling reasons for an agent, especially a soldier, to act.27 Taking all these 
considerations into account the overarching notion with regard to the completion of 
allotted tasks seems to be responsibility: for the agents’ personal well being, like self-
esteem; for his fellow soldiers for the sake of both comradeship and even peer pressure; 
and because of his being a soldier and the obligations this role implies. Responsibility is 
                                                          
20 Johnson, P. (1994). Reclaiming the Aristotelian ruler. After MacIntyre. J. Horton (ed.). Cambridge, Polity 
Press. P 45. 
21 Hume, D. (1975). Enquiries concerning  human understanding and concerning the principles of morals. 
Oxford University Pres. Section IX, conclusion: ‘By the pursuit of a name, a reputation in the world we 
bring our own deportment and conduct frequently in review and consider how they appear in the eyes of 
those who approach and regard us… a habit that is the surest guardian of any virtue.’   
22 Johnson, P. (1994). Reclaiming the Aristotelian ruler. After MacIntyre. J. Horton (ed.). Cambridge, Polity 
Press. P 49. 
23 Snider, D. J. (2003). "The professional practice." Military review 83(1): 3-8. P 7: ‘… duty is not confined 
to explicit orders or tasks; it involves allegiance to their commissioning oath.’ 
24 Bieri, P. (2011). Het handwerk van de vrijheid.(Das Handwerk der Freiheit) Amsterdam, 
Wereldbibliotheek. 
25 Ibid. P 160 – 168. 
26 Ibid. P 257 – 266. Feasible action is also an Aristotelian notion, see Aristoteles (2005). Ethica 
Nicomachea. Budel, Damon. Par.1113a9-1113a12. 
27 Marshall, S. L. A. (1978). Men against fire: the problem of battle command in future war. Gloucester 
Massachusetts, Peter Smith. P 149 and Wong, L., Kolditz, T.A., Millen, R.A., Potter, T.M. (2003). Why they 
fight: combat motivation in the Iraq war. U.S. Army  War College. Carlisle, Strategic Studies Institute: 35. 
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not only an issue in the soldier’s deliberation and decision to act; it also implies 
accountability for his actions and the consequences.28 Responsibility thus encompasses 
the reasons why a soldier acts and in doing so, the soldier accepts being responsible for 
his actions and the consequences; he accepts to be held accountable.29 Responsibility 
reconciles the external reasons of duty, the internal the disposition to act and 
accountability for the consequences: all major issues in military ethics.30 Responsibility,  
or rather a sense of responsibility, the disposition to act because of the commitments a 
soldier has to realize the task at hand - as well as to himself, his peers and others. To act 
in an appropriate way, even in the face of adverse circumstances - seems to be the virtue 
that provides the opportunity  to enhance the pleasure and satisfaction one finds in 
completing military tasks. Walzer expresses a similar idea.31  
4.3.3.   However, responsibility is a notion with a wide variation in meaning. It could 
refer to a cause, a liability, a capacity or a duty. Neither of these meanings covers the 
meaning of responsibility as a virtue; the dispositions to take tasks seriously and to 
perform these in a well-considered way, while taking into account the consequences for 
others.32 One could act in a more or less responsible way. In this respect, one could 
speak of an analogous notion rather than a digital.  According to Bovens, it is hard to 
establish whether a certain kind of conduct can be considered responsible as the context 
and characteristics of the agent may vary substantially. However, he identifies several 
notions that are often applied in order to come to an opinion on the virtuous character 
of specific responsible conduct.33 First of all, the agent must take his task - and the duties 
this implies - seriously.  Secondly, he must be able to identify whether a moral issue is at 
stake. In the third place, he must take the consequences of his action into account, 
especially where others are concerned. Autonomy is a fourth notion which means that - 
although the agent should listen to others and their advice - the agent must act on his 
own strength and convictions. The last point is that the actions should be based on some 
kind of code, which is verifiable and will bear examination. However, he states that these 
‘criteria’ are not solid nor have all of them to be taken into account. In the end, 
responsible conduct in the virtuous sense is a kind of conduct that is well received in 
moral terms.34  
4.3.4.   In approximating  the content of this virtue I will look first at the vice of 
deficiency. Shortcoming in the sense of responsibility could result in a neglect of the self, 
falling short in  accomplishing the allotted tasks, ignoring the interests of other 
                                                          
28 Baarda, T. A. v., Verweij, D.E.M., Ed. (2006). Military ethics, the Dutch approach. Leiden, Koninklijke Brill 
N.V. P 39-43. 
29 Verweij, D. E. M. (2010). Geweten onder schot. Amsterdam Boom. P 137-141. 
30 Bonadonna, R. R. (1994). "Above and beyond: marines and virtue ethics." Marine Corps Gazette 78 
(Jan.): 3. P19. 
31  Walzer, M. (2004). Arguing about war. New Haven, Yale University Press. P 23-27: ‘A field commander 
has a twofold responsibility... First he is responsible upward - to his military commanders and through the 
highest of them, the commander in chief, to the sovereign people, whose officer he properly is and to 
whose collective safety and protection he is pledged... He also has a responsibility downward, to each and 
every one of his fellow soldiers, who are in one sense the instruments with which he is supposed to win 
victories, but they are also men and women whose lives, because they are his to use, are also in his care... 
He is bound to minimize the risks his soldiers must face... As a moral agent he is also responsible outward 
- to all those people whose lives his activities affect.’ 
32 Bovens, M. A. P. (1990). Verantwoordelijkheid en organisatie. Zwolle, Tjeenk Willink. P 33. 
33 Ibid, P 42-49. 
34 Ibid, P 182. 
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stakeholders and a failure to accept the consequences. The shirking of responsibility  to 
the self can take many forms. The burden of responsibility may frighten the agent into 
inertness. Other reasons may play a role as well in shirking responsibilities.  
Accountability is often shirked as well. A well-known strategy in exonerating is to claim 
that the agent had no other possibility  and that the agent was not really free in his 
decision on how to act: the circumstances, other persons, lack of knowledge or means, or 
whatever other reasons are to blame. All arguments leading to the conclusion that the 
agent himself cannot be held accountable. This attitude has two important aspects. First, 
it testifies to a lack of critical distance in reviewing one’s own actions. Without some 
kind of ‘soul searching’, it will be very hard to redeem self-esteem. Thus the agent runs a 
serious risk of further loss of self-esteem. In a further response the sense and 
meaningfulness of  allotted tasks could be questioned, which could lead to a further 
withdrawal and even alienation.35  Secondly however, this will not refrain others from 
holding the agent accountable.  This may well result in further denying of any 
responsibility by the agent, resulting in further loss of self-esteem and/or resentment 
against those who hold him accountable.  Shirking responsibility will corrode the status 
of an agent, to himself and to others.36 As to falling short in accomplishing the allotted 
task, this is a somewhat risky course of action for a soldier. In the military a soldier is 
obliged to execute a lawfully given order. However, there are ways to circumvent a 
direct confrontation: slow moving might go unnoticed and eventually nullify the task. 
Another strategy is blaming circumstances that prevented a proper execution. Especially 
on the battlefield this excuse sounds plausible, and countervailing facts are hard to 
check. Outright refusing to execute an order may do the trick as well, but involves a 
higher risk as it is punishable under military law. Risk avoiding, indifference and 
laziness are attitudes that play a role in a defective sense of responsibility. As to the 
consequences it is relatively easy to deny that unwelcome consequence could be 
foreseen. In short, irresponsibility, failing to accept responsibility, could affect the moral 
status of the agent, the accomplishment of the task at hand and the amount and nature 
of unwanted negative consequences.  
4.3.5.   But there is a flip side: the vice of too much. Overestimating one self and an 
excess of self-esteem may well lead to vanity and overrating one’s capabilities.  As to the 
task at hand  there is just too much involvement in completing the allotted task. 37 This 
could even result in the fanatical attitude that puts orders before everything else: ‘Befehl 
ist Befehl‘. This kind of zeal may well result in taking risks that could easily have been 
avoided and puts soldiers and materiel to unnecessary hardship and danger. Changing 
circumstances are disregarded. This kind of behaviour too seldom leads to the required 
result. It provokes annoyance and leads to passive or active resistance by those who 
have to bear the brunt of this relentless ambition. Unwelcome consequences of 
exaggerated zeal are played down or  simply denied. Another symptom of an 
exaggerated  sense of responsibility could be an expansion of assumed responsibilities 
well beyond the actual responsibilities of the agent. This exaggerated sense of 
responsibility could lead to interference in the responsibilities of others and 
                                                          
35 Richardson, R., Verweij, D., Vogelaar, A.,Kuipers, H., Ed. (2002). Mens en organisatie: de krijgsmacht in 
verandering. Alphen aan den Rijn, Haasbeek. P 227. 
36 Bieri, P. (2011). Het handwerk van de vrijheid.(Das Handwerk der Freiheit) Amsterdam, 
Wereldbibliotheek. P 293-333 and Sloterdijk, P. (2009). Du musst dein Leben ändern. Frankfurt am Main, 
Suhrkamp. P 512-515 and 642-646. 
37 Richardson, R., Verweij, D., Vogelaar, A.,Kuipers, H., Ed. (2002). Mens en organisatie: de krijgsmacht in 
verandering. Alphen aan den Rijn, Haasbeek. P 226, 227. 
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meddlesomeness. A proper sense of responsibility will find the morally responsible 
mean between the irresponsible love of the easy and blind zeal. A preliminary definition 
could describe responsibility as the appropriate mean between, on the one hand, an 
attitude of shirking and scraping through and on the other hand an attitude of 
meddlesomeness or blind zeal and fanatically pursuing a mission while circumstances 
have changed.   
4.3.6.   A proper sense of responsibility can be developed. It is first a matter of educating 
soldiers and explaining the importance of a proper sense of responsibility. Training 
provides ample  opportunities to have soldiers experience what responsibility entails. 
This involves confronting soldiers with the consequences of irresponsible behaviour and 
show how an appropriate way of bearing responsibilities mostly leads to success. 
Leadership based on trust - as in mission command - will further create a culture in 
which bearing responsibility is a normal feature of executing orders.38 Mission 
command is based on the notion that it is impossible to provide binding rules that apply 
in all circumstances, as situations in the area of operations change constantly, 
sometimes unimaginably. In mission command initiative and responsibility as well as 
trust are the key elements.39 Applying mission command requires that a clear goal is set; 
the limits in time and space in which the mission must be accomplished are established; 
the appropriate means are allocated. How the soldier or the unit aims to meet the set 
standards is his or their own responsibility. This style of command is based on mutual 
trust and will spark creativity and enhance the sense of responsibility of all involved in 
accomplishing the mission. This also implies the willingness to be held accountable for 
one’s actions. A consequent application of mission command and the appropriate 
leadership style could well instil a proper sense of responsibility in soldiers of all ranks. 
Experience will add to the recognition and internalization of an appropriate sense of 
responsibility. 
Competence  
4.4.1.   As to the internal goods related to the wielding of arms and other specialized 
equipment with an enormous, even lethal power, I have identified pride and satisfaction 
over skill and proficiency in handling these systems as the connected internal goods. To 
acquire these skills and proficiency one must have a professional attitude: the will to 
master the weapon systems one is entrusted with.40 One could argue that acquiring the 
knowledge and skills to master a weapon system is a matter of preparing for tasks 
ahead. From this perspective, responsibility could be the appropriate virtue. However, 
as I explained in chapter 2, the distinction between separate virtues is primarily a 
matter of the appropriate standards of excellence that pertain to the characteristics of 
the practice. Besides, we need separate virtues that cover these spheres of military 
practice in order to create practical goals and appropriate standards.41 Furthermore it is 
clear that this kind of preparing for tasks ahead is an activity in its self. Proper 
                                                          
38 Uhle-Wettler, F. (1984). Höhe- und Wendepunkte Deutscher Militärgeschichte. Mainz, Hase & Koehler 
Verlag. P255-304. See also Vries, de, P.H.  “ ‘Auftragstaktik’: ontstaan, ontsporing en (her)ontdekking.” 
Militaire Spectator 161(6): P 283-289. 
39 The concept  was first developed by the Prussian general staff under Helmuth Graf von Moltke (the 
elder) in the second half of the 19th century. Blaschke, P. H., Gramm, R., Sixt, W., Ed. (1986). De officio: zu 
den Herausforderungen des Offiziersberuf. Hannover, Lutherisches Verlaghaus. P 132. 
40 Huntington, S. P. (1957). The soldier and the state. Cambridge (Massachusetts), Harvard University 
Press. P8-18. 
41 See paragraph 2.6.8. - 2.6.11.  and 4.2.2. and 4.2.3. above. 
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preparation is a longstanding military dictum, the importance of which cannot be 
underestimated.42 Therefore a separate virtue seems to be appropriate  to provide a 
tangible goal to aspire at with regard to acquiring the skills and proficiency in order to 
master the use of weapon systems, as well as the disposition to use these systems well. 
Military competence can be identified as that virtue, because it is a necessary condition 
for achieving proficiency and skill in handling arms and other special equipment and 
meeting the related standards of excellence.43 It is more than likely that realizing this 
proficiency will ensue in a feeling of pride over the accomplishment.44 This will be a 
stimulus in further developing the disposition to master and show military competence 
in an excellent way. 
 
4.4.2.   However, competence  is also a notion with a wide variation in meaning.45 
Especially in the field of business strategy and –administration, as well as in human 
resources management, the term competence acquired specific meanings. Therefore, it 
is worthwhile to have a closer look at the term. Some use the term "core competences" 
to indicate the characteristics organizations have developed over time. These core 
competences are specific to an organization and provided they are used effectively, they 
ensure a continued lead over competitors. The core competence of an organization is a 
unique combination of business specialism and human skills that give expression to the 
organization's typical character.46 Others have a more limited view of competence as: 
"basic personal characteristics that are determining factors for acting successfully in a 
job or a situation".47 Some use a more generic approach and define competence as 
clusters of knowledge, skills and attitudes necessary to accomplish specific tasks.48 
Spencer and Spencer combine both notions in a system of four levels of competence.49 
According to them, the first level of the competence structure is concerned with the 
observable (instrumental) knowledge and skills that relate to carrying out work or 
holding a position and that are necessary to enable the occupation, job or task to be 
performed properly. The second level is referred to as "widely applicable vocational 
skills" or "starting qualifications" and include things like social and communicative 
skills, general technical and vocational insights, organizational qualities and basic 
approaches to work and situations. The third level in the competence structure consists 
of the values, standards, ethics and morals of the person concerned as well as those of 
the organization and the (professional) group to which he/she belongs or to which 
                                                          
42 Sun Tzu, (1983). The art of war. New York, Delacorte Press. P 17: ‘He will win who, prepared himself, 
waits to take the enemy unprepared.’ 
43 MacIntyre also uses the notion of craft and craftsmanship. See MacIntyre, A. (1990). Three rival 
versions of moral inquiry. Notre Dame (Indiana), University Press. P 64-66. 
44 Snider, D. J. (2003). "The professional practice." Military review 83(1): 3-8. P 7: ‘Expert knowledge of 
the profession is the foundation... of expertise and professional practice, and it enables the daily exercise 
of discretionary judgment to make decisions and to take actions that fulfil moral and legal 
responsibilities.’ 
45 Nordhaug, O. and Gronhaug, K. (1994). "Competencies as resources in firms", The International Journal 
of Human Resource Management, 5 (1): 89-106.”The concept of competence has different meanings, and it 
remains one of the most diffuse terms in the organizational and occupational literature.”  
46 Bergenhenegouwen, G. J. (1996). "Competence development- a challenge for HRM professionals: core 
competences of organizations as guidelines for the development of employees." European Journal of 
Training and Development 20(9): 29-35. 
47 MacClelland, D.C. (1993). "The concept of competence", in Spencer, L.M. and Spencer, S.M. (Ed.), 
Competence at Work, John Wiley &Sons, New York, 1993.  
48 Kuiper, H., de Beer, M. (2009). Competentiegericht opleiden. TNO, Soesterberg: 27. P 8-11.   
49 Spencer, L.M. and Spencer, S.M., Ed. Competence at Work, John Wiley &Sons, New York, 1993.  
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he/she reports. These values and standards are internalized by the person on the basis 
of his or her own insights, experiences and education. The fourth and deepest level of 
the human competence structure consists of deeper-lying personal characteristics, such 
as image of self, actual motives and the source of the enthusiasm and effort that goes 
into (professional) actions. A less elaborate system is provided by Jurse and Tominc, 
who claim that competences and skills are to be understood as a combination of: 
knowing and understanding (theoretical knowledge, the capacity to know and 
understand); knowing how to act (applications of knowledge to certain situations); 
knowing how to be (values, living and working with others, etc.).50 When next we look at 
the virtue of competence, as a disposition to aspire at achieving the standards of 
excellence pertaining to a proper use of the implements of war, we can see that the idea 
of competence as a virtue is captured by both Spencer’s first three levels and by Jurse’s 
and Tominc’s simpler three-tiered system. Competence as a virtue encompasses the 
instrumental knowledge and skill to perform the allotted task in an excellent way, the 
capability to aspire to the standards of excellence together with others in the context of 
a practice, and to internalize these aspirations in a disposition to act accordingly. 
4.4.3.   Another point is that skills and proficiency are generic terms. By adding the 
adjective military, I want to emphasize the stamp of quality that goes beyond general 
skill and proficiency.51 Military competence entails more than skills: it entails care and 
keeping the arms and other equipment in a perfect working order; it entails the ability 
to repair and improvise if regular functioning proves impossible; it entails a thorough 
understanding of the possibilities and limitations of mechanical systems both in serving 
these (weapon) systems and in the effects they are able to produce.52 A soldier must 
know what effect his weapon produces: is the weapon system reliable to produce the 
same effects even after heavy firing; what are the exact effects against different kind of 
targets; does it allow for precision fires and to what extend will accuracy be impaired by 
extensive use; is it prone to cause collateral damage; etc. He must be wary of the moral 
hazards of his lethal skills.53 It are these qualities  that enable soldiers also to make 
adequate moral appreciations when and how to use his weapons.54 Similar 
considerations are appropriate with regard to the use of non-lethal systems, machinery 
and other military equipment: what are the effects they could produce, which risks are 
involved in improper handling, etc. This moral appreciation will add to the willingness 
and preparedness to display  the appropriate competence. According to Sherman, the 
Aristotelian notion of acquiring an art is not a matter of internalizing procedural 
principles only. Acquiring  a virtue is about having reliable motives, expressed in chosen 
actions which come to have intrinsic value. The virtuous action will not be chosen 
                                                          
50 Jurse, M., Tominc, P. (2008). "Professional competences of graduates as a labour market mechanism." 
Journal of Contemporary Management Issues 13(1): 17-36. 
51 Mullaney, G. M. (2009). The unforgiving minute; a soldier's education. London, Penguin books. P 107: 
‘The next day we did our drills blindfolded. At First our platoon bumbled around like kids striking a 
piñata. After two days of practice, we could set a platoon of forty rangers in a midnight patrol base in 
under thirty minutes.’ 
52 Ibid. P 286: ‘Markam was a master – timing the length of his bursts to balance firepower and accuracy.’ 
53 Sherman, N. (2011). The untold war: inside the hearts, minds and souls of our soldiers. New York, W.W. 
Norton & company. P 144. 
54 A rather chilling example of  a lack of moral appreciation of military skills is found in Herr, M. (1978). 
Dispatches. London, Pan Books. P 35: ‘some reporters asked a door gunner, ‘How can you shoot women 
and children?’ and he’d answered, ‘It’s easy, you just don’t lead ‘em as much.’ The soldier in question 
answered a moral question with a technical response on the technique of using a different angle to lead 
his machinegun shooting on - slower moving - women and children. 
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merely  by procedure, nor will what is brought about be valued apart form the actions 
which realize it.55 Military competence can be taught and trained and by experience it 
eventually could well become a habit, a true virtue of the soldier as a member of the 
military: a notion that is corroborated by both Rawls and Sloterdijk.56 
4.4.4.   The virtue of military competence pertains to the skills and attitude of the soldier 
in applying these skills. A soldier’s deficient attitude towards his equipment can be a 
matter of light heartedness. 57  He thinks that he will be able to use his equipments after 
a few instructions and experience will do the rest. He will be negligent in study, training 
and in the maintenance of his equipment. This could be a matter of indifference or the 
idea that there is little chance he will come into a position in which he will depend on the 
proper functioning of his tools. On the battlefield he will pay dearly for this attitude. On 
the other hand, it is possible that the soldier takes an exaggerated care of his equipment. 
This care may result in reluctance to use his equipment in order to avoid wear. As to the 
use of his tools, this kind of soldier is also very precise indeed: everything must be done 
by the book, no matter how long this may take. This attitude too can cost him dearly. 
Proper military competence means that the soldier wants to know how to use his 
equipment and the range within which it can be used properly. He will want to know 
what the possibilities are and its limits in using it and what are the effects of its use. The 
many exercises and training will give him a proper idea within which constraints he can 
use his equipment and how to keep it in an optimal working order. But military 
competence is not limited to the personal individual skills. Meeting the standards of 
excellence is also the result of following exemplary other practitioners: role models. This 
implies sharing training and discussions with those who serve as examples. Being 
partners in a practice involves cooperation; not only in the activities of the practice but 
also in meeting the required standards of excellence. Being a competent soldier and 
participating in a practice together with others, also includes  attention for the 
proficiency of others as well. This means the willingness to assist others in acquiring the 
proper knowledge and skills. It also means the willingness to address others who fail to 
live up to professional standards. But there is another incentive as well, because as the 
performance of military missions is teamwork, it is important that every member of the 
team knows his job!58 Appropriate military competence does not allow for members of 
the practice whose conduct is lacking in competence.59  Therefore a preliminary 
definition of military competence could be read as the right mean between an attitude of  
thinking that a rough general knowledge of weapon systems and other equipment will 
do and that this won’t come to serious problems and an attitude of exaggerated care for 
material and equipment and handling these strictly according to regulations and 
wanting to do everything by the book and disregarding situational necessity.  
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4.4.5.   Military competence can be acquired as is shown almost daily in most militaries.  
It requires clear standards of excellence, and dedicated and competent  instructors who 
portray as role models as well.  Challenging training as close to reality as feasible will 
stimulate absorbing lessons learned. Presentations by  experienced colleagues of all 
ranks will help to bring home the practical relevance of the skills and drills taught. 
Competition  may further enhance the zeal of trainees.60 Meeting the appropriate 
standards could be accompanied by some ceremony in order to stimulate pride and 
promote eagerness to get to the next step of proficiency. In short, there are many ways 
and means to instil in soldiers a disposition of military competence.  
 
Comradeship 
4.5.1.   As already mentioned in chapter 2 and the preceding paragraphs, a practice 
always involves the company of others: mostly in cooperation, often others are merely 
bystanders and sometimes the others are confronted as opponents.61 The successful 
cooperation with others in accomplishing a task together results in the internal goods of 
a sense of belonging and warmth. The notion of being a successful member of a primary 
group creates a feeling of belonging, contentment, security and peace of mind. 
Comradeship seems the virtue that enhances the establishment of a strong social fabric 
within a group. Comradeship can be given substance by an active care for the wellbeing 
of fellow soldiers and enjoying and appreciating their friendship in return. However, 
comradeship and friendship are different concepts. Friendship is something which can 
start spontaneously and develop in all kind of settings and circumstances. Basically, it is 
a special kind of voluntary benign relation between two individuals based on 
reciprocity.62 Aristotle discerns three kinds of friendship: based on benefit, on pleasure 
and on mutual sharing of a notion of the good.63 Only the latter is considered to be  true 
friendship: ‘Only the friendship of those who are good, and similar in their goodness, is 
perfect’.64 Aristotle considers friends as ‘the greatest of external goods.’65 Comradeship 
is of a different nature, as it is connected with a specific context. Comradeship is not a 
matter of individual choice; it is a matter of being brought together (by chance) and 
being thrown on each other’s company. Comradeship is forged under duress, shared 
hardship, and under circumstances of mutual dependency and trust.66 Comradeship 
entails giving and taking, giving and getting assistance, to support and be supported, to 
correct and to accept criticism, all in spite of personal differences.67 Above all 
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comradeship entails trust.68 Comradeship enables a group to work together in harmony 
and - also as a result of this - more effectively.69  
 
4.5.2.    The enhanced effectiveness of close-knit groups is a well known fact and this is 
the main reason why military education aims at creating and strengthening group 
cohesion.70 Peer pressure and self-esteem are powerful incentives for living up to formal 
as well as informal standards. Manning systems are often organized to allow for group 
training and deployment. Teambuilding is a constant factor in military education, 
training and exercise. Applying pressure is one of the most common used techniques to 
enforce cohesion: pressure in set standards, time allotted and circumstances aggravated. 
Under these pressures the inadequacy of the individual soldier is demonstrated whereas 
the accomplishments of team work are accentuated. Soldiers experience the power and 
comfort of their primary group. Often soldiers are assigned a fellow soldier as a special 
buddy for whom they carry a specific responsibility. All these efforts are aimed at 
imbuing the importance of cooperation and establishing cohesive groups and almost 
always these efforts are successful. Having experienced the value of comradeship it will 
be relatively easy to acquire the disposition to build and foster comradeship as the key 
to successful and emotional gratifying cooperation. Especially in the face of discomfort 
and danger, comradeship is an indispensable virtue.71 This notion is strongly 
exemplified by John Keegan, who states: ‘What battles have in common is human: the 
behaviour of men struggling to reconcile their instinct for self-preservation, their sense 
of honour and the achievement of some aim over which other men are ready to kill 
them. The study of battle is therefore always a study of fear and usually of courage; 
always of leadership, usually of obedience; always of compulsion, sometimes of 
insubordination; always of anxiety, sometimes of elation or catharsis; always of 
uncertainty and doubt, misinformation and misapprehension, usually also of faith and 
sometimes of vision; always of violence, sometimes also of cruelty, self-sacrifice, 
compassion; above all  it is always a study of solidarity and usually also of disintegration 
- for it is towards the disintegration of human groups that battle is directed.’72 However, 
disintegration can also be the result of a derailing of internal cohesion as a result of 
which the group withdraws in itself and is no longer open to deliberation and criticism, 
both from within and from external sources.  
 
4.5.3.   Sometimes cohesion and comradeship can have a dark side. Kohlberg defines 
three levels of moral development: the pre-conventional level in which individuals have 
a predominantly egocentric perspective; the conventional level in which people have a 
more group- oriented outlook an understand values and norms;  the post-conventional 
level in which individuals understand and accept universal principles and try to act 
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accordingly, even in spite of societal ordering.73 Soldiers will on average exceed the pre-
conventional level as cohesion is strongly promoted. For the same reason conventional 
moral thinking will be strong. This could put a brake on further development into the 
post-conventional level of moral thinking. Bradly argues that merely abiding by the 
conventional moral frame of reference could lead to de-individuation of group members 
by which anonymity is enhanced. This could lead to moral disengagement, which 
includes avoiding responsibility, misrepresenting consequences and dehumanizing 
victims. Emotionally charged situations  and weak leadership could well lead to an 
ethical derailing of group cohesion and comradeship. A notion that is also found with 
Verweij, Oltshoorn and other authors.74 To avoid such derailing  soldiers at all levels - 
and not just officers - have to be trained in moral reasoning.75 
4.5.4.  All together, the much extolled virtue of comradeship pre-eminently defines 
military practice as it is based on the fact that on the battlefield soldiers live and act 
together in close cooperation. The hardships they endure together and their mutual 
dependence creates a very special bond indeed.76 Comradeship depends on the  specific 
context of a primary group in danger. 77 The primary military group is a micro cosmos, 
like a family, a ‘band of brothers’. However, even within a family one can nevertheless 
withdraw from the obligations that are entailed by family ties. A deficiency in 
comradeship, individual egotism and indifference can be very demanding for a group. 
The result will be that the group withdraws its support as well and will leave the strayed 
member to its own. But this will inevitably create tension within the primary group, and 
this may afflict the internal cohesion and eventually may even destroy the social fabric 
of the primary group. On the other hand there are those who put their group, their 
‘family’, before everything else. Everything the members do, is done well. No criticism is 
accepted: not within and not from the outside. This attitude too will create tension and 
will impede the ability to create well balanced relations within the group. Proper 
comradeship is based on the awareness that cooperation and mutual trust are necessary 
and that this entails more than just working together. Living together promotes the 
founding of special bonds. Sharing hardship and danger further strengthens these ties 
and comradeship supports and actively maintains these ties. Proper comradeship 
further fosters mutual trust and support. This true trust and support entail constructive 
criticism as well. Comradeship exists for the benefit of all who share in this 
phenomenon. A preliminary definition of the virtue of comradeship could read as the 
right mean between an attitude of egotism, without any concern for others and an 
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attitude of an exaggerate attention for group opinions and uncritical support of group 
actions. 
Respect. 
4.6.1.  Cohesion in the military has both a horizontal dimension - with fellow soldiers 
with whom the bond is fostered by comradeship - and a vertical dimension - with others. 
These others form a miscellaneous group.  First of all, there are soldiers from other units 
who are not a member of the inner circle of the primary group, but with whom there is 
still a special bond as members of the same military ‘tribe’. Then there are others who 
are outsiders, who is not a member of the own armed forces and who are beyond the 
bond of cohesion. These outsiders  include innocent bystanders, civilians, and also not so 
innocent others; the enemy. With all these others there is some kind of relation, the 
basis of which is the fact that they are all fellow human beings: the same race the soldier 
belongs to as well. The internal good of belonging is thus extended. This means 
accepting other people as they are and treating them fairly and refraining from 
harassment, humiliation and discrimination. Recognizing these others - even the enemy 
- as fellow human beings entitle them to respect.78 ‘At the heart of moral conduct, 
whether in peace or in war, is a sense of that our actions are constrained by respect and 
reverence for others.’79 In the following paragraphs I will elaborate on the virtue of 
respect and to what extend the different others require a different kind of respect. First 
of all, respect can be a matter of deference for a person based on his position, role or 
quality. This refers to the stoic notion of decorum, dignity and decency.80 But there is 
also a wider notion of respect based on recognition of our fellow human beings who are 
therefore all eligible to our respect. Considering the nature of the military organisation 
and its characteristics as a practice, as well as the challenges of new wars, the virtue of 
respect is the key to successful cooperation in a wider perspective. 
4.6.2.   The respect soldiers have for fellow soldiers who is not a member of the exclusive 
entity of their primary group is clearly a matter of deference. This kind of respect is due 
to soldiers from other units, subordinated personnel as well as superiors. 81  Deference 
involves esteem for a fellow soldier as a member of the same ‘tribe’ who underwent the 
same kind of education and training and faced the same kind of challenges and as such is 
eligible to the same support as  one would expect oneself of other soldiers. Successful 
cooperation with these others requires respect.82 It is often out of respect that we assist 
and obey colleagues who are relative strangers. Without the virtue of respect, wider 
cooperation with others would hardly get going and would be of little quality.  
4.6.3.   However, there is still another kind of respect, which is self-respect. In Rawls´ 
view self-respect is the most important internal good. He links self-respect with the 
Aristotelian principle according to which people aspire for achieving excellence in the 
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things they do just for their own sake: the internal goods. Self respect pertains to the 
trust a person has that he is able to realize his intentions.  The realisation of these 
intentions requires virtues - among other aspects. A person desires to own these 
dispositions and to manifest these in his actions: a healthy self-respect encourages  
practicing of virtues.83  He does so both for the sake of self-esteem as for the sake of the 
opinion of others.84 Respect is a two-way street: respect paid is often a prerequisite for 
being paid respect. On the other hand, if fellow soldiers do not live up to the standards of 
their common calling one cannot stand by and do nothing about it.  Self-respect as well 
as respect for his fellow soldiers requires an intervention. In short, respect has both an 
internal and an external source. Both sources are important because they are the 
fountainheads of mutual respect, especially within the social fabric of the armed forces: 
a notion that is confirmed by Oltshoorn.85  
4.6.4.   There is yet another more limited notion of respect as well. This kind of respect is 
a matter of appraisal; a valuation of others based on conduct or character.86 This esteem 
is often paid to soldiers who demonstrate special characteristics or competences. 87 
These outstanding soldiers often serve as role models. Role models are important in 
imbuing virtues. They provide extra stimuli to aspire at excellence.  The experience of 
the pleasure entailed in paying proper respect and receiving it, is probably the most 
important incentive to develop the disposition of respect.88 
4.6.5.  The virtue of respect can hardly be defined in isolation as this virtue is closely 
connected to the preceding virtue of military character:  comradeship. However, as 
stated before, respect does not only pertain to the members of the primary group, but 
also to others the soldier has to cooperate with.89 The military is a hierarchical 
organisation which implies there are military superiors as well as military subordinates. 
Both superiors and subordinates, as well as other fellow soldiers can be the object of a 
lack of respect: contempt. This contempt sometimes is based on no other ground than 
the relative position of the other. Contempt can also be the result of peer pressure: we 
all have contempt for this person and so will you. Contempt can also be the result of 
perceived or real grievances, apparent incompetence or a perceived flawed character. 
Contempt towards subordinates can result in an authoritarian and even insolent 
conduct. However, this kind of superior’s contempt can result in a reluctance to comply 
with orders or even outright sabotage, or worse - like ‘fragging’.90 Contempt impedes 
forwarding appropriate criticism. On the other hand, superiors and subordinates can be 
the object of too much respect, infatuation or exaggerated admiration. In this situation 
there is no room for criticism either, just for approval and flattery. This too can have 
negative effects. The object of admiration may well be induced to think he really is very 
gifted if not infallible. Also it can undermine discipline as the necessary distance will 
disappear between the idol and his fans. This can affect performances as leadership - 
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even of primary groups - still requires distance. Distance is necessary when one has to 
act with authority. Especially when orders are issued that involve danger and hardship.  
A lack of distance, to close a relationship, may  also interfere with necessity. Orders are 
not given in order not to imperil to close associates.  The right mean  of respect among 
soldiers lays between contempt and uncritical admiration. This respect is, first of all, 
based on the functional position of the other(s). This kind of respect is inherent to being 
a member of a military, hierarchical, organisation. In the second place, this respect could 
- or rather should - be based on the appreciation of the exemplary way the superior, 
subordinate or fellow soldier conducts himself. Lastly, the disposition to respect others 
should be based on a proper respect for the self. Respect thus also entails the duty to 
criticize and question those functionaries - and the self - with the aim to broaden the 
personal appreciation and insight as well as that of the other. All members of a unit, as 
well as the unit as such, will profit from a respectful conduct by all. The preliminary 
definition of respect could be defined  as the right mean between an attitude of 
contempt and authoritarian behaviour toward others and the blind infatuation and 
approving of anything the other does. Respect does not only pertain to the members of 
the same group but also to other fellow soldiers, including subordinates and superiors. 
Respect also entails self-respect: appropriate respect is founded in proper self-respect. 
4.6.6.  Still, as indicated above, there are more ‘others’ who also are entitled to a 
respectful treatment.91 The expeditionary battlefield can be anywhere and as such it is 
seldom empty; especially on land. The very concept of asymmetrical warfare entails that 
war is waged amongst the peoples,  civilians.92 These civilians and their property 
present in the area of operations are an inevitable feature of modern military 
operations. Civilians are fellow human beings which become involved in military 
activities against their will; most of the times they just happen to be there. However, in 
spite of their sometimes unwelcome presence, the mere fact that they are indeed fellow 
human beings entitles them to a correct and respectful treatment.  Furthermore, the 
tradition of ‘jus in bello’ and the international law pertaining to this tradition set clear 
rules for the protection of non-combatants. Thus, they are entitled to respect under the 
rule of law. Abandoning those rules could seriously undermine the public and moral 
support for the armed forces and would also cause serious damage to the self-respect of 
the soldiers involved with possibly long-lasting effects.93 However, by the same rule of 
law, military necessity is recognized which allows for ‘inevitable’ civilian casualties. 
Albeit that under the principle of ‘double effect’ civilians have a right that due care is 
taken regarding their presence on the battlefield. Under this principle, a military 
commander has the obligation to minimize the risks for non-combatants even to the 
extent that he should accept increased risk for himself. 94 Respect can play a role in 
assessing the risks involved as it is a virtue that requires reflection on what to do, not 
only on what is legitimate, but also on the morally appropriate course of action. Respect 
helps in finding a balance between the entitlements that are at stake, in establishing 
what is fair.95 However, reality spells a somewhat different account. The war on terror of 
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the last few decade cost more civilian lives than all terrorist attacks together.96 This 
seemingly neglect of civilian rights may be due to the element of ‘nearness’. Hume 
formulated this as follows: ‘a man naturally loves his children better than his nephews, 
his nephews better than his cousins, his cousins than strangers, where everything else is 
equal.’97 One of the consequences of this kind of thinking is an increasing emphasis on 
the safety of own troops, resulting in a heavier reliance on stand-off weapon systems  
targeted  at areas instead of on clearly identified enemy elements.98 At the same time 
new wars are almost all fought amongst the peoples and winning their hearts and minds 
is an established aim of armed operations.99 It is especially from this perspective that 
the virtue of respect for civilians in the area of operations should therefore be extended 
beyond present practice. Not only because the rule of law requires this, but also from the 
perspective of the overall aim of modern armed interventions. The latter argument 
should be based on the conviction that civilians are entitled to a respectful treatment as 
they are fellow human beings.  
4.6.7.   What entails  a respectful treatment of civilians? Their presence can be seen as an 
impediment for combating the enemy. In that case their interests will be easily 
considered to be irrelevant. In such a situation, the military is at best not interested in 
their fate. This may be due to the emphasis on the safety of own troops. At worst the 
civilians are seen as accomplices of the enemy or even as the enemy itself. On the other 
hand, the presence of civilians on the battlefield  cannot be considered to be merely a 
matter of their bad luck.  In asymmetrical warfare the civilian population is part of the 
equation. To ignore them is counterproductive. Not to make a distinction between the 
enemy and the civil population in general, will at best undermine the willingness of 
civilians to cooperate and at worst will sow hatred and resentment amongst them. 
Especially when operating in an area in which the population has a strong notion of 
honour and respect, a lack of respect will be experienced as a humiliation.100 However, 
from a military point of view, it would be counterproductive if not impossible to keep 
civilian entitlements in absolute awe. The appropriate respect towards civilians in the 
area of operations is based on the  recognition of the other as a fellow human being. The 
right mean between indifference if not hostility and exaggerated veneration is respect. 
The proper attitude is one of empathy for people who are involved in a conflict against 
their will; an attitude which recognizes their interests, property and cultural heritage.101 
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Proper respect based on this recognition will result in a conscientious weighing of 
military necessity and civil desirability, if not rights. 
4.6.8.    Last but not least there is the ultimate other: the enemy. The enemy too is among 
the others in the area of operations, but the enemy also is a conceptual necessity. 
Without an enemy, there is no military, so eventually the soldier will always have to 
confront an enemy who is out to thwart his aim by using violence and if necessary by 
killing him. A successful confrontation with the enemy will result in internal goods of 
satisfaction, of moral righteousness.  However, these internal goods can only be acquired 
by a proper treatment of an enemy, after he has been overcome - either wounded or 
captured - and is at our mercy. This requires first of all respect. Respect is a powerful 
disposition to  remain on the moral high ground and refrain from abuse or worse.102 
This respect is primarily a matter of deference for the enemy in his role as a fighter who 
is prepared to take up arms and fight and is willing to risks his life. 103 Another issue is 
that under the rule of law, the enemy is entitled to certain rights once he has fallen into 
our hands: even when dead.104 This means that a respectful treatment in accordance 
with the rule of law is also an aspect of the respect due to the enemy.  As I explained 
above in paragraph 4.7.2., respect is also a matter of self-respect which in its turn has a 
close relation with the esteem by others. 105 Abuse should lead to disapproval and 
condemnation by peers resulting in a damaged self-respect. This too could be a strong 
incentive to refrain from maltreating a fallen enemy. Thus showing proper respect is 
also a matter of maintaining the respect by peers and the self. Respect for the enemy is 
from many perspectives an appropriate military virtue. The soldier owes moral duties to 
both enemy troops and non-combatants as they are - like himself - free and equal moral 
agents.106 But there is another reason as well to respect the enemy and even to feel 
empathy for him. ‘Recognizing the key aspects of his humanity is necessary to anticipate 
the enemy’s likely actions and reactions. To dehumanize the enemy in one’s mind may 
reduce one’s moral qualms about killing hem. But it also greatly impedes one’s ability to 
outwit him and so to prevail against him.’107 
4.6.9.   However, what entails proper respect for the enemy. A lack of respect could be a 
result of anger and even revulsion or hatred for the enemy. This may result in 
bloodthirstiness and cruelty: killing becomes the first aim of combat and the enemy that 
falls into our hands alive awaits a dreadful fate. On the other hand, one cannot expect a 
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soldier to regard the enemy as a tragically misled victim of an ill-informed nation: an 
enemy that deserves our concern and can be convinced of his erring by peaceful means 
and should be set free. A too lenient approach could easily imperil the soldiers’ own 
safety as the enemy is willing to kill as well. Therefore, the proper mean between hatred 
and brutality on the one side and  concern and leniency on the other hand, lays in 
respect as well. This means that the enemy is confronted with an unyielding effort to 
overcome him, using all the legitimate means at our disposition: if necessary the enemy 
will be killed. But as soon the enemy has yielded, either freely or forced, then he is 
entitled to a humane treatment. If the victor fails in this respect, he will lose his moral 
authority and imperil the justness of his case.108  
 
 4.6.10.   The question can be raised whether this virtue - that encompasses so many 
aspects - can be taught, trained and embedded in the individual’s soldier character. The 
answer is similar to the answer given in the case of other virtues.  However, respect is 
less self-evident as a relevant virtue when compared with responsibility, military 
competence or comradeship. More effort has to be put in further education, ‘Bildung’, 
the moral development of soldiers.109 To incorporate moral education in training could 
be a challenge, but not impossible; dilemma training has proven to be a useful tool.110 
Ultimately, experience will make a soldier realize the intrinsic worth of a respectful 
disposition. Other military virtues of character could support the expression of the 
virtue of respect as well. A sense of responsibility as well as discipline and  comradeship 
are valuable incentives to stimulate the disposition of respect in  a soldier’s character.111 
High quality leadership and exemplary conduct will further promote respect as a 
military virtue.  
 
4.6.11.   Based on the arguments in the paragraphs before, an extended preliminary 
definition on respect can be formulated. This definition encompasses the wider notion of 
respect and its different recipients. Respect can thus be defined as the right mean 
between an attitude of indifference if not contempt toward others and ignoring their 
rights and entitlements, and on the other hand, an attitude of  leniency  if not blind 
infatuation and thus losing sight of  the higher interests at stake. Respect is required for 
the self, fellow soldiers - including subordinates and superiors - members of the 
opposing forces and civilians and their property, living and working in the area of 
operations.  
 
Courage  
4.7.1  Danger is another integral part of military practice and produces the internal 
goods of thrill, excitement and joy after having faced a dangerous situation. The classical 
military virtue that is connected with facing danger is courage.112 It is in courage that the 
soldier finds the ultimate way of coping with danger in such a way that he experiences 
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the excitement and the joy that goes with beating the odds and survives!113 The question 
is whether courage can be acquired. 114 According to Aristotle this can be done by 
familiarization. Therefore, training and education seem to be the key notions in shaping 
(military) character. Aristotle claims that the person who is afraid and runs from 
everything will become a coward.115 His description of courage is at first rather simple; 
it suffices to look down on what frightens a man and this will make him courageous.116 
In book III of the Ethica Nicomachea Aristotle elaborates on courage. He explains that 
courage implies to defy fear - even of death. This means that a courageous person is not 
without fear, but  is able to overcome this.117 A proper self-confidence, a noble cause and 
practical wisdom are  important ‘tools’ in overcoming fear.118 Oltshoorn argues that it is 
hard to say whether a person acts out of courage or out of fear for loss of esteem by his 
peers (or by himself: a loss of self-esteem). He points at the importance of unit cohesion 
as a means to improve performance, including courage. As to the reasons why a person 
overcomes his fears; he argues that a concern for reputation may be a powerful 
incentive. Thus, as we cannot see into a person’s mind, we can never be sure that a 
courageous act is the result of a virtuous disposition or other motives. However, he 
concurs with the idea that courage is also a matter of overcoming fear and that unit 
cohesion contributes to the willingness to accept risks.119 From this perspective, courage 
seems a disposition that can be acquired.  
 
4.7.2.   Overcoming fear and imbuing cohesion in units is an important feature of military 
training and exercising. Overcoming fear is trained in obstacle courses, life firing 
exercises, and other activities involving  risks and the unexpected as well as training  
and exercising under harsh conditions. These activities are also aimed at creating 
pressure, which is a strong means in creating bonds between soldiers. Putting teamwork 
first and demonstrating the relative impotence of the individuals, especially in the face 
of strong resistance, supports bonding and imbuing cohesion. Further education may 
play a role as well, like a call on tradition, the ‘esprit de corps’ and narrative. Stories of 
role models, heroes, serve to get a clear picture what valour entails. 120 Tradition and 
narrative help to explain what courage entails and what is its practical  meaning. The 
interconnectedness of courage with other virtues like responsibility, discipline and 
comradeship may further contribute in instilling these virtues.121 A sense of 
responsibility compels one to act. Discipline helps to continue doing what should be 
done and thus to overcome fear. Comradeship provides the support to live up to one’s 
obligations and to fear the contempt if one fails to do so.122 Not every soldier is a hero, 
but this does not mean that there is no courage where there are no heroes.  
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4.7.3.   The idea of courageousness is often primarily associated with facing physical 
dangers; however, there is also moral courage. Moral courage pertains to overcome the 
fear of the opinion of others, rather than a physical danger. This means standing up 
against wrongdoings perpetrated not by the enemy but by fellow soldiers.123 An 
outstanding example is the helicopter pilot who grounded his airframe and threatened 
to shoot his compatriot soldiers if they did not stop harassing and killing civilians.124 
Basically moral courage is a matter of weighing the certainty of losing self-esteem 
against the risk of losing the esteem by peers and others.125 The latter risks often seem 
to be more important: ‘Physical courage is never in short supply in a fighting army. 
Moral courage sometimes is’.126 Especially  in the often diffuse realities of new wars the 
moral dimension of courage seems to gain importance.127 Recent breaches of moral 
standards -  and the ensuing harm to the support of the mission - underpin the 
institutional need to give greater weight to moral courage as an important aspect of the 
virtue of courage. Courage seems true courage only when physical and moral courage 
goes hand in hand!128 But even then,  for a courageous act to be considered virtuous, 
some considerations have to be taken into account. What are the moral implications of 
the situation at hand and what could be the consequences in case of non-interference? Is 
there an adequate estimate of the dangers involved, not only for the agent but also for 
others? Is the ensuing conduct based on an autonomous decision and does it make sense 
regarding the values that are at stake?129  
4.7.4.   The virtue of courage enables the soldier to overcome the dangers on the 
battlefield. Lacking courage, a soldier of course can try to avoid danger. He will put his 
personal safety first and will avoid everything that will imperil his personal wellbeing. In 
justification of his conduct real and imagined dangers are exaggerated and eventually 
his ability to act will be paralysed by fear. On the other hand, the soldier can 
underestimate or even ignore danger. This may be the result of ignorance or the 
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superstitious conviction that he cannot be hurt. In his recklessness, he will take 
unnecessary risks and endanger not only his own life but that of his fellow soldiers as 
well. Courage is the right mean between cowardice and recklessness.130 In a courageous 
act the soldier has taken the dangers into account and - sometimes after cool 
deliberation, sometimes on an impulse - decides to face these dangers and act resolutely 
but wisely.131 This decision is rooted in a moral conviction that one has to act. Courage is 
not only a matter of facing physical danger. Courage also pertains to the willingness to 
stand up against the wrong doings in general even in spite of possible personal 
repercussions. Courage has a physical as well as a moral dimension. Courage, therefore, 
could be preliminary defined as being the mean between an attitude of avoiding risks - 
both physical and moral - and cowardice and an attitude of recklessness and taking 
unnecessary risks for yourself and others. 
  
Resilience  
4.8.1.  The conditions in the theatre of operations, the battlefield, which can be anywhere 
and on which action can take place at any time, produce the internal good at 
experiencing the thrill of the unknown and the excitement of being alive and recovering 
after long and exhausting action. To cope with the often harsh conditions and the  
pervasive uncertainty on the battlefield one needs physical and mental stamina. The 
satisfaction over  the ability to cope with the challenges of the battlefield is enhanced by 
resilience. The virtue of resilience enables a soldier to belittle the heavy experience and 
optimistically face the next challenge.132 It’s a prerequisite to overcome the adverse 
circumstance of which the nature as well as the duration is beyond personal control. 
Epictetus described this as follows: ‘But as soon as a man has picked himself up and 
renewed his grip on himself and shown the same enthusiasm, he is allowed to compete 
(again)..’133  
4.8.2.   An important feature of resilience is self-knowledge: knowing one’s strengths and 
weakness.134 Especially getting to know one’s weaknesses, ‘the repressed and despised 
parts  of our personality’ is essential, as  these ‘weaknesses and the ensuing petty acts 
can have consequences of immense horror and evil in the crucible of war.’135 A soldier 
can be made aware of these by demanding, even harsh,  physical and mental training. 
This awareness is a prerequisite for a proper control of weaknesses and the efforts to 
over come these. This awareness is a prerequisite too to put one’s strengths to a proper 
use. ‘The primary reason you don’t make sound judgments in combat is that you to often 
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are exhausted and numbed and there is little that can be done about this, except training 
under extreme duress and learn how to function at such times.’136 Demanding physical 
and mental training as well as collective evaluation of the effects are the methods and 
means to develop resilience.137 Military training provides ample opportunity to 
incorporate the developing of mental a physical stamina. Improving these is almost 
always experienced as enrichment by the soldier and is easily embedded in the military 
mind.138 As a result, many individual soldiers pay great attention to their physical 
fitness: both as a direct goal (physical endurance) and as a means to an indirect goal 
(mental endurance).139 Soldiers appreciate physical and mental fitness as a part of being 
a true member of the military. Resilience is perceived by most soldiers as a necessary 
military virtue. 
 
4.8.3.  Circumstances on the battlefield are often harsh. Laws and regulations on welfare 
do not always apply. Adequate housing is never sure, nor are regular meals. Rain or 
snow, day or night, heavy seas, rough terrain, low hanging clouds: none of these are an 
excuse for not conducting military operations.140 The planned outcome of these is not 
sure either: friction will disturb the conduct of the operation in a smaller or larger 
amount.141 The virtue of resilience based on physical and mental stamina will enable the 
soldier to overcome these adverse conditions. A deficiency in this respect will affect 
morale. As a result, the soldier will neglect taking proper care of himself, his equipment 
and the system(s) he handles. His willingness to carry his part of the general burden will 
erode. Eventually, the soldier will succumb to self-pity and inertia. On the other hand, 
the soldier should not ignore the messages of his body. In that case he may think that 
sleep deprivation and physical exhaustion will not bring him down. That soldier will 
mock those who do take a nap when possible. Overestimation of ones possibilities will 
eventually result in a collapse, and that inevitable collapse will probably take place at a 
most inconvenient place or time, or both. Surviving on the battlefield requires that 
soldiers are - and remain -  in a good shape. They have to be physically fit, and this 
physical fitness is a prerequisite for mental stamina. Physical and mental fitness shapes 
overall resilience, the capability to withstand physical and mental exhaustion and to 
‘bounce back’. 142  According to Aristotle, perseverance (an aspect to the notion of 
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resilience) entails resistance. 143 Resistance against succumbing to bodily pain and 
indulging in self-pity. This requires self-knowledge and the willingness to train physical 
and mental capacities.  Proper resilience will add to the overall virtuousness of the 
soldier which will enable him to: “bear the hazards of fate harmoniously… and accept 
setbacks in all calm and not because he is insensible of pain, but because he is truly 
noble and great”.144 Based on the above, resilience could be defined as  the right mean 
between an attitude of weakness and resignation at the smallest misfortune and 
overestimating  one’s capabilities and not taking human limits into account. Resilience 
has both a physical and a mental component. 
     
Discipline  
4.9.1.  The rules a soldier has to adhere to are often experienced as superfluous 
constraints: they limit the margins within which the soldier operates. The most 
important rules define the legal and moral boundaries within which killing is allowed 
and even these can be confusing.145 On the other hand,  rules do create certainties and 
provide comfort in sometimes extreme circumstances. However, rules are not a matter 
of choice: one cannot pick those one likes, and disregard those one does not like. Or as 
Walzer puts it: ‘War is still a rule-governed activity, a world of permissions and 
prohibitions.’146 Discipline is required to cope with rules: to accept the limitations they 
impose and to benefit from the security they offer.147 Discipline is a virtue that enables a 
soldier to live with and to accept  rules as an integral part of military practice. The 
military regimen is part and parcel of being a member of the armed forces which entails 
living close together on board of vessels,  in barracks, in tented camps, airbases, etc. 
Generally two types of discipline are discerned: outward discipline and inner 
discipline.148 Outward discipline is a means to show self-esteem and emphasize the 
special character of the military. ‘Who does not avoid a man who is dirty and smells and 
looks unwholesome?’149 Outward discipline is also often seen as a means to achieve 
internal discipline, that is the acceptance of the necessity of rules and to abide by them: 
not out of fear of being caught trespassing, but out of the conviction that rules are there 
for a reason.150 On the other hand, there is the opinion that acquiring outward discipline 
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requires inner discipline first; rules must make sense in order to assure compliance.151 
However, discipline - outward and internal - is counted as a pre-eminently military 
virtue.  
 
4.9.2.  Discipline is often described as enforced obedience to an external authority. 
Especially in the first education and training a soldier receives; an often rigid discipline 
is imposed. Discipline is used as a means to promote military socialization, enhance 
learning and support team building. Rigorous discipline, enables the elements of body 
and equipment to combine faster, thus achieving  a speed which conquers its 
adversaries by enabling using time to appropriate space.152 This collective and formal 
discipline aims at controlling and managing large numbers of soldiers and reducing their 
autonomy.153 Although some aspects of this formal kind of discipline are still useful (e.g. 
in learning repetitive skills), modern wars require another kind of discipline. Modern 
wars require decentralization of control and a corresponding kind of discipline, which is 
not based on reducing autonomy.154 On the contrary, this functional and individual 
discipline aims at achieving autonomous self discipline.155  We can perhaps make a 
useful analytical distinction here between, on the one hand formal and collective 
discipline, which aims at subjection - i.e. subjection to domination - and on the other 
hand, functional and individual discipline, which aims at “subjectification” i.e. the 
constitution of subjects who are free to act, free to obey.156 The most effective discipline 
is that which is self-imposed, which springs from the ‘tribal’ structure of small groups 
and from mutual confidence between leaders and led.157 This internal discipline  which 
compels soldiers to obey, is foremost a matter of team spirit, the sort of discipline team 
members are proud of. Internal discipline regulates the conduct of soldiers by way of 
general standards that encourage them to exercise judgement, taking into account the 
actual situation on the basis of local knowledge, assessed in the light of prior 
experience.158 These characteristics allow for growth and development, whereas formal 
discipline is more static.159 Internal discipline fits with the concept of the military as a 
practice as it is based on the acceptance of rules as sensible means to control the 
activities of the practice and the mutual trust between participants in the practice. 
However, this does not deny that discipline is ultimately based on compliance by many 
to the wishes of few. It is important to keep this willingness to cooperate,  to comply and 
to obey,  intact. This especially is a responsibility of those who lead. Leaders should be 
very careful not to issue orders which cannot be obeyed, as such orders could well affect 
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- if not destroy - the willingness to comply, to obey. 160 This is reflected in the 
fundamental truth that a military leader needs to lead from the front: ‘les épaulettes en 
avant!’ A strictly managerial approach to leading units will not do: it will erode the 
deference necessary to his leadership, it will erode trust. Mutual trust is an important 
element in establishing and maintaining discipline. 161  Savage and Gabriel articulated it 
thus: ‘Men, of course, cannot be managed to their death.’162 However, history shows that 
soldiers are willing to be lead, even until death. Furthermore, discipline has other 
limitations as well. It has to conform to the values of civilian society, while maintaining 
standards that meet military necessity.163 Discipline has many features of which 
obedience and trust are the most important.  
 
4.9.3.   The disposition to obey and abide by the rules is imbued by education, especially 
in the first phase of military socialization. Soldiers have to learn what it means to obey. 
They have to understand the necessity of obeying. Training,  exercises and further 
education will enhance the development of this disposition. Group cohesion and the 
ensuing team spirit will further foster internal discipline. Leadership based on 
exemplary conduct and appropriate care will create mutual trust; a further stimulus to 
discipline. But there are other forces as well that compel the soldier to obey and these 
are the dynamics of battle: the personnel carrier that transports the soldier to the battle 
zone, the psychology of the primary group, modern surveillance systems that monitor 
the soldiers movements, enemy fire and actions that leave no time for deliberation but 
require immediate action, etc.164 
  
4.9.4   As I stated before, the military operates with large numbers in exceptional 
circumstances, which involve many uncertainties and sometimes high risks. Under these 
circumstances to create some kind of order, rules are indispensable. The virtue of 
discipline enables the soldier to abide by these rules. When discipline is insufficient, the 
soldier will ignore rules. He can also try to bend the rules, to look for loopholes and petty 
excuses.165 By doing so he can bring himself and his fellow soldiers in (great) danger. 
But he will ignore these dangers as well, if only out of ignorance. On the other hand, the 
soldier can be very strict in adherence to the rules. He then often refers to the literal 
wording of the articles and not to the intrinsic meaning of the rule. He will do everything 
by the book and this attitude could also endanger himself and his fellow soldiers.166 A 
notorious example of this ‘doing everything by the book’ took place on 21st of January 
1897 during the battle of Isandlwana in which the British forces engaged the Zulu 
warriors of King Shaka. During this battle, a British NCO insisted on opening 
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ammunition boxes according to the time consuming regulations. He was found among 
the 858 other British soldiers that were killed that day. He was stabbed to death over his 
ample store of ammunition.167 So the proper mean between ignoring and bending the 
rules and attaching paramount importance to them is the virtue of discipline, which 
could be defined as a disposition to obey orders and to adhere to the standards that are 
set by rules and regulations.168 Proper discipline is internalized, it includes proper care 
for a military appearance and the willingness to promptly do what is required.169 
Discipline involves trust in others and being in control over oneself.170 Discipline could 
be defined as the right mean between, on the one hand an attitude of neglect of rules and 
regulations by which one might endanger oneself and others and on the other hand, an 
attitude of strict abidance by rules and taking these literally which could frustrate the 
progress of the work at hand. 
 
Practical wisdom 
4.10.1.  In the preceding paragraphs, I have identified seven military virtues of character, 
qualities that can be acquired and will enable the soldier to enjoy the internal goods that 
can be found in the military practice.171 These are: a sense of responsibility, military 
competence, courage, comradeship, respect, resilience and discipline. Similar notions 
(with the exception of courage and some additional values as well) were also identified 
in a survey conducted among Dutch officers and cadets. The survey aimed at 
establishing  which values played a part in the individual soldier’s  moral 
professionalism.  Moral competence - as a part of moral professionalism - is described as 
the capability to perceive the moral dimension in a specific situation, to come to a 
morally appropriate judgment and to act accordingly and lastly to accept accountability. 
172 And although the survey was not based on the concept of virtue ethics, the approach 
as well as part of the results warrants comparison.  Acquiring virtues requires not only 
education, training and experience. Acquiring a virtuous disposition requires 
deliberation as well. It is also through frequent deliberation that a habit  becomes a 
disposition that is part of the individual’s mental make-up. Aristotle discerned this and 
defined two kinds of virtue: virtues of moral worthiness, of character and the virtues of 
intellect.173 It is by using the virtue of intellect, practical wisdom (phronèsis) that we 
come to act in a virtuous way.174  From this perspective, practical wisdom is the most 
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important virtue.175 Virtuous action implies a well-considered decision which is the 
result of careful deliberation, discursive thinking.176 So apart from these seven virtues of 
military character the virtue of the intellect, practical wisdom, is also required!177 
Aristotle even goes as far as to state that the virtue in a strict sense cannot exist without 
practical wisdom: ‘… if the subject acquires intelligence he becomes outstanding in 
conduct, and his disposition, instead of resembling virtue, will now be virtue in the full 
sense.’178 It is the virtue of practical wisdom, which enables a well-considered decision 
on a course of action which is within our power.179 In order to come to such a decision, 
critical analysis is indispensable as well as thinking synthetically on choosing the 
morally responsible mean to guide our action.180 Schwartz states that practical wisdom 
enables us: ‘to perceive the situation, to have the appropriate feelings or desires about it, 
to deliberate about what is appropriate in these circumstances and to act.’181 So apart 
from the virtues of character the virtue of intellect, practical wisdom,  is a necessary 
condition in developing a virtuous disposition.182  As situations in war change constantly 
and deliberation on how to act is thus an important feature of the military practice it is 
obvious military practitioners cannot do without practical wisdom.183 
4.10.2.  In elaborating on the meaning of the virtues I identified, it has become clear that 
the virtues of military character are closely related, interconnect in several aspects and 
are mutually supportive, if not reinforcing. A proper sense of responsibility and deep felt 
comradeship could well spark acts of courage. Discipline and respect may inspire acts of 
moral worthiness. Resilience and military competence enable one to discharge his 
allotted tasks, etc. The relationship between the different virtues strengthens their 
power and reduces their vulnerability to human weaknesses.184 This interconnectivity 
plays a part in the application of the virtue of the intellect, practical wisdom, as well. 
This adds to the complexity of the appropriate amount of deliberation. This means 
taking into account the overall aim of the action, interpreting rules, reading the social 
context, feeling empathy for others and learning from experience.185 This kind of 
deliberation is usually associated with command and leadership, and as such it is often 
appreciated as  primarily a responsibility of officers. Whether this view was true in 
regular wars could be a matter of debate, but in new wars, soldiers of all ranks are faced 
with this kind of deliberation. This has to do with dispersion of forces and the 
complexity of new wars.186  
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4.10.3.   Although practical wisdom is not a virtue of character, it still is a virtue.187 It is a 
disposition to come to an appropriate action; an action that is right both for the soldier 
himself as well as for others and that contributes to the overall goal of excelling in the 
military practice. The choice for a course of action requires deliberation. It requires 
perceiving a situation, including the moral component.  A situation in which the odds are 
heavily against the own unit, and a hasty retreat is clearly warranted, will generally not 
call for courage.188 A deficiency in deliberating will result in a decision which will be 
quick, but not necessarily good. It could be that not all factors are taken into account. 
Time often seems to be the most important factor, and this may well lead to 
stubbornness in sticking to the decision taken. A quick decision often does not allow for 
much reflection or taking suggestions into account criticism. On the other hand, 
deliberation can take to long. One wavers and vacillates and hesitates in taking a 
decision. When a decision is finally taken one  often fails as well in displaying conviction 
that it is a right decision. Criticism comments on the quality of the decision and 
suggestions for changes are more easily accepted resulting in more delay. A preliminary 
definition of practical wisdom could therefore read as the right between immediate and 
impulsive action at the first hint of difficulties and on the other hand, a wavering 
conduct and inconclusive action in case of pressure or any other emergency. Practical 
wisdom in a military context is often displayed in leadership. Leadership involving 
practical wisdom entails keeping a clear head, taking full account of the situation, taking 
decisive action and giving strong directive guidance while leaving room for initiative and 
displaying strong personal commitment. The latter component of leadership aims at 
conveying  the conviction that the chosen course of action is the best possible, both 
practically and morally. Display of personal commitment by leaders encourages trust 
and commitment by those who are to follow. 
4.10.4.   Practical wisdom is knowing what do and to act accordingly. The deliberation 
required will generally take place in two stages. First, the situation and its relevant 
factors are considered. In the second stage, a decision will be reached on how to act. This 
decision is based on weighing what is the overall best course of action. In this 
appreciation, both the actual situation is taken into account as well as the overall goal of 
the practice and how to excel.189 Practical wisdom is a moral skill that enables us to act 
wisely. How can we learn to be practical wise? 190 There is no manual on how to become 
wise. Basically, it is foremost a matter of experience.191 But not every experience adds to 
wisdom: some do and others don’t. Getting the right experience is first of all a matter of 
identifying and embracing  the right goal (Telos) of the practice. For the military, that is 
aspiring at being a good soldier, which means knowing what the military stands for and 
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identifying with this overall aim. From this perspective aspiring at excellence is a logical 
next step for a soldier. The military should then provide the prerequisites for satisfying 
this aspiration. If the military would try to make good soldiers by bonuses, it would 
corrupt military practical wisdom, as soldiers would act for the wrong reasons: 
incentives instead of intrinsic pleasure and satisfaction.192 Harsh discipline would not do 
the trick either: soldiers would act out of fear or blind obedience to rules and regulations 
instead out of the genuine aspiration to excel.193 The development of practical wisdom is 
stimulated by providing ways and means to excel and to grow in knowledge and skills. 
This requires an organizational culture in which it is allowed to make mistakes. Training 
and exercises should provide challenges to display the knowledge  and skill that are 
acquired and opportunities to learn more and most is learnt of mistakes made.194 This 
kind of education (‘Bildung’) provides the best opportunities to nurture the capacity to 
be wise.195  
 
Non-virtues 
4.11.1.  The virtues of character I identified in the preceding paragraph are related to a 
specific practice; they pertain to military character. Why did I identify these seven 
military virtues and not others, or less, or perhaps more? The first question can be 
answered as follows. The virtues I identified are the result of a careful analysis: first, I 
analyzed and dissected military practice, then I identified internal goods which are 
closely related to the constitutive parts of the practice. Next, based on both constitutive 
parts and related internal goods, I identified the virtues as those acquired human 
qualities that enhance the experience of the internal goods in military practice. My 
identification of the virtues is the result of a careful analysis of this military practice and 
a logical elaboration of MacIntyre’s theory. Still, it is not easy to establish which 
dispositions qualify as a virtue. Sometimes it is a matter of wording: fitness as well as 
perseverance are valuable properties for a soldier but on close scrutiny they refer to the 
same characteristics as (mental and physical) resilience. On the other hand, there are 
notions that are often used in relation to virtuous military conduct, which I have not 
listed as a military virtue. These exemptions need some explanation. I will limit my 
argument to the ‘usual suspects’: honour, loyalty, obedience, country and integrity.196  
4.11.2.   Honour is an ancient notion and is often considered a virtue. However, it is a 
qualification that is bestowed on a person by others. It pertains to the quality of a 
private person as someone righteous which is averse to meanness and deceit, or of a 
public servant as one who has all the qualities needed for the job and who discharges his 
duties in a most excellent manner.197 The flip side is that others can also censure. As we 
have seen the opinion of others is a strong incentive to behave properly. This raises 
questions as to the validity of qualifying honour as a virtue.  Honour becomes explicit 
and clear only  in relation to others, whereas virtues are moral dispositions in itself 
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without any external incentive.198 Honour can be aspired at: a symptom of care for a 
positive public reputation if not vanity.199 Oltshoorn concludes that: ‘Honour although 
often ranking high on militaries’ list of virtues, is in fact not a virtue at all; it is above all a 
reward for virtuous behaviour.’200 In a positive perspective an honourable person seems 
also to be a virtuous person. Also therefore, it is not  logical to assert that honour should 
qualify as virtue.  
4.11.3.   With loyalty, the matter is only slightly different. This notion pertains to a 
person or a unit, a cause or even a principle. This notion seems to entail a priority, giving 
extra weight to the interest to which loyalty is acclaimed. This means that loyalty has an 
external cause, and we have already noticed that a proper virtue has an internal cause. 
Loyalty could also interfere with choosing the appropriate course of action as priorities 
might distort the proper view on the issues at hand.201 Covering up unwelcome 
information is also a risk that is often a matter of perceived loyalty.202 The question then 
is; loyal to whom or what: to my fellow soldiers or to the abstract rights of strangers. 
The meaning or content of the notion of loyalty seems problematic: how to weigh 
different loyalties. Loyalty should not be qualified as a virtue: it has an external cause the 
nature of which could be problematic. Loyalty could also hamper the flourishing of other 
virtues.203 Loyalty can deteriorate into rigidity, the unwillingness if not the incapacity to 
question where loyalty may lead us. 204 Thus, loyalty could interfere with the proper 
exercise of the virtue of the intellect as well.205 This does not mean that the military can 
do without loyalty. Loyalty has a bright side as well. It will play a role in the virtue of 
comradeship, in being true to one’s comrades. Also in other virtues the sentiment of  
respecting  agreements and commitments may play a role. In this sense, the practical 
value of loyalty is already incorporated in some virtues, and a separate status would not 
add much: on the contrary, it would provide a status to the idea of loyalty that could do 
more harm than good.   
4.11.4.   A similar argument applies to obedience, which is an integral part of the virtue 
of discipline as well as respect and responsibility. Thus, the idea of obedience is already 
incorporated in the virtues of military character I identified. A separate status is 
therefore superfluous and would probably confuse the issue as if obedience would not 
be a part of discipline. But there is another objection as well to qualify obedience as a 
virtue. It might result in a disproportionate concern for obeying. A critical analysis of 
orders given and taken - a prerequisite in the proper exercise of  the virtue of intellect, 
practical wisdom - could be hampered. The dark side of this virtue, blind obedience, 
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(‘Befehl ist Befehl’) could emerge. So there are strong reasons not to qualify obedience 
as a virtue.  
4.11.5.   Country as a notion appeal to loyalty to the nation, its people and the values 
these represent, it stands for patriotism. In a way this notion is of some importance. 
Soldiers join the armed forces of their country. Only very few - in the Dutch context even 
less -  join a foreign legion or a private company that provides military capacities. So 
there is some kind of adherence to the nation. In my opinion, this adherence is captured 
in the notion of responsibility and respect. The nation decides to have armed forces and 
the legitimate government - with the consent of parliament - decides for which tasks the 
armed forces will deploy. When joining a soldier accepts the responsibilities involved 
and respects the oath he takes and the values this entails. However, nowadays the 
armed forces of constitutional democracies are seldom (if ever) deployed to defend the 
continuity of the nation-state. This fact diminishes the actual motivational worth of 
patriotism. Furthermore, it is a well researched fact that in modern constitutional states 
the idea of the nation does not feature as an incentive for day to day activities. Also in 
war the notion of a country is proven to play only a limited role: soldiers do not fight for 
their country, they primarily fight for their fellow soldiers, their comrades and their 
leaders.206 Patriotism also has a ‘dark side’ as it could well lead to unwarranted feelings 
of superiority and demonizing the enemy. All in all, country does feature in military 
practice, but only indirectly: it is not a direct constitutive part of the practice. This fact, 
as well as the risk of unwanted side-effects disqualifies country as a virtue. It will be 
clear that I think that the virtues of character I defined, do cover all aspects of the 
military practice. Adding others would not contribute to the completeness of this set of 
virtues, on the contrary, in some aspects additional dispositions could  obscure the 
overall idea of a set of virtues, which is by analysis related to a specific practice, its 
characteristics and the related standards of excellence. And there is another reason for 
this disqualification as well; country refers to an external cause, whereas the notion of a 
virtue refers to an internal disposition. 
 
4.11.6.   There is however, still another term that is often used in relation to the virtues 
which needs attention: integrity. Integrity is a recent concept and it is not exactly clear 
what is meant by it.207 A modern dictionary gives three meanings: adherence to moral 
principles, honesty; the quality of being unimpaired, soundness; unity, wholeness.208 It is 
obvious that the first definition is appropriate in the  present context. But this definition 
does not give a clear picture of what is meant by it: what are the moral principles 
involved? Fjellstrom discerns five directions of interpretation. First, the health view of 
integrity. The view that integrity amounts to health is still current and includes 
physiological, psychological and axiological integrity. The second direction of 
interpretation stands in a close relation to the first, defining what is often seen as the 
substance of a healthy state. This refers to an intact, harmonious state, especially in a 
person. The third direction of interpretation is also closely connected to the first, but 
here the key notion is that of a person’s basic or true self; a person’s integrity, on this 
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interpretation, is the person’s true self and the personal sphere. The fourth direction of 
interpretation has a legal background; it is derived from considerations of legal dues and 
claims in regard to the property of a person, a community, or a state. Integrity, on this 
view, is not an intact state of a piece of property, but the intactness of the owner’s right 
to it. The fifth direction of interpretation identifies integrity with human dignity.  The 
idea that each human is a being of infinite worth, regardless of his or her qualities of life 
and action. At the bottom this idea is the (Kantian) thought that each person as an 
autonomous, rational moral agent has infinite dignity and therefore should be treated 
with respect.209  Only the third interpretation could be understood as connected with 
the idea of an overall virtuous person, a conclusion that is supported by Bauman.210 Also 
Beauchamp and Childress offer a similar opinion: ‘Moral integrity means fidelity in 
adherence to moral norms…a coherent integration of aspects of the self… and …the 
character trait of being faithful to moral values and standing up in their defence when 
necessary.’211 However, none of the authors identify which moral norms define the 
notion of integrity. In this respect, the term integrity seems a portfolio that can have any 
content. Van Blijswijk  - in a different approach - states that integrity: ‘can be thought of 
as individuals upholding the obligation of office by implementing public programs in 
accordance with laws and rules, as well as in support of the public intent or the 
collective trust.’212 He clearly refers to an outer source of integrity and not a disposition.  
Integrity is sometimes seen as a  characteristic  that can be managed.213 It seems that 
also the Dutch Ministry of Defence shares this view.214 Williams too states that integrity 
is not a virtue because it is not a disposition that yields motivations like the motivational 
virtues of responsibility and respect. Integrity does not enable one to act from desirable 
motives in desirable ways. Integrity is merely the expression of the dispositions that 
form a person’s identity.215 Rawls seems to accept integrity as a virtue, but argues that 
the virtues of integrity are: ‘Yet while necessary they are not sufficient; for their 
definition allows for almost any content.’216 Besides in many organizations, integrity is 
used as a tool to clarify what employees should not do without impairing their integrity 
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and that of the institution as well. ‘Clearly this is not what a virtue is about.’217 So far the 
claim that integrity is a proper virtue seems to find little support. 
 
4.11.7.   However, one could argue that integrity has some connection with the notion of  
virtue as it encompasses all other virtues. MacIntyre interprets virtue in two different 
ways: broad and narrow.218 The narrow approach pertains to the virtues of character 
related to a specific practice. I elaborated on these in the preceding paragraphs, and 
integrity is not included as a virtue of military practice. Therefore, there remains the 
broad notion of the virtues: being virtuous. A broad conception would eventually lead to 
the idea of a single virtue: the quality that enables one to live a good life. This is what 
Aristotle suggests when he speaks about a single goal in life and the virtuous way in 
which to achieve that, requires only one single virtue: the disposition to excel.219 But 
Aristotle himself considers this not very practical as ‘people can be good in one way 
only, but bad in many ways’.220 He therefore introduced the necessity of moral 
dispositions, virtues of character. The virtues determine our moral goals, and practical 
wisdom makes us act in such a way that we can attain this moral goal.  Indeed, it does 
not seem very practical to found a system of morality on one virtue only. We therefore 
identified several virtues of military character. In this process, it already has become 
clear that some virtues often seem to overlap and connected, rather than being separate 
entities. But even apart from this interconnectivity of virtues, it would be hard to 
envisage how one can be virtuous in one respect and vicious in another. It is hard to 
imagine that a person who posses the virtue of responsibility will be lacking in the virtue 
of respect. It is reasonable to imagine that a person who posses the virtue of practical 
wisdom in the military practice will also be a wise participant in another practice. From 
this perspective, one could argue that by possessing a number of virtues that manifest 
themselves in different contexts, one may come close to the conception of single virtue 
that is being virtuous.  The notion of integrity could cover this idea of a being  an overall 
virtuous person. MacIntyre also supports this notion: ‘… the wholeness of human life – 
the virtue of integrity or constancy.’221 This interpretation too comes close to the other 
definitions in the dictionary. It is not hard to imagine that someone who has acquired 
the seven virtues of military character, and therefore who has also a well-functioning 
virtue of intellect, practical wisdom is a virtuous person in the broad sense.222 By his 
wholeness he could also be seen a person of integrity. In this approach, integrity is the 
result of an overall virtuous disposition. Integrity is therefore not a separate virtue in 
the narrow sense of that term. It is by acquiring the - narrow - virtues of character which 
are completed by practical wisdom, that one becomes a person of integrity, a virtuous 
person -  in the broad sense.223 This approach is also supported by a more recent 
attempt to define integrity in terms of a virtue.224 The authors came to the conclusion 
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integrity has to offer that is not covered by virtues that are, in fact, always desirable.’ 
224 van Tongeren, P.; Becker, M.; Hoekstra, A.; Karssing, E.; Niessen, R. (2010). Deugdethiek en integriteit 
Assen, van Gorcum. 
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that integrity could be defined as a disposition to act in accordance with the cardinal 
virtues of temperance, prudence, courage and justice. In other words, they too consider 
integrity the expression of an overall virtuous disposition.  
Conclusions. 
4.12.1.  In this chapter I identified seven virtues of military character: sense of 
responsibility military competence, courage, comradeship, respect - for fellow soldiers, 
civilians and even the enemy - resilience, and discipline. These seven virtues of military 
character cover all aspects of military practice, and the number needs no extending. If I 
would delete one of these seven virtues, I would ignore one of the constitutive parts of 
military practice and the internal goods that are closely related with it. I would have 
presented a flawed composition. A greater, or even  an unlimited number of virtues 
would only confuse the matter and in some cases it could be hard to tell exactly what the 
distinction between virtues is. The same argument applies to reduce the number of 
virtues to one: being virtuous. The number of virtues is therefore too a matter of 
establishing the right mean: not too many and not too few. The virtues I identified are 
tangible, they accommodate the pursuit of excellence and provide clear goals - and also 
yardsticks - for military education and training and personal development. Their 
theoretical foundation facilitates critical analysis and provides an appropriate  base for 
further reflection.  
4.12.2.  Based on MacIntyre’s theory - and with the practice and the related internal 
goods as a starting point in chapter 3 - I developed in this chapter a logical and coherent 
picture of the appropriate military virtues of character. The acquisition of these and the 
virtue of practical wisdom, allow a soldier to be truly virtuous, to be a person of 
integrity. I thereby created a body of military professional ethics that could provide 
guidance on morally responsible conduct under the specific - and sometimes extreme - 
circumstances in which the military has to operate, while keeping within the bounds of 
the rule of law. Such a body of ethics sets standards, which: protect other members of 
society against abuse of the military monopoly on violence; define the professional as a 
responsible and trustworthy expert in the service of the state; delineate the moral 
authority for actions necessary to the military function but otherwise impermissible in 
moral terms.225 In chapter 6 I will compare this theoretical approach with the opinions 
articulated in a number of interviews with persons who participate in different 
practices: soldiers, people working in health care and people who work as a town 
council civil servant. But first - in the next chapter 5 - I will elaborate on the practical 
relevance of the concept of narrative in MacIntyre’s theory. 
  
                                                          
225 Van Baarda, T. A. & Verweij, D.E.M., Ed. (2006). Military ethics, the Dutch approach. Leiden, Koninklijke 
Brill N.V. P 2-3 and 124. 
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Annex A to chapter 4: military practice; characteristics, internal goods and virtues226  
 
Virtues of character 
 
Characteristics 
of military 
practice 
Internal goods Specific 
groupings227  
Virtues  
1 Task 
Fulfilment 
Achievement 
 Satisfaction  
  
Responsibility 
2 Arms 
Excitement 
Satisfaction 
Pride  
  
Competence 
3 Cooperation 
Esteem  
Comfort  
Belonging 
Members of the 
same primary 
group 
Comradeship 
Other fellow 
soldiers 
 
 
 
Respect 
Permissive, 
supportive 
civilians 
4 Enemy 
Pride 
Satisfaction 
Contentment  
Non-violent , 
opposing civilians 
Armed 
opposition, 
fighters 
5 Danger 
Excitement 
Elation 
Thrill  
  
Courage 
6 Undetermined 
time and place 
Challenge  
Tension 
Adventure  
  
Resilience 
7 Rules  
Comfort 
Structure 
Stability  
  
Discipline  
 
Virtue of intellect 
 Action    Practical wisdom 
 
 
 
                                                          
226 This figure is an extension to the figure in Annex B to chapter 3: the two  right hand columns are added. 
227 This subdivision into specific groupings refers to the distinctions made in the text of chapter 4 
between: soldiers who are members of the same primary group (par. 4.5); other fellow soldiers (par. 
4.6.2.-4.6.5.); other non-soldiers, civilians, with either a permissive or a non-permissive attitude towards 
soldiers (par. 4.6.6.-4.6.7.) and non-soldiers who are members of the opposing forces, fighters (par. 4.6.8.-
4.6.9.). 
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Chapter 5: narrative. 
 
Introduction. 
5.1.1. In the preceding chapter I argued that MacIntyre’s theory provides a suitable 
instrument to identify and develop the required moral standards in the military. How to 
instil and uphold these standards will be addressed in this chapter.1  MacIntyre rejects 
the possibility to secure moral agreement in our culture by rational theories only. He 
states three reasons: moral theories use different rational premises, and therefore it is 
inevitable that there is a conceptual incommensurability between rational moral 
theories; moral theories presuppose the existence of impersonal arguments and so 
underestimate the power of personal reason-giving; moral theories have a wide variety 
of historical origins, which adds to further incommensurability.2 Of every particular 
theory there is a narrative to be written, and being able to understand that enquiry is 
inseparable from being able to identify and follow that narrative.3 Therefore, Macintyre 
seeks another method and uses narratives as complementary to theory. He sees 
narratives as an approach to moral philosophy through which action, the unity of human 
life, and the pursuit of the good receives their intelligibility.4 His use of narrative found 
many followers. Knight states that: ‘MacIntyre‘s use of the concept of narrative in ‘After 
Virtue’ has attracted much attention. Postmodernists now commonly argue that 
narration plays an important part in all sorts of human reasoning but ‘After Virtue’ - the 
first edition was published in 1981 - was one of the first works in English to articulate 
this approach.5 Not only postmodern philosophers but also other continental and Anglo-
Saxon philosophers support the idea of narratives as an important element in moral 
theory.  However, this does not mean that the concept of narratives has not met 
criticisms, especially regarding its impreciseness and indeterminateness.6  
 
5.1.2.   According to MacIntyre, the development of the concept of a virtue and 
internalizing a virtue always requires a narrative. In this chapter I will elaborate on the 
notion of narratives. First, I will relate and explain the ideas of MacIntyre on narratives 
and its function in making action intelligible, creating a unity in one’s life and pursuing 
the good. Next I will investigate in which way his ideas on narratives are incorporated in 
his view on virtue ethics. First, I will discuss the role of a narrative in relation to the 
notions of practice and virtue. Then I will focus on the relation between narrative and 
identity.  As MacIntyre sees narrative as an important means to acquire a virtuous 
disposition, I will elaborate on the relation between narrative and identity. For this 
purpose I will discuss some authors whose opinion on this issue support MacIntyre’s 
ideas. As I aim to apply MacIntyre’s theory in a military context, I will lastly argue how 
narrative can be practically applied in this military context. 
 
                                                          
1 See paragraph 1.8.2. 
2 MacIntyre, A. (2007). After Virtue. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 6-11 and 71-78. 
3 MacIntyre, A. (2006). The Tasks of Philosophy: Selected Essays, Volume 1. Cambridge, University Press. P 
143-178. 
4 MacIntyre, A. (2007). After Virtue. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 210 - 218 and MacIntyre, A. 
(1990). Three rival versions of moral inquiry. Notre Dame (Indiana), University Press. P 42. 
5 Knight, K. (1998). The MacIntyre Reader Notre Dame (Indiana), University Press. P 283. (italics added by 
the author) 
6 For an extensive discussion of these (and other) criticisms see: MacAdam, B. M. (2011). Narrative, Truth, 
and Relativism in the Ethics of Alasdair MacIntyre. School of philosophy. Washington D.C., Catholic 
University of America. PhD: 255. 
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Narrative according to Alasdair MacIntyre. 
5.2.1.   In his book ‘Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry’ MacIntyre writes: ‘Human 
action is human behaviour with a narrative: namely, a narrative of purposiveness. To 
explain a piece of behaviour as a human action is to be able to tell the story of how the 
behaviour relates to the purpose or intention of the agent.’7 According to MacIntyre, 
actions would not be intelligible without some kind of narrative.8 A narrative is also a 
prerequisite to establish an identity. In MacIntyre‘s understanding the self is partially 
defined by the roles and relationships into which an agent is born. He writes: ‘The story 
of my life is always embedded in the story of those communities from which I derive my 
identity.’9 These different communities require different roles, which could lead to a 
segmented life. But such a compartmentalized understanding of human life would 
provide no way of evaluating the proper place that a person should accord to the goods 
of each segment of life. Some kind of unity is required in order to make sense of life. 
Therefore he writes: 'What is important is to recognize that each life is a single, if 
complex, narrative of a particular subject, someone whose life is a whole into which the 
different parts have to be integrated…’.  To integrate these parts is a task; a task rarely, if 
ever, completed. This task is to understand those diverse goods as contributing to a 
single overall good, the ultimate good of this or that particular individual.'10  MacIntyre 
sees the necessary integration of the different goods into an overarching telos of life as a 
quest.11  However, this kind of quest is not simple, as: ‘…the medieval conception of a 
quest is not at all that of a search for something already adequately characterized, as 
miners search for gold or geologists for oil.’12 He argues that any adequate conception of 
the good will requires the perspective not only of practices and of the unity of a human 
life, but also of traditions. Ultimately, a determinate conception of the good could only be 
given through the progress made within and between traditions, which refine and 
advance that conception. In this respect, traditions are seen as arguments through time. 
However, he acknowledges that just because someone is born into a particular tradition, 
and just because that tradition constitutes the person‘s moral starting point, does not 
mean that the person is constrained by the limitations of that tradition. The fact that the 
self has to find its moral identity in and through its membership in communities such as 
those of the family, the neighbourhood, the city and the tribe does not entail that the self 
has to accept the moral limitations of the particularity of those forms of community.13 In 
short, narrative has an important function in Macintyre’s theory, a function that 
permeates almost all notions he uses. 
 
5.2.2.   In the first place a narrative is required to give a prior account of certain features 
of social and moral life in terms of which the virtue can be defined and explained.14 
                                                          
7 MacIntyre, A. (1990). Three rival versions of moral inquiry. Notre Dame (Indiana), University Press. P 
144.  
8 MacIntyre, A. (1988) Whose Justice? Which Rationality? Notre Dame (Indiana), University Press, P. 130. 
and MacIntyre, A. (2007). After Virtue. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 206 – 209. 
9 MacIntyre, A. (2007). After Virtue. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 221. 
10 MacIntyre, A. (2002). "Alasdair MacIntyre on Education: In Dialogue with Joseph Dunne." Journal of 
Philosophy of Education 36, (1): 10. 
11 Czarniawaska articulates it thus: ‘ A life is lived with a goal, but the most important aspect of life is the 
formulation and re-formulation of that goal. This circular teleology is what MacIntyre calls a narrative 
quest… A search looks for something that already exists; a quest creates its goal rather than discovers it.’ 
Czarniawaska, B. (2004). Narratives in social science research. London, Sage publications. P 13. 
12 MacIntyre, A. (2007). After Virtue. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 219. 
13 Ibid, P 221. 
14 Ibid, P 186-187. 
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Before one can talk of a virtue one has to have a notion of the Telos, which is aspired at 
in a Praxis. A practice itself is governed by rules, which are not only a matter of the 
present participants but also of those who preceded in the practice: ‘every practice has 
its own history.’15 A practice does not only have a history, it also has a present, and that 
present is made up by the actual participants. Any individual who participates in a 
practice enters into a relationship with the other participants.16 This relation is defined 
by the purpose and standards of the practice.17 This means that this relation extends not 
only to the present participants but also to all who preceded in the particular practice – 
and who will follow.18 Narrative is required in order to convey the purpose and 
standards of a practice beyond the reach of the actual participants. 
 
5.2.3.   A narrative is not only used to explain and elucidate a practice, but a second 
function is that a narrative is used as a means to initiate and educate practitioners.  A 
narrative supports the practitioner in developing the virtuous dispositions that fit the 
practice. This development will be actualized by participating in the practice. The 
ensuing membership of the community of practitioners will stimulate adhering by the 
tradition and values, of the community and thus fostering an appropriate behaviour and 
promote aspiring to excellence appropriate to the practice. This notion is shared by 
Miller.19 I will once again use the parallel of the rugby game. It would make no sense to 
join a rugby club without wanting to play rugby and being accepted as a player, and 
preferably a good one. The virtues of the good rugby player are primarily acquired and 
improved in playing the game. Exercise, training, discussions with fellow players, 
watching other games and inspiration by well known rugby players, will support  
acquiring the appropriate dispositions like team spirit, resilience, fair play, respect, 
physical prowess, technical skill, etc.20 These dispositions will eventually be internalized 
by the participants in the practice. 
 
5.2.3.   MacIntyre then argues that: ‘When someone genuinely possesses a virtue he can 
be expected to manifest this in very different types of situation. The unity of a virtue in 
someone’s life is intelligible only if it can be conceived as a characteristic of a unitary life, 
a life that can be conceived and evaluated as a whole.’21 It is indeed hard to conceive that 
a person who is virtuous in one practice will not behave likewise in other practices. The 
                                                          
15 Ibid, P 194. See also MacIntyre, A. (1990). Three rival versions of moral inquiry. Notre Dame (Indiana), 
University Press. P 64: ‘The standards of achievement within any craft (practice) are justified historically. 
They have emerged form the criticism of their predecessors and they are justified because and insofar as 
they have remedied the defects and transcended the limitations of those predecessors as guides to  
excellent achievement within that particular craft. Every craft is informed by some conception of a finally 
perfected work which serves the shared telos of that craft.’ 
16 Ibid, P 191. 
17 Ibid, P 192. 
18 Ibid, P 194. 
19 Miller, R. B. (1996). Casuistry and modern ethics. Chicago, University Press. P241: ‘narrative ethics… 
emphasize the importance of personal identity, the excellences of character(the virtues), and the 
individual and collective stories in which those excellences find their intelligibility.’ 
20 MacIntyre, A. (1990). Three rival versions of moral inquiry. Notre Dame (Indiana), University Press. 
P127: ‘To become adept in a craft, as we noticed earlier, one has to learn how to apply two kinds of 
distinctions, that between what a activity or  product merely seems to me good and what really is good, a 
distinction always applied retrospectively as part of learning from one's earlier mistakes and surpassing 
one's earlier limitations, and that between what is good and best for me to do here and now given the 
limitations of my present state of education into the craft and what is good and best as such, 
unqualifiedly.’ 
21 MacIntyre, A. (2007). After Virtue. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co.  P 204. 
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virtues of character pertaining to different practices - the narrow concept of the virtues - 
will eventually evolve in an overall virtuous attitude - the broad concept of the virtue.22 
Otherwise, an individual would be internally divided, which could impede the 
development of an agent’s unified selfhood.23 In MacIntyre’s words this means that in 
order to conceive unity in one’s life a telos is needed, which transcends the limited goods 
and virtues of the practices that constitute life. If such a unity is missing, ‘…arbitrary will 
invade the moral life and we shall be unable to specify the context of certain virtues 
adequately.’24 This means that reflection is required in order to ascertain which values 
and dispositions are relevant in all practices and how these can be expressed in an 
overall virtuous conduct.25 Implicitly, MacIntyre thereby acknowledges that there is 
more to morality than the concepts that are part of a culture of specific communities or 
practices.26 However, in order to conceive which values transcend practices, narrative is 
indispensable as narrative creates connections between different practices and thereby 
supports the development of transcendent values and thus a unified life and a unified 
identity.27 MacIntyre continues by stating that in relation with selfhood and human 
actions, it: ‘is natural to think of the self in a narrative mode.’28 An often taken for 
granted but clearly correct conceptual insight about life is that it is not experienced as a 
series of unconnected episodes; it is generally conceived as a psychological continuity.29  
The concept of psychological continuity requires the notion of an identity, a concept of 
selfhood. It is natural to think of the self in a narrative mode.30 A narrative is interpreted 
by MacIntyre as providing continuity and an intelligible account of the actions of an 
agent. Continuity is created in two ways: the actions of the agent - in a perspective of the 
past, the present and the future  - and the history of the context, the settings, in which 
the agent acts. The history of settings provides the context in which the agent can act 
intelligibly.31 This means that his actions can be explained and accounted for.32 The 
narrative concept implies further that the agent is both object and subject of  a story.33 
On the one hand, the agent is who he is as perceived by others in a history that runs 
from his birth to his  death and on the other hand the agent is the subject of his own 
history with his own meaning and no one else’s.34 The narrative of the agent as object 
and subject are connected in the interaction with others, and this connectivity helps to 
                                                          
22  See par. 2.6.8. and 2.6.9. above. 
23  MacIntyre, A. (2007). After Virtue. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 201 - 204. 
24 Ibid, P 203.  
25 See par. 2.6.14. before. 
26 This reproach is articulated among others by Martha Nussbaum, see: Nussbaum, M. (2007). Wat liefde 
weet (Love's knowledge). Amsterdam, Boom. P 205. 
27 MacIntyre, A. (1990). Three rival versions of moral inquiry. Notre Dame (Indiana), University Press. P 
128: ‘But no one who engages in a craft is only a craftsperson; we come to a practice of a craft with a 
history qua family member, qua member of this or that local community. So the actions of someone who 
engages in a craft are at the point of intersection of two or more histories, two or more enacted dramatic 
narratives.’ 
28 MacIntyre, A. (2007). After Virtue. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 206. 
29 Ibid, P 217. 
30 Ibid, P 206. 
31 MacIntyre, A. (1990). Three rival versions of moral inquiry. Notre Dame (Indiana), University Press. P 
64-66. 
32 MacIntyre, A. (2007). After Virtue. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co.  P 208-209. 
33 MacIntyre, A. (2003). Whose justice? Which rationality? Notre Dame (Indiana), University Press. P 29, 
291. 
34 MacIntyre, A. (2007). After Virtue. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 217. See also MacIntyre, A. 
(1990). Three rival versions of moral inquiry. Notre Dame (Indiana), University Press. P 196,197 and   
Habermas, J. (1992) Post-metaphysical thinking: philosophical essays . Cambridge, MIT Press, P 184-186. 
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establish a personal identity, a character.35  Narrative thus plays an important role in 
MacIntyre’s scheme: it explains the terms of a practice and the standards of excellence 
involved; it provides a context, a story,  in which the appropriate kind of conduct can be 
identified, articulated and practised, which will eventually result in the development of 
the relevant disposition to act in accordance with those standards, a virtue; furthermore 
it creates wider context in which the cohesion between virtues is clarified, which 
supports the development of an integrated identity, a virtuous character.  
 
Narrative and practice. 
5.3.   MacIntyre argues that the Aristotelian notion of a shared overall goal (Telos) in life 
has been lost, and therefore is untenable in modern complex societies. Instead, he claims 
that there is: ‘a particular type of practice as providing the arena in which the virtues are 
exhibited.’36 Life is not a single practice; life is made up of numerous practices. 
Furthermore, he states that ‘A practice involves standards of excellence and obedience 
to rules as well as the achievement of goods.’37 It is obvious that participating in a 
practice and acquiring the appropriate knowledge and skills  requires, first of all, 
communication with those who already participate in the practice and maintain the 
standards and purpose of the practice. Secondly,  in a wider perspective, narrative can 
provide insight into human actions and ethical reflections pertaining to the practice and 
beyond.38 Narrative also creates an awareness of the others besides them self.39 Or as 
Aristotle wrote: ‘… a person ought to be conscious of his friend’s existence, and this can 
be achieved by living together and conversing and exchanging ideas with him - for this 
would seem to be what living together means in the case of human beings; not being 
pastured like cattle in the same field.’40 We need to live together with friends and share 
in argument and thought in order to be aware of the  sort of lives we are living. Self-
knowledge is for a large part based on entering into relations with others.41 A third 
characteristic of narrative is that it requires personal interpretation and involvement by 
both the narrator and the recipient of the narration.42 In this respect narrative is an 
important constituent of a practice, as a practice is never a mere set of technical skills 
and rules that can be acquired by merely reading a manual, an instruction.43 A 
practitioner must get properly acquainted with the practice and gets a notion of  the 
pleasure participating in the practice entails, the enrichment of human powers that can 
be achieved in the practice.44 Or as Nussbaum elegantly articulates that a newcomer to a 
practice must develop: ‘…the keen responsiveness of intellect, imagination and feeling to 
the particulars of a situation.’45 This requires a living history, an appropriate story in 
                                                          
35 Arendt, H. (1994). Vita Activa (The human condition). Amsterdam, Boom. P186. 
36 MacIntyre, A. (2007). After Virtue. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co.  P 187. 
37 Ibid, P 190. 
38 Nussbaum, M. (1986). The fragility of goodness. Cambridge, University Press. P 12,13, 378 and 397- 
421. 
39 Ibid, P 70. 
40 Aristotle (2004). The Nicomachean ethics. London, Penguin books.Par. 1170b10-13. 
41 Dohmen, J. (2010). Brief aan een middelmatige man. Amsterdam, Ambo. P 96-98 and 107,108. 
42 Nussbaum, M. (1986). The fragility of goodness. Cambridge, University Press. P 167-168. 
43 De Rosier, M., Mercer, S. (2007). "improving student social behaviour; the effectiveness of a storytelling-
based character education programme." Journal of research in character education 4(2). P 134: ‘ Examples 
provided through narrative and visual images are an effective way of teaching and influencing behaviour, 
particularly because they provide a meaningful context within which to understand the information.’ 
44 Nussbaum, M. (1986). The fragility of goodness. Cambridge, University Press. P 191. 
45 Ibid. 
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which the practice and its values are elucidated.46 This story must be convincing; it must 
provide a context in which the participant recognizes himself; it must create a vision of 
possible achievements to be gained by excelling.47 This story becomes tangible in 
interpreting and participating in the practice  together with others.48 It is hard to 
conceive of a practice that would attract participants without these kinds of stories. It is 
hard to conceive of a practice that could do without a history, a present and a future and 
that is not shaped in narrative. In any practice, communication is indispensable: in 
getting to know what the practice entails; in experiencing and sharing what it means to 
be a member of the community of participants; in understanding the traditions that 
permeates the practice;  imbuing the morality of the practice and developing an 
aspiration to excellence.49 Nussbaum states  that Aristotelian deliberation is based on: '... 
a belief that the fundamental distinctions in the world of practice are human, backed by 
nothing more eternal or stable than human things, (and which)  contributes to an 
agent's sense of ethical risk. For Aristotle, this ethical anthropocentrism is a special 
development of a general argument denying that our belief commitments do, or can 
attach themselves to objects that are altogether independent of  and are more stable 
than human thought and language.'50 Narrative - as an important use of language - is 
indispensible to make sense of our world. 
  
Narrative and virtue. 
5.4.   Virtue ethics aims at developing a virtuous character which is considered a 
prerequisite for flourishing in life, for living a good life. 51 The virtue is not a mere means 
to a flourishing life, but to flourish in life means living virtuously and as such, the virtue 
is a goal in itself. A flourishing life can be attained by anybody. Everybody can acquire a 
virtuous disposition and flourish in life.52 Participating in a practice will generally result 
in adopting the virtues that are inherent to the practice. A virtuous disposition means 
that a person is disposed to act in accordance with the standards of excellence that 
define a practice. A just person is disposed to act justly; a temperate person is disposed 
to act with temperance. The virtuous person recognizes a situation, a setting,  and what 
is the important feature of that setting.53 Sometimes, perceiving a situation results in a 
cataleptic, a strong mental, impression. But even then these impressions too require 
interpretation.54 Narrative is an important element is this process of recognizing, 
                                                          
46 Abrahamson, C. E. (1998). "Storytelling as a pedagogical tool in higher education." Education 118 (3): 
440-441. P441: ‘Stories not only explained life and preserved history, but also ensured the continuity of 
experiences from one generation to the next. Civilizations survived because of storytelling.’ 
47 Yackley, L. E. (2006). storytelling: a key to adult learning. Education. Newark, University of Delaware. 
PhD: P 11: ‘I observed how storytelling worked in practice. The learner became active in the process. I 
observed that telling stories did not just entertain the adult learner; the stories seemed to be why adults 
learned…. Stories are a way we accumulate information that we then integrate to understand and apply 
the lessons to other situations.’ 
48 De Rosier, M., Mercer, S. (2007). "improving student social behaviour; the effectiveness of a storytelling-
based character education programme." Journal of research in character education 4(2). P133: 
‘Storytelling to make complex social skills, character choices, and social dilemmas more concrete and 
recognizable.’ 
49 Ibid, P 134: ‘… the use of storytelling has been supported as an effective strategy for moral education.’ 
50 Nussbaum, M. (1986). The fragility of goodness. Cambridge, University Press. P 238. 
51 Aristoteles (2004). Ethica Nicomachea. Budel, Damon. Par. 1098b29-31. 
52 See par. 2.6.13 above. 
53 Tongeren, van, P.; Becker,M.; Hoekstra, A.; Karssing, E.; Niessen, R. (2010). Deugdethiek en integriteit. 
Assen, van Gorcum. P 22-23. 
54 Nussbaum, M. (2007). Wat liefde weet (Love's knowledge). Amsterdam, Boom. P 108. 
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interpreting and evaluating a situation. Previous experiences help an individual to select 
a ‘frame’ with which he can interpret a setting.55 A virtuous disposition supports a 
person in choosing the appropriate frame.  What is appropriate depends on the purpose 
of the impending action and the values which are at stake; it is a matter of practical 
wisdom. Narrative is a tool that supports ‘framing’ and thus interpreting situations. 
Narratives support the internalization of pattern recognition.  Van Tongeren calls this 
internalizing of dispositions ‘scratching’.  Each time a person acts, he creates a scratch 
on the surface of his personality, and every time he acts in a similar way the scratch is 
deepened. After some time - when in a similar situation – action follows the scratch as a 
matter of course. The etymology of scratching, graffito, goes back to the Greek graphein, 
which is etymologically related to character.56  This process is similar to the Aristotelian  
idea of the virtue as a developed habit. Virtue is a matter of growth: the virtuous 
disposition is strengthened by further practice and experience.57 Communication, 
narrative - in education, training, further education (Bildung) and (sharing) experiences 
- contributes to these scratches, and thus shaping character. Storytelling is an influential 
instrument in education and shaping character.58 Thus, also in connection with 
appropriating virtues narrative is important!  
 
Narrative and the concept of the self. 
5.5.1.   The virtues developed within the context of different practices will contribute to 
shaping character, which cannot be seen apart from the notion of selfhood, identity.59  
An overall (different practice’s transcending) identity is necessary to make sense of an 
otherwise compartmentalized a segmented life and to become a truly virtuous person.60 
Also with regard to the notion of identity narrative plays an important role. This notion 
of narrative as constituting identity is closely connected to communitarian political 
philosophy. The central idea in communitarianism is that an individual is thrown into an 
already existing community which has common social practices, cultural traditions and 
shared social and moral understandings. Therefore, individuals are bound up with the 
communities they belong to.61 However, it is not my intention to get involved in 
arguments regarding the plausibility of communitarianism; my aim is merely to 
establish whether MacIntyre’s theory provides a suitable instrument to apply on 
military practice. The same applies to the notion of selfhood, which is a much discussed 
subject. It is an issue in at least the philosophy of mind, in political philosophy and in 
social philosophy. I will not address these theories. In the context of this thesis I will 
limit myself to explore the notion of narrative as a constituent for the concept of a self. 
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MacIntyre claims that narrative is a prerequisite for developing an identity. The 
development and shaping of an identity is not a singular and unique event. The shaping 
and reshaping of identity is an ongoing process during man’s life. According to 
MacIntyre the greater part of this shaping is realized in the context of practices. Than the 
shaping within the practices needs to be harmonized in order to create the unity 
necessary to develop a stable identity. His vision allows for ‘character building’ , a 
perspective on the  practical applicability  of this theory. The central theme of my thesis  
is to demonstrate the practical applicability of MacIntyre’s theory. In this context I will 
first address the role of narrative in developing and shaping identity. Charles Taylor is 
one of the authors who endorse the view that a narrative is an important factor in the 
shaping of an identity in the wider context of the community the agent belongs to. 
Another author, Galen Strawson, questions the notion that narrative is a prerequisite for 
the development of morality as part of an identity. However his arguments are not 
conclusive. Thereafter I will seek support for issue, which is part of MacIntyre’s theory is 
the notion that shaping one’s identity, one’s character could be a conscious process. His 
issue is addressed by Peter Sloterdijk who develops a powerful argument in support of 
this idea. Finally, John Christman is presented as he elegantly combines some of the 
notions, which are addressed by the previous authors.  
 
5.5.2.   In his influential and comprehensive book ‘Sources of the self’ Charles Taylor 
gives his account of the connection between the notions of narrative, identity and the 
self.62 The interpretation of an individual is first of all, a matter of being socially 
embedded. This provides a language and frames of reference.63 He argues that it is 
impossible to imagine a person that could do without frames of reference. Without any 
frames of reference, we would lack the horizons within which we live and give meaning 
to our life.64 This moral orientation provides an answer to the question ‘Who am I?’ and 
thereby a notion of an identity. The notion of a self develops in the co-existence with 
others and how we - by reflection - morally position ourselves in relation to the others. 
This positioning of one’s own self in relation with others requires a kind of orientation 
regarding the good which we share with others:  you can only be a self amongst other 
selves.65 The  relation with others is for a very important part based on the use of 
language. It is in conversation with others that one finds one’s identity, one’s self. One 
cannot become a self on one’s own.66 It is in our orientation on a shared idea of the good, 
and in relation with others that we find a meaning for our life which unfolds like a story. 
In order to know who we are we must have a notion how we have become what we are, 
and where we are going.67 Insight into one’s self necessarily requires a story.68 However, 
in his book Taylor more or less ignores the role of human autonomy and how this 
concept can be reconciled with the idea of selfhood primarily  as a result of cultural 
framing. Neither does he address the question of how - by what means - a selfhood is 
developed.  In other words, Taylor provides powerful arguments in favour of the notion 
of narrative as a constituent in selfhood but fails in explaining the process of gaining 
selfhood.  
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5.5.3.   The idea of human autonomy is one of the issues which Galen Strawson uses to 
deny the idea that narrative shapes selfhood.69 He argues that in order to be morally 
responsible it is not required to have a diachronic view on oneself: the self as something 
that was there in the past and will be in the future. He claims that an episodic view of 
oneself is more appropriate:  the self can have experiences without a historical context.70 
In his view, this is particular clear with regard to deontology or consequentialism. In 
these theories doing the right is a matter of here and now.  Only those who support 
virtue ethics, in which the moral character is central to ethics, will favour a diachronic 
view on selfhood. However, he argues that this is not logical as the notions of conscience 
and responsibility are more ancient than the notion of a self. They predate the sense of a 
self and are independent of it. ‘The diachronic sense of the self can only exist in 
creatures - like ourselves - that have evolved in to fully fledged concept-exercising self-
consciousness…’71  Self awareness or understanding the situation one finds oneself in 
need not involve any memory of one’s past actions. However, Strawson’s claims ignore 
the fact that we indeed have ‘evolved into fully fledged concept-exercising self-
consciousness’ human beings, who live together in complex societies. Although 
individual human beings may experience  episodic views regarding their lives, living 
together requires some shared notion of the good, a shared moral orientation. Living 
together requires the capacity to communicate successfully. It is hard to see how this is 
possible without a shared notion of a past, a present and goals that are aspired at.72 
Strawson neither provides an answer to the question what the origin of moral 
experiences is and how this moral capacity is embedded in a person’s self. It seems he 
claims it is something which is inherent to being human, maybe even genetic? Another 
issue Strawson does not address is that in spite of his views, man is by many considered 
to be a ‘storytelling animal’73  This ‘animal’ communicates with others, and in this 
communication he also defines his place among others in both a physical, a social and a 
mental capacity. 
 
5.5.4.   As to the other question which refers  to what extend it is possible to actively 
(re)shape identity Peter Sloterdijk has recently contributed to the discussion in his book 
with the compelling title ‘Du musst dein Leben ändern’.74 He argues that human identity 
is the result of permanent self-reproduction triggered by an invisible training’s 
programme.75 In Sloterdijk’s view, a stable and permanent identity requires at first 
constant training and adjustment in order to absorb new notions.76 An important 
method in these processes is ‘Retrivialisierung’, by which he means the capability to 
treat new phenomena as if they do not exist; either by denying it is a new phenomenon 
or by denying its relevance. He assumes that stability, in principle, opposes change. He 
then explicitly states that this process of ‘Retrivialisierung’ refutes the notion of 
narrative as used by Alasdair MacIntyre as only a very small part of our identity is 
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shaped by  conscious changes.77 Sloterdijk of course is right when he states that a large 
part of our identity is shaped by subconscious processes in which repetition is the 
formative power. This ‘invisible training’s programme’ is inspired by the human drive to 
improve one’s life; or as Sloterdijk puts it: the training imperative which exceeds the 
hypothetical and categorical imperative.78 This argument is similar to the Aristotelian 
principle.79 Thus, although Sloterdijk refutes narrative as  a means to support the 
development of identity ,he does accept the Aristotelian concept of character 
development.  Also he admits to a conscious influence on character, by trainers, 
exemplary practitioners, acceptance of standards of excellence and discipline.80 
Furthermore does Sloterdijk accept the formative influence of participating in a 
practice.81 In his Aristotelian zeal, he even goes so far as to formulate a perfection 
imperative: aspire to excellence in such a way that the story (sic) of your achievement 
can serve as a model to others.82 People can learn in a conscious way, as is shown daily 
all over the world.  The point is that lessons learnt - either consciously or subconsciously 
- can eventually become embedded in character. This is a matter of impact and exposure. 
Both these elements are part of the Aristotelian notion on how to acquire a virtuous 
disposition. First it is a matter of recognizing the relevance of achieving a standard of 
excellence (impact). Then it becomes a matter of education, training and experience 
(exposure) until acting virtuously has become a habit. A part of this process will be 
conscious, another part subconscious; the question is whether this matters.  The 
conclusion is that in spite of his claim, Sloterdijk does not disqualify narrative as a 
formative power of identity, he does acknowledge and support an Aristotelian approach 
to shaping the future. This requires aspiring at standards of excellence, which demands 
continuous exercising; an important feature of achieving a virtuous disposition! In the 
end Sloterdijk supports the notion that practicing  eventually changes a person. 
 
5.5.5.   In the above paragraphs I tried to find support for MacIntyre’s ideas on narrative 
and the possibility to shape a character. More support is found in the position, of John 
Christman, who  combines some of the notions mentioned above by Taylor and 
Sloterdijk.83 He supports the notion that the historical self is constructed by narrative, 
but only in the broad sense of being  diachronically comprehensible.84 He further states 
that  the ‘self’ is not a permanent stable entity. Elements of the self emerge in practical 
reasoning as one acts, speaks and expresses oneself. Which elements emerge, is 
contingent. So in his view it is not plausible to postulate a static set of values, interests, 
capacities and the like that make up the settled self prior to practical reasoned actions.85 
He supports his line of reasoning by citing a number of post-modern thinkers.86 In spite 
of these arguments, Christman states:  ‘Yet, accepting all that, we can still claim that a 
‘self’ arises out of the public, interpersonal interactions that sincere communications 
involves. We commit ourselves to fixed meanings even if the meanings of our internal 
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reflections are rife with fluidity and ambiguity, both conscious and unconscious.’87 In 
this process of developing a self the human memory  has an essential part as it is 
necessary for having a self-concept which enables us to valuate ourselves.88 
Autobiographic recall and its social and active components play an important role 
therein. The construction of a self-concept involves passive and active self-narratives - 
just like a memory; it is an ongoing process of socially mediated self-interpretation.89 
This requires social interaction and reflection. Identifying oneself with the ensuing 
interpretation requires the acceptance of the self-narrative as mine and thereby creating 
accountability. This notion of accountability is also articulated by Alasdair MacIntyre, 
who argues: ‘Human beings can be held to account for that of which they are the 
authors; other beings cannot. To identify an occurrence as an action is in the 
paradigmatic instances to identify it under a type of description, which enables us to see 
that occurrence as flowing intelligibly from a human agent‘s intentions, motives, 
passions and purposes. It is therefore to understand an action as something for which 
someone is accountable, about which it is always appropriate to ask the agent for an 
intelligible account.’90 Christman further argues that these self-narratives are for many 
people diachronic and require ‘tellability’ and ‘thematic unity’ in order that a coherent 
unity is created that can be recognized as one’s own.91 As to the notion of autonomy, he 
concludes that it is true that there are certain social background conditions from which a 
person cannot detach himself. This requires non-alienation from basic value 
orientations that are part of practices and relations of a particular sort.92 However, this 
leaves room for reflection on the importance and meaning of these attachments.93 In the 
end, Christman accepts the notion of narrative as constituent element in forming a self-
concept, an identity, however not in a encompassing meaning. He does not accept 
narrative as a linear concept based on causality nor as a story of a quest, a development 
toward an overarching telos of life. In his view, life is more than a mere recollection of 
biographic facts. He claims that narrative only aims at creating a life of thematic 
coherence, as our lives are made up of several different and separable purposes. 
Thematic coherence founds emotional and moral stability, but constant re-
interpretation is inevitable. This notion of re-interpretation is shared by Martha 
Nussbaum.94 This approach even allows for Sloterdijk’s invisible trainings programme. 
Furthermore, the notion of a stable identity leaves room for and even requires self-
reflection.95  
 
5.5.6.   Taking into account the arguments of the different authors, we can conclude that 
narrative is indeed an important factor in the development of selfhood, including moral 
orientation. The idea of an ongoing process of self-reflection and reinterpretation seems 
credible as well:  characters do change, albeit slowly. The role of memory in this process 
cannot be refuted, and furthermore, opens the possibility of actively shaping character. 
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This shaping is primarily a question of autonomous deliberation: which values are 
considered important and which not. This involves also identifying standards of 
excellence worth aspiring at. This perspective on evaluation is supported by the idea of 
thematic narrative, which aims at a conceptual unity, rather than a mere sequential 
notion of unity. Evaluation will take place in relation with values - what is important -  
rather than a sequence of events.  This self-reflection supports the idea of an identity, a 
notion of unity in life, a unity that transcends the many practices a life is made up of. It is 
this kind of unity that is required to develop an overall virtuous attitude that transcends 
the virtues required in the different practices:  that is virtuousness in the broad sense; 
an attitude that enables overall virtuousness. However, evaluation is also a matter of 
experience! Experience - and further education - gives fuel to developing of memories as 
well as active deliberation, the prerequisites for developing virtues of character. 
Exercise and training are important features in achieving excellence.  Narrative is 
instrumental in both developing virtuous dispositions in different practices as well as 
shaping an unified identity as a human being. The former pertains to the narrow concept 
and the latter to the broad concept of the virtues. This notion is shared by Sandel who 
argues that if we reject the narrative account of moral agency and embrace the idea that 
we are free to be the author of our moral obligations, we also reject the community in 
which we were thrown. Such a kind of neutrality may not be possible as we cannot 
deliberate on moral issues without a notion of the good life.96 
 
Narrative and the military.  
5.6.1.   In paragraph 3.2. I explained that the military has all the characteristics to qualify 
as a practice. It provides rules, standards of excellence and a historical setting, the latter 
of which is visible and is daily experienced in details in the uniform, specific habits, as 
well as in the tradition of the units which are part of the military organisation. The rules 
are laid down in a formal military regimen supplemented by traditions. The standards of 
excellence apply to formal professional skills and competence as well as to live up to the 
informal culture of the unit. Both add to establishing and upholding an ‘esprit de corps’. 
The function of ‘esprit de corps’ should not be underestimated! Being a member of a unit 
that has a distinctive functional role already facilitates pride in this membership. The 
specific ways in which the unit and its members present themselves add to this feeling of 
pride and self-respect. This specific ‘style’ is imbued by the older members of the 
community. Stories are an important element in this process. These stories do not only 
refer to ‘how we do things here’, but also to tradition of the unit. This tradition is for a 
large part based on stories; stories of battle honours, stories about remarkable 
members, stories of rivalries with other units and corps, stories of special feats and 
peculiarities, etc. Often these stories are larded with humour, which enhances the sense 
of ‘style’ that is  appreciated. These stories also help to identify exemplary individuals, 
characters,  and their conduct that can serve as models for junior soldiers. This ‘esprit de 
corps’ is often outwardly expressed by specific manners and symbols. Think of the  
dolphin of the submarine community, the wing of the flying family and the green, red 
and black berets of specific army regiments and corps. However, ‘noblesse oblige’ and 
this means that membership provides an extra incentive to live up to the expectations 
created by being a member of a specific unit or corps.97 Narrative has an important role 
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in this process; not only in the instruction, training and further education that goes with 
initiating someone into a practice, but also in maintaining the tradition of the unit and 
the specific ‘esprit de corps’. All these factors add to the substance of military practice. 
Military practice especially cannot do without narrative, as narrative  contributes to the 
necessary cohesion of military units.98 
 
5.6.2.  Narrative also supports the development of the military virtues of character. First, 
on a primarily technical level by explaining why standards of excellence have to be met 
and how the virtues are important in order to meet these standards. Second narrative 
provides a vivid picture of these otherwise abstract concepts and the values involved. 
Abstract concepts become tangible goals that can be achieved by the appropriate course 
of action.99 Furthermore, narrative triggers the imagination about what is told and 
supports reflection about personal ends, ways and means. Narrative also provides a 
context as stories often refer to settings and history, which enhance a sense of being part 
of a tradition.100 Training, exercise and other (simulated) experiences add to the 
internalisation of the disposition to act in accordance with the standards of 
excellence.101  This is a matter of both maintaining self-esteem and living up to 
standards of fellowship.  
 
5.6.3.   However, the use of narrative is not only effective in teaching skills and standards 
of excellence, but also in moral education. Narrative helps in grasping the moral import 
of sometimes abstract lessons.102 Soldiers must understand the ideas and values that 
underlie the standards of excellence of the practice. Narrative also facilitates expressing 
the pleasure one experiences at performing well. This pleasure is a strong stimulus to 
aspire at further excellence.103 The eventual aim of this moral education is to have this 
aspiration - as well as other dispositions - internalized. Narrative also supports the 
sharing of this pleasure with others and by expressing esteem. This also entails 
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reflection on those others: what is it that guides the actions of these admirable others? 
Narrative brings to life also a wider opportunity for reflection on what is admirable. This 
is in the history of units and corps in which virtuous acts and conduct are extolled, and, 
which provides frames of reference as to what kind of conduct is expected. These stories 
often have a tangible presence in the colours and ensigns of units in which are 
embroidered the names of places where the units performed noteworthy deeds. The 
special events in which the colours are presented to the troops - mostly accompanied by 
much pomp and circumstance - adds to the importance of these stories: they represent a 
living tradition. This kind of sharing enhances the overall pleasure one experience.104 
Narrative also creates bonds that provide the support and stimuli to try to excel. It 
shapes involvement and moral sentiments of empathy. This kind of mutual involvement 
(Philia) sustains a good character.105 By narrative one can explain to soldiers that they 
will encounter moral dilemmas and dangers and how they can cope with these.106 
Stories create a context which can assist soldiers in recognizing moral hazards.107 
Narrative  can clarify the importance of deliberation required to really internalize the 
appropriate values and to develop a virtuous disposition.  This deliberation is necessary 
to reflect on situations, including the critical evaluation of  earlier decisions and actions 
and thus develop an appropriate practical wisdom.108 Narrative, stories are thus a 
vehicle for introducing and elaborating military virtues in a tangible way. Stories are 
flexible: the same virtues - like courage, comradeship and professionalism - can be 
extolled in different stories in different ways that fit a specific subculture. This flexibility 
supports the introduction of  a defence wide set of virtues, as it leaves ample room for 
specific stories that meet the characteristics of the services. The services do have a 
different culture, and this fact needs to be accommodated in the narrative which makes 
virtues intelligible for the community they are meant for.109 The stories could be 
reminiscences of real events or even fictional literature in which a military context is 
present.110 All these stories provide opportunities for empathy and critical reflection, 
which support growing moral awareness.111 This pertains not only to actual moral 
actions but also in digesting morally challenging experiences. In the aftermath of battle 
stories help to cope with the horrors that were experienced. By telling these stories, 
sometimes over and over, these experiences can be digested and given a place in the 
soldier’s memory  instead of being repressed. Thus narrative helps in maintaining the 
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mental health of soldiers.112  Narrative thus has an important role in imbuing standards 
of excellence and developing and maintaining  a virtuous disposition in soldiers.113 
 
5.6.4.   Military practice requires military men, soldiers. Soldiers who have imbibed the 
military virtues of character, intellect and practical wisdom. ‘Scratching’ in training, 
exercises, further education and experience will lead to the internalisation of these 
virtues. Harsh training and exercises are  an indispensable means to this end. ‘Some 
need persuasion, others need violence.’114 Living together on board of ships, in barracks 
and on bases creates a powerful condition for military socialisation and the 
internalisation of the appropriate dispositions. ‘Parental guidance’ by well qualified 
instructors and role models will add to the overall formative effort. Narrative supports 
the development of thematic unity in identity. The military identity is often referred to, 
but it still is a somewhat foggy notion: there is no standard description of the military 
identity. Sometimes attempts are made to develop some kind of standard, mostly for 
education purposes, but as policies change none of these attempts gained an enduring 
status.115 However, one of the recurring themes of identity in the military will be 
‘masculinity’.116 It is often heard: in the armed forces, you will be made a man. In the 
Dutch armed forces - as in many other nationalities - this is not as much a matter of 
gender or sexual orientation as well as of a classic notion of a typical male attitude: 
physical fit, mentally tough, emotionally controlled and prepared to use violence when 
the circumstances require so.117 This notion of military bearing is supported by the 
military virtues like resilience and discipline, supported by comradeship.118  Sociability 
is also a recurring and important theme of a military identity as the military requires 
cooperation and teamwork. This  theme is supported by the military virtue of 
comradeship, respect and responsibility.119  
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use. However, a close look shows that all these traits can be seen as constitutive of the virtues of military 
character developed in this thesis. Koninklijke Militaire Academie (1992). Handboek persoonsvorming. 
Breda, Gouverneur: 52. P 5-19. 
116 Hinojosa, R. (2007). “Recruiting the self: the military and the making of masculinities". Philosophy. 
Gainesville, University of Florida. PhD: 249. P114-139.  See also Ramakers, F. Omgaan met ‘orde’ en ‘chaos’ 
is het leervermogen van de krijgsmacht daarvoor toereikend? In Richardson, R., Verweij, D., Vogelaar, A., 
Kuipers, H., Ed. (2002). Mens en organisatie: de krijgsmacht in verandering. Alphen aan den Rijn, 
Haasbeek. P 171-173. 
117 Hinojosa, R. (2007). “Recruiting the self: the military and the making of masculinities". Philosophy. 
Gainesville, University of Florida. PhD: P 98.  ‘Actively constructing the self as virtuous means fitting tales 
of the self within the warrior discourse such that one’s actions provide evidence of virtue. Some of the 
men situate their current self as virtuous, but the unique quality of a discourse, as a set of ideas, allows 
men to also  construct past and future selves as virtuous by framing these selves with the warrior 
discourse.’ P 74: ‘The warrior discourse can be understood as a highly stylized, albeit, loosely formulated 
construction of masculinity; a militarized masculinity.’ 
118 See also Bilgiç, R., Sümer, H.C. (2009). "Predicting military performance from specific personality 
measures: a validity study." International journal of selection and assessment 17(2): 231-238. 
119 See Sabongui, A. G. (2006). Personality and social predictors of adaptation in the military. Humanities. 
Montreal, Concordia University. PhD: 121. 
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5.6.5.   Another recurring thematic narrative is of a moral nature. Where do I stand and 
which values do I cherish? These issues are also a matter of reflection, deliberation and 
repetitious re-interpretation. This deliberation and reflection are essential. The nature 
of military activities implies that a soldier is faced with dilemmas and hard questions.  In 
order to cope with these circumstances a soldier must be willing and able to be critical: 
not only as to the options for action he has, but also as to his own capabilities and 
deficiencies. It is hard to be a good person if you are not aware of your weaknesses and 
deficiencies. For a soldier this is even more important as the extreme circumstances of 
war may well lead to extreme failures; or success for all purposes.120 Unity in identity 
requires recognizing the duality inherent to being human. Unity in this respect is 
supported by the virtues of responsibility, respect, courage and practical wisdom.  
However, being virtuous is a two-way street. Having a virtuous disposition as a soldier 
implies often being virtuous in general. From this point of view it is hard to conceive 
how a soldier who has imbued the virtues of responsibility, and respect will not be a fine 
member of a civil sports team or a good neighbour. It is hard to conceive how a soldier 
who has internalized the virtues of competence and discipline  will be negligent in the 
maintenance of his privately owned house.  A resilient soldier is not apt to let his head 
hang by the first minor setback, whether in his military or private affairs. Being a soldier 
and acquiring an identity that is partly shaped by military virtues does not necessarily 
contradict civil values and virtues, on the contrary: military virtues and a military  
shaped identity support the notion of a responsible citizen. The ideal military self is well 
equipped for membership of the civil society and the narrative that supports it. But 
there is a flip side to this story as well: ‘People in the field have a tendency to be rather 
self-congratulatory about the moral climate we associate with the profession of arms.’121 
This kind of complacency could well alienate the military from the wider civil society 
and - which is worse - could hamper continuous attention as to the moral state of affairs 
within the military.122 Therefore, the relation between the military and the civil society 
also needs to be governed by a virtuous attitude: the right mean between 
presumptuousness and embarrassment. The right mean between, on the one hand,  
exaggerated pride and complacency regarding the moral standards of the military 
profession often resulting in disapproval of civilian standards, and on the other hand, an 
overestimation of civil values and standards, which could well result in a depreciation of  
the military profession and the values it entails. 
 
Conclusions. 
5.7.   Narrative is an important feature of MacIntyre’s theory. However, this does not 
mean that all stories have a similar impact: there is a lot of small-talk going on. Neither 
does it mean that all narrative related to practices, virtues and values have a positive 
connotation: negative comments are also a part of narrative. Even purpose narrative can 
be morally corrupting, as was shown in the ‘Third Reich’.123 However, narrative still 
provides the necessary context in practices, supports the development of the virtues and 
                                                          
120 Marlantes, K. (2011). What it is like to go to war. New York, Atlantic Monthly Press. P81: ‘Under 
ordinary circumstances the repressed and despised parts of our personalities manifest themselves as 
small human foibles or weaknesses in character that foster on petty acts  with minor harmful 
consequences. In the crucible of war those same weaknesses and petty acts can lead to consequences of 
immense horror and evil.’ 
121 Toner, J. H. (2000). Morals under the gun. Lexington, University Press of Kentucky. P1. 
122 Oltshoorn, P. (2011). Military Ethics and Virtues. Abingdon, Routledge. P  134-140. 
123 These notions are substantiated in: Neitzel, S., Welzer, H. (2012). Soldaten:over vechten, doden en 
sterven (Soldaten, Protokolle vom Kämpfen, Töten und Sterben). Amsterdam, Ambo. 
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creates a unified identity. The first two functions can be easily understood. Stories 
provide practical  clues on what to expect and what is appropriate to do in a specific 
context. Especially in a military context - that in many respects is very different from 
ordinary life - stories are an indispensible tool  to convey the abstract ideas as well as 
the concrete consequences of being a member of the military. Over time - by instruction, 
training, exercising, education and experience, all activities involving stories - being a 
member the military will evolve in a typical military bearing, an attitude that cannot be 
limited to the barracks nor to duty hours only: this bearing becomes part of one’s 
identity. This identity is not static; it requires constant re-interpretation, affirmation or 
re-orientation.124 Thematic narrative provides a vehicle for these processes. Narrative is 
rightly an important feature, not only in MacIntyre’s  theory, but also in military 
practice. This does not mean that all stories that are told in a military context are 
relevant, although even small talk can have an educational meaning. The narrative I 
refer to shapes the relevant context, supports the imbuing of the military virtues 
eventually resulting in an overall military bearing.  
                                                          
124 Taylor, C. (2010). Een seculiere tijd (A secular age). Rotterdam, Lemniscaat. P 569,570. 
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Annex A to chapter 5: the hallmarks of the services 
 
Fire, water, air and earth.125 
Fire, earth, air and water are the primal elements (Archè) which - according to the pre-
Socratic philosophers - constitute the living and dead world.  Thales of Milete (624-546 
B.C.) claimed that water was the primal element. Anaximenes (585-525 B.C.) on the 
other hand stated that air was the essential element, while Empedocles (492-432 B.C.) 
assumed all four elements were constituent of the surrounding world. In the ensuing 
ages these elements gained a more metaphorical meaning. This metaphorical meaning is 
here elaborated in a military context. It explains and clarifies the necessary differences 
between the services of the armed forces while all share the ability to bring to bear 
violence.  
Fire. 
The core business of the armed forces is operations. This pertains to the capability to 
operate under all circumstances bringing to bear the threat with or actual use of 
violence. This feature provides the groundwork for military values and virtues, and how 
to express these, the culture of the armed forces. This overall violent characteristic can 
be symbolized by the classic element of fire. However, the armed forces are composed of 
different services: the navy, the army and the air force.126 All these services operate in 
one of the different classical elements: the navy has its natural element in the high seas, 
water; the army finds its theatre on land, and the air force has it arena in the air.127 
These different elements in which the different services operate, result in different 
cultures. I will elaborate on these differences: not to create a division, but to enhance 
insight and understanding in the necessary differences between the services. I will not 
use the traditional Dutch sequence in which the navy is the senior service and the air 
force the most junior, but for the sake of argument, the army will be treated as last. 
Water. 
The largest part of the planet earth is covered in water. Water is the element in which 
naval forces operate. The ship is the fighting system.128 A ship is an autonomous system. 
The ship’s company is a part of this system. Beside the operational mission, the ships 
company has one common goal: staying afloat. The ships company cannot break away 
from the pressure that being part of the system entails; jumping overboard is not an 
option. When the ship changes its course the ship’s company necessarily follows suit. To 
change the course of the ship is the prerequisite of one man only; the ship’s captain. He 
is the officer who is charged with a mission and then sails away. The master has absolute 
power over the actions of the ship and its company. The master is alone; there is no 
                                                          
125 This text is based on the article by de Vries, P. H. (2000). "Vuur, aarde , lucht en water." Carré 23(6): 
18-19, and a lecture by the author held at the Royal Military Academy in 2003 on October 25th. An 
abridged version was published in the UK in: (2008). The occasional - number 54 'Take me to your officer' 
offiership in the army. Strategic and combat studies institute. London, Corporate document service: 82. 
126 The fourth service in the Dutch armed forces is the constabulary (Koninklijke Marechaussee) which in 
this context is regarded as part of the land forces.  
127 This classification needs some clarification and adjustment. The marine corps is a formal part of the 
Dutch navy – in some countries  the marines corps is a separate service. However its main theatre of 
operations is clearly on land, therefore in this text they are considered a part of the land forces (and not of 
the army!). Some also consider armed helicopters a component of land forces, as land manoeuvre is made 
up of ground manoeuvre and air manoeuvre. As (armed) helicopters are one of the systems deployed in 
the land war  they too are considered part of the land forces (and not of the army!). 
128 Ships include al men of war including submarines. 
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superior officer physically present. Water is a clear element. You cannot hide.129 Mostly 
you can see the enemy at already a great distance, and the ship can engage the enemy at 
that great distance. Sometimes the enemy is not even spotted by eyesight but is it a mere 
dot on a radar screen. This screen is seen by only a select company in the ship’s 
command centre. The decision to engage the enemy is made by the master only. A ship 
to ship action is primarily a technical affair of a platform against platform in which 
integrated systems of sensors, weapons and command and control capacities are 
brought to bear. For many on board of a man of war the use of violence is an abstract 
affair; the majority of the ship’s company does not see, hear or feel the enemy. Another 
feature is that there are hardly any ‘others’ at sea. In most cases it is beyond a doubt who 
is a combatant and who is not. However, when the ship is hit by enemy fire, the ship’s 
company returns as one man to its primary aim: staying afloat. What does this all mean 
regarding the naval culture? A few conclusions can be drawn. It’s discipline is 
authoritarian with a strict division between, the master, the other officers and the other 
ranks. As a result respect comes natural to a sailor as does comradeship, especially by 
those on the same watch. Professionalism must be outstanding and it is a quality 
appreciated by all on board, as a ship is a complex system and every member of the 
company has a contribution to make to its proper functioning the common aim of it is: 
staying afloat. Damage control is therefore a much appreciated capability.  
Air. 
The planet earth is completely surrounded by air! We are nowhere without air: we have 
to breathe it in order to survive. Air is the element of the air forces. The aeroplane is the 
fighting system.130 The aeroplane is also an autonomous system. Mostly an aeroplane is 
flown by one person, sometime two and for larger aircraft a crew may be necessary. The 
pilot is in command of the aircraft, and  mostly alone. The actual use of violence is his 
and his responsibility only. He alone makes an estimate of the situation and decides 
whether to engage the enemy target or not. The consequences are also only his.  His 
success is his’ only, and his failure often results in his death. The element air is also very 
clear, even transparent. The pilot can see far! With his equipment, his on board 
electronics, he can even see further than his eyes allow him. There is no place to hide. 
However, the modern fighter pilot seldom actually sees his enemy: a classical dog fight 
has become obsolete. A modern air battle is largely a standoff affair. The air to air 
engagement is relatively simple: it is a matter of reading displays and pushing buttons. 
In the air too, there are seldom non-combatant ‘others’ and if a civilian plane enters an 
airspace under surveillance it is immediately spotted and soon afterwards identified as a 
civilian plane. In close air support missions, the picture is slightly different: the pilot can 
actually see his target. Often his view is perfunctory due to the high speed of his aircraft 
and consequently there is little time to get a complete picture of the situation on the 
ground. Nevertheless, and in spite of sometimes tight air control,  it is the warplane’s 
pilot who decides to engage the enemy, and it is the war plane’s pilot who bears the 
risks. The pilot knows this and thus he wants to know everything there is to know about 
his airplane; especially what to do in case of any malfunction! These malfunctions are 
not necessarily the result of enemy action; they could be technical failures. But being 
high in the air, even a simple malfunction may will cost the pilot his life. Therefore, the 
pilot is the ultimate air warrior; he is the icon of the air forces. For the rest of the air 
                                                          
129 Unless in a  submarine of course, but even these can be detected. 
130 In some armed forces ground to air air-defence is part of the air forces. Again in this text ground to air 
air-defence is considered a part of the land forces (and again not necessarily of  the army).  
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force danger is often a mere abstraction. The rest of the air forces ( a large majority) can 
concentrate on its main task, which is providing  combat ready airplanes. This activity 
takes place in fixed infrastructure and can best be characterized as a largely technical 
affair which can be optimized in a production process. Reliability is of the outmost 
importance: technical malfunctions must be prevented as the safe return of the airplane 
and its subsequent use depends on it. What does this mean for the culture of the air 
force? On the one hand, we have the class of ‘air warriors’, the pilots who run the risks, 
who make autonomous decisions and who want to know everything of the system they 
are in command of. On the other hand, we have the technical professionals who have to 
meet very strict standards of excellence, who have to know their job. But this is also the 
realm of the manager who wants to be in control of a process, who must meet targets, 
whose risks are managerial risks, not risks pertaining to personal survival! However, by 
the mere weight of numbers the managerial ethos becomes more and more the 
dominant feature of the air force culture. In the air force professionalism is of 
paramount importance, as is discipline to adhere by the technical manuals as well as a 
professional fellowship. A sense of responsibility supports autonomous decision making. 
Mutual respect is also a feature of the culture of air forces as this is the cement that 
creates a mutual shared culture.  
Earth. 
Earth is only a small part of our planet, but it is the element we live on, on which we 
build our houses, roads and factories and grow our crops and produce other foodstuffs 
and build our societies and raise our children. The earth is not very clear nor 
transparent. The force of nature has created mountains, hills and other elevations as 
well as rivers, brooks and swamps. Vegetation adds to a varying degree of visibility and 
accessibility. Buildings, infrastructure and other consequences of human interventions 
may further influence visibility and accessibility. Moreover, on land one can take cover, 
go into hiding. On land there is no clear concept of a typical single fighting system. Battle 
on land requires a large variety of systems: armoured infantry fighting vehicles, tanks, 
reconnaissance vehicles, artillery pieces, engineering equipment, communication and 
signal systems, supply vehicles, maintenance equipment, storage capabilities, medical 
facilities, etc. And all these separate systems have their own crew. These crews, these 
primary groups, these teams of soldiers are the real carriers of the fight. There are many 
of these teams: the infantry groups, the tank crews, the gunners manning a piece of 
artillery, the repair and maintenance teams, the medical transport groups, the resupply 
truckers, etc. All these systems and their crews operate more or less independently. This 
is a result of the limited visibility and accessibility on land and because of the many 
different functions these systems have. However, the majority of these teams operate 
within reach of the enemy and as a result can be faced with real danger! Because of the 
limited visibility on land, it is often hard to observe an approaching enemy, and an 
engagement is mostly well within each other’s line of sight. These engagements are 
mostly direct fire fights, sometimes even developing in hand to hand combat. The enemy 
on land is seldom a mere abstraction! And then there are ‘others’. Land is hardly ever 
empty! These others (are they combatants or not?) add to the overall unpredictable and 
complex nature of land warfare. The actual decision to engage the enemy thus has to be 
taken independently by many systems. This means that crews have the possibility to 
refrain from opening fire and sometimes - as in the case of non- combatant ‘others’- they 
are even required not to fire. If, on the other hand, the concerted fire of all systems is to 
be brought to bear, coordination, synchronizing and orchestration are required. This is 
the challenge of land warfare: how to coordinate, synchronize and orchestrate the 
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power of all these systems, which are dispersed over a relatively wide area and which 
are all basically autonomous in their decision making. The challenge is how to create and 
maintain some kind of order in a principally unpredictable and sometimes chaotic 
process. This explains the preoccupation of the army with planning as a - often 
overestimated -  tool of creating and maintaining order. The context of land warfare 
explains also the importance of resilience, of responsibility and discipline and  
sometimes courage. Professionalism and comradeship within crews and respect 
between teams is important, as is respect for the ‘others’, the civilians who are caught in 
the fighting, and respect in coping with the enemy. Leadership is of a different kind: it 
aims at creating bonds, bonds of trust  that enhance cooperation in doing the job even 
under extreme adverse circumstances. Exemplary conduct is an important feature of the 
leadership that is required in land warfare. Land warfare is never simple, it is a complex 
affair of which the outcome is largely unpredictable! 
 
The quintessence.  
And yet there is a fifth essence: the essence that puts it all  together. That quintessence is 
spiritual and consists of the virtues. In all these media - fire, water, air and earth – the 
same virtues can be displayed. All soldiers are faced with tasks to accomplish and the 
ensuing responsibilities. In battle, the competence of all soldiers will be stretched to the 
limit. In order to survive and to accomplish the allotted tasks, teamwork is indispensable 
with comradeship as  its reward.  All soldiers will meet and work with other soldiers 
who are entitled to respect, which is due to a fellow soldier. But soldiers will also meet 
others who are entitled to respect due to their being a fellow human being even if it is 
the enemy. In facing the enemy soldiers cannot do without courage to overcome fear and 
to face danger. This courage is required under all circumstances, and soldiers therefore 
need resilience to cope with the physically and mentally exhausting adversities of the 
battlefield. Discipline is the ultimate military virtue that compels soldiers to abide by 
their rules and standards: to face their responsibilities, to act like competent soldiers, 
supporting comrades, respecting fellow soldiers as well as civilians and even the enemy, 
to show courage when required and to display the resilience necessary to persevere. 
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Chapter 6: reality check. 
 
Introduction. 
6.1. The aim of my thesis is to contribute to the moral professionalism of the military of 
all services by identifying a set of virtues that is relevant to military practice, and that 
has practical value. Its applicability requires that it provide guidance for soldiers on 
moral reasoning and action in matters of moral concern.1 This means it must address 
issues that are of practical relevance to the military and it must provide insight into the 
underlying features of moral evaluation that makes an action good or bad. In the 
preceding chapters, I developed such a practical set of military virtues. However, the 
practical value of such specific set of military virtues must be recognized, 
acknowledged and accepted by soldiers as relevant and important in military practice; 
that is, under actual operational conditions. In this chapter I will investigate whether 
the theoretical concepts I developed in the preceding chapters are indeed recognized, 
acknowledged and accepted by those who are active in the military practice: soldiers. 
This means that my research has a limited aim. I want to validate my findings hitherto. 
My research does not  aim at a formative evaluation based on a hypothetical-deductive 
approach, in order to come to conclusive judgement whether my hypothesis is 
tenable.2 
 
Theoretical account. 
6.2.1. My investigation of the appreciation of the military virtues is primarily based on 
literature. The main reason is that quantitative research in the field of ethics is 
problematic as it is hard to ascertain the validity of data. Another difficulty lies in the 
aim of my research, which is to develop a set of virtues that has practical value and is 
applicable in the military practice; that is, in operational deployments. Furthermore, 
validating the set of virtues I developed, requires that the participants in the survey 
have been in a situation which enables them to relate to the framework I developed: 
they must have experienced the practice in all its constituent parts, including the 
benefits of cooperation, danger and the tension of an undetermined time and place. 
This kind of experience is in particular found in combat situations. This means that a 
statistical approach using an a-selective sample of the overall population of (Dutch) 
military personnel would not do, as a large part still lacks this kind of experience in 
operational deployments. Even an a-selective sample of the Dutch soldiers who 
participated in a military mission abroad would not do, as not all of those would have 
combat experience. Furthermore, whether soldiers have experienced combat is not 
always recorded in individual conduit files. These considerations preclude a formal 
large scale quantitative statistical approach. However, some appraisal of the practical 
value of my findings is indispensable to establish whether my thesis finds support from 
those soldiers who have practical operational experience in combat. These 
considerations lead me to conduct a limited empirical survey, using both qualitative 
and quantitative methods. The qualitative approach I used is partly based on methods 
known as ‘theoretical sampling’ or ‘purposive sampling’.3 This means that my research 
is specifically aimed at soldiers with relevant operational experience and to verify 
whether they do, or do not support my - largely theoretical - findings. These empirical 
investigations are largely based on interviews: a widely accepted method in qualitative 
                                                          
1 Timmons, M. (2002). Moral theory: an introduction. New York, Rowman & Littlefield. P 3-4. 
2 Maso, I. & Smaling, A. (1998). Kwalitatief onderzoek: praktijk en theorie. Amsterdam, Boom. P 27-28. 
3 Ibid, P 74 - 75. 
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research.4 However, my approach is not purely qualitative. The interviews were 
conducted on the basis of a structured protocol while a purely qualitative method 
would be based on a series of completely open interviews, the content which would be 
refined based on earlier interviews. My analysis is also partly based on a quantitative 
approach, which is also contrary to the method of theoretical sampling. However the 
quantitative analysis adds to the verifiability of my findings. Therefore my approach 
could best be labelled ‘mixed methods’5 The fact that I conducted all interviews myself, 
and made both notes and recordings added to the validity of the results.6 By limiting 
my research to soldiers with actual combat experience, I ensured that my questions 
pertain to subjects the respondents are familiar with; a prerequisite for a scientific 
relevant result.  
 
6.2.2. The main issue of my thesis is ‘… how to apply virtue ethics in military practice in 
order to ensure that individual soldiers will uphold adequate moral standards in their 
actions…’. As a general aim I have specified in the research question, whether: ‘…the 
theory of virtue ethics as elaborated by Alasdair MacIntyre in his book ‘After Virtue’ 
provides a suitable instrument to identify, develop, instil and uphold the required 
moral standards in the military’. This infers that my practical research will have to 
address two issues: the theoretical means and the more practical end.7 The question 
pertaining to the means refers to the suitability of MacIntyre’s theory: to what extend 
are the concepts and notions MacIntyre uses in his theory applicable in identifying a 
set of virtues that is relevant to military practice. This requires assessing whether 
soldiers experience military activities as a practice in which internal goods are satisfied 
and in which specific virtues enhance aspiring to excellence in the specific aspects of 
the military operational practice, resulting in a better overall performance. The 
question pertaining to the end refers to the outcome of the theoretical approach. Do 
the outlines of the virtue ethical framework I developed addresses the complexities of 
operational reality?  To what extend are these outlines recognized, acknowledged and 
accepted by soldiers with proven operational experience? From this perspective, my 
research can be qualified as an empirical validation with a limited formative scope: the 
central issue is the practical applicability of a virtue-ethical approach to military 
morality. This means that the respondents will also take present policies into account. 
This implicit comparison adds to the value of the outcomes.8  
 
6.2.3.   I already stated that I based my practical research primarily on interviews. For 
these interviews, I used the method of narrative inquiry.9 This method enables a data-
gathering process based on mutual trust and empathy resulting in detailed 
information, including temporal and contextual information.10 Both the method and 
                                                          
4 This method is frequently used in similar cases, see: Smaling, A., van Zuuren, F., Ed. (1992). De praktijk 
van kwalitatief onderzoek: voorbeelden en reflecties. Meppel, Boom. When I refer to these interviews I 
will insert the following footnote: Soldiers (2011). Interviews on virtue ethics with OR, NCO and officers. 
Amersfoort. 
5 Smaling uses the term ‘mixed methods’. See: Smaling, A. (2009). "Generaliseerbaarheid in kwalitatief 
onderzoek." KWALON, platform voor kwalitatief onderzoek 14(3): 5-12. 
6 Huffcut, A., Woehr, D.J. (1999). "Further analysis of employment interview validity: a quantitative 
evaluation of interviewer-related structuring methods." Journal of Organizational behaviour 20(4): 549-
560. 
7 Maso, I. & Smaling, A. (1998). Kwalitatief onderzoek: praktijk en theorie. Amsterdam, Boom. P 26-28. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Czarniawaska, B. (2004). Narratives in social science research. London, Sage publications. P 42-45. See 
also  Conle, C. (2000). "Narrative inquiry: research tool and medium for professional  
development."European journal of teacher education 23(1): 49-64.  
10 Kohler Riessman, C. (1993). Narrative analysis. Newbury Park (California), Sage Publications. P 5. 
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the product are useful.11 In my questions I tried to tap on the operational experience of 
the respondents. In these experiential stories is given voice to otherwise tacitly held 
personal knowledge without abandoning the particular, the contextual and the 
complex. This personal knowledge has a practical function, not in a technical sense, or 
as an instrument for previously determined outcomes, but leading back to Aristotle, as 
a source of deliberation, intuitive decisions daily action and moral wisdom. Narrative 
inquiry is particularly suited to get at such 'practical knowledge'.12 However, in a 
narrative there are no single causes and no predictable effects. Instead, open-
endedness pervades all data. This open-endedness is also required in order to create 
the opportunity to stop trading in self-evident 'truths' and social 'facts'.13 However, this 
open-endedness also has some problematic features. The first risk pertains to the 
autonomy of the narrators. How to ascertain the respondents is telling a ‘true’ story. 
This risk can be countered by returning to earlier stories during the interview and 
checking on several elements. Also similarities with stories by other respondents can 
add to the reliability of the respondent and his particular story. Furthermore, the 
inquirer - who should be knowledgeable on the subject - can appraise the authenticity 
of both the respondent and the story. Also the interviews I conducted focused 
primarily on the subjective experience of the respondents and their appreciation of 
what transpired. In this respect it also should be kept in mind, is that establishing the 
‘historical truth’ of a narrative is not the first objective. It is the trustworthiness that 
counts.14 The promise to use only anonymous data and the assurance that the 
respondents would get the opportunity to screen the transcripts, added further to 
overcome doubts as to the autonomy of the narrators.15 A second problem may arise as 
a result of the inquirer not sharing a culture with the respondent. If they do not speak 
the same language, meaning can be lost. This risk was diminished as the respondents 
were all soldiers as well as the inquirer, albeit no longer on active service. Although the 
soldiers I interviewed were from different services and units, the language that was 
used proved to be very similar. These circumstances also helped to reduce the third 
possible risk of a lack of transparency in communication. Speaking the same ‘military’ 
language helped to reduce the gap between inquirer and the respondents and thus 
overcome this difficulty.16 ‘Translating’ the recordings of the interviews into a written 
transcript which were submitted to the respondents for approval provided another 
opportunity to verify adequate reproduction of what was said and meant.17 Another 
difficulty that arises from using open-end questions is that they could invite discursive 
stories that do not address the issues that are looked for. Using a protocol helps to 
prevent this kind of excursions.18 Finally, there is the disadvantage that it is more 
difficult to quantify and analyze the responses. However, given the relatively small 
number of samples, and the use of a protocol which in practice limited the average 
duration of the interviews to two hours - resulting in transcripts of on average 9 pages 
-, the advantages of open-end questions exceed the drawbacks. The protocol l 
developed for the interviews contained open-end and closed questions. Open-end 
questions, as implied in using the narrative method, give ample latitude for the 
                                                          
11 Conelly, F. M. and Clandinin, D.J. (1990). "Stories of experience and narrative inquiry." Educational 
Researcher 14(5): 2-14. 
12 Conle, C. (2000). "Narrative inquiry: research tool and medium for professional  
development."European journal of teacher education 23(1) P  51. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Kohler Riessman, C. (1993). Narrative analysis. Newbury Park (California), Sage Publications. P 64. 
15 Czarniawaska, B. (2004). Narratives in social science research. London, Sage publications. P 115. 
16 Kohler Riessman, C. (1993). Narrative analysis. Newbury Park (California), Sage Publications.  P 57. 
17 Ibid, P 12-13 and 66-67. 
18 Czarniawaska, B. (2004). Narratives in social science research. London, Sage publications. P 51-53. 
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respondents and decrease the influence of the interviewer’s possible bias.19 Using a 
protocol added to the focus of the interview and the external reliability of my survey; 
the extent to which a repetition of the survey would produce similar results.20  
 
6.2.4.   The open-end questions pertain to several notions of MacIntyre’s theory and 
whether the respondents had any practical experience with these notions. The 
questions cover six issues.  The first questions refer to the internal goods. These 
questions aim at identifying relevant internal goods and are predominantly factual: 
‘What were you looking for when you joined the armed forces? Did you find what you 
were looking for? Did you find things you hadn’t been looking for? Etc.’  In this way I 
tried to establish whether and which internal goods are related to the practice. 
Furthermore, these first questions conform to the requirements of setting the general 
scope of my interests and addressing an issue with which all respondents would be 
familiar.21 The second set of questions pertains to the operational experience, 
specifically to action and deliberation in problematical situations: ‘What exactly did 
happen? What did you do? What made you do what you did? Has this occurrence 
changed your outlooks? Etc.’ These questions aim at creating a focus on operational 
actions and which considerations or virtues play a role in decision making and action. 
The third topic aims at identifying which characteristics (virtues) are thought to be 
desirable. The questions are of an evaluative nature and include issues like: ‘Whom do 
you respect or admire and what are the admirable characteristics? Whom do you 
detest and because of which characteristics?’ The fourth set of “evaluative” questions 
focus on the disposition of the respondent him- or herself and which virtues are 
desirable in general, as well as whether it is possible to acquire these virtues. 
Questions include:  ‘What makes you a good soldier? How did you acquire these 
characteristics? What should we do to impart these virtues to all fellow soldiers?’ The 
fifth part addresses ‘external’ values and whether these played any role in their general 
outlook and operational decision making. These questions aim at establishing if there 
are any other evaluative factors than situational circumstances  that play a role in 
operational decision making and action: ‘Are there any general values that play a part 
in military practice? To what extent are external goods of any importance?’ The last of 
the open-end questions refer to the nature of the interview and whether the 
respondents felt free in answering and whether they wanted to add anything.  Next the 
respondents were given a set of closed questions in which they were confronted with 
the list of theoretically established military virtues of character. They were asked to 
indicate whether they thought the virtues to be relevant or not, whether the list was 
complete or not and whether the virtues were only relevant under operational 
circumstances. They were asked to mark on a five-point scale to which extent they 
agreed to the description of the specific virtues. I tested the protocol in a test interview, 
which resulted in some marginal adjustments. The definitive protocol of the complete 
questionnaire is attached in annex A to this chapter.22  
 
6.2.5. In this survey I interviewed a total of 21 persons: 11 soldiers, 5 town civil 
servants and 5 workers in healthcare (doctors as well as nurses). I interviewed the 
civil servants and healthcare workers to compare the results with those of the soldiers 
                                                          
19 Maso, I. & Smaling, A. (1998). Kwalitatief onderzoek: praktijk en theorie. Amsterdam, Boom. P 50-52. 
20 Smaling, A., van Zuuren, F., Ed. (1992). De praktijk van kwalitatief onderzoek: voorbeelden en 
reflecties. Meppel, Boom. P 99. 
21 Ibid, P 88. 
22 In the interviews with civil servants and healthcare workers the ‘typical’ military terms were replaced 
by a more neutral terminology. 
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I interviewed and thus add to the validation my findings. As my investigation is 
primarily aimed at soldiers - who in a formal sense are government officials - I limited 
my other interviews to government or semi-government officials as well, in order to 
make a comparison relatively easy. Another reason was that by not including workers 
in commercial firms, I aimed to limit the influence of typical external goods, like 
earnings and status. My assumption was that health-care workers and soldiers would 
be more involved in their job and score their professional activities relatively high with 
regard to the characteristics of a practice.23 This assumption is corroborated by Leget 
and Olthuis who describe medical care in terms of a virtue in which in the practice of 
caring for other human beings, standards of excellence are aspired at. Typical virtues of 
the medical practice are: caring, respect, fellowship and competence.24 In the 
comparison I assumed that town civil servants would score relatively low regarding 
their job as part of a practice with the ensuing virtues. The assumption is that the 
average civil servant sees himself as a representative of the public authorities. Rules 
are an important feature of their jobs; either in developing or in maintaining these. 
Therefore, duty is an important concept, as is service. Both values have a primarily 
external source which does not correspond to the notion of virtue.   
 
6.2.6.   I did not adapt the protocol I used to accommodate specific civil virtues. In the 
open-end conversations, I sometimes explained what could be a civilian equivalent of 
the sometimes typical military terminology I used (e.g. fellowship to colleagues instead 
of comradeship, pluck instead of courage, etc.). Because my empirical research had a 
limited aim, I based the selection of the respondents primarily on qualitative criteria 
and some level of representativeness. The representativeness is enhanced by an 
appropriate variation coverage of the sample, which refers to the composition of the 
sample of the armed forces which reflects the  composition of the overall population of 
the armed forces in the proportion of officers, non-commissioned officers (NCO) and 
other ranks (OR), as well as the services (navy, army, air force and constabulary).25 As 
my aim is to validate which virtues are relevant in the military operational practice, all 
respondents had to have operational experience in a combat zone. The approach I used 
- which is partly inspired by theoretical or purposive sampling - requires that the 
respondents are knowledgeable about the subject. To make sure that the respondents 
had relevant experience and knowledge, I requested that the respondents were to have 
demonstrable operational experience in a combat zone; for example, by being 
distinguished for valour or wounded in action. The Netherlands Ministry of Defence 
called for volunteers and forwarded their names and addresses. I had no direct 
influence in the selection of the candidates. As to the sample of respondents of town 
civil servants, I approached the town clerk of my resident city and asked for a mixed 
(age and gender) number of volunteers whose job involved daily contact with the 
citizens. The town clerk forwarded the names of the volunteers, and again I had no 
direct influence in the selection of the candidates. The same applied to workers in 
health care which I secured through the cooperation of a local hospital. In all cases I 
specifically asked for people who had a ‘hands on’ job which brought them in daily 
contact with their clients and patients. Thus, in all three sectors, I interviewed people 
                                                          
23 An assumption also articulated in: Hackett, J. (1983). The profession of arms. London, Sidgwick and 
Jackson. P 9 and 203 
24 Leget, C., Olthuis, G. (2007). Professioneel zorg verlenen: ideaal of deugd. Werkzame idealen. Kole, J., 
Ruyter, de, D. Ed. Assen, van Gorcum: 24-36. See also: Dwarswaard, J., Hilhorst, M. (2007). Over de 
idealen van de (huis)arts. Ibid, P 37-50. 
25 Smaling, A. (2009). "Generaliseerbaarheid in kwalitatief onderzoek." KWALON, platform voor 
kwalitatief onderzoek 14(3): 5-12. 
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who had experience in their respective ‘frontline’.26 With only a few exceptions the 
interviews were held at the place the respondents worked. The familiar and safe 
context enhanced the ‘normality’ of the situation and reduced uneasiness, which could 
influence the answers.27 Notes were taken and every conversation was recorded. Based 
on the notes and the recordings, I made a transcript of every interview. These 
transcripts were then submitted to the respective respondent for approval. If 
necessary, changes were made. Only approved transcripts are used for the analysis.28 
 
6.2.7. In my analysis, I scrutinized every transcript for propositions that referred to a 
desire, disposition or virtue and external goods. I identified these by: words, context, 
internal consistency and frequency. In order to avoid personal bias, I did not take into 
account the extensiveness of the comments nor did I make a qualitative assessment of 
the intensity of responses.29 Of each of those propositions, I picked the relevant entry 
or catchword, which I marked. Then I grouped synonyms and otherwise similar terms. 
Next I distributed these terms in the categories internal goods, virtues and other. 
Thereupon I made a cross reference to establish the number of entries made by each of 
the respondents in the respective categories. In this way, I established the frequency in 
which the terms were used by the respective respondents.30 I tried to approximate the 
notion of intensity by dividing the total scores of the appreciation of internal goods and 
virtues by the number of participants who made an entry. This gives some idea about 
the intensity in which the topic was expressed during the interviews. I repeated my 
analysis on the data after some time in order to avoid intra-interviewer 
inconsistency.31 
 
Military data and analysis. 
6.3.1. My interviews and the initial analysis were initially limited to the internal goods 
and related virtues of military character I established, as well as related topics. This 
initial analysis led me to the conclusion that the virtue of intellect, practical wisdom, 
needed explicit mentioning as well. Quite a number of entries refer to the then implicit 
notion of practical wisdom. These entries pertain to decisions with a moral dimension, 
like: to fire a weapon or not, to continue an action or to disengage and to adhere 
strictly to the Rules Of Engagement (ROE’s), or to allow for interpretation, etc. 
Therefore I made an addition to the questionnaire which I also submitted to the 
original respondents. In this addition, I introduced a draft of the virtue of practical 
wisdom and asked the same closed questions as I had done with the drafts of the 
virtues of military character. All who were interviewed reacted positively, after which I 
included the virtue of practical wisdom in the questionnaire and the ensuing further 
                                                          
26 See annex B. 
27 Baarda, D. B., de Goede,M.P.M., Teunissen, J. (2005). Basisboek kwalitatief onderzoek. Groningen, 
Stenfert Kroese.  P 177 - 181. 
28 Maso, I., & Smaling, A. (1998). Kwalitatief onderzoek: praktijk en theorie. Amsterdam, Boom. P 58-59. 
29 Krueger, R. A., Casey, M.A. (2000). Focus Groups: A Practical Guide for Applied Research. Thousand 
Oaks (California), Sage publications. See also Smaling, A., van Zuuren, F., Ed. (1992). De praktijk van 
kwalitatief onderzoek: voorbeelden en reflecties. Meppel, Boom. P 62. 
30 Rabiee, F. (2004). "Focus-group interview and data analysis." The proceedings of the nutrition society 
63(4): 6. P 657: ‘data analysis consists of a number of stages, i.e. examining, categorising and tabulating 
or otherwise recombining the evidence, in order to address the initial goal of a study’. See also: Schorn, 
A. (2000). "The "Theme-centred Interview". A Method to Decode Manifest and Latent Aspects of 
Subjective Realities." Forum : Qualitative Social Research 1(2), and Kohler Riessman, C. (1993). 
Narrative analysis. Newbury Park (California), Sage Publications. P 60-64. 
31 Baarda, D. B., de Goede,M.P.M., Teunissen, J. (2005). Basisboek kwalitatief onderzoek. Groningen, 
Stenfert Kroese. P 195. 
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analysis. The results from this analysis are presented in the tables, charts and 
schedules in Annex C. 
 
6.3.2. As to internal goods, in the interviews I refrained from using this abstract term. 32  
Individual interpretations of abstract notions could differ and thereby obscure the 
results. Instead, I posed open questions on what kind of specific expectations or desires 
the respondents wanted to satisfy by entering military practice and whether these 
expectations and desires proved to be relevant and to what extent they still are. This 
resulted in a total of 129 entries listed. The number of entries by soldiers (OR) is 
smaller than their share in the overall population (the Dutch armed forces): they 
contributed 15% of the entries compared to their 37% share of the population. The 
number of entries by NCO’s conforms to their part in the overall strength (43% to 
43%) The percentage of entries by officers exceeds their representativeness (42% to a 
total of 20%).33 The approximation of intensity I computed gave a similar result: the 
OR scored an average intensity of 1,7 while NCO’s scored 2,9 and officers 4.8. These 
differences could be interpreted as reflecting the strength of the intrinsic urge to join 
the military. If this assumption would be valid   the OR seems to have a less intrinsically 
urge to join the military, while officers would seem to have a stronger inclination to 
join. However, further research is required to substantiate the validity of this 
deduction. In spite of these differences, all respondents answered that they had found 
whatever they had been looking for in joining the military. As to the number of entries 
for each internal good some comments can be made. The item of satisfaction, as related 
to the virtue of a sense of responsibility is only mentioned by one OR while all NCO’s 
and officers made several references. The notions of adventure and challenge were 
addressed by 10 of the 11 respondents. Satisfaction and achievement as well as 
belonging and security were mentioned by 8 respondents. The internal goods of pride 
and appreciation and contentment and fairness were scored by 6 respondents. 
Excitement and thrill were mentioned by 3 respondents only, while structure as 
related to discipline was not mentioned by any of the respondents. Based on the 
percentage of the frequency of entries at each internal good, I distinguish weakly, 
intermediate and strongly evaluated internal goods. Weakly evaluated are structure 
(0%) and excitement (3%). Intermediately evaluated are pride (18%) and 
contentment (12%). Strongly evaluated are satisfaction (23%), belonging (21%) and 
adventure (23%). Adventure is also the only internal good that is mentioned by 
practical all respondents (minus 1). Taking a closer look at the dispersion of the entries 
over the respective internal goods and the number of respondents involved, we can 
note that the number of respondents per internal good corresponds with the overall 
evaluation of the respective internal goods. This seems to underpin further the 
distinction between weak, intermediate or strong evaluation of the different internal 
goods. These findings largely coincide with the intensity attached to the notions, with 
the exception of pride and adventure: the former has a higher score on intensity than 
on frequency while the latter shows the opposite. These findings are corroborated in 
several reports by the Dutch Ministry of Defence.34  
 
                                                          
32 See annex C, table 1. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Rees Vellinga, N. van (2006). Belangstellingsonderzoek 2005-2006, Een baan als militair. Afdeling 
Gedragswetenschappen. Den Haag, Ministerie van Defensie. P 10 and  Gelooven, R. M. W. v. (2009). 
Basisstudie Imago en Belangstelling. Afdeling Gedragswetenschappen. Den Haag, Ministerie van 
Defensie. P 31. 
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6.3.3.  Regarding virtues, the representation of the entries is more in line with the 
overall group totals (33% to 37% for OR,  46% to 43% for NCO’s and 21% to 20% for 
officers).35 However, the intensity shows a similar dispersion as is the case with 
internal goods (table 1): intensity seems to rise through the ranks (OR score an 
average intensity of 8,2, NCO’s 9,3 and officers score 10,2). The number of entries 
related to virtues (673), is more than five times the number of entries for internal 
goods (129). This seems to indicate that virtues are more easily articulated and/or 
stronger evaluated than internal goods (expectations and desires). This is 
corroborated by the fact that all virtues but one (courage) are mentioned by all 
respondents. Based on the distribution over the frequency of entries, I also made a 
distinction  between weak, intermediate and a strong evaluation of the different 
virtues. Weakly evaluated are courage (4% of the total number of entries) and 
discipline (6%). Intermediate evaluated are respect (16%), comradeship (13%), 
resilience (12%), while strongly evaluated are responsibility (27%) and competence 
(22%). These findings coincide with the scores on intensity I computed. When I took 
again a closer look at the dispersion of the respondents, the weak evaluation of the 
virtues of courage is also caused by the relatively small number of respondents (8 out 
of 11) that made any entries. All other virtues have entries by all of the respondents.36 
Also the virtue of practical wisdom was mentioned by almost all (minus 1) respondent. 
As to the closed questions pertaining to draft virtues, some of the respondents made 
comments on the negative articulation (neither… nor) of the virtues and thought that 
an additional positive and practical description would be clearer. 
 
6.3.4. According to MacIntyre there should be a relation between internal goods and 
virtues. He states that virtues pertain to ‘an acquired human quality the possession and 
exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods that are internal to 
practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such 
goods.’37 However, I already mentioned (in paragraph 3.4.9.) the difficulty of 
establishing such a specific relation. At first sight, the data as well do not warrant this 
relation.38 The number of entries suggesting a strongly evaluated internal good like 
adventure is not ‘translated’ in a similar number of entries and strong evaluation of the 
virtue of resilience and a similar disconnection goes for the internal good of belonging 
and the virtue of comradeship. On the other hand, the virtue of competence has more 
entries and therefore seems to be more strongly evaluated than could be expected, as 
according to the number of entries the internal good of pride was only evaluated as of 
intermediate importance.  Only in four cases the proportion to the number of entries of 
internal goods and virtues match: satisfaction and responsibility, both strong; 
contentment and respect, both intermediate; excitement and courage, both weak; 
structure and discipline, both weak. However, when we take a look at the intensity, I 
computed for the internal goods and virtues, we see a match for all relations. One could 
argue that there are at least some indications that there is a relationship between some 
internal goods and specific virtues. However, in the preceding chapter 3, I explained 
that one internal good could ‘serve’ more than one virtue, as well as that several 
internal goods could contribute towards the development of one particular virtue. 
However, hard evidence in support of a clear relationship between specific internal 
                                                          
35 See annex C, table 2. 
36 These findings are corroborated by other research. See: Verweij, D. E. M. (2007). Morele 
professionaliteit in de militaire praktijk. Werkzame idealen. Kole, J., Ruyter, de, D. Ed. Assen, van 
Gorcum. P 129-134. 
37 MacIntyre, A. (2007). After Virtue. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 191. 
38 See annex C, table 3. 
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goods and specific virtues seems lacking. Doubts increase if we take into account that 
the description of internal goods is largely based on qualitative arguments. This means 
there is room for interpretation, which may result in obscuring some of the 
connections I have been looking for. The interconnectivity and the problematic nature 
of discerning exactly the meaning and limitations of internal goods and virtues and the 
ensuing room for overlap between internal goods as well as between virtues may 
further hamper establishing clear relations between specific internal goods and 
virtues.  Other factors could also obscure connections. For example, the fact that the 
virtue of courage is mentioned in the open-end interviews a mere 26 times and only by 
eight of the respondents and not by the others (some of whom are decorated for 
valour), could be attributed to modesty. However, when we look at the total number of 
entries on related internal goods39 in relation with the number of entries on virtues,40 
we cannot but record a general increase in the number of entries. This seems to 
corroborate that virtues are thought to be important for excelling in military practice 
and do increase the pleasure one finds in this practice. This view is substantiated by 
the strong support for the virtues I detected, and which I tested in a set of closed 
questions: all respondents thought the listed virtues relevant and thought the overall 
list complete and a large majority (96%) agreed on the draft descriptions. Only 4% of 
the respondents indicated they had no opinion on a specific description; none 
expressed disagreement.41 Although it is hard to establish a direct link between 
specific internal goods and virtues, the relevance of the virtues I developed seems 
substantiated by the results from the survey.  
 
6.3.5. Another issue that is addressed in the survey pertained to the possibility to 
impart virtues on military personnel.  There is considerable agreement that this is 
indeed possible in most instances.  As one of the respondents put it: ‘There are always 
people who cannot be taught or educated, who do not accept rules and who do not care 
for anyone but themselves.  This kind of person does not belong in the military. 
Recruitment has to make sure that they don’t enter. If they nevertheless do, it is up to 
the initial education and training to identify and dismiss these individuals as soon as 
possible.’42 As to imparting specific virtues, the overall idea is that ‘skills and drills’ can 
be taught and brought to a higher standard of excellence by training, exercising, further 
education and experience.43 This pertains to the virtues of competence and discipline. 
Comradeship, resilience and respect can be imbued in (harsh) training and exercise 
and - of course - experience. The development of a sense of responsibility requires 
                                                          
39 Ibid, table 1. 
40 Ibid, table 2. 
41 Ibid, table 6. 
42  Soldiers (2011). Interviews on virtue ethics with OR, NCO and officers. Amersfoort. 
43 In the field of education there are many theories and as a result many controversies as well. For 
practical reasons I will in my thesis discern five kind of educational activities. (1) Instruction, what  
refers to teaching basic knowledge, skills and drills. (2) Training involves physical and mental activities, 
mostly of a repetitive nature, in which the ability to apply what was taught is enhanced. Training aims at 
improving practical standards of excellence and the self-confidence of  the soldier. (3)Exercises aim at 
applying the acquired knowledge, skills and drills in situations which simulate operational conditions, 
often under increasing adverse circumstances. Standards of excellence and self-confidence are further 
improved.(4) Further education (‘vorming’ in Dutch or ‘Bildung’in German) aims at creating awareness 
of  the inherent importance of the subjects taught, trained and exercised. This awareness motivates 
soldiers to improve their attitude as a soldier and to achieve the required standards of excellence for 
themselves. Further education is often incorporated in training and exercises. (5) Experience refers to 
the participation in real life operations with all the uncertainties, pressures and dangers involved. 
Awareness is much enhanced by experience. See also Army, R. N. (1996). Military doctrine. The Hague, 
Army staff. P 259 & 268 (glossary). 
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especially further education and experience. ‘You can teach a monkey how to fly an 
airplane if only you have enough bananas. But to appreciate a situation; that requires 
flexibility, responsibility, resilience!’44 The respondents (half of them distinguished for 
valour!) do not give any indication on how to acquire a courageous disposition.45 This 
seems to indicate that the respondents do not think that it is possible to instil the 
virtue of courage (in its moral meaning) in a person’s character. On the other hand 
overcoming ones doubts and fears is a staple ingredient of military training, but then 
this could also be considered as a means to imbue resilience. The general responses 
however provide ample support for the Aristotelian idea on how to impart virtues and 
the role of experience therein, whether in training and exercise or in real life 
operations. Comments by respondents regarding the necessity of harsh physical and 
mental training as well as the importance of rules and exemplary conduct underpin the 
general outcome.46  
 
6.3.6. Participating in a practice requires action and virtue ethics aims at providing 
guidance as to decide which action. In the survey this issue is addressed as well. 
Respondents were asked to relate a difficult operational situation in which they were 
involved: ‘It was combat actions with soldiers killed and wounded, successes, fear, 
shortages of ammunition, combat stress; I have seen it all that night.’47 Then they were 
asked what they eventually did: ‘I had trained my men, we were well prepared!, I felt 
enormous respect and pride in the way they performed their mission.’48  Next they 
were asked how they came to do what they then did: ‘You’ve got to make up your mind, 
which risks I am prepared to take. I told my second in command that if there ever was 
a place for an ambush; this was it. So I decided to refrain from a further advance of the 
vehicles and ordered a foot patrol. I joined the foot patrol, and as I passed the lead 
vehicle, I told the driver to back up and give us cover. The moment he started turning 
the Taliban opened fire... Why I stopped? I guess it was intuition, experience; I do not 
know exactly.’49 In the analysis of the interviews these answers were scored whether 
they referred to one or more virtues.50 The results indicate that respondents refer to 
practically similar virtues. The most mentioned virtue by all categories is 
responsibility. The virtues that are not mentioned by all, or only by a few respondents, 
are courage comradeship and resilience.  This seems logical as these virtues refer to 
dispositions, qualities, that are of a personal nature and generally not the first 
consideration projected in a situation that requires a decision. The virtues which were 
mentioned most refer to personal attitudes that enable a person to make a decision 
under difficult circumstances: competence, discipline and respect. However, the entries 
do not necessarily refer to the content of the deliberation that precedes a decision. 
Although the number of entries on deliberation is relatively small (92), some remarks 
can be made. The importance of practical wisdom is especially noted by NCO’s and 
officers, which is logical as this virtue is of importance in decision making, and that is 
what NCO’s and officers are supposed to do when in action. They use terms like: clever, 
well considered,  experienced, insight and when referring to actions, ‘well done’, and 
many variations on that theme. As to the virtue of discipline, the number of entries is 
relatively large with NCO’s; which in the light of the preceding argument seems logical 
                                                          
44 Soldiers (2011). Interviews on virtue ethics with OR, NCO and officers. Amersfoort.  
45 See annex C, table 4. 
46 See also: Robinson, P., De Lee, N., Carrick, D., Ed. (2008). Ethics education in the military. Aldershot, 
Ashgate Publishing Limited. P 36,127 and 166 
47 Soldiers (2011). Interviews on virtue ethics with OR, NCO and officers. Amersfoort. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
50 See annex C, table 5. 
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as well. The other virtues that are mentioned by all categories are competence - ‘These 
drills were hammered into me!’51-  and respect - ‘I had a medic with me and he was so 
competent; he made you feel invulnerable!’52As the issue of decision making was only a 
small part of the overall survey (4 out of 35 open-end questions) it is not surprising the 
number of entries is relatively small as well. However, the respondents give a clear 
indication that virtues do play a role in their decision making, especially the virtue of 
responsibility and practical wisdom, which involves situational deliberation. 
 
6.3.7. The survey revealed that external values do not play a significant part in the 
soldier’s mind. An individual respondent mentioned patriotism, and another spoke of 
his royalist sentiments: but only after some probing.53 The notion of soldiering as a job 
was not mentioned by any of the respondents. One of the respondents even explicitly 
refuted this notion when asked what he was looking for when he joined: ‘Well, by no 
means was I looking for a job!’54 Some mentioned the importance of emotional stability 
in their family relations and attachments.  All in all, there is no indication that external 
values are a strong part of the mental make-up of soldiers. 
 
6.3.8.   The analysis of the interviews and the transcriptions provided a substantial 
amount of data, and the analysis provided persuasive support for my thesis. However, 
from a wider perspective, it would add to the validity of my findings if these could be 
substantiated by other data. In addition, I also consulted another source: the database 
of the Dutch Veterans Institute. In 2007 this foundation initiated a comprehensive 
project in which over 1100 veterans were interviewed. The project was completed in 
2011 and the data are assembled in a database in which 500 interviews are open to 
public scrutiny; 500 are only open for particular purposes and on approximately 150 
there is an embargo in place.55 The project aimed at collecting stories of veterans of all 
kinds of background, different military branches  and ranks, and of all missions the 
Dutch military participated in, starting with WW II. The missions included: WW II, the 
Indonesian war of independence, the Korean War, the guerrilla war in the former 
Dutch New Guinea, several peacekeeping missions - the most important were those in 
the Lebanon, former Yugoslavia, Eritrea and Cambodia - and the recent missions in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. The interviews were conducted as a semi-structured 
conversation using a protocol of topics  regarding: personal and military background; 
several aspects of the operational deployment, including location, job, contacts with 
others and special experiences; experiences on return from deployment both within 
the military and civil communities. The database allows queries by name, gender, 
subject, mission and service, as well as through a standardized thesaurus, allowing, e.g. 
queries by rank or unit. The database does not aim at providing statistical 
representative samples: for example, the public accessible sample of 500 interviews 
includes 90 interviews by naval veterans, 350 army, 13 former Royal Netherlands 
Indonesian Army, 42 air force, 20 constabulary and 4 from the (during WW II 
militarized) merchant navy. Furthermore, it is not possible to select interviews by 
veterans who participated in actual combat operations. Another issue is that the 
interviews aimed at collecting broad information. This means that the data from this 
                                                          
51 Soldiers (2011). Interviews on virtue ethics with OR, NCO and officers. Amersfoort. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Weerts, J. (2011). Interviewproject Nederlandse Veteranen, Stichting Veteraneninstituut. 
http://www.veteraneninstituut.nl/projecten/interviewproject. 
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project cannot be compared to the outcomes of the more limited and more specific 
survey I conducted for this thesis.  
 
6.3.9.   Nevertheless, some relevant information can be gathered: to what extend are 
the notions pertaining to the military virtues of character also mentioned by those 
veterans interviewed? Accessing the public part of the database gave the following 
results: responsibility, 85 hits; competence, 70 hits, comradeship, 137 hits; respect, 
158 hits; courage, 137 hits, resilience, 45 hits; discipline, 96 hits. From these results, it 
seems that comradeship, courage and respect are strongly valuated. Responsibility, 
competence and discipline seem intermediately valuated, and resilience seems weakly 
valuated. However, some nuance is appropriate. It is not always easy to establish in 
which context the comments were made. For example, as to the virtue of respect, I 
identified several grouping that are entitled to respect: fellow soldiers, civilians and 
even the enemy. In the hits on respect the two latter categories were seldom explicitly 
mentioned. Sometimes the notion of respect was used to indicate honour rather than 
respect. Consequently, some reservations as to the results are warranted.  It was 
difficult - if not impossible - to establish the relevance of internal goods. One of the 
circumstances that have to be taken into account is that many veterans did not enter 
the military voluntarily: many were conscripts and had no particular desire to join the 
armed forces. Another circumstance pertains to the nature and structure of the 
interviews: they were not aimed at uncovering desires and expectations. The notions 
pertaining to internal goods resulted in hits, but again when looking at the context in 
which these notions were used, it became apparent that these were mostly used in 
retrospect, and in an evaluative sense rather than referring to the characteristics of the 
military as a practice and expectations and desires. For example, the notion of pride 
scored 213 hits, but pride was mostly expressed in relation to the time they spend in 
the military, what they did and achieved and seldom in relation to skills and other 
competences. Other internal goods scored only a few hits, like belonging (2 hits), 
structure (10 hits) and challenge (23 hits). For these reasons it was - also with these 
data - impossible to establish a direct relation between specific internal goods and 
related virtues. This seems to corroborate the earlier findings in chapter 4 and in 
paragraph 6.3.4., that internal goods are relevant for joining the military and finding 
pleasure in serving. From this perspective  internal goods also contribute in 
articulating standards of excellence and adapting a disposition to act in accordance 
with these standards. However, it is hard to establish a direct link between a certain 
internal good and a specific virtue.  
 
6.3.10.   Furthermore, in 2012, a researcher of the Dutch Veterans Institute, drs. Major 
Groen, published a book based on witness accounts of the operations in Uruzgan, 
Afghanistan.56 He interviewed 12 platoon commanders who served with each of the 
separate units that were deployed in the 4 years the mission lasted, as well as 9 
‘enablers’ (an officer who served with the Regional Command South Reserve, 
engineers, an Apache helicopter pilot, soldiers who served with an Operational Monitor 
and Liaison Team, Provincial Reconstruction Teams, and a Psychological Operations 
Support Element, a doctor and a nurse). The very personal accounts of the soldiers 
interviewed proved a valuable addition to the interviews I conducted. My interviews 
were aimed at establishing whether virtues mattered and if so, which? The interviews 
Groen conducted were aimed at capturing the experience of the soldiers and how they 
coped with the challenges of their mission.  
                                                          
56 Groen, J. H. M. (2012). Task Force Uruzgan: 'Getuigenissen van een missie'. Den Haag, Ministerie van 
Defensie. 
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6.3.11.   Although these sets of interviews were conducted with different aims, the 
similarities in the outcomes were remarkable. All virtues of character I defined were 
mentioned in the interviews; especially sense of responsibility, comradeship, and 
respect. Respect was used in all subdivisions I discerned: fellow soldiers, civilians and 
the opposing forces, the fighters. The need of competence, resilience and discipline 
were often mentioned as well. The importance of practical wisdom was especially 
mentioned by those in command. In almost every interview the importance of 
appropriate education, (realistic and harsh) training and exercising was stressed. Some 
referred to the inspiration found in the exemplary conduct of other soldiers. All 
mentioned the impact of their experience in a combat zone, and many expressed the 
probably lasting effect of their experience in their mental makeup, living attitude and 
priorities in life.  
 
6.3.12. As to the result of my application of MacIntyre’s theory, the provisional 
conclusion is that the outcome does support that the military practice is indeed 
experienced as an activity in which internal goods are satisfied. However, this must be 
understood as a generic connection, as I was unable to detect a conditional relation 
between specific internal goods and related virtues. The problematic character of this 
connection is twofold. In the first place, it is difficult to establish to what extend 
internal goods (desires) play a role in the mind of an individual respondent and his 
ensuing actions. The second problem is how to determine which specific internal goods 
are contributing to the development of a specific virtue. I was not able to establish such 
a direct connection.  Nevertheless, the respondents positively recognized, 
acknowledged and accepted the virtues I identified and described. In the open-end 
questioning three virtues (responsibility, competence and respect) appear to be 
strongly evaluated and shared by all. Comradeship and resilience are well endorsed by 
all too. The only virtue which was mentioned relatively little is courage, but this 
omission could be attributed to modesty. In the closed questionnaire, a substantially 
stronger approval is apparent. All consider the listed virtues of military character and 
the virtue of practical wisdom relevant for military practice. They are positive in their 
appreciation of the possibility to impart virtues by education, training and experience. 
Regarding the practical value of my findings, they all endorse the completeness of the 
list I compounded: in their view no aspect is lacking and none could be missed. They 
further all expressed that the virtues were valid under all circumstances and not only 
in an operational context. This notion underpins the value of the virtues and their 
being embedded as a part of an individual’s character.  A character that - at least to 
some extend - can be shaped to accommodate the requirements of military practice. 
The fact that there was little divergence in the responses adds validity to the general 
outcome. 
 
Civil Servants data and analysis. 
6.4.1. As to internal goods, the civil servants were less explicit in identifying the 
internal goods they find satisfying.57 They scored a strong evaluation - in both 
frequency and intensity - only with contentment as referring to the ambition to help 
other people.58 This was also an internal good which was mentioned by all (minus 1) of 
the respondents. Satisfaction was mentioned by all of the respondents as well and 
scored six entries. Belonging scored a mere two entries by two respondents. Although 
                                                          
57 Civil servants scored an average of 4 entries each, while soldiers scored on average 12 entries. See 
annex C table 1 and 7. 
58 Ibid, table 7. 
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the number of respondents is small, still some differences with military responses can 
be noted. Typical military internal goods like adventure and excitement are not 
appreciated by civil servants. 59 Structure and stability do not score any entry with both 
categories. On the other hand, do military respondents score relatively low on 
contentment, whereas civil servants produce a high score? Another and more 
remarkable difference is the importance that is attached to external goods (job 
security, salary, etc.) Civil servants have a pronounced and vested interest in these, 
while with soldiers these seem to be of secondary (or even less) importance.60 Or, as 
one of the respondents stated: ‘It is hard to tell what I was looking for, actually I did 
only look for a job.’61 This seems to indicate that civil servants do not experience their 
work as a practice.  
 
6.4.2. These kinds of differences in valuing are also notable regarding virtues. 
Responsibility and competence are highly ranked, with respect and fellowship (the 
civilian equivalent of comradeship) on a second level; all in both frequency and 
intensity.62 Typical military virtues like courage and resilience are weakly evaluated by 
civil servants, while discipline scores relatively low as well. Another feature that 
attracts attention is the low number of entries by each individual respondent. With 
virtues, the military respondents score an individual average of 61 entries, while civil 
servants score an individual average of only 43 entries. This seems to indicate an 
overall weaker evaluation of virtues by civil servants than with soldiers. This is 
corroborated by the scores on intensity in which civil servants scored an average of 7,4 
against a score of 9,1 for soldiers.  These outcomes are, to some extent, mirrored by the 
responses regarding virtues in the closed questions of the survey.63 Although the 
responses in the open-end questions of the survey suggest otherwise, almost all civil 
servants considered every draft virtue to be relevant: two respondents disqualified 
courage, one discipline and another resilience. More discrepancies come to light with 
regard to the support of the descriptions of the virtues. Only 20% of the draft 
descriptions attracted strong agreement by the civil servant, against 53% with the 
soldiers; the civil servants expressed agreement to 62% of the draft descriptions, 
against 42% with soldiers: a total of 82% agreement with civil servants and 95% 
agreement with soldiers. The civil servants did not agree with 18% of the proposed 
descriptions, against none of the soldiers. 
 
6.4.3. The one on one relation between internal goods and virtues remains problematic. 
However, this is not very surprising. Civil servants show fewer specific intrinsic 
reasons (expectations and desires) for joining the civil service than soldiers and 
healthcare workers. For civil servants, external goods (a job, stability and a salary) 
seem to be rated as more important. Nevertheless, some relations can be discerned. 
The limited number of reference to the virtue of courage matches the weak evaluation 
of excitement as an internal good (no entries).64 A similar (lack of) connection can be 
discerned with comradeship, resilience and discipline and the attractiveness of 
belonging, adventure respectively structure. Overall, the same criticism applies as with 
the relation between military internal goods and military virtues: the data provide 
                                                          
59 The relative high number of entries on adventure by civil servants is caused solely by including 
references to a ‘challenging job’. 
60 Gelooven, R. M. W. v. (2009). Basisstudie Imago en Belangstelling. Afdeling Gedragswetenschappen. 
Den Haag, Ministerie van Defensie. P  28: ‘Most youngsters haven’t a clue on what they are going to earn.’ 
61 Soldiers (2011). Interviews on virtue ethics with OR, NCO and officers. Amersfoort. 
62 See annex C, table 8. 
63 Ibid, table 12. 
64 Ibid, table 9. 
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insufficient support for a specific connection between theoretically related internal 
goods and virtues.  
 
6.4.4. Regarding the possibility to impart a virtuous disposition, civil servants have a 
different appreciation than soldiers. The entries show that competence is 
preponderantly a matter of formal teaching.65 With responsibility, further education 
plays a relatively important role. The rest is a matter of experience: ‘learning by doing’. 
As to decision-making civil servants refer most often to the need to reconcile their 
responsibility to uphold the rules and to treat the citizens with respect and fairness. 
Other virtues are hardly mentioned.66 This seems to indicate a stronger attachment to 
the purposive nature of their practice, than was found with soldiers.  
 
6.4.5. The data allow for some tentative conclusions. Civil servants do seem to have 
another orientation to their job than soldiers have. This can be inferred from the 
differences in the appreciation of internal goods and their interest in external goods as 
well as from the overall weaker evaluation of the concept of the virtues.  The latter 
appreciation is based on: the average 50% higher number of entries by soldiers; the 
broader view of soldiers regarding the possibility and need to impart virtues; and the 
stronger role of virtues in military decision-making. The responses to the closed 
questions of the survey add to this impression. Nevertheless the civil servants 
appreciated the virtues as relevant to their professional activities. 
 
Healthcare workers, data and analysis. 
6.5.1. Although again, the number of respondents is small, still some differences and 
similarities with military responses can be noted. Regarding internal goods the 
healthcare workers as well as military personnel scored strong evaluations with 
satisfaction, pride and contentment. 67 However, these internal goods had entries by 
almost all healthcare workers, while only 60% of the soldiers made entries. This 
difference does not seem very startling; after all these desires and expectations are all 
closely related to the notion of care, which is an important feature of the (Para) 
medical practice. On the other hand, soldiers scored much higher with adventure and 
belonging, which is only weakly evaluated by healthcare workers. The same applies to 
the internal good of excitement.  Albeit that challenge and stability had a relative low 
score on frequency, the score on intensity was higher. Excitement scored nil entries. 
Healthcare workers (as civil servants) had higher frequency scores than soldiers on 
contentment as referring to the ambition to help other people, but as to intensity, the 
scores were almost level.68 This was also the only internal good which was mentioned 
by all the civil respondents: civil servants and healthcare workers. Several comments 
were made on the intrinsic gratification the job offers. Only one entry is made 
regarding external goods, but this comment was made in an offhand manner: ‘The 
income is very practical.’69 
 
                                                          
65 Ibid, table 10. 
66 Ibid, table 11. 
67 These findings are confirmed in other research. See: C. Leget,  G. Olthuis (2007). ‘Professioneel zorg 
verlenen: ideaal of deugd’ and J. Dwarswaard, M. Hilhorst (2007) ‘Toch maar liever timmerman, over de 
idealen van de (huis)arts’ in  Werkzame idealen. Kole, J., de Ruyter D. Ed. Assen, van Gorcum. P 25, 38-41 
and Mulder, H. (2005). "Wil je meten en beheersen, of geef je mensen de kans hun persoon met de 
professie te verbinden?" Christen Democratische Verkenningen Beroepszeer: waarom Nederland niet 
goed werkt. (Zomer 2005): 190-195. 
68 See annex C, table 7. 
69 Soldiers (2011). Interviews on virtue ethics with OR, NCO and officers. Amersfoort. 
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6.5.2. These differences and similarities are also notable regarding virtues. Typical 
military virtues like courage, resilience and discipline are weakly evaluated by 
healthcare workers. Responsibility,  competence, and respect, on the other hand, are 
highly ranked by both soldiers and healthcare workers.70 These virtues have entries by 
almost all soldiers and healthcare workers. 71 The strong commitment to these virtues 
is also visible in the number of entries: military respondents score an average of 14 
entries, while healthcare workers score an individual average of  15 entries. 
Comradeship is well evaluated by both groups as well: both healthcare workers and 
soldiers score 8 entries on average. This seems to indicate an overall strong evaluation 
of at least four of the seven virtues of character. Furthermore, the scores resulted in a 
ranking of virtues, which is the same as with soldiers, which seems to suggest some 
kind of consensus in appreciating the different virtues. This support is mirrored by the 
responses regarding virtues in the closed questions of the survey.72 A substantial 97% 
of the healthcare workers agreed to the draft descriptions of the virtues, while 3% (one 
entry) entered ‘no opinion’. None disagreed.  
 
6.5.3. The relation between internal goods and virtues seems less problematic with 
health care workers. Six virtues have a similar evaluation as the related internal goods. 
Furthermore, the absence of any reference to the virtue of courage matches the 
absence of any reference to the internal good of excitement.73 The fact that the 
evaluation of six out of seven virtues matches with the evaluation of the related 
internal goods seems to indicate that there is a direct connection between some 
specific internal goods and the respondent virtues.  However, this connection is not 
necessarily of a causal nature. It could well be that people who aspire at working in 
health care have more realistic expectations. Many have experience with health care: 
directly and personal or indirectly by friends and family. Their motivation to work in 
healthcare and the ensuing attitude is largely care related, and this relation could 
manifest itself in strong evaluation on both internal goods and virtues. The matches 
that were identified do not provide a convincing support for a clear cut one on one 
relation between specific internal goods and separate related virtues. Although, the 
data on frequency suggest a generic relation between some internal goods and specific 
virtues, this suggestion is contradicted by the scores on intensity with only two 
matches (one of which refers to a weak connection). There are still no convincing 
arguments that warrant a positive conclusion as to a specific single relation between 
specific internal goods and related virtues. On the other hand, do the data not 
contradict any such connection. Therefore, also in the case of health care workers, 
there are still reasons to doubt whether it is possible to identify a direct connection 
between specific internal goods and separate related virtues.  
 
6.5.4.  The possibility to impart a virtuous disposition is appreciated by health care 
workers primarily as a matter of further education (‘Bildung‘). There was little 
response as to the possibility to impart different virtues, with one exception: 
responsibility. All methods to impart this virtue are mentioned: instruction, further 
education and experience.74 Inspiration by exemplary conduct of role models is 
                                                          
70 C. Leget,  G. Olthuis (2007). ‘Professioneel zorg verlenen: ideaal of deugd’ en J. Dwarswaard, M. 
Hilhorst (2007) ‘Toch maar liever timmerman, over de idealen van de (huis)arts’ in  Werkzame idealen. 
Kole, J., de Ruyter, D.  Ed. Assen, van Gorcum. P 24, 29-34, 42-43. 
71 See annex C, tables 2 and 8. 
72 Ibid, table 12. 
73 Ibid, table 9. 
74 Ibid, table 10. 
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mentioned as well.75 As to decision-making, healthcare workers often refer to their 
special responsibility towards their patients. This relation requires high professional 
standards and respect for their patients.76 Medical considerations, sometimes backed 
by a second opinion of peers, as well as respect for the vulnerability of the patient are 
decisive in coming to practical decisions.  
 
6.5.5. Based on the data some preliminary conclusions can be drawn. In many respects, 
healthcare workers seem to have a similar orientation to their professional activities 
like soldiers have. Both disregard external goods. This can be concluded from the 
similarities in the appreciation of some of the internal goods and virtues. However, 
these similarities do not provide positive evidence that there is a direct (even causal) 
relation between specific internal goods and related virtues. Divergent appreciations 
(for example, with courage, resilience and discipline) can be readily explained by 
differences in the nature of both the military and healthcare practice. They both also 
have a positive appreciation of the possibility to impart virtues, although healthcare 
workers seem to take a weaker position regarding this issue and views on methods 
differ as well. A similar conclusion can be drawn regarding the role of virtues in 
decision making.  
 
Conclusions. 
6.6.1.   Application of the theoretical framework on military practice results in findings 
that are recognized and acknowledged as relevant. Some of these findings are 
supported by other data.77 This pertains to internal goods, virtues and the possibility to 
impart virtues as well as to what extent virtues play a role in practical decision-making. 
Therefore, the conclusion seems justified that the theory of MacIntyre enables the 
development of a virtue ethical scheme of military ethics. However, there is one 
element in Macintyre’s theory that seems problematic and that is the assumed 
connection between internal goods and virtues. There are indications that such a 
generic relation does exist, but I have not been able to particularize this generic 
relation on the level of specific internal goods and related virtues.  
However, the fact that I have not been able to prove, or otherwise substantiate the 
existence of such specific relation, does not mean that such relation is absent, however 
further research is required. This further research could include the question to what 
extent desires can be identified and whether there is a connection between specific 
desires and actions. In short, how far is human behaviour ‘directed’ by desire, both in a 
generic as in a specific sense. The other question I try to answer in this chapter is to 
what extent do the outlines of the virtue ethical scheme I developed, address the 
complexities of operational reality. The interviews give a strong indication that the 
virtues I discerned are indeed recognized, acknowledged and accepted by soldiers with 
proven operational experience. The consistent and strong support further indicates 
that the outcomes have representative value: known as communicative 
                                                          
75 J. Dwarswaard, M. Hilhorst (2007) ‘Toch maar liever timmerman, over de idealen van de (huis)arts’ in  
Werkzame idealen. Kole, J., de Ruyter, D. Ed. Assen, van Gorcum. P 40. 
76 Ibid, table 11. 
77 See: Rees Vellinga, N. van (2006). Belangstellingsonderzoek 2005-2006, Een baan als militair. Afdeling 
Gedragswetenschappen. Den Haag, Ministerie van Defensie. P 10 and  Gelooven, R. M. W. v. (2009). 
Basisstudie Imago en Belangstelling. Afdeling Gedragswetenschappen. Den Haag, Ministerie van 
Defensie. P 31. Verweij, D. E. M. (2007). Morele professionaliteit in de militaire praktijk. P 129-134; 
Leget, C., Olthuis, G. (2007). Professioneel zorg verlenen: ideaal of deugd. P 24-36; Dwarswaard, J., 
Hilhorst, M. (2007). Over de idealen van de (huis)arts. P 37-50; . Karssing, E., Niessen, R. (2007). 
Geroepen om het algemeen belang te dienen: de idealen van ambtenaren. P 139151, alle in  Werkzame 
idealen. Kole, J., de Ruyter, D. Ed. Assen, van Gorcum.  
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generalizability.78 This indication is validated by the parallel survey among civil 
servants and healthcare workers. The overall idea of the military as a practice is 
supported by the similarities with healthcare workers regarding the strong evaluation 
of internal goods and virtues and the absence of a primary interest in external goods 
(job security, salary, status, etc.) Additional support is found in the differences with 
civil servants whose jobs have fewer characteristics of a practice. This is especially 
apparent in their interest in external goods and a weaker evaluation of virtues.79  The 
overall coherence seems strong: the respondents made a serious attempt to 
communicate their experiences related to the questions asked and in their expositions 
they addressed similar themes.80 
 
6.6.2. What at first sight seems remarkable is that a majority of civil servants and all 
healthcare workers found that the military virtues of character also covered the virtues 
- or more abstract  ideals -they thought applicable to their own professional activities. 
None of the respondents mentioned other virtues. Especially in the case of healthcare 
workers this is striking as their profession has a strong ethical component, and a lot of 
attention is given to the ethics of care and principles of medical care.81 However, this 
outcome could be the effect of the closed nature of that part of the survey. On the other 
hand, all were explicitly asked whether the list covered all aspects of their activities. 
However, we should also bear in mind that virtues are related to practices, which serve 
as frames of reference. The notion of a virtue pertains to a disposition to act in 
accordance with the standards of excellence. The nature of the practice determines 
what kind of activities is required and how specific standards of excellence are aspired 
at. Practices shape the frames in which activities are put forth, and standards of 
excellence are aspired at. From this perspective, a specific virtue could be 
demonstrated in different ways depending on the practice, the frame of reference, in 
which the virtuous conduct is displayed.  
 
6.6.3. As to the description of the virtues, several comments were made on the 
importance of a more positive articulation and practical recognisability.  In the first 
version, the descriptions started right on with an articulation of the mean. A number of 
respondents found it hard to understand the correct meaning of the definition: they 
had to read the description several times before understanding what was meant.  As 
my aim is to create a practical applicable set of virtues, these comments made me 
adjust the tentative descriptions of the virtues I articulated in chapter 4. In the adjusted 
version, I start with a positive description of the generic meaning of the virtue. Further 
minor changes were made as well. The result is listed below. 
 
Sense of responsibility is the disposition to try to accomplish allotted tasks as well as 
possible. This disposition requires the right balance between on the one hand a 
negative attitude of shirking and scraping through and on the other hand an equally 
negative attitude of blind zeal and fanatically pursuing a mission when circumstances 
have changed. It also implies being prepared to account for one’s actions.  
 
                                                          
78 Smaling, A. (2009). "Generaliseerbaarheid in kwalitatief onderzoek." KWALON, platform voor 
kwalitatief onderzoek 14(3): 5-12. 
79 See annex D. 
80 Kohler Riessman, C. (1993). Narrative analysis. Newbury Park (California), Sage Publications. P 67 - 
68. 
81 Beauchamp, T. L., Childress, J.F. (2001). Principles of biomedical ethics. Oxford, University Press.  
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Competence is the disposition to acquire the knowledge and skills to serve (weapon) 
systems as well as the ability to perceive the effects these systems can produce. This 
disposition requires the right balance between, on the one hand, an attitude of  
thinking that a rough general knowledge will do and that this won’t come to serious 
problems and on the other hand, an attitude of exaggerated  attention for material and 
rules and wanting to do everything by the book and so hampering practical operations.  
 
Comradeship is the disposition to share moral and practical support with fellow 
soldiers with whom one shares hardship and duress. This disposition requires a right 
balance between, on the one hand, a negative attitude of egotism, without any concern 
for others and on the other hand, an attitude of an exaggerate attention for other group 
members and their opinions and uncritical support of group actions. 
 
Respect is the disposition to value people as fellow human beings. This disposition 
requires a right balance between, on the one hand, a negative attitude of contempt and 
authoritarian behaviour toward others and on the other hand, an attitude of blind 
infatuation and exaggerated concern for any others. Respect does not only pertain to 
the members of the same group but also to other soldiers; military subordinates and 
superiors, as well as to civilians and even the enemy is entitled to a respectful 
treatment when fallen into our hands.  
 
Courage is the disposition to take personal risks in order to achieve an important goal. 
This disposition requires a right balance between, on the one hand, an attitude of 
avoiding risks and cowardice and on the other hand, an attitude of recklessness and 
taking unnecessary risks for yourself and others. Courage is not only displayed in 
taking physical risks but also in showing moral vigour. 
 
Resilience is the disposition to persevere in the face of adverse conditions and physical 
exhaustion and mental distress. This disposition requires the right balance between, on 
the one hand, an attitude of weakness, self pity and resignation at the smallest 
misfortune and on the other hand, an attitude of  overestimating  ones capabilities and 
not taking human limits into account, eventually resulting in collapse. Resilience has 
both a physical and a mental component.   
 
Discipline is the disposition to abide by rules and regulations. This disposition requires 
a right balance between, on the one hand, a negative attitude resulting in a neglect of 
rules by which one might endanger oneself and others and on the other hand, an 
attitude of strict adherence by rules and taking these literally which frustrates the 
progress of the work at hand. 
 
Practical wisdom is the disposition that enables a person to perceive a situation, to 
deliberate on what is appropriate and to act accordingly.  The virtues of character 
identify the need for action, the virtue of practical wisdom enables a person to 
determine 
 how to act. This disposition requires a right balance between, on the one hand, a 
wavering conduct and inconclusive action in case of pressure or any other emergency 
and on the other hand, immediate and impulsive action at the first hint of difficulties. 
Practical wisdom entails keeping a clear head, taking full account of the situation and 
taking decisive action. When displayed in leading others it also entails strong directive 
guidance while leaving room for initiative and displaying strong personal commitment. 
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6.6.4.  The overall outcome of this empirical validation does provide support for my 
assumption that: ‘…the theory of virtue ethics as elaborated by Alasdair MacIntyre in 
his book ´After Virtue´ provides a suitable instrument to identify, develop, instil and 
uphold the required moral standards in the military.’ The overall support for the 
theoretically developed concept of military virtues and the constructive comments by 
the respondents I interviewed resulted in the above definition of seven military virtues 
of character and the military virtue of intellect, practical wisdom.  This support regards 
the possibility to identify and develop the required moral disposition and standards of 
excellence. This chapter concludes the first part of this thesis, which pertained to the 
exploration and analysis of military practice and the related internal goods and virtues. 
In the next chapters, I turn to the military institution without which there would not be 
a military practice. 
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Annex A to chapter 6: interview protocol 
 
1. Particulars of the respondent 
Name  
Date of birth  
Particulars  duration of service/rank/previous working experience 
 
2. First ‘broad’ orientation: which desires play a part in joining?  
a. Can you recall what you were looking for when joining? 
 
b. Did you find what you looked for? 
 
c. Is there anything you looked for, but didn’t find? 
 
d. Did you find things, you hadn’t looked for? 
 
e. What is it precisely that you enjoy your work for? 
 
f. Are these thing important for you, and how come? 
 
g. Did your satisfaction increase or decrease while a member of…, and how 
come? 
 
 
3. Specific orientation: did your experience lead to reconsidering your desires and 
values?  
a. Have you experienced any serious operational incidents?  
 
b. Can you tell me in your own words what happened and what you have faced?  
 
c. Did this experience result in a changed attitude toward the things you find 
important? 
 
d. Can you tell me which attitudes changed and why?  
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4. To what extend do ‘values’ play a part in decision making? 
a. Did you ever have to make a (morally) difficult decision?  
 
b. Can you tell me what happened then. 
 
c. Why did you find the decision difficult?  
 
d. Why did you eventually do what you did?  
 
e. Was that a conscious decision (after a rational deliberation)? 
 
f. What determined your decision?  
 
g. Did values play any role in your decision making?  
 
 
5. Which ‘values’ do you consider important in others? 
a. Are there people with whom you work together who you admire or respect?  
 
b. What is this admiration or respect based on?  
 
c. Are there people with whom you work together who you do not admire or 
respect? 
 
d. On which grounds?  
 
 
6. Which values do you consider important en can these be conveyed to others?  
a. Which characteristics make you a good member of your organization? 
 
b. Did you already possess these characteristics before you joined?  
 
c. How did you acquire these characteristics?  
 
d. Which characteristics should all fellow members possess?  
 
e. Is it possible to impart these characteristics to others?  
 
f. What would we have to do in order to impart these characteristics to others?  
 
 
7. To what extend are wider values of the armed forces or society important? 
a. Are there any wider values that are important for you in your job?  
 
b. To what extend do these values play a role?  
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8. Conclusion  
a. Regarding the things we talked about, is there anything you want to add?  
 
b. Is there anything else you want to bring forward?  
 
 
9. Evaluation  
a. How did you experience our conversation?  
 
b. Did you have ample opportunity to say whatever you wanted to say?  
 
c. Did you feel hampered in any way during this conversation?  
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10. Reality check 
 
Below is a number of dispositions listed. Do you (strongly) agree or disagree with the 
description and do you consider this disposition relevant for you as a professional?  
 
a. Sense of responsibility, as the right mean between an attitude of shirking and 
scraping through and an attitude of blind zeal and fanatically pursuing a mission while 
circumstances have changed.   
strong 
disagreement 
disagreement no 
opinion 
agreement strong 
agreement 
 relevant not 
relevant 
  
b. Competence, as the right mean between an attitude o  thinking that a rough 
general knowledge will do and that this won’t come to serious problems and an 
attitude of exaggerated   attention for material and rules and wanting to do everything 
by the book.  
strong 
disagreement 
disagreement no 
opinion 
agreement strong 
agreement 
 relevant not 
relevant 
 
c. Comradeship, as the right mean between an attitude of egotism, without any 
concern for others and an attitude of an exaggerate attention for group opinions and 
uncritical support of group actions. 
strong 
disagreement 
disagreement no 
opinion 
agreement strong 
agreement 
 relevant not 
relevant 
 
d. Respect, as the right mean between an attitude of contempt and authoritarian 
behaviour toward others and blind infatuation and approving anything the other does. 
Respect does not only pertain to the members of the same group but also to 
subordinates, superiors and civilians in the area of operations; as well as any opponent.  
strong 
disagreement 
disagreement no 
opinion 
agreement strong 
agreement 
 relevant not 
relevant 
 
e. Resilience, as the right mean between an attitude of weakness and resignation at 
the smallest misfortune and an attitude of overestimating ones capabilities and not 
taking human limits into account. Resilience has a physical and a mental component.   
strong 
disagreement 
disagreement no 
opinion 
agreement strong 
agreement 
 relevant not 
relevant 
 
f. Discipline,  as a meant between an attitude of neglect of rules by which one 
might endanger oneself and others and an attitude of strict abidance by rules and 
taking these literally which frustrates the progress of the work at hand. 
strong 
disagreement 
disagreement no 
opinion 
agreement strong 
agreement 
 relevant not 
relevant 
 
g. Courage, as the mean between an attitude of avoiding risks and cowardice and 
an attitude of recklessness and taking unnecessary risks for yourself and others. 
strong 
disagreement 
disagreement no 
opinion 
agreement strong 
agreement 
 relevant not 
relevant 
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h. Practical wisdom,82 as the mean between wavering conduct and inconclusive 
guidance in case of pressure or any other emergency and impulsive action and strong 
directive guidance at the first hint of difficulties. Practical wisdom entails keeping a 
clear head, taking full account of the situation, taking decisive action while leaving 
room for initiative and displaying strong personal commitment. 
strong 
disagreement 
disagreement no 
opinion 
agreement strong 
agreement 
 relevant not 
relevant 
 
Are there any dispositions missing or cover the above all aspects that are relevant 
under operational circumstances?  
 
 
Are the above dispositions only relevant in your work or also in other circumstances 
and situations? 
 
 
  
                                                          
82 Added later. 
132 
 
Annex B to chapter 6: Composition of samples. 
 
1. military sample 
 
 Strength military personnel Royal Netherlands Armed Forces by July 1st 201183 
 
 Other Ranks 
 
NCO Officers Totals by 
service 
Totals 
 
 (#) (%) (#) (%) (#) (%) (#) (%) (%) 
Navy 3137 32% 4353 45% 2200 23% 9690 100% 20% 
Army 10379 47% 7275 33% 4504 20% 22158 100% 48% 
Air Force 2079 22% 4529 48% 2782 23% 9390 100% 20% 
Constabulary 1142 19% 4133 68% 764 13% 6039 100% 12% 
 16737 37% 20290 43% 10250 20% 47277  100% 
 
 
Composition of sample military respondents in 2011 
 
 Other Ranks 
 
NCO Officers Totals by 
service 
Totals 
 
 (#) (%) (#) (%) (#) (%) (#) (%) (%) 
Navy 1  2  0  3  23% 
Army 3  1  1  5  45% 
Air Force 0  1  1  2  18% 
Constabulary 0  1  0  1  9% 
 4 37% 5 45% 2 18% 11  100% 
 
Operational experience military respondents 2011 
• Wounded by enemy fire  3 
• Wounded by friendly fire  1 
• Distinguished for valour  6 
• Other proven combat experience 1 
 
 
2. civil samples 
 
                                                          
83 Data by the Chief Directorate Personnel Ministry of Defence in E-mail to the author of  July 20th  2011. 
 Gender Age 20-30  Age 30-40 Age 40-50 Age 50 > Totals  
Civil servants 3M/2F - 2 2 1 5 
Healthcare  1M/4F - 1 3 1 5 
Totals  10 - 3 5 2 10 
1
3
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Table 1: internal goods 
 OR  
1 
OR 
 2 
OR  
 3 
OR 
 4 
Int. 
OR 
NCO  
1 
NCO  
2 
NCO 
 3 
NCO  
4 
NCO 
 5 
 Int. 
NCO 
Off 1 Off 2  Int. 
 Off 
Total Int. 
Satisfaction & 
achievement 
1 - - -  2 3 2 3 5  2 12  30 4,3 
Pride & 
appreciation 
- 1 - -  2 - 4 1 -  3 11  22 3,7 
Contentment & 
fairness 
1 - 1 4  - - - - 1  2 7  16 2,7 
Excitement & 
thrill 
- - - -  - 1 1 - -  - 2  4 1,3 
Belonging & 
security 
1 - 2 3  - - 3 1 7  5 5  27 3,4 
Adventure & 
challenge 
4 - 1 1  3 6 2 4 4  4 1  30 3 
Structure 
&stability 
- - - -  - - - - -  - -  0 0 
Total  7 1 4 8  7 10 12 9 17  16 38  129  
Intensity1  1,8 1 1,3 2,7 1,7 2,3 3,3 2,4 2,3 4,2 2,9 3,2 6,3 4.8   
External goods - - - -  - - - - -  - -  0  
   Frequency entries # per respondent: average () = 12, Median (M) = 9 
   Frequency entries # per internal good:      = 18,   M  = 22 
 
 
1
3
4
 
             
 
Table 2:  virtues 
 OR  
1 
OR  
2 
OR  
3 
OR 
4 
 Int. 
 OR 
NCO  
1 
NCO 
2 
NCO  
3  
NCO   
4 
NCO  
5 
  Int. 
NCO 
Off   
1 
Off  
2 
 Int. 
 Off 
Total  Int. 
Responsibility  
 
5 13 19 16  11 18 17 23 13  30 18  183 16,6 
Competence   
 
11 9 14 19  9 18 15 11 9  21 11  147 13,4 
Respect 
 
7 10 11 11  8 10 14 5 7  13 9  105 9,5 
Courage 
 
- 1 3 3  1 3 6 - -  6 3  26 3,3 
Comradeship 
 
12 7 6 9  5 10 13 6 6  8 4  86 7,8 
Resilience 
 
8 3 6 7  6 18 6 8 5  10 5  82 7,5 
Discipline 
 
4 3 3 2  2 13 4 3 5  4 1  44 4 
Total  47 46 62 67  42 90 75 56 45  92 51  673  
Intensity 7,8 6,6 8,9 9,6 8,2 6 12,9 10,7 9,3 7,5 9,3 13,1 7,3 10,2   
Practical 
wisdom 
- 4 2 5  2 3 4 3 7  10 18  62  
  Frequency entries # per respondent:  = 61, M = 56 
  Frequency entries # per virtue:  = 96, M = 86 
 
 
 
135 
 
Table 3: evaluation of internal goods and related virtues 
Internal 
goods 
Evaluation   Virtues 
 
Evaluation  Direction  
of change 
Freq. Int. Freq. Int. Freq. Int. 
Satisfaction S S  Responsibility S S Match     
→ 
  → 
Pride  M S  Competence S S Stronger 
↑ 
  → 
Contentment M M  Respect M M Match     
→ 
  → 
Excitement  W W  Courage W W Match     
→ 
  → 
Belonging S M  Comradeship  M M Weaker   
↓ 
  → 
Adventure S M  Resilience M M Weaker   
↓ 
  → 
Structure W W  Discipline W W Match     
→ 
  → 
 
 
Table 4: appreciation of the possibility to impart virtues 
 Instr. Train. Edu. Exp. Total remarks 
Responsibility 3 5 3 4 15  
Competence 2 5 2 2 11 Serious training 
Respect - 3 3 2 8  
Courage - - - - 0  
Comradeship  1 3 1 2 7 Exemplary conduct 
Resilience 2 4 - 1 7 Harsh training 
(physical & mental) 
Discipline 3 - 2 1 6 Rules matter (ROE) 
Practical 
wisdom 
- - 4 1 5  
Total  11 20 15 13 59  
 
 
Table 5: appreciation of the influence of virtues in operational decisions 
 Decision-making   
Total (11x) OR (4x) NCO (5x) Off (2x) 
Responsibility 7 19 6 32 
Competence 5 7 2 14 
Respect 8 4 2 14 
Courage 1 1 - 2 
Comradeship  - - - 0 
Resilience - 1 - 1 
Discipline 3 6 1 10 
Practical wisdom 3 9 6 18 
Total  27 47 17 92 
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2. Number of entries by military personnel in closed questionnaire. 
    
Table 6: entries on draft military virtues 
Virtues strongly 
disagree 
disagree no opinion agree strongly 
agree 
Responsibility - - 1 5 5 
Competence  - - - 7 4 
Courage - - 1 5 5 
Comradeship - - - 5 6 
Respect - - - 4 7 
Resilience - - - 4 7 
Discipline - - 2 4 5 
Practical wisdom - - - 3 8 
Total  0 0 4 37 47 
Completeness - - - 4 7 
Relevance  - - - 3 8 
Number of entries by civilians in open-end interviews. 
     (civil servants = CS; health care workers = HCW) 
  
1
3
7
 
    
 
 
Table 7: internal goods  
 CS 
1  
CS 
2 
CS 
3 
CS 
4 
CS 
5 
Freq 
CS 
Int. 
CS 
HCW 
 1 
HCW 
  2 
HCW 
  3 
HCW 
  4 
HCW 
  5 
Freq 
HCW 
Int. 
HCW 
Total 
Satisfaction & 
achievement 
1 1 2 1 1 6 1,2 - 3 4 4 3 14 3,5 20 
Pride & 
appreciation 
- - - 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 3 6 13 2,6 15 
Contentment 
& fairness 
- 1 4 3 2 10 2,5 2 6 1 3 1 13 2,6 23 
Excitement & 
thrill 
- - - - - 0 0 - - - - - 0 0 0 
Belonging & 
security 
- - - 1 1 2 1 - - - - - 0 0 2 
Adventure & 
challenge 
- - - - - 0 0 - - 5 2 - 7 3,5 7 
Structure & 
stability 
- - - - - 0 0 - - 5 2 - 7 3,5 7 
Total  1 2 6 6 5 20  4 10 11 12 10 47  67 
Intensity  1 1 3 1,5 1,3  1,6 2 3,3 2,2 4 3,3  3  
External 
goods 
2 3 3 2 2 12  - - - - 1 1  13 
 
 
 
1
3
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Table 8: virtues 
 CS 
1  
CS 
2 
CS 
3 
CS 
4 
CS 
5 
Freq. 
CS 
Int. 
CS 
HCW 
1 
HCW 
2 
HCW 
3 
HCW 
4 
HCW 
5 
Freq. 
HCW 
Int. 
HCW 
Total 
Responsibility  
 
14 12 9 17 25 77 15,4 19 14 22 13 13 81 16,2 158 
Competence   
 
8 11 5 14 15 53 10,6 13 10 15 21 13 72 14,4 125 
Respect 
 
10 6 6 11 7 40 8 8 10 16 22 16 72 14,4 112 
Courage 
 
- 1 - - 2 3 1,5 - - - - - 0 0 3 
Comradeship 
 
4 6 5 3 8 26 5,2 13 2 12 8 3 38 7,6 64 
Resilience 
 
- - 1 4 2 7 2,3 3 4 8 7 5 27 5,4 34 
Discipline 
 
2 4 3 2 2 13 2,6 3 3 1 4 - 11 2,8 24 
Total  38 40 29 51 61 219  59 43 74 75 50 301  520 
Intensity  7,6 6,7 4,8 8,5 8,7  7,4 9,8 7,2 12,3 12,5 10  10,4  
Practical 
wisdom 
 
1 - - - 3 4  1 2 6 - - 9  13 
  CS entries # per respondent:  = 44, M = 40 
  HCW entries # per respondent:  = 60, M = 59 
  CS entries # per virtue:  = 31, M = 26 
  HCW entries # per virtue:  = 43, M = 38 
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Table 9 A: evaluation of internal goods and related virtues by civil servants 
Internal 
goods 
Evaluation   Virtues Evaluation   Direction of change 
Freq. Int. Freq. Int. Freq. Int. 
Satisfaction S S  Responsibility S S  Match             
→ 
Match         
→ 
Pride M M  Competence S S  Stronger          
↑ 
Stronger     
↑ 
Contentme
nt 
S S  Respect M M  Weaker           
↓ 
Weaker      
↓ 
Excitement  W W  Courage W W  Match             
→ 
Match         
→ 
Belonging M M  Comradeship  M M  Match             
→ 
Match         
→ 
Adventure W W  Resilience W W  Match             
→ 
Match         
→ 
Structure W W  Discipline W W  Match             
→ 
Match         
→ 
 
 
Table 9 B: evaluation of internal goods and related virtues by health care workers 
Internal 
goods 
 
Evaluation   Virtues Evaluation   Direction of change 
Freq. Int. Freq. Int. Freq. Int. 
Satisfaction S S   Responsibility S S  Match             
→ 
Match         
→ 
Pride S M  Competence S S  Match             
→ 
Stronger     
↑ 
Contentme
nt 
S M  Respect S S  Match             
→ 
Stronger     
↑ 
Excitement  W W  Courage W W  Match             
→ 
Match         
→ 
Belonging W W  Comradeship  M M  Stronger          
↑ 
Stronger     
↑ 
Adventure M S  Resilience M M  Match             
→ 
Weaker       
↓ 
Structure W S  Discipline W W  Match             
→ 
Weaker       
↓ 
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Table 10: appreciation of the possibility to impart virtues  
 Instr. Train. Edu. Exp. Total remarks 
CS HC
W 
CS HC
W 
CS HC
W 
CS HC
W 
CS HC
W 
Total  
Responsibility - 1 1 - 9 4 - 1 10 6 16  
Competence 8 2 2 - - - 2 - 12 2 14 Example 
Respect - 1 - - 1 1 1 - 2 1 3  
Courage - - - - - - - - 0 0 0  
Comradeship  - 1 - - 2 1 1 - 3 1 4  
Resilience - - - - 1 - - - 1 0 1  
Discipline - - - - - - - - 0 0 0  
Practical 
wisdom 
- - - - - - - 1 0 1 1  
Total  8 5 3 0 1
3 
6 4 2 28 11 39  
 
 
Table 11: appreciation of the influence of virtues in operational decisions84  
 Decision-making   
Total  
 
Remarks  CS HCW 
Responsibility 9 4 13  
Competence 1 10 11  
Respect 4 10 14  
Courage - - 0  
Comradeship  1 3 4  
Resilience 0 5 5  
Discipline 2 1 3  
Practical 
wisdom 
- 4 4  
Total  17 37 54  
                                                          
84 ‘Practical decisions’ in civilian terms 
1
4
1
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Table 12: entries on draft military virtues 
Virtues Strongly disagree Disagree No opinion Agree Strongly agree 
CS HCW Total  CS HCW Total  CS HCW Total  CS HCW Total  CS HCW Total  
Responsibility - - - - - 0 - - 0 3 3 6 2 2 4 
Competence - - - - - 0 - - 0 3 2 5 2 3 5 
Respect - - - - - 0 - - 0 3 2 5 2 3 5 
Courage - - - 2 - 2 - - 0 3 4 7 - 1 1 
Comradeship - - - - - 0 - 1 1 4 3 7 1 1 2 
Resilience - - - 1 - 1 1 - 1 2 2 4 1 3 4 
Discipline - - - 1 - 1 - - 0 4 3 7 - 3 3 
Practical wisdom - - - 1 - 1 1 - 1 3 3 6 - 1 1 
Total  0 0 0 5 0 5 2 1 3 25 22 47 8 17 25 
Completeness - - - 1 - 1 - - - 4 5 9 - - - 
Relevance  - - - 2 - 2 - - - 3 5 8 - - - 
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    Annex D to chapter 6: positioning of respective activities 
     Activity A: preponderant characteristics of a practice 
Activity B: characteristics a balance of both practice and poièsis 
Activity C: preponderant characteristics of poièsis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                            
          
 
               
 
 
Praxis 
Poièsis 
A B C 
X Y Z 
X & Y = military and health care 
Z = civil service 
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Chapter 7: military institution. 
  
Introduction 
7.1.   In the preceding chapters I elaborated on military practice: its characteristics, 
internal goods, virtues and the role of narrative in this context. I concluded my 
discussion so far with a ‘reality-check’. This check supported the validity of my findings 
so far. This means that I have addressed the first and most important part of my 
hypothesis by which I aim to answer the central question, that the theory of virtue ethics 
as elaborated by Alasdair MacIntyre in his book ‘After Virtue’ provides a suitable 
instrument to identify, develop, instil and uphold the required moral standards for the 
military.1 However, in his theory MacIntyre also addresses the role of institutional 
structures and the relation of these with the practice as such. Therefore, in this chapter I 
will also address the issue of the military institution and its relation with its practice. I 
will first explain the position of Alasdair MacIntyre regarding institutions and the 
related notions he introduces.  From this perspective I will then have a look at the way 
this relationship is shaped in the Dutch military context. I will investigate to what extent 
the institutional interests correspond to the needs of the practice. In this context I will 
also investigate the present policy on morality of the Dutch MOD as embodied in the 
code of conduct.  After all, a code of conduct communicates what an organisation thinks 
important.2 I will compare the present code with the framework of military virtues I 
developed in the preceding chapters. In order to add weight to this comparison, I will 
also compare this code with those of some other constitutional democracies; the US, the 
UK, the FRG and France and establish similarities and differences. I will conclude this 
chapter by arguing whether a virtue ethical approach to military ethics should be 
preferred. 
 
Practice and institutions  
7.2.1.   MacIntyre argues that practices cannot survive for any length of time unless 
sustained by institutions.3 Without proper and consistent organization of the internal 
conditions and characteristics of a practice, it will not develop into a specific and as such 
recognizable activity. A practice will not be able to manifest itself as such, without the 
proper and consistent organization of the internal circumstances which provides 
conditions and rules and an authority to uphold the regulations under which the 
practice is realized.  Institutions are the organisations which facilitate the practice by 
providing the conditions, means and context for its continuous existence. They provide 
the organizational structures and procedural frameworks by codifying rules and setting 
standards. Often practices are organisationally supported by more than one institution. 
Referring again to the example of rugby as a practice it is true that one can play rugby 
with a few friends on a stretch of turf that happens to be available. However, if one 
wants to play regularly in a regular team and on a regular playing field, it is obvious that 
a rugby club is required. The rugby club provides continuity and the appropriate context 
for the game. It organizes teams and matches, appoints referees, and provides a pitch 
and training facilities. A rugby club is in its turn a member of the national rugby league.  
The league organises a competition between clubs, provides education and training for 
rugby referees and coaches, as well as club officials, etc. The league in its turn is a 
                                                          
1 MacIntyre, A. (2007). After Virtue. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. 
2 Oltshoorn, P. (2011). Military Ethics and Virtues. Abingdon, Routledge. P 86. 
3 MacIntyre, A. (2007). After Virtue. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 194, 195. 
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member of the international rugby board that organises international competitions and 
tournaments and provides internationally uniform rules and standards.  
 
7.2.2.   It is in the context of the institutions that the external goods of a practice can be 
acquired. 4 These external goods are not acquired by participating in a practice, but by 
means of a practice. The practice serves as an instrument to acquire these external 
goods. The institution that supports the practice is the place where these external goods 
are made available. The institutions provide organisation and structure, which implies 
positions for officials, jobs. Within the framework of institutions positions and the 
ensuing status are acquired; power is wielded and money is earned: the prototypical 
external goods.5 From this perspective, the institution serves as a means to other ends, 
whereas the practice is an end in itself.6  In his later works, MacIntyre introduces some 
gradation compared with this earlier approach. He articulates the distinction between 
internal goods (acquired through participating in the practice) and external goods 
(acquired by means of the practice) also as respectively goods of excellence and goods of 
effectiveness.7 He explains that the relation between these two types of goods is a 
complicated one.  He states that the acquisition of both internal goods (of excellence) 
and external goods (of effectiveness) require sometimes the same kind of qualities; for 
example, a sense of responsibility, competence and respect. But he then states that it is 
also clear that the content of these qualities will differ depending on the context and 
perspective.8 In the practice, these qualities are self imposed and excellence is primarily 
a matter of merit and desert. A person not meeting the standards of excellence will 
primarily wrong himself. After all, he knows very well what is expected and 
nevertheless, fails in doing so, which may affect his self-esteem. In the institution these 
qualities, to a certain extent, could be necessary as well, but excellence is primarily a 
matter of tangible results and institutional targets met. A person not meeting these 
standards could not only wrong himself but also those who depend on him, as well as 
the institution he serves. According to MacIntyre internal and external goods are not 
mutually exclusive: some excellence is required to be truly effective and on the other 
hand, the yields of effectiveness often are a stimulus to improve excellence.  
 
7.2.3.   However, institutions can also have a more substantial role than merely 
sustaining the practice. This criticism is articulated by Miller and pertains to MacIntyre’s 
view of a practice as an autotelic, self-contained phenomenon.9 According to Miller this 
is a too limited a view on the concept of a practice. In his view, practices are not pursued 
only for the sake of acquiring internal goods, some of them serve social ends beyond 
themselves.10 These purposive practices also can - and should - be reviewed from the 
perspective of the end(s) they are meant to serve. Is a virtue something autotelic, a goal 
                                                          
4 Ibid, P 190. 
5 Ibid, P 194. See also: Verbrugge, A. (2005). Geschonden beroepseer. Beroepszeer; waarom Nederland 
niet werkt. M. Jansen. Amsterdam, Boom. Zomer 2005: 108-123. 
6 Tongeren van, P. (2003). Deugdelijk leven. Amsterdam, Sun. P 20,21. 
7 MacIntyre, A. (2003). Whose justice? Which rationality? Notre Dame (Indiana), University Press. P 32-
46. 
8 Ibid, P 32. 
9 Miller, D. (1994). Virtues, practices and justice. After MacIntyre. Horton, J and Mendus, S. (ed.) 
Cambridge, Polity Press: 245-264 and Miller, D. (1999). Principles of social justice. Cambridge 
(Massachusetts), Harvard University Press. P 111-130. 
10 Miller, D. (1999). Principles of social justice. Cambridge (Massachusetts), Harvard University Press. P 
117. 
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in itself, or could it  also contribute to a higher goal? The concept of a purposive practice 
allows for a wider evaluation of the virtues involved.11 The standards of excellence are 
not only a matter of the participants in the practice, but are also a matter of achieving 
the wider purpose of the practice in an excellent way. For example, the practice of 
medicine is not practiced solely to help patients and find better cures, but also to 
increase public health!  The realization and safeguarding of public health is not a matter 
of medical expertise only, but requires organization and therefore institutions. This 
means that a critical assessment of the standards of excellence can be made both from 
within the practice as from the perspective of the social ends served by the practice. As a 
consequence of Miller’s criticism, institutions often have a more substantial role than 
just sustaining a practice. Institutions can also embody the purpose of a practice: 
institutions do not only provide means to sustain a practice, but also provide direction 
and guidance in achieving and serving a wider (moral) goal. This means providing rules 
and regulations and standards of excellence that are not only relevant to the excellence 
in the practice but also to social ends that are served by the practice.  
7.2.4.   In my opinion, the criticism by Miller cannot be ignored: there are just too many 
examples of his kind of purposive practices. Some obvious examples are teaching and 
the public education system, medical care and the public health organization, etc. 
Especially with a view on the military practice, there is no doubt that a purposive 
perspective is indispensable. Without a social purpose a public institution, and (legal) 
rules and regulations, some aspects of the military practice - killing other soldiers - 
would come to nothing more than wanton killing: murder. However, the criticism of 
Miller does not imply that the complete concept of MacIntyre is invalid. The idea of 
internal goods and their function as to establish what kind of virtues are relevant, is not 
refuted by Miller’s criticism. Nevertheless, Miller’s argument is convincing that there are 
more influences relevant as to establishing which virtues are important, than just those 
which facilitate the acquirement of the internal goods of the practice. Some practices do 
seem to have a double character. In this thesis, I will therefore use the concept of a 
purposive practice in addition to the framework developed by MacIntyre, and as such it 
will provide an extra and necessary perspective of evaluation. In order to provide a clear 
picture of the relation between the practice and the military institution, the question 
that needs to be answered is, which moral directions figure in the case of the military as 
a purposive institution? 
 
7.2.5.   Institutions also play a role within the community and are a part of the fabric of 
society, and thus they are often part of the moral tradition of a community as well. As 
such the institutions also officiate as a kind of linking pin between the practice and the 
wider fabric of society and its moral traditions. Also from this perspective the influence 
of the institutions on the morality of the practice cannot be ignored and has to be taken 
into account. This is evident in practical moral reasoning - as part of a practice - which is 
often, at least partly, based on institutional and social values. Also from this perspective 
the institution is more than just an organizational backbone to support a practice. 
 
Military institutions and purpose 
7.3.1.   Military practice is no exception to the rule that it needs an institution to provide 
an adequate structure, to set standards of excellence and safeguard continuity. However, 
there is also another, more pressing necessity for military institutions: a navy, army, air 
                                                          
11 Ibid, P 120. 
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force and a constabulary. These institutions create vehicles for the legitimate use of 
violence. Without legitimate military institutions and the legal and moral rules and 
regulations that are part and parcel of these institutions, military practice would be little 
more than banditry.  
 
7.3.2.   Also it will be clear that the military is a purposive practice: it has a wider goal 
than merely providing a vehicle for individuals to participate in military activities.12 This 
purpose, the social end, of the military in the Netherlands is embedded in the 
constitution.13 The (international) commitment of the armed forces is also subject to the 
(international) rule of law that is embedded in both the constitution and the 
international treaties to which the Dutch government is a signatory. The most important 
of these international legal agreements are the UN Charter, the NATO treaty and the 
treaties and protocols of the Geneva Convention. These treaties constitute the most 
important parts of the legal body of the ‘jus ad bellum’ which stipulates when it is 
legitimate to go to war.14 The most important tenets can be summarized as follows: an 
armed conflict is legal if taking up arms is a matter of self-defence or as the inevitable 
means of last resort when all other ways to solve the conflict have failed; the aim of a 
war must be just as well and revenge can never be a motive to go to war; war can only 
be decided on by the legal government of a nation-state.15  
 
7.3.3.   The generic purpose of the Dutch armed forces is elaborated into actual political 
goals. These political goals, the practical political purposes, are articulated in the year 
2000 Defence White paper.16 In this White Paper, three main tasks are discerned. In a 
concise version these are: (1) defence and protection of the national territory and 
interests, (2) promotion of the international rule of law and (3) support of civil 
authorities. This practical purpose and tasks clearly refer to the operational nature of 
the ensuing military activities: to defend, protect, promote and assist.17 This approach is 
                                                          
12 Huntington, S. P. (1957). The soldier and the state. Cambridge (Massachusetts), Harvard University 
Press. P 2, 9-10, 57-58, 65. 
13 Grondwet van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden. Den Haag, Kluwer, (2002) art. 97: ’ten behoeve van de 
verdediging van en ter bescherming van de belangen van het Koninkrijk, alsmede ten behoeve van de 
handhaving en bevordering van de internationale rechtsorde is er een krijgsmacht.’ (In translation that is: 
For the defence of the realm and to protect the interests of the Kingdom as well as to maintain and 
promote the international rule of law, there will be an armed force.) 
14 For a summary of the main aspect of the tradition of  ‘jus ad bellum’ and its problematic aspects see: 
Koninklijke Landmacht. (1996). Army Doctrine Publication I Military Doctrine. Den Haag, Landmachtstaf. 
P 28-30; Norman, R. (1995). Ethics, Killing and War. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. P 117-121; 
Achterhuis, H. (2008). Met alle geweld. Rotterdam, Lemniscaat. P 505-535 and Walzer, M. (1977). Just and 
unjust wars. New York, Basic books. P 152-153. 
15 The role of the nation-state in this respect has diminished and is largely taken over by the international 
community, notably the U.N. The tenets of ‘jus ad bellum’ tradition have not changed though. For a more 
elaborate account see: Ducheine, P. A. L. (2008). Krijgsmacht, Geweldgebruik & terreurbestrijding. 
Nijmegen, Wolf Legal Publishers. 
16 Kamerstukken II 1999-2000, 26 800 X, nr. 46. Den Haag, Staatsdrukkerij, (2000) P 41: ‘De hoofdtaken 
van de krijgsmacht zijn: beschermen van de integriteit van het eigen en bondgenootschappelijke 
grondgebied, bevorderen van de internationale rechtsorde en stabiliteit, ondersteunen van civiele 
autoriteiten bij rechtshandhaving, rampenbestrijding en humanitaire hulp, zowel nationaal als 
internationaal.' (In translation that is: The main tasks of the armed forces are: protecting the integrity of 
the own territory and that of allies, promoting of the international rule of law and stability, supporting 
civil authorities in maintaining law and order, disaster relief and providing humanitarian aid, both 
nationally and internationally. ) 
17 The emphasis on these operational activities is in support of my operational perspective on military 
practice. 
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also noticeable in the recent policy of NATO: ‘The lessons learnt from NATO operations, 
in particular, in Afghanistan and the Western Balkans, make it clear that a 
comprehensive political, civilian and military approach is necessary for effective crisis 
management.’18 In the international colloquial this comprehensive approach is often 
referred to by the acronym 3D, which stands for defence, diplomacy, and development. 
The profile for higher educated officers of the Dutch armed forces (colonel and higher 
ranks) is based on this approach as well. In this inter-service profile, three roles are 
discerned: warrior, manager and diplomat.19 This development reflects the present 
three different main tasks of the armed forces, which imply more divergent roles than 
only to fight the nation’s wars.20 
 
7.3.4.   However, as noted in the preceding paragraph, modern soldiers are confronted 
with diverging tasks, which - on the practical level - may require different roles and 
frames of reference. These differences could be of such proportion that for all practical 
purposes one could claim to discern separate practices. Recently, the issue of soldier’s 
different roles was studied in depth, which resulted in some remarkable conclusions.21 
Broesder studied role identities of Dutch soldiers in both ‘peace keeper’ and ‘warrior’ 
missions and how their respective role affected their work-related attitudes. Her first 
finding was that these roles can be measured as independent constructs: in short, there 
are measurable differences. She also found out that - in spite of these differences - Dutch 
soldiers identified with both roles simultaneously and that a preference for one role is 
not related to a preference for the other role. This means that - at least in the Dutch 
context - preparing for one role does not disqualify the soldier for deployment in 
another role. Role strain develops only when allotted tasks are not in line with the role 
identity of the mission. This could mean that general training could be focussed on a 
‘warrior’ identity without impairing the ability to adapt to a ‘peace keeper’ identity. The 
relevant frame of reference must be clear! This means that an operational focus in 
training and education and aspiring at the related technically and tactically more 
complex standards of excellence for ‘warriors’ do not impair the soldier’s ability to adopt 
other roles. However, it does not seem wise to focus exclusively on a ‘warrior’ ethos in 
all aspects of military training. This could hamper the necessary conversion to other 
roles. From this perspective especially a virtue like the above-described respect, which 
encompasses not only fellow soldiers but civilians and opposing fighters as well seems 
appropriate. Another conclusion that can be drawn is that mission specific training 
seems to gain in importance as a means to limit the risks of role strain and increases 
relevant competence. However, in spite of the differences Broesder identified, there are 
no indications that different roles imply different practices, on the contrary. On the 
whole, it seems clear that the purposive perspective adds an extra dimension to military 
practice and its virtues: on the institutional level which provides a wider frame of 
reference and on the practical level depending on the role in which the military is 
deployed. 
                                                          
18 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Active Engagement, Modern Defence. Strategic Concept for the 
Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation adopted by Heads of State 
and Government in Lisbon, 19 November 2010. 
19 Commandant der Strijdkrachten, (2007). Profiel hoger opgeleide krijgsmacht officier. Ministerie van 
Defensie. Den Haag. 
20 See also Oltshoorn, P. (2011). Military Ethics and Virtues. Abingdon, Routledge. P 6-7. 
21 Broesder, W. A. (2011). Soldiers wielding Swords and Ploughshares. Psychology. Leuven, Katholieke 
Universiteit Leuven. PhD: 114. 
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7.3.5.   However, whatever the role of the military, the legitimate deployment of the 
armed forces requires full political control. The armed forces are by tradition an 
instrument of force in the hands of the legitimate political government to defend the 
sovereignty of the nation (and its allies). In order to serve its purpose the military must 
be trustworthy in the discharge of its duty, it must be credible in equipment and training 
and reliable as to its abidance to the law and the directives issued by the legal 
government. This also requires that those who are members of the military organization 
subordinate themselves to this legal and political control unconditionally and willingly. 
As a formal confirmation of the special status of the military as an instrument of state 
violence and to assure that the military will dutiful execute its special task, all Dutch 
soldiers are required to take an oath.22  In this oath, they swear allegiance to the king, 
abidance to the law and subordination to the military regimen.23 Allegiance to the king is 
not a personal allegiance, but allegiance to the king as the formal head of the 
democratically chosen and legitimate government. Abidance to the law means that the 
military will abide to the laws of the realm and the laws and regulations of ‘jus in bello’: 
this formula speaks largely for itself. Subordination to military discipline means that the 
soldiers will respect their legal superiors and obey their orders faithfully, as well as 
adhere to the other rules and regulations of the military regimen. The oath is sworn in 
front of a unit while holding on to the ensign of the regiment and after the oath is sworn, 
the national anthem is played. These circumstances makes taking the oath more than an 
abstract speech act; instead, it is a personal commitment of the soldier in question to his 
fellow soldiers who are present and beyond. However, taking an oath and the ensuing 
duty to abide by the rule of law and the tenets of the democratic constitution does not 
mean that the soldier is a mere passive instrument of state. Albeit a soldier surrenders a 
number of rights, he still left with some important civil rights. It is possible that 
individual soldiers do not agree with the political goals and/or the means used to 
achieve those - otherwise even legal - goals. Also it is possible that soldiers are not 
satisfied with the organization, equipment and standards of training, or moral practices 
within the military. In these cases, they are faced with a moral dilemma.24 They can 
escape only in one way, which is to resign from the military organization. The most 
proper way to do so would be after a formal protest against the policy or practices they 
do not agree with. That would provide ample opportunity for public debate about on the 
development that is protested.25 Otherwise a soldier has to fulfil his duty. The preceding 
argument refers to a situation in which the soldier reacts on a moral issue ex-ante. In the 
case of an ex-post moral issue, in which the soldier is confronted with immoral actions, 
the soldier is bound by the rule of law not to participate in illegal actions and should 
report these wrongdoings to his superiors.  
                                                          
22 (1982) (laatstelijk herzien op 12 juli 2012). Algemeen Militair Ambtenaren Reglement (AMAR). 
Ministerie van Defensie. Den Haag. Artikel 126. 
23 The formal text of the Dutch military oath is: ‘Ik zweer/beloof trouw aan de koningin, gehoorzaamheid 
aan de wetten en onderwerping aan de krijgstucht. Zo waarlijk helpe mij God almachtig/Dat beloof ik.’ (In 
translation that is: I swear/promise allegiance to the Queen, abidance by the laws and subordination to 
military discipline. So help me God almighty/ So I promise.) For those who have religious objections to 
swearing an oath invoking the help of the almighty an alternative text is available in which they make a 
solemn promise. 
24 Sherman, N. (2011). The untold war: inside the hearts, minds and souls of our soldiers. New York, W.W. 
Norton & company. P 22 and 41-48. 
25 However, there is a limit to this right. If the soldier - for example - does not protest the participation of 
the armed forces (of which he is a member) in a international conflict, he cannot refuse to be deployed. If 
he does and persists in his refusal he will be brought to trial and sentenced after which he will be 
discharged dishonourably. See also Walzer, M. (1977). Just and unjust wars. New York, Basic books. P 75. 
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7.3.6.   The idea of political primacy - and the duties and rights this entails - must be an 
integral part of the mental ‘make up’ of the military mind. In the Dutch context, this 
means that the notion of the democratic constitutional state and the values embedded in 
it, must be an integral part of the shared military moral standard.26 First of all, this 
entails bearing the responsibility inherent to the public office the soldier holds. 
Secondly, this involves paying respect to the law and his political and military superiors. 
The third implied moral standard is to maintain the discipline required to assure the 
effective and efficient operations of the military. Thus, the internally based military 
virtues responsibility, respect and discipline also have an external, institutional source, 
albeit that the latter has a different focus: effectiveness rather than excellence.27 The 
importance of a wider social and institutional frame of reference cannot be 
underestimated. This is illustrated in the frames of reference of German soldiers during 
WW II. In the ‘Third Reich’, a shared frame of reference was created in which the basic 
inequality of different groups of human beings and even dehumanizing certain groups, 
were accepted as normal. From this perspective wanton killing of those who were 
labelled as sub-human was not considered immoral by - at least a substantial part of - 
the German soldiers.28 Although constitutional democratic states are based upon the 
notions of freedom and equality and their armies are educated in this spirit, still some 
similar effects can be identified in many other armed conflicts.29 This underpins the 
importance of the military virtue of respect, actively supported by a democratic frame of 
reference. 
 
7.3.7.   The central values in this democratic frame of reference are freedom and 
equality.30 In the Dutch context, the value of cooperativeness and solidarity could be 
added. According to Rawls, equality entails that all men have equal political rights. 
Freedom entails amongst other’s freedom of conscience and freedom of speech. 
However, these rights also require that citizens display an appropriate sense of 
tolerance.31 However, these values are broadly formulated and can be interpreted in 
different ways. Van Baarda and Van Iersel argue that ‘peace’ is the fundamental value for 
the armed forces as the armed forces are an instrument of the state to protect the peace 
and peace allows the flourishing of freedom and equality.  According to them, the 
ensuing specific values for the armed forces should be justice (as a prerequisite for 
                                                          
26 Huntington, S. P. (1957). The soldier and the state. Cambridge (Massachusetts), Harvard University 
Press. P 10. 
27 MacIntyre, A. (2003). Whose justice? Which rationality? Notre Dame (Indiana), University Press. P 35-
41. 
28 Neitzel, S., Welzer, H. (2012). Soldaten:over vechten, doden en sterven (Soldaten, Protokolle vom 
Kämpfen, Töten und Sterben). Amsterdam, Ambo. P 16-31, 63-77, 375-402. See also: Goldhagen, D. J. 
(1996). Hitler's willing executioners; ordinary Germans and the holocaust. London, Abacus. P 391-406. 
29 In the Dutch colonial war of 1946-1947 the Indonesian nationalist resistance fighters were derisively 
called ‘peloppers’. The American soldier deployed to Vietnam in the seventies talked about ‘gooks’ when 
referring to their enemies of the Viet Cong and the north Vietnamese army. These derisive terms played a 
part in creating a context in which the enemy was often seen as sub-human and sometimes treated 
accordingly. 
30 Christman, J. (2002). Social and political philosophy. New York, Routledge. P 94-95. 
31 Rawls, J. (2006). Een theorie van rechtvaardigheid. (A theory of justice) Rotterdam, Lemniscaat. P 223 - 
238. 
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peace) and security (as a result of peace).32 Their approach aims at describing the 
outlines of an institutional ‘body of ethics’. These organisational ethics encompass 
security, human rights, communicative competences, international law, accountability, 
moral awareness and civil values: all very abstract principles largely based on a 
deontological approach. It is hard to match these generic abstract principles to specific 
military virtues. However, there is also an approach to purposive values, which is based 
upon the virtues. Starting from the same broad democratic principles of freedom and 
equality, Galston argues that responsible citizenship requires four kinds of civic virtues. 
These are: general civic virtues like courage, law-abidingness and loyalty; social civic 
virtues like independence and open-mindedness; economic civic virtues like work ethics 
and saving; political civic virtues like respecting the rights of others and the willingness 
to engage in the political discourse while displaying ‘public reasonableness’.33 These 
civic virtues do give the military virtues also a wider purposive connotation. From this 
perspective, responsibility does not only pertain to military tasks to fulfil, but also to 
uphold the political rights of freedom and equality. Competence is also a matter of civic 
work ethics; of a positive attitude towards the job to be done and demonstrating 
diligence in its performance. Comradeship could find its civil equivalent in solidarity. 
Respect for the rights of others gets a wider scope which adds to the importance of this 
military virtue and the same goes for the virtue of courage. Resilience could be 
interpreted as a special kind of work-ethics; to continue on the face of set-backs and ill 
luck. Discipline too gets a wider perspective based on the general civic virtue of law-
abidingness. Also the military virtue of intellect, practical wisdom, has a civic parallel in 
independence and open-mindedness. Thus, the purposive character of military praxis 
could be expressed by interpreting the military virtues as aggravations of civic virtues; 
an approach which adds further weight to the importance of the military virtues.  
 
Military institutions and external goods 
7.4.1.   The military institution as such also provides external goods that can be aspired 
at. From this perspective, the military institution serves as a means to other ends. In 
generic terms, these ends include money, power and status or any combination of those 
three.34 To acquire these, the employees must meet institutional standards, and these 
standards are not necessarily similar to the standards of excellence that are set and 
upheld in military practice. The first tangible institutional external good mentioned, is 
money. By participating in military practice - and therefore joining the armed forces - 
military personnel is entitled to a salary, but hardly any other financial benefits. The 
standard for paying soldiers is similar to those of other civil servants and entails no 
serious extension as the times of plunder as a substantive addition to their pay is long 
gone. On the other hand, when deployed abroad soldiers do get extra allowances, and 
these can be quite substantive. These allowances sometimes provide an incentive to 
volunteer for extra tours of duty abroad. However, this incentive becomes effective only 
once a soldier has experienced gaining an allowance. The surveys I consulted showed no 
proof that allowances, etc. are separate external goods for which young people desire to 
                                                          
32 Baarda, T. A., van,  Iersel, A.H.M., van (2002). Militaire ethiek, morele dilemma's van militairen in theorie 
en praktijk. Budel, Damon. P203-242. 
33 Galston, W. (1991). Liberal purposes: goods, virtues and duties in the liberal state. Cambridge, 
University Press. P 221-227. 
34 MacIntyre, A. (2007). After Virtue. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 190, 194 and MacIntyre, A. 
(2003). Whose justice? Which rationality? Notre Dame (Indiana), University Press. P 32-39. 
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join the military.  So money is hardly to be counted as a particular relevant external good 
provided by the military institution. Sometimes the opposite is the case.35  
7.4.2.   Status is another generic institutional external good. In the Netherlands status is 
primarily a matter of money, excellence and tradition. However, as I explained in the 
preceding paragraph money is hardly a source of military status. Nor seems tradition a 
source of external goods: the Netherlands have no living military tradition like, for 
example, the United Kingdom or France.36 Some traditional status could be derived from 
the connection of the armed forces with the monarchy, but this kind of status hardly 
seems appealing for the larger part of the Dutch military. So excellence seems the only 
serious means to acquire status. This kind of status can be expressed in admiration, 
honours, public praise, etc. The question is how to earn these. Recent deployments in 
Iraq and Afghanistan and the fine stories about the excellent performance of the Dutch 
troops there, as well as the price paid in soldiers killed and wounded, have greatly 
contributed to the increasing status of the Dutch armed forces: national as well as 
internationally.37 On the national level, this increased appreciation for armed forces and 
the excellent way in which they fulfil their duties. This increasing appreciation is also 
visible in the changed attitude towards the veterans of passed conflicts. The status of the 
veterans of the armed forces has substantially improved, as a result of both assertive 
actions by the veterans themselves and an increasing awareness of political 
responsibility. This improved status and recognition is visible in the presence of high 
standing politicians and other officials at veteran’s commemorations, the introduction of 
an official ‘veterans day’, the founding (and funding) of the independent Veterans 
Institute,  the proposed enactment of a ‘Veterans Law’ and the introduction of material 
benefits for veterans.38 Nonetheless, it seems doubtful whether soldiers join the military 
in order to gain a share in this institutional status: status-related desires hardly figure in 
the surveys on reasons for joining the armed forces. 
7.4.3.   The last of the generic external goods is power. As stated in paragraph 7.3.2., the 
institutional power of the military is primarily based on the credibility of the armed 
forces as the state instrument of war. This means that the armed forces must be well 
manned, well equipped and well trained. This is basically a matter of adequate budget. 
The amount of social power that the armed forces actually have, could be ascertained by 
measuring the military budget in relation to other sectors that are financed by the state. 
The budget of the Dutch armed forces is modest (a mere 1.2% of the national product, 
and further reductions are not be excluded). The modest budget reflects the modest 
nature of the public power which could be acquired by participating in military practice. 
                                                          
35 Hastings, M., Ed. (1987). The Oxford book of military anecdotes. Oxford, University Press. P 174:  “Not a 
soldier moved (during the siege of Savannah in 1779). Much mortified colonel Dillon began to upbraid 
them for cowardice. A sergeant-major stepped forward; ‘Had you not sir’ he protested, ‘held out a sum of 
money as a temptation your grenadiers would one and all have presented themselves ‘”. See also 
paragraph 6.3.7. 
36 Klinkert, W. (2008) Van Waterloo tot Uruzgan, de militaire identiteit van Nederland. Amsterdam, 
Vossiuspers, Universiteit van Amsterdam. 
37 In 2006 Elsevier magazine proclaimed the Dutch soldiers in Uruzgan (Afghanistan) to be the man of the 
year. (Vrijsen, E. (2006). Militairen Uruzgan Nederlander van het jaar. Elzevier magazine. Amsterdam, 
Elzevier. 61: 5.) 
38 (2012). Handelingen Eerste Kamer: het voorstel van wet tot vaststelling van regels omtrent de 
bijzondere zorgplicht voor veteranen (Veteranenwet) Eerste Kamer, December 19, 2011. Den Haag. A 
comprehensive survey of activities and developments regarding Dutch veterans can be found in the year 
reports of the Veterans Institute.( http://www.veteraneninstituut.nl/over-het-vi)  
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Within the Dutch context, this fact does not constitute any problem: it is a well-accepted 
fact of Dutch reality. Therefore, it seems justified to assume that sharing in the limited 
institutional power of the Dutch armed forces is not considered an attractive external 
good for most soldiers. 
 
7.4.4.   However, although institutional external goods seem weakly appreciated, on the 
personal level the appreciation of money, status and power may be different. An obvious 
candidate to qualify as an external good for the individual members of the armed forces 
- and related to money - is the relative job-security.39 As a soldier is a servant of the 
state, he is also entitled to the benefits that go with such a position. These benefits 
include job security, a guaranteed and steady income, medical care, adequate insurances 
and regulated working hours and holidays.40 Among the benefits are also opportunities 
for further education. However, to be eligible for special courses, further education and 
specific postings that require specific education and training, it often does not suffice to 
be merely a good soldier. Often formal and civilian qualifications are required. However, 
the military is a closed system which has to educate its own personnel and therefore, 
soldiers are stimulated and assisted in meeting these formal qualifications and get better 
education. From a wider perspective, the armed forces provide ample opportunity for 
further educations and personal development of all who serve. Further education also 
provides opportunities for promotion and the higher salary and status that go with it. 
Educational opportunities do qualify as a relevant external good for almost all who join 
the armed forces.  
 
7.4.5.   With the other external goods, power and status, a similar argument could be 
entered into. Although it is problematic to derive power and status from the - relative 
weak - institutional position of the Dutch armed forces in society, the individual soldier 
also can acquire these external goods within the military organization. From the 
individual perspective power and status can also be acquired by the position a soldier 
holds within the institution. This can be a matter of expertise or rank. Informal status 
and power are a matter of personality and special knowledge and/or skills. Formal 
status and power go with rank, and rank requires education and mostly ambition as 
well. On an institutional level, some individual qualities, which are of little or no 
importance in the operational practice, are highly valued in the higher echelons and the 
Ministry of Defence. This pertains to qualities like: having a good hand at writing and a 
good and expressive style; having a good eye for the political implications of actions, 
plans and policies; being a good negotiator in  interdepartmental or commercial 
consultations and having a scarce and expert knowledge in a relatively small but 
(politically) interesting field, etc.  Another difference that requires special capabilities 
and talents on an institutional level is that there are more stakeholders than those 
committed solely to the best of the military practice.  Beside military interests, there are 
also political and economic interests at stake. This can result in decisions which - from 
an operational perspective of the practice - are at most second-best and sometimes not 
even that. Sometimes decisions which affect military capabilities are taken nevertheless, 
                                                          
39 Rees Vellinga, N. v. (2006). Belangstellingsonderzoek 2005-2006, Een baan als militair. Afdeling 
Gedragswetenschappen. Den Haag, Ministerie van Defensie: 22. An average of 5 % of those who consider 
joining is interested in salary and 6% is interested in educational opportunities (P10) 
40 If these benefits cannot be met - e.g. during deployment - adequate compensation is provided. 
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in order to serve the interests of other stakeholders.41 This sometimes requires soldiers 
in institutional jobs to act against the (actual or perceived) needs of the practice. To be a 
good ‘player’ at the institutional level ‘game’ requires flexibility and a strong and 
primarily personal ambition.  However, successful institutional ‘players’ do gain status 
and power, and it is plausible that these gains qualify as external goods. Although the 
armed forces provide little or no opportunities to gain money, power and status at the 
institutional level, the armed forces do provide access to these external goods on an 
individual level.    
7.4.6.   The question then is to what extend soldiers all having the same opportunities to 
access these external goods. Some benefits like a salary, job security and educational 
opportunities come for all who join the armed forces. To increase these, is primarily a 
matter of personal capacities and ambition. At the individual level, the external goods of 
power and status mostly come with advanced positions within the military institution. 
Reaching those positions is a matter of both time and individual capacity and ambition, 
as the military has a closed personnel system. This means that soldiers of all ranks enter 
at junior level and are educated and trained for their primary jobs.42 Based on their 
educational credentials when they join, capabilities, diligence, further educational 
accomplishments and personal ambition they are advanced through the ranks: private 
soldiers can become non-commissioned officers and even get a commission. However, 
the majority of military personnel will stay in the category in which they entered the 
military. This fact, as well as the capacity of the organization  and the reality that the 
military requires physical and mental capabilities that are not easily met when older, 
results in a relatively high turnover of personnel in the lower ranks. The average Dutch 
soldier serves for a term of 7 years; NCO’s serve an average of 17 years, while officers - 
who often have a lifetime employment, which could run to a maximum of 40 years - 
remain in service for on average 24 years.43 This means that the external goods of 
individual (formal) status and power are primarily accessible for senior employees: 
officers and to a lesser extent, NCO’s.   
7.4.7.   Still there remains one issue that needs to be addressed, and that is the 
attractiveness of violence as such and the power one experiences in using violence. The 
question is whether this attraction is an internal good which finds its satisfaction in the 
activity that constitutes the practice. According to Achterhuis this kind of violence could 
be labelled as: a matter of the animal spirit of human beings; the fight for recognition 
amongst other human beings; and violence as the result of a ‘them’ and ‘us’ dichotomy.44 
Hooligans probably fit these qualifications. The other possibility is that wearing a 
uniform and carrying arms add to a sense of power in the agent’s mind, a mental state, 
which as an end could be achieved by means of being a member of the armed forces. 
                                                          
41 For example in procuring military equipment it is often required that Dutch industries are involved in 
the manufacturing, even when this is more expensive and sometimes even when Dutch industries seem to 
lack the appropriate know-how and technical skills. The first happened with the procurement of the 
Leopard tank (1979-1980), the latter practice was manifest in the procurement of the YPR armoured 
infantry fighting vehicles (1977-1989) and the Fennek armoured reconnaissance vehicles (2006-2008). 
42 Rare exceptions are made for civil specialists with relevant credits, like lawyers, accountants, general 
practitioners and such. 
43 Information to the author by the department of plans and  policy of the Chief Directorate Personnel 
(afdeling BO/HDP) of the Dutch MOD in an E-mail correspondence of may 22, 2012.  
44 Achterhuis, H. (2008). Met alle geweld. Rotterdam, Lemniscaat. P 43-54. See also Taylor, C. (2010). Een 
seculiere tijd (A secular age) Rotterdam, Lemniscaat. P 855-860. 
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From this perspective, this sense of power would qualify as an external good.45 The 
related manifestations of violence could be described as: a rational means to an 
appropriate end and morally justified violence, as the result of a tension between 
morality and politics.46 In the surveys on the motivation of soldiers to join the military, I 
did not find any reference to the attractiveness of using violence; neither as an internal 
good, satisfying a desire nor as an external good in which joining the military serves as a 
means to legitimately indulge in violence.47 This does not come as a surprise as 
admitting to such a personal fascination of violence is not only highly political incorrect, 
but it would almost certainly result in disqualifying the candidate as constituting a 
liability in the legitimate and proportionate use of violence. For the same reasons, the 
inhibitions to openly admit to this kind of fascination will probably remain in place once 
a candidate has joined the armed forces as a soldier. Therefore, as there is no direct 
evidence to qualify an inherent attraction to violence as an internal good, I will - for 
practical reasons - label the satisfaction felt in carrying arms as a part of the generic 
external good of power. This kind of external good is accessible for all soldiers, but 
especially for those who actually wield their arms, and this is a preponderant junior 
level activity.  
Military practice and institution 
7.5.1.   As I mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, MacIntyre discerns the practice and 
the institution. The practice is seen as autotelic activities: the enjoyment is found in the 
activity itself. The achievement gained through the practice is defined by standards of 
excellence inherent to the practice, a view which is supplemented with the notion of 
‘purposive practices’ in which the standards of excellence are also founded in the wider 
purpose of practices. Practices need institutions to provide organization and continuity. 
The institution allows for acquiring benefits, external goods, which are beyond the 
immediate activities that define the practice. The institution is a means to gain these 
other goods. This description runs parallel to the concepts of praxis versus poiesis which 
I introduced in chapter 2 and elaborated in chapter 3. Soeters uses the term ‘Janus’ 
culture to articulate the different perspectives of the practice (praxis) and the institution 
(poiesis) within the military. 48 This perspective sheds a new light on the figure in annex 
A to chapter 3. From this perspective, this figure could also be read as to what extent 
activities are dominated by,  on the one hand, the  internal goods and the virtues of the 
practice, the goods of excellence  and/or, on the other hand, the external goods and the 
wider purpose related to the practice as pursued by the institution, the goods of 
effectiveness. The figure also provides the possibility to visualize whether there is a 
close relation between the purpose and ideology of the institution on the one hand, and 
                                                          
45 The sense of power that I referred to, is basically a matter of a specific mental state that comes with 
being a member of the armed forces, wearing a uniform and carrying arms. This sense of power should 
not be mistaken for the actual power an individual possesses which is based on formal or informal 
authority and which enables him to get things done by others. 
46 Achterhuis, H. (2008). Met alle geweld. Rotterdam, Lemniscaat. P 43-54. 
47 Gelooven, R. M. W. v. (2009). Basisstudie Imago en Belangstelling. Afdeling Gedragswetenschappen. Den 
Haag, Ministerie van Defensie; van Rees Vellinga, N (2006). Belangstellingsonderzoek 2005-2006;  Een 
baan als militair. Afdeling Gedragswetenschappen. Den Haag, Ministerie van Defensie; Tuinier, A. (2005). 
Stand van zaken belangstelling voor een baan als BBT-er bij de Koninklijke Landmacht. Afdeling 
Gedragswetenschappen. Den Haag, Ministerie van Defensie. 
48 Richardson, R., Verweij, D., Vogelaar, A.,Kuipers, H., Ed. (2002). Mens en organisatie: de krijgsmacht in 
verandering. Alphen aan den Rijn, Haasbeek. P43-52. 
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the virtues and values of the practice on the other hand, or whether such a relationship 
(the gap between the wedges) is more distant.49  
7.5.2.   When investigating the nature of the relation between the military practice and 
the military, we must first take into account the context in which the Dutch military 
fulfils its purpose: Dutch society. The wider moral tradition of Dutch society as well as 
the relation to the practices is addressed in the next chapter. In this paragraph I will 
limit my investigation to the military practice and institution as compared with civil 
purposive practices and the related public and semi-public institutions. Over the last 
decade, these institutions were faced with a trend to reduce the size of the 
administration and to limit the amount of government involvement and control and to 
promote the establishment of independent agencies.50 This development was part of a 
bigger effort which aimed at improving the effectiveness and efficiency of public and 
semi-public organisations while reducing costs. However, it seems that after the initial 
success and enthusiasm over the benefits from this development, also feelings of 
discomfort have grown. These feeling were for a large part based on the - real or 
perceived - negative side-effects of the imposed changes.51 This pertains, for example, to 
public education, in which the practitioners, the teachers, are feeling underestimated 
and overruled by the institutional managers who are primarily focussed on reducing 
costs and increasing control, often under the supervision - if not with the endorsement - 
of the ministry of education.52 The perceived negligence of the educational standards of 
excellence is criticised, as well as the problematic nature of a primarily managerial ethos 
in education.53 These criticisms even lead to the foundation of an association for the 
improvement of education in the Netherlands.54 Also in the public health sector there is 
widespread discontent over the rules and regulation imposed on medical practice by the 
                                                          
49 See Annex A to this chapter. 
50 Kickert, W. J. M., Bestebreur, A., Hoekstra, A., In't Veld, R.j., Verhey, A.J.M. (1998). Aansturing van 
verzelfstandigde overheidsdiensten. Alphen aan den Rijn, Samson. 
51 Verhaeghe, P. (2012). Identiteit. Amsterdam, Bezige Bij. Sambeek, van, N., Tonkens, E., Broer, C. (2011). 
"Sluipend kwaliteitsverlies in de gezondheidszorg: professionals over de gevolgen van marktwerking." 
Beleid en Maatschappij 38(1): 47-64. Beer, de, P. "Hoezo zijn er te veel publieke diensten?" Socialisme en 
democratie 67(7/8): 142-149. Graaf, de, Th.; Hoeven, van der, D. A.; Langeberg, P.J. (1985). Omtrent 
Parlement, opstellen over parlement en democratisch bestuur. Amsterdam, Veen. Waarden, v., F. (2012). 
Was Privatisering van het Publieke Domein wel in het Publieke Belang? Een kritische beschouwing over 
het Nederlandse privatiseringsbeleid van de afgelopen decennia. Utrecht, Utrecht University College: 63. 
Geschreven i.o.v. de Parlementaire Onderzoekscommissie ‘Privatisering en Verzelfstandiging van 
Overheidsdiensten’, Eerste Kamer der Staten-Generaal. See also: Klamer, A. (2013). It's the society, stupid. 
Meer. Thieme, M. Ed. Utrecht, Jan van Arkel: 108-127. 
52 A critical article states that authorities require a lot from schools But when it comes to action these 
authorities are absent. Instead of assisting schools they launch new demands and plans.  Sikkes, R. (2012). 
"Waarom het steeds mis gaat bij roc's: zeven vragen." Het onderwijs blad 11(14 November). P17-19.  The 
association for public education (Vereniging van openbare en algemeen toegankelijke scholen) published 
an article in which it argues that in spite of all kind of plans, measures and directives the quality of Dutch 
education did not increase, while it improved in the surrounding countries. Boogaard, van der, M. (2012). 
"Onderwijskwaliteit al jaren in 'watertrappelstand' ". Retrieved January 27, 2013 from: 
http://www.vosabb.nl/onderwijskwaliteit-al-jaren-in-watertrappelstand/.  
53 Ibid, also the managerial ethos is criticized: managers have given professional education a bad name. 
Beuningen, van, T. (2010). Competentiegericht onderwijs is zondebok. De Volkskrant. Amsterdam. 
54 In 2006 an association was founded which aims at improving the standards of education in the 
Netherlands (de Vereniging Beter Onderwijs Nederland: BON) The association has approximately 4000 
members - which for a large part are educational professionals - and even more sympathizers. BON plays 
an important role in the public debate on education. (2012). "Beter Onderwijs Nederland." Retrieved 
December 27, 2012, from http://www.beteronderwijsnederland.nl/over-bon. 
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ministry of public health and the insurance companies; all to the underestimating and 
detriment of medical competence and necessity. Protests are raised by general 
practitioners, medical specialists and other employees active in medical care over 
developments, which show an increasing focus on costs and infringement on medical 
expertise and autonomy.55 Recently also judges protested the infringement on the 
quality of  the administration of justice by the emphasis on effectiveness and efficiency 
rather than excellence. More than 500 of the approximately 2500 judges in the 
Netherlands signed a manifesto to protest this development.56 They claimed that their 
judicial work is hampered by an emphasis on quantity rather than quality.57 This feeling 
of discomfort is added by recent publications on fraud and self-enrichment by high-
ranking managers in charge of administrating this kind of institutions.58 It is hard to 
define the causes of these kinds of derailments, but apparently, there is widening gap 
between practice and institution - praxis and poiesis - within certain, mainly public and 
semi-public, sectors of Dutch institutional fabric. These developments seem to be the 
result of an increased focus on institutional instrumentality and the ensuing institutional 
values and norms rather than the virtues of the practice. The paradox is that in order to 
enhance effectiveness and efficiency often more bureaucracy is introduced, which in 
addition often obstructs rather than facilitates the activities of the practitioners.59 In 
short, institutions do provide continuity and organisational support for practices, and 
they can add a wider purpose - including a wider moral perspective - to practices. 
However, institutions can also create restrictions for practices and affect the internal 
directedness of practices and the ensuing standards of excellence, eventually 
undermining the pleasure the practitioners find in their activities.  
7.5.3. The growth of institutional bureaucracy also took place within the Dutch MOD; a 
growth that finds its origin in wider financial and social developments, which seemingly 
contributes to a diminished operational focus. In 1994 a number of larger military units 
                                                          
55 Both general practitioners and medical specialist as well as others active in medical care, frequently 
protest developments which focus on costs and infringe on medical autonomy. See:  "vereniging 
Nederlands Huisartsen Genootschap." Retrieved December 27, 2012 from 
http://nhg.artsennet.nl/Home.htm; "Orde Medisch Specialisten." Retrieved December 27, 2012, from 
http://www.orde.nl/over-oms/nieuws; "Werknemers in de zorg." Retrieved December 27, 2012, from 
http://www.werknemersindezorg.nl/. Especially the latter organisation is very active and critically 
follows the developments regarding medical care.  
56 Haenen, M. (2012). Meer dan 500 rechters ondertekenen pamflet; we hebben het te druk. NRC. 
Rotterdam. 
57 (2012).  “Manifest”. Retrieved December 27, 2012, from 
http://www.rechtspraak.nl/Actualiteiten/Nieuws/Documents/Manifest.pdf. 
58 The college for applied sciences ‘In Holland’ dropped admission standards to recruit more pupils and 
dropped examination standards to improve the output. The college thus succeeded in presenting a high 
effectiveness and based on this fraud received more government subsidies. Rengers, M. (2011). 
Tentamenfraude op grote schaal bij In Holland. De Volkskrant. Amsterdam. Managers of other big 
educational institutes (Amarantis, Boor) were caught in open fraud and self-enrichment. de Pous, I. 
(2011). Zelfverrijking bij top scholenreus Amarantis. De Volkskrant. Amsterdam, and Rengers, M. (2012). 
Behalve fraude ook zelfverrijking bij Rotterdamse scholenkoepel BOOR. De Volkskrant. Amsterdam. Also 
in the medical sector there are numerous reports on mismanagement, frauds and self-enrichment. See: 
A.N.P. (2012). Zorgdirectrice cel in voor miljoenenfraude. De Volkskrant. Amsterdam. Redactie (2012). 
Onnodige dure technologie in ziekenhuizen door marktwerking. De Volkskrant. Amsterdam. A.N.P. 
(2012). Ziekenhuizen doen valse declaraties. De Volkskrant. Amsterdam.  
59 van den Brink, G., Jansen, T., Pessers, D., Ed. (2005). Beroepszeer: waarom Nederland niet werkt. 
Amsterdam, Boom. See also:   Verbrugge, A. (2004). Tijd van onbehagen. Amsterdam, Sun;  Dohmen, J. 
(2010). Brief aan een middelmatige man. Amsterdam, Ambo; Simon, C. (2011). En toen wisten we alles: 
een pleidooi voor oppervlakkigheid. Amsterdam, Ambo. 
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were also designated as ‘profit centres’ and these were to close management agreement 
with their superior level.60 These contracts specified the products the units were to 
deliver and the means they were allocated in order to be able to meet their end to the 
contract. However, in the end the means provided, including budgets, were largely 
virtual, which means that the limits that they were supposed to set were virtual as well 
and as a result the expected efficiency gains did not materialize.61 Therefore, in 2003 a 
new kind of governance was introduced in the armed forces. This method aimed at a 
separation of policy and implementation and introducing a customer-supplier 
relationship between operational commands and service centres. The changes were 
meant to create result-orientated processes, which would produce efficiency incentives 
and a reduction of bureaucracy. Although the need for strict financial control was readily 
accepted, the civilian method which was introduced resulted in a number of unforeseen 
bureaucratic side effects and a substantial administrative workload. This was 
substantiated in an evaluation report which was released in 2007.62 The report 
commented on faltering relations between the MOD concern staff and the operational 
commands, the absence of a clear link between defence planning  (with a horizon of 9 
years) and budgetary planning (with a horizon of 4 years), an excess of detailed  input 
instead of  control based on output and a gap between the ‘reality’ at the level of the 
MOD and ‘reality’ on the operational work floor. Bureaucracy did not decreased: the 
report mentions 310 conferences in which over 500 participants are involved for every 
fiscal year. In 2013 yet another report was published.63 This report - written by a 
consultant of the Ministry of Home Affairs - again comments on a lack of vision, little 
coherence and lengthy processes involving many consultations and a large amount of 
red tape. The recommendations include the need for a decisive intervention based on a 
clear vision in order to create a coherent governance and a substantive reduction of 
bureaucracy. A side effect was the introduction of a managerial vocabulary which 
seemed to suggest that a managerial approach was appropriate for the military, even for 
junior soldiers in primarily operational matters.64 A similar development was noticed in 
the UK: ‘No balanced assessment of the Ministry of Defence in the first decade of this 
millennium should ignore the slurry of management-speak that washes across the decks 
from time to time, and the many officials who have come to regard defence as the might 
a commercial organisation with the receivers in it.’65 Much earlier - in the ‘Vietnam era’- 
a civilian managerial approach was introduced in the US military under the secretary of 
defence Mr. McNamara. One of the results was that professional soldiers - especially 
officers - became entrepreneurs of their own career rather than leaders of men, which 
eventually resulted in a moral corruption of the practice.66 In the Dutch armed forces the 
consequences were a lot less dramatic, but in some regards the armed forces were seen 
as just another government agency and as a result primarily civilian oriented legislation 
                                                          
60 Reitsma, R. (1994). Beleidsvoornemens 1994 en 1995. Ministerie van Defensie. Den Haag, Koninklijke 
Landmacht. 
61 Heijnsdijk, J. (1999). "Resultaat Verantwoordelijke Eenheden: papier of werkelijkheid." Militaire 
Spectator 169(9) P 494-500. 
62 Kreemers, H. P. M., Homstra, E. (2007). Tussen machten en tegenkrachten: Rapport bestuurlijke 
evaluatie Defensie. Den Haag, Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties.: 25. 
63 Paul, H. en van der Steenhoven,  K. (2013). Quickscan bestuurlijke processen Defensie. Ministerie van 
Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties. Den Haag, BZK. 
64de Vries, P. H. (2002). "Vaktaal." Militaire Spectator 171(7/8). P 400. 
65 Holmes, R. (2011). Soldiers. London, Harpers Press. P 24. 
66 Gabriel, R. A., Savage, P.L. (1978). Crisis in command: mismanagement in the army. New York, Hill and 
Wang. 
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was introduced. For example, the use of the classical mess tins was forbidden because of 
the possible health risks. As a result a huge amount of plastic disposables is used every 
year, which produces a just as big a threat to the environment.67 Civilian norms on first 
aid and further medical treatment were introduced, with substantial consequences for 
the military medical system which is primarily geared for emergencies in very adverse 
conditions. Labour regulations were introduced limiting the number of hours a soldier 
can be employed on a job, the physical effort he is allowed to perform without 
appropriate supportive machinery, etc. Many of these developments are at best not well 
understood and at worst resented by those who consider the military primarily an 
operational organisation which has to fulfil its tasks no matter the circumstances.  
7.5.4.   The tension between a primarily operational focus and the primacy of 
institutional interests can also be found within the military population. This is because 
the armed forces use a closed personnel system. This implies that not all soldiers are at 
all times engaged at the sharp end of the military organisation, in the operational 
practice. Due to the inherent internal and upward mobility soldiers - especially officers 
and NCO’s - are also engaged in institutional activities, mostly in training facilities and 
the higher staffs and at the level of the MOD. The operational focus of their daily 
activities there is replaced by a primarily institutional involvement. Regular transfers 
from operational postings to staff positions and vice versa may assist these officers and 
NCO’s to keep in touch with their operational background, but this is not given for 
everyone. In the end, it is not to be avoided that during the course of their career, a 
number of senior officers and NCO’s do get more or less alienated from the operational 
practice in which they started as junior leaders.68 In these cases, the distinction between 
an operational focus and the ensuing goods of excellence and an institutional focus and 
the implied goods of effectiveness can grow into a gap.69 This gap refers to a situation in 
which the interests of the praxis and the related goods of excellence are - in perception 
or effectively and whether deliberately ore inadvertently - subordinated to the interests 
of the institution and its related goods of effectiveness. 
 
7.5.5.   Taking into account the developments described before I now take to the 
question how practice and the Dutch military institution relate to each other. Goods of 
excellence are those benefits which are found in participating in a practice and to do so 
in an excellent way. The aspiration to excel in those activities that are enjoyed comes 
natural to man.70 The aspiration to excel pertains both to the here and now and to meet 
the standards which are the result of: ‘the history of successive attempts to transcend 
the limitations of the best achievements in a particular area.’71 These historical 
standards as well the efforts that preceded the accomplishments are part of the 
                                                          
67 Ironically the armed forces’ policy intentions for 2001 announced the establishment of an 
environmental agency with 79 pax. Seijkens, A. H. M. (2000). Beleidsvoornemens 2001. M. v. Defensie. Den 
Haag, Koninklijke Landmacht: 67. 
68 Holmes, R. (2011). Soldiers. London, Harpers Press. P 24: ‘… some military officers, especially those 
‘Whitehall Warriors’ on a second or third tour of duty, become so wise in ‘the ways of the building’ that 
they sometimes forget that men and women in uniform are much more than ‘line serials’ on a 
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69 See annex A. 
70 Rawls, J. (2006). Een theorie van rechtvaardigheid (A theory of justice). Rotterdam, Lemniscaat. P 432. 
See also MacIntyre, A. (2003). Whose justice? Which rationality? Notre Dame (Indiana), University Press. 
P 31. 
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narrative that - together with other characteristics - define the practice. Over time, a 
body of maxims will develop, which characterizes the practice and the standards of 
excellence involved. However, how to apply these maxims is a matter of experience, 
practical wisdom, a capacity which cannot be specified by further rules. To acquire both 
the skills and the disposition to excel in a practice and to act in accordance with the 
maxims of a practice is a matter of apprenticeship. It is hard to conceive that everything 
the apprentice has to learn could be reduced to rules and regulations: the instruments of 
institutions. On the other hand, Institutions provide external goods or goods of 
effectiveness, which to some extend can also be acquired by participating in the 
practice.72 In that case, it is the result that counts, and not only the pleasure and 
satisfaction one find in merely participating in the practice. Sometimes difference 
between the goods of excellence and goods of effectiveness seems blurred. This, for 
example, is evident in professional sports, in which excellence is required to gain 
financial benefits and status that come with good results: winning the game. Winning is 
not only to the benefits of the practitioner but also in the interests of the institution. The 
question is whether it would be possible to promote excellence and thus winning by 
means of institutional external goods? 
 
7.5.6.   Although excellence can result in winning these are not the same. Excellence can 
result in winning and winning can lead to a reward in internal goods (satisfaction and 
pride) and external goods (honour, status, power, and even material benefits). However, 
these external rewards can also be objects of desire in themselves, independently from a 
desire for achieving excellence. To achieve these external rewards often requires the 
same kind of qualities that are required to achieve internal rewards. However, there are 
differences as well. When striving for excellence the practitioner imposes restraints on 
himself. The agent who wants to achieve excellence in accordance with the standards of 
excellence of the practice will do so in adherence to the appropriate maxims and not by 
foul play. Nevertheless, if he does play foul, the agent will be aware of that: otherwise, it 
would be an unintentional failure to abide by the standards of excellence. However, by 
wilfully ignoring the standards of excellence of the practice, he will primarily wrong 
himself rather than anybody else; at least, his self-esteem will be affected. Therefore his 
behaviour is primarily judged by himself. This does not mean that he will not repeat his 
offences: the external goods, the stakes, may be too high. In that case, the benefits to be 
gained will overrule the embarrassment over an offence against the standards of 
excellence.  However, if the agent is caught in the act of intentionally ignoring the 
standards of excellence and duping his opponent in order to win, the culprit will meet 
with contempt and derision. The agent who plays foul in pursuing the institutional 
goods of effectiveness (winning) deceives others rather than himself. Therefore, in this 
case, his conduct is primarily judged by others. In order to come to such a judgement the 
others refer to constraints that are expressed in formulas to define justice: rules. Rules 
that are either complied to or broken. In this context, compliance is not primarily a 
matter of virtue, but could well be the result of habit or fear of punishment. The 
difference between these approaches is best exemplified with the virtue of courage. A 
soldier cannot excel in war without the willingness to face danger, to run risks. This 
disposition to be willing to face danger and even to risk one’s life, this virtue of courage, 
is judged after the action; by the soldier himself and his fellow soldiers. For his courage, 
he is rewarded with honour. When it comes to awarding a decoration for valour, rules 
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are applied whether all the requirements are met. However, there are no rules which 
prescribe courage. The institution cannot lay out rules that spell out under which 
conditions supererogative action is required. To do so would destroy the notion of 
courage and would corrupt the conduct of soldiers. Similar arguments can be applied to 
the other virtues. 
 
7.5.7.   However, the display of desirable dispositions - like courage - could perhaps be 
stimulated; for example, by promising rewards in honours, promotion, other (material) 
benefits, etc.  A relatively innocent example of such an incentive was the distribution of 
‘a tot of rum’ in the British armed forces before a pending battle. A little less innocent is 
the intentional hunt for decorations.73 Money was also used as an incentive, albeit the 
tempting was not always successful.74 Promotion as an incentive is also used, but for 
obvious reasons, both the patron as well as the beneficiary mostly keeps silent about the 
arrangement. When incentives are part of an official scheme, rules are needed to ensure 
that the official incentives are used properly. This raises the familiar question on how to 
capture in words when and for what reasons incentives are distributed. But there is 
another argument that pleads against incentives. Instead of acting in accordance with 
his aspiration to excellence, the agent who is primarily motivated by incentives will act 
in a way that gets him the most benefits. His actions are based on a utilitarian computing 
rather than the result of aspiring at excellence in accordance with the virtues of 
character of the practice and made tangible by practical wisdom.75 The agent’s frame of 
reference becomes economic rather than moral.76 Therefore, the application of benefits 
to stimulate to promote adequate behaviour has some serious drawbacks.  
7.5.8.   From the above emerges a picture in which the institutional interests seem  best 
served by embracing the standards of excellence used in the practice and accepting that 
these are promoted by adhering to maxims rather than trying to promote excellence by 
institutional rules or incentives; or as Schwartz puts it: ‘by sticks and carrots.’77 Of 
course this does not mean that the institution can do without rules. Rules will remain a 
necessary instrument to regulate behaviour. Also they are sometimes used as an alibi to 
show the willingness and energy of institutions to address abuses and effectiveness is 
considered to be less important if not cynically irrelevant. However, the application of 
rules should be limited to those spheres in which their utility is obvious and 
effectiveness measurable. These spheres are, for example: judicious, rules of 
engagement, safety proceedings, technical manuals and regulations, the organisational 
economy, etc. On the other hand, in the sphere of moral reasoning actions should be 
governed by the virtues, rather than rules or incentives. The realization of a policy based 
on virtue ethics requires personnel that is educated and trained in developing the 
required dispositions. This will take time and a substantive effort and what is more, it 
will take trust! Trust in the eventual results, trust in the capabilities of soldiers and of 
those who lead them. However, soldiers mentally equipped along these lines will 
                                                          
73 Holmes, R. (1985). Acts of war. London, Wellington house. P 358: ‘Hunting for decorations is a menace. 
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74 Hastings, M., Ed. (1987). The Oxford book of military anecdotes. Oxford, University Press. P 174:  A 
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maintain and display their virtuous disposition in a wide variety of circumstances, also 
while pursuing the results the institution expects them to achieve. In this way the goods 
of excellence and the good of effectiveness could coincide to the benefit of both the 
practice and the institution. In the meantime, many nations try to achieve that goal of 
morally responsible soldiers by issuing a code of conduct. The Dutch armed forces also 
established and promulgated a code of conduct. The question then is to what extend a 
code of conduct achieves what it aims at: creating morally responsible soldiers. Only 
after this question has been answered, a comparison can be made whether a virtue-
ethical approach promises a better result. 
Code of conduct 
7.6.1.   In 2006, a number of incidents involving improper behaviour by members of the 
armed forces were published in several newspapers and TV programs. The media 
coverage suggested that such misdemeanours were rife in the armed forces. The ensuing 
political debate made the government decide to take action. In the best of Dutch 
traditions, a committee was founded (de commissie Staal) to advice the Minster of 
Defence on a policy on how to put an end to these kinds of incidents. In September 2006, 
the committee produced its report with a large number of recommendations.78 These 
recommendations included the need for explicit norms, and integrity was to be secured 
at all organizational levels, and a special and professional staff department was to be 
realized in order to provide a tangible foundation for a serious implementation of the 
recommendations. The deputy commander of the armed forces was appointed to chair 
the workgroup that would develop proposals on how to implement the 
recommendations of the Staal committee.  
 
7.6.2.   The workgroup first made an inventory of existing codes both in the military as 
well as in a number of large Dutch (international) companies. Based on this inventory 
the workgroup developed a tentative first concept. This concept was evaluated by 
approximately 1000 employees of the Ministry of Defence.79 This evaluation resulted in 
a second more substantial proposal. This proposal was also evaluated, and the feedback 
on this second proposal led to a definite proposal in March 2007. This proposal for a 
Code of Conduct for the Dutch armed forces was discussed at the highest levels within 
the Ministry of Defence, accepted by the minister, presented to parliament and 
implemented.80  
 
7.6.3.   The aforementioned development seems adequate but there is room for serious 
criticisms.81 Codes do not influence behavior because as those to whom it is addressed 
and who need it the most, will not adhere to it anyway, and the rest of the good people in 
the profession will not need it because they already know what they ought to do. From 
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this perspective, codes could undermine the responsibilities of employees and could be 
interpreted as accusatory, threatening, and demeaning. Moreover, codes are often 
viewed as mere window-dressing providing superficial and distracting answers to the 
question of how to promote ethical behavior in corporate life.82 Evaluations show a wide 
variety in the appreciation of codes: from counterproductive, little impact and not very 
effective to much needed, very effective and successful.83 The general criticism is that 
codes as such, being a set of formal prescriptive rules, do not automatically lead to 
tangible results. On the other hand, codes do increase moral awareness and provide a 
starting point for the further development of this awareness.84 Codes of conduct aim at 
creating an explicit yardstick for the conduct of the members of an organization and aim 
at assisting the members in (mutually) evaluating and improving their conduct. Also 
these codes are a tool for changing the conduct of those members who do not (yet) 
adhere to general or specific rules. However, a code as such will not necessarily result in 
establishing (organizational) appropriate conduct and changing (inappropriate and 
unwanted) conduct unbecoming. In order to be effective in directing moral conduct 
Birnbacher identified several criteria.85 First of all, rules and regulations should take 
into account that people are fallible in their capacity to translate abstract rules and 
regulations in specific conduct. Rules should be articulated in such a way that meets the 
situations in which agents have to act.86 In the second place, rules should be articulated 
in such a way that provides a sense of continuity  regarding already existent moral 
convictions. Rules must appeal to already familiar moral concepts.87  And last the rules 
should not be over exacting nor under taxing. In order to be effective, rules must provide 
a feasible challenge.88 The more ambitious the objectives of business 
codes, the less likely business codes will be considered to be effective.89 However, even if 
the rules meet these criteria, there will still be non-abiders that know perfectly well 
what is expected of them, and still they just do not do it. There has to be an additional 
effort to reach these non-abiding members of the organization and convince them to 
change their attitude and behaviour.90 The need for such additional measures was also 
recommended in the report by the Staal committee.  
 
7.6.4.   As one of the consequences of the Staal report, in 2010 a special integrity desk 
was established: ‘Centrale Organisatie Integriteit Defensie’ (COID) which is to monitor 
the policies on improving the integrity of the members of the armed forces and when 
necessary to propose improvements. Furthermore, COID is to advice and support line-
management, to conduct risk-assessments and to investigate (serious) integrity 
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breeches. In addition, a regulation regarding complaints on misdemeanours was 
issued.91 A network of some 650 ‘local confidential agents’ within the units was 
developed and a reporting system was established in order to monitor developments. 
COID reports every year on trends and developments.92 In short, several institutional 
efforts are undertaken to improve and maintain the moral consciousness of Dutch 
soldiers. The question is whether these efforts are successful.  
 
7.6.5.   Although the reporting system does not yet cover all incidents, the reports do 
show a decline in the number of contacts with confidential agents and complaints.93 This 
refers to both institutional breaches and social integrity.94 The issues which are most 
frequently reported pertain to aspects of social integrity and in particular intimidation 
and badgering. The accused are mostly NCO’s and civil employees of the Ministry of 
Defence.95 Nevertheless, in a practical sense, it seems that integrity is improving. It is 
hard to draw a conclusion as to the causes of this improvement, but it seems that the 
increased attention for morally appropriate behaviour pays off.  However, the role of the 
code of conduct in achieving this result seems limited. In 2007, a survey was conducted 
regarding the introduction of the code of conduct. It showed that almost two third of the 
Defence population were to some extend familiar with the code. However, a mere 50% 
of the soldiers and civil employees appreciated the code as a useful instrument. A change 
in this attitude was primarily brought about by the efforts of the direct superiors.96 In 
2009, a second survey was conducted. This time 75% of the participants acknowledged 
being familiar with the code; a substantial increase compared with the 2007 survey. 
However, the thematic knowledge of the issues addressed in the code had declined. Still, 
a majority of the soldiers appreciated the code as relevant; also an increase in support! 
Even then, still 60%  do not perceive any change in the overall conduct of soldiers and 
civil employees of the MOD.97 Another researcher concluded that the code does not 
contribute effectively in preventing unbecoming behaviour. He advocates a code that 
uses an ethical approach more in line with the frames of reference of those for whom the 
code is meant: soldiers.98 This opinion is shared by the head of COID, who stated that 
reports showed that it is found difficult to broach the issues addressed in the code of 
conduct. This seems to be due to the relatively abstract nature of the code and - partly 
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consequently - the lack of a clear link with what soldiers do. As a result he attributed to 
the code an only limited practical impact.99 It could well be that the limited impact of the 
code is also due to the fact that it addresses only a part of the issues which soldiers 
consider relevant.100 Altogether, it seems that the improvements on integrity are mainly 
because of the efforts of officers and NCO’s: the leaders of soldiers. The code of conduct 
in its present form seems to have an only limited value and lacks a practical connection 
with the soldier’s day-to-day activities, especially operational activities.101 
 
7.6.6.   This lack of a practical connection with what soldiers do, becomes obvious when 
we take the proceedings of the workgroup which developed the present code into 
account. The working party used a highly instrumental approach. Primarily, it was felt, 
there was a need for practicable tools to address manifest problems. The consequent 
want of a more conceptual approach also explains the strange mixture of deontological, 
duty-ethical, utilitarian and consequentialist elements of the code of conduct.102 
Paragraph 1 and 4 stress the importance of autonomy and equality and these notions 
are an important feature of deontological normative ethical theories. In paragraph 2 the 
issue of subordination of private interests to general utility is stressed: a utilitarian 
concept. In paragraph 3 and 5 the need for safety and effectiveness is elaborated: an 
appeal to consequentialism. The instrumental and institutional character of the code of 
conduct becomes clear further when it is realized that it could easily be transferred to 
any kind of organization. It provides only general norms and has no direct connection to 
the military; it could as well be a corporate code. Generally a professional code of 
conduct is based on the practice it refers to: it establishes what is valuable in a practice 
and what the specific responsibilities are of the (autonomous) professionals who engage 
in this practice. The present code lacks such a foundation. Furthermore those tenets in 
the code that are of a military nature, aim primarily at the conduct in peacetime. This 
probably is because the code aims at addressing all employees of the MOD, both military 
and civilian. Apparently, for this reason operational considerations are almost 
completely lacking. This is even stranger, as it is the very special operational conditions 
in which the military has to perform its task that create the need for a specific kind of 
morally appropriate conduct. All in all the code refers to goods of effectiveness, rather 
than goods of excellence. Consequently, it is not surprising that the present code has no 
clear relation with military practice and its standards of excellence and morals.103 
Obvious notions like courage, comradeship, and resilience as traditional features of 
proper military conduct are not mentioned. On the contrary, values pertaining to safe 
working-conditions that are included in the present code are easily understood as 
contradicting with the military tradition of accepting risks. Mileham observes a similar 
partition in the UK, which he defines as the difference between military institutional 
ethics and operational ethics. The former deals with: ‘The need for military persons to 
accept the spirit beyond legislation and regulation of such matters as anti-discrimination 
norms, equal opportunities, health and safety and employment laws, as well as 
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adherence to criminal law, particularly on such matters as drug and alcohol misuse.’ The 
latter includes virtues like discipline, respect for others, courage and commitment.104 
    
7.6.7. Altogether the Dutch MOD succeeded in implementing a system for improving the 
overall moral awareness of its personnel, both military and civilian. The MOD also 
succeeded in articulating a code of conduct valid for all the services. However, this code 
lacks a comprehensive theoretical framework and as a result, it shows a remarkable 
patchwork of theoretical influences and practical considerations. The code misses 
intrinsic coherence. Another limitation of the present code is that it provides a very 
general and relatively abstract framework and does not address the primarily 
operational nature of the armed forces and the ensuing need for a shared moral 
standard that fits with traditional military values. Also references to any military virtues 
are entirely missing. It appears to be difficult to make the present abstract and generic 
code palpable in practical activities. It seems there still is room for considerable 
improvement.  
 
International comparison 
7.7.1.   However, there are more nations that have developed and issued military codes 
of    conduct. It is worthwhile to compare these with the Dutch code as this comparison 
could add an extra dimension to the assessment of the present Dutch code. In order to 
enhance the relevance of the comparison, the sample involves only those constitutional 
democracies, which sustain close cooperation with the Dutch military: France, the 
Federate Republic Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States.  France and 
Germany have issued a generic, defence wide code, while the UK and the US use different 
codes for the services. The complete results are presented in Annex C to this chapter. 
The main results are discussed in the next paragraphs.  
 
7.7.2.   In the military codes of conduct of the four nations investigated a total of 18 
different concepts were used, which resulted in a wide variety of combinations. Only 
two concepts are shared by all nations: competence and respect! Furthermore, there is 
wide international support (3 out of 4 nations) for three concepts: courage, loyalty and 
discipline. Four more are also supported (by 2 out of 4 nations): commitment, 
comradeship, honour, and integrity. The remaining 9 other concepts were used by only 
one nation.  When we compare this outcome with the official Dutch military code of 
conduct, only the concepts of professional competence, integrity and respect are 
acknowledged in the international average. The remaining concepts of responsibility, 
team spirit, and safety find little or no international support. 
 
7.7.3.   Another issue that attracts attention is that all nations have a code that 
encompasses both references to the practice as well as to institutional interests of the 
military.  However, in spite of this, in the majority of the texts the overall terminology is 
clearly inspired by virtue ethics and also the elaborations often clearly aim at the 
virtues.105 Furthermore, all other international codes refer explicitly to the operational 
practice in which soldiers are active: a context the Dutch code lacks. In interpreting the 
different codes one must bear in mind that the concepts which are used by the different 
nations can be attributed a more extensive meaning - which may even include concepts 
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which are not mentioned otherwise. Responsibility is often related to the need to be 
physical fit and an accomplished expert; integrity is often interpreted as responsibility; 
while loyalty is often connected with comradeship. When compared with the military 
virtues I identified in this thesis the concurrence with internationally accepted concepts 
seems better. Of the seven virtues I identified, four find strong international support: 
competence, respect, courage, and discipline. Comradeship is also widely supported, 
while only two, responsibility and resilience, seem weakly supported. However, as I 
stated before the internationally used concepts in some respects are interpreted in a 
wider and sometimes even a different way106. When these differences are taken into 
account, the overall support of the virtue-ethical framework is stronger than the 
arithmetical average shows. Al in all, the similarities between the alternative virtue-
ethical framework and other international codes predominate, which could have 
practical value in a better common consent in international military cooperation. 
 
7.7.3.   In the context of an international comparison the question is justified to what 
extent the interpretation of concepts is influenced by cultural bias. In his book, Hofstede 
provides the means to get some insight in the possible answers to this question.107 He 
distinguishes four dimensions by which differences between national cultures can be 
measured. These are: power distance (PDI) relating to social inequality, including the 
relationship with authority; individualism (IDV) referring to the relationship - loose or 
tight - between the individual and the wider communities; concepts of masculinity 
(MAS) as the social implication of being born as a boy or a girl; uncertainty avoidance 
(UAI) pertaining to ways of dealing with uncertainty, including the control of aggression 
and the expression of emotion.108 As to the first index of power distance the scores of the 
50 nations included in the survey range from 104 (Malaysia) to 11 (Austria). France has 
a score of 68, while the USA, the Netherlands, the UK and the FRG have scores between 
40 and 35: relatively close together and relatively low on the scale of PDI.  The main 
feature of a low score is the generic notion of equality between man and the legitimacy 
of power.109 The next index on individualism runs from a high score of 91 (USA), 89 
(UK), 80 (the Netherlands), 71 (France) and 67 (FRG) to a low of 6 (Guatemala). All the 
countries of comparison score relatively high on individualism.110  The main features of 
the IND index pertain to self-reliance, identity as based in the individual, self-respect and 
tasks prevailing over relationships.111 The third index on masculinity shows a different 
picture. The scores run from a high score of 95 (Japan) to a low of 5 (Sweden). The UK 
and the FRG both score 66 while the USA scores 62: all fairly close together. Then comes 
France with a score of 43, while the Netherlands score a mere 14. The MAS index 
features masculinity by assertiveness, ambition and toughness and sympathy for the 
strong. The opposite refers to modesty, relations, care, and sympathy for the weak.112 
The last index on uncertainty avoidance shows less diverging scores. In the scores - 
which run from a high of 112 (Greece) to a low of 8 (Singapore) - only France scores 
relatively high (86). The other nations involved score relatively low: the FRG (65), the 
Netherlands (53), the USA (46) and the UK (35). The relevant notions of a low UAI score 
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include the acceptance of uncertainty and differences as well as a low need for rules 
combined with internationalism and a believe in human rights.113 This (very concise) 
excerpt shows that the nations involved in this comparison have largely similar cultural 
outlooks. This means also that the frames of reference from which the respective codes 
of conduct are derived include similar values. These facts give extra credence to the 
relevance of the outcomes of the international comparison. This observation adds 
weight to the conclusion in the preceding paragraph that the virtue-ethical framework I 
developed could contribute to the international common consent, which in its turn could 
improve international military cooperation.  
Conclusions 
7.8.1.   There can be no doubt that the military encompasses both a practice and an 
institution. Furthermore, it is clear that the military is a purposive practice; to defend 
the interests of the Dutch constitutional state. This means that the values which are 
embedded in the Dutch constitution should be part of the standards upheld by the 
practice. This obligation is captured in the oath all Dutch soldiers take on entering the 
institution of the armed forces. The institution provides - beside continuity and stability 
for the practice - the means to acquire external goods: money, status and power. At the 
institutional level, these external goods provide little attractiveness. However, at the 
individual level, these external goods provide interesting incentives, including: job 
security, educational development and opportunities for promotion resulting in an 
increase in salary and internal power and status. In a number of practices, including the 
military, there is an increasing emphasis on the institutional goods of effectiveness, 
which results in introducing regulations and norms alien to the practice and its 
standards of excellence. In the military this development can - at least partly - be 
explained by the fact the that the armed forces have a closed personnel system, with the 
result that senior members are generally less in touch with the practice and more 
involved in institutional issues and the ensuing goods of effectiveness.  
 
7.8.2.   In order to safeguard standards of excellence and to prevent a possible slipping of 
moral standards in the armed forces a code of conduct was introduced in the Dutch 
armed forces. However, this code was inspired primarily by institutional values rather 
than virtues pertaining to the practice. The operational context, which determines the 
nature of the practice, is mentioned only implicitly.  And although it appears that the 
overall integrity of the personnel of the MOD has improved, the impact of the code of 
conduct is appreciated as limited. It seems that the code has little appeal and fails to 
convey practical relevance. An international comparison shows little support for the 
official Dutch official code as well. A framework of ethics based on military virtues of 
character and practical wisdom could overcome at least a number of the deficiencies I 
identified. It would create a tangible link with the (operational) reality soldiers 
experience while serving. As a result, it would be easier to incorporate the code in 
education, training and exercise, which could increase the internal support for the code 
as well. As the alternative framework is based on virtues, which are founded on an 
internal disposition to act in accordance with the standards of excellence, the overall 
technical and moral  quality of the soldiers - and as a result the armed forces in general - 
could increase. The survey among civil servant indicated that they also consider the 
military virtues relevant to their professional activities. Furthermore, it would be 
relatively easy to create a similar tangible link between the military virtues and 
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corresponding civic virtues, which would enhance an appropriate wider frame of 
reference for both civil employees of the MOD and members of the armed forces. 
Furthermore, it would be relatively easy to create a similar tangible link between the 
military virtues and corresponding civic virtues, which would enhance an appropriate 
wider frame of reference. From this perspective, a virtuous soldier would probably be a 
virtuous citizen as well. A code based on virtues would also find more international 
support. However, imbuing these dispositions requires time and the realization of a 
policy geared to that purpose. But also such a body of military virtues must have support 
in the wider Dutch society. MacIntyre argues that any adequate conception of the good 
will requires the perspective not only of practices and of the unity of a human life, but 
also of traditions. Tradition constitutes the person‘s moral starting point.114 This issue is 
the subject of the next chapter. 
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Annex A to chapter 7: job characteristics. 
     Activity A: preponderant characteristics of a practice 
Activity B: characteristics a balance of both practice and poèsis 
Activity C: preponderant characteristics of poièsis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Category   X: junior soldiers preponderantly active in operational activities (praxis) 
 
Category Y: senior soldiers (mostly NCO’s and officers) preponderantly active in 
institutional staff activities (poiesis) 
 
Feature     Z:  the gap between praxis with a primarily operational focus and poièsis with 
a primarily institutional focus  
 
 
                            
          
 
               
 
 
Praxis 
Poièsis 
A B C 
Y 
X 
Z 
170 
Annex B to chapter 7: Dutch military code of conduct. 
 
Abridged English version of the Dutch military code of conduct 
 
1. I am part of a professional organization. 
I maintain my professional knowledge and skills, technically as well as socially,  on 
the acquired level. Therefore can I perform my tasks well, even under adverse 
circumstances. 
 
2. I am a member of a team with a common job. 
I am working together with my colleagues and I am also responsible for them and 
the team. I confront others with their conduct and I accept that others confront me 
with mine.  
 
3. I am aware of my responsibility. 
I do not harm the interests of the defence department and I will be exemplary in my 
attitude, demeanour and conduct. I will use defence equipment in a responsible way 
and will use these carefully and legitimately.  
 
4. I am a person of integrity and I treat everybody with respect. 
I do not accept unwanted behaviour like discrimination, (sexual) intimidation and 
harassment. I will abide by the law and regulations en will not abuse my power nor 
position.  
 
5. I will look after safe working conditions. 
I feel responsible for the safety of others and myself. This pertains to all kinds of 
safety, like operational security, information security, and safe working conditions. I 
do not use drugs. Alcohol may never impair my performance. 
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Complete Dutch version of the military code of conduct 
 
Defensie staat voor vrede en veiligheid, in eigen land en daarbuiten. Wij leveren een 
bijdrage aan stabiliteit en vrijheid in de wereld en dienen daarmee de samenleving. 
Defensie is snel en flexibel inzetbaar en kan overal ter wereld optreden, ook onder de 
zwaarste omstandigheden. In nauwe samenwerking met anderen en gesterkt door een 
rotsvast vertrouwen in elkaar. Defensie wil een betrouwbare werkgever zijn. 
Defensiepersoneel is goed opgeleid en getraind, uitgerust met modern materieel. De 
militair kan indien nodig verantwoord omgaan met geweld. In het uiterste geval met 
gevaar voor eigen leven. Dat is Defensie.  
  
Deze kernboodschap is voor het personeel vertaald in een defensiebrede gedragscode 
die uitgaat van de eigen verantwoordelijkheid en staat voor professioneel gedrag, 
fatsoenlijke omgangsvormen en goede samenwerking. De code is een onderlinge 
afspraak en is gebaseerd op vijf pijlers:  
   
1. Ik maak deel uit van een professionele organisatie.  
Ik houd mijn kennis en vaardigheden, zowel vakinhoudelijk als sociaal, op het vereiste 
peil. Daardoor kan ik, ook onder moeilijke omstandigheden, mijn taken goed uitvoeren. 
  
Toelichting: Wij vinden het normaal dat we in ons dagelijks werk voldoende 
verantwoordelijkheden en bevoegdheden krijgen. Wij willen dat ook. Wij zijn immers 
volwassen en professioneel met ons werk bezig. Onze verantwoordelijkheden gaan 
verder dan onze directe taken. Defensie schept de randvoorwaarden voor een 
professionele, veilige en plezierige werk- en leefomgeving. Maar we zijn zelf 
verantwoordelijk voor het op peil houden van onze kennis, vaardigheden en fysieke 
conditie. We houden rekening met de mensen om ons heen en zijn steeds bereid 
rekenschap te geven over gemaakte keuzes. We nemen de regels in acht zonder ons 
erachter te verschuilen. 
   
2. Ik ben lid van een team met een gemeenschappelijke taak.  
Ik werk samen met collega’s en ben mede verantwoordelijk voor hen en het team. Ik 
spreek anderen aan op hun gedrag en accepteer dat anderen mij op mijn gedrag 
aanspreken.  
  
Toelichting: Wij maken deel uit van een team met één taak of doelstelling, gebaseerd op 
wederzijds vertrouwen. Dat betekent dat we geregeld onze eigen belangen 
ondergeschikt maken aan de belangen van het team. Binnen het team hebben we 
allemaal een eigen taak. Toch zijn we niet alleen verantwoordelijk voor ons eigen 
gedrag, we dragen medeverantwoordelijkheid voor wat de anderen in ons team doen. 
Het beste resultaat behalen we alleen als we elkaar scherp houden en als we elkaar 
durven coachen en durven aanspreken op de kwaliteit van het werk en op ons gedrag. 
Leidinggevenden in onze organisatie hebben een bijzondere verantwoordelijkheid. Zij 
geven te allen tijde het goede voorbeeld. Zij durven de leiding ook daadwerkelijk te 
nemen. Tegelijkertijd geven zij teamleden ruimte voor inbreng. 
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3. Ik ben mij bewust van mijn verantwoordelijkheid.  
Ik schaad de belangen van Defensie niet en geef in houding, voorkomen en  gedrag het 
goede voorbeeld. Ik ga verantwoord om met defensiemiddelen en  gebruik deze 
zorgvuldig en rechtmatig.  
  
Toelichting: Wij staan voor vrede en veiligheid en dat brengt specifieke 
verantwoordelijkheden met zich mee. Negatieve gedragingen van de individuele 
defensiemedewerker hebben, meer nog dan bij andere organisaties, een negatieve 
uitstraling op de overige medewerkers en op de Defensie als geheel. Wij realiseren ons 
dat we voor de buitenwereld 24 uur per dag, 7 dagen per week defensiemedewerker 
zijn. Wij gaan verantwoord om met gemeenschapsgeld.  
  
4. Ik ben integer en behandel iedereen met respect.  
Ik accepteer geen ongewenst gedrag zoals discriminatie, (seksuele) intimidatie en 
pesten, niet ten aanzien van mijzelf of anderen. Ik houd mij aan de geldende wetten en 
regels en misbruik mijn macht of positie niet.  
   
Toelichting: Wij zijn eerlijk, oprecht, betrouwbaar en zorgvuldig. We maken deel uit van 
een organisatie die veiligheid creëert. We accepteren dat we daarbij fysiek gevaar 
kunnen lopen. Dat kan alleen vanuit een sociaal veilige werkomgeving. We versterken 
het team door ons te realiseren dat we niet allemaal hetzelfde zijn maar wel 
gelijkwaardig. We behandelen anderen met respect zoals wij ook met respect behandeld 
willen worden.  
   
5. Ik zorg voor een veilige werkomgeving.  
Ik voel mij verantwoordelijk voor de veiligheid van anderen en mijzelf. Dit geldt voor 
alle vormen van veiligheid, zoals operationele veiligheid, informatieveiligheid en veilige 
arbeidsomstandigheden. Ik laat mij niet in met drugs. Alcohol mag nooit invloed hebben 
op mijn functioneren.  
  
Toelichting: We werken met wapens en met zwaar materieel. We oefenen bij nacht en 
ontij. We treden bij ernstoperaties klokrond op onder fysiek en mentaal zware 
omstandigheden. We kunnen dat alleen maar succesvol doen als we oog hebben voor de 
veiligheid van anderen en onszelf. Daarin passen geen drugs. Gebruik en bezit van of 
handel in drugs zijn dan ook verboden. Ook alcohol kan onze veiligheid in gevaar 
brengen. Het gebruik van alcohol tijdens operaties, oefeningen en dienst uitoefening is 
daarom niet toegestaan tenzij na uitdrukkelijke toestemming van de bevoegd 
commandant.  
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Annex C to chapter 7: international comparison of military codes of conduct 
 Armed forces Navy Army Air force  
France115 
 
Competence 
Discipline 
Honour 
Obedience 
Resilience 
Respect 
Responsibility 
   
Germany116 
 
Comradeship 
Competence 
Courage 
Democracy  
Discipline 
Loyalty 
Moral 
judgment 
Respect 
   
United 
kingdom117 
 
 Commitment 
Courage 
Discipline 
Integrity 
Loyalty  
Respect118 
 
Commitment 
Competence  
Comradeship 
Courage 
Discipline 
Integrity 
Loyalty 
Respect119 
 
 
Commitment 
Competence 
Courage 
Discipline 
Honesty 
Integrity 
Justice 
Loyalty 
Pride  
Respect 
Responsibility120 
United states 
 
 
Commitment 
Competence  
Courage 
Honour 
Integrity 
Loyalty 
Respect 
Responsibility
121 
Courage  
Duty 
Honour 
Integrity  
Loyalty  
Respect  
Selfless 
service122  
Commitment 
Decisiveness 
Energy 
Loyalty 
Integrity 
Selflessness123 
 
 
                                                          
115 (2005). Décret n° 2005-796 du 15 juillet 2005 relatif à la discipline générale militaire. Le Président de 
la République. Paris. 
116 (2009). Lebenskundlicher Unterricht. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. Bonn. (2008). Innere 
Führung. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. Bonn. 
117 The UK also has a Civil Service Code which applies also to civil servants in the UK MOD. Its core values 
are: integrity, honesty, objectivity and impartiality. (2010). Civil Service Code. Civil Service Commission. 
London. 
118 (2007). Naval service core values. Head Quarters Royal Navy. Portsmouth. 
119 (2008). Values and Standards of the British Army. Head Quarters Land Forces. Andover. 
120 (2007). Ethos, Core Values and Standards of the Royal Air Force. Head Quarters Royal Air Force. 
Gloucester. 
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Analysis  
For the sake of clarity, the notions are listed in an alphabetical order, although in some 
national documents there is a clear ordering and sometimes subordination of concepts. 
The first thing that can be noted is that not every nation has succeeded in establishing a 
joint code of conduct. In this sample, the UK and the US still maintain separate codes for 
the respective services, although many similarities can be noted. In the international 
comparison, the UK and US notions will be counted for one each as the notion in 
question is noted by at least two of the three services of the country in question. This 
leads to the following chart 
 
 France Germany United 
Kingdom 
United  States Total 
Commitment   + + 2 
Competence + + + + 4 
Comradeship  + +  2 
Courage   + + + 3 
Decisiveness    + 1 
Democracy   +   1 
Discipline  + + +  3 
Energy    + 1 
Fairness     1 
Honour +   + 2 
Integrity   + + 2 
Justice   +  1 
Loyalty  + + + 3 
Moral 
judgment 
 +   1 
Obedience +    1 
Respect + + + + 4 
Responsibility +    1 
Resilience   +  1 
 
The first thing that attracts attention is that there are only two notions which are shared 
by all nations: competence and respect! There is wide international support (3 out of 4 
nations) for three notions: courage, loyalty, and discipline. Four more are also supported 
(by 2 out of 4 nations): commitment, comradeship, honour, and integrity. The other 9 
notions find only little international support. This low rate of international conformity is 
not surprising when we take the different codes into accounts. The German approach 
emphasizes the idea of the soldier as a citizen in uniform who is to defend the ensuing 
values of the democracy. France emphasizes the role of the soldier as a servant of the 
state, albeit a special kind of servant. The US pictures the soldier as a paragon of the 
citizen fulfilling his duty to the nation. The approach by the UK services is steeped in 
their respective traditions. These different approaches lead to different kind of codes. In 
one aspect all codes are similar: they all include both institutional values as well as 
values and virtues directly related to military practice.   
                                                                                                                                                                                     
121 (2008). Core Values Charter. Department of the Navy. Washington 
122 (2010). Army: profession of arms. Center for the army professional and ethic. Fort Leavenworth. 
123 (1985). To the men and women of the Air Force. Department of the Air Force. Washington. 
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However, when we make this comparison, we must bear in mind that the notions that 
are used in the different national codes are part of a national culture and are therefore 
interpreted in different ways.124 For example, commitment (in the UK army) and loyalty 
are often used in reference to being loyal to your fellow soldiers and the team the soldier 
is a part of. Integrity is often used in terms of accomplishing those things that a soldier is 
responsible for. Responsibility is a number of times used in explaining the duty a soldier 
as to be fit and competent. However, I refrained from any interpretation and merely 
present the notions as used in the different codes. But even then, the chart gives some 
idea of the differences and similarities between the different national military codes of 
conduct.  
When we look at the Dutch official military code of conduct, we can conclude that of the 
six notions only two are also acknowledged in the international average; professional 
competence and respect. Integrity too is internationally supported, albeit to a lesser 
extent; whereas responsibility, team spirit and safety find little or no international 
support.  
When we compare the alternative framework of military virtues as identified in this 
thesis a more positive comparison emerges. Of the seven virtues, four find strong 
international support: competence, respect, courage, and discipline. Comradeship is also 
widely supported, while only two, responsibility and resilience, are weakly supported. 
However, also in this respect one must bear in mind that the concepts used sometimes 
have different meanings. 
 
 
 
                                                          
124 Hofstede, G. (2003). Cultures and organizations. London, Profile books. P 3-19. 
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Chapter 8: moral tradition and the military  
 Introduction 
8.1.   In his theory, MacIntyre discerns three layers in the logical development from the 
concept of the virtues. These layers are: first a background account of the practice; 
second an account of the narrative order of a single human life and third an account of 
what constitutes a moral tradition.  Each later stage presupposes the earlier, but not vice 
versa.1 However, he acknowledges that eventually each layer is both modified and 
reinterpreted in the light of the other layers.2 In the preceding chapters, I addressed the 
concept of the virtues, practice and narrative and how to interpret and apply these 
notions in a military context. In order to provide a complete answer to my research 
question to what extent MacIntyre’s theory provides a suitable instrument to identify, 
develop, instil and uphold the required moral standards in the military, I will address in 
this chapter the third layer which in Alasdair MacIntyre’s theory pertains to the moral 
tradition and how this relates to the military practice and its virtues. I will first focus on 
Alasdair MacIntyre’s position regarding tradition. From this perspective, I will then have 
a look at the way this relationship is shaped in the Dutch context. I will analyze to what 
extent this tradition relates to military virtues and practice. I will refer to the virtues of 
military practice and verify whether these virtues are reflected in Dutch moral tradition. 
After that, I will investigate the formal relationship between the military as an 
institution and wider civil society and how it is shaped; which kind of contract is used. 
 
Moral traditions according to Alasdair MacIntyre 
8.2.1   MacIntyre argues that: ‘the past is never something to be discarded, but that the 
present is intelligible only as a commentary upon and response to the past in which the 
past, if necessary and if possible, is corrected and transcended, yet corrected and 
transcended in a way that leaves the present open to being in turn corrected and 
transcended by some yet more adequate point of view. ’3 This past is substantiated in 
the present in the form of tradition. MacIntyre defines a moral tradition as: ‘… a 
historically extended socially embodied argument, and an argument precisely in part 
about the goods which constitute that tradition.’4 Thus, in his view tradition is 
something completely different from the general idea in which tradition is seen as an in 
time coagulated set of opinions and rules. Living traditions do make progress, but in an 
evolutionary, cumulative way, rather than in a process of complete overthrow of a set of 
ideas and the introduction of a complete new set. Even if radical new ideas emerge it is 
hard to envisage how these can be developed without earlier ideas, even if these new 
ideas aim at overthrowing present notions. MacIntyre states that a tradition …’will have 
some contingent historical starting point’5. From that contingent starting point it will 
develop further. He discerns three stages in this development. In the first phase, a set of 
beliefs, texts and authorities is established and adopted as relevant, if not more. 
Eventually, the tradition provides its adherents with an attitude which allows them to 
encounter radically different and incompatible positions, which are part of other moral 
traditions. However, these encounters and arguments that ensue may well affect the 
                                                          
1 MacIntyre, A. (2007). After Virtue. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 186-187. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid, P 146. 
4 Ibid, P 222. 
5 MacIntyre, A. (1990). Three rival versions of moral inquiry. Notre Dame (Indiana), University Press. P 
116. 
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beliefs and authority which are part of their own tradition. As a result - in the second 
phase - the established truths of the own tradition are questioned, and inadequacies of 
various types are identified. In the third phase, the response to the inadequacies 
identified results in reformulations, re-evaluations and new formulations designed to 
remedy the inadequacies and to overcome limitations.6 This renewed tradition stays in 
place until new criticisms come forward. A tradition - in MacIntyre’s view - is a socially 
embodied argument extended through time.7 
 
8.2.2.   In moral traditions the argument centres characteristically on the question how 
to sustain and improve a practice and the goods involved: ‘… the pursuit of which gives a 
tradition its point and purpose.’8 Living traditions involve practices in which the tenets 
of the tradition are embodied; and the standards of excellence of a practice find their 
anchorage in the virtues.  The extent to which the virtues relevant to the practice are 
exercised, determines whether a tradition remains living or gets corrupted.9 A lack of 
virtues like responsibility, respect and courage corrupts both the practice as well as the 
institution, which derives their existence from the traditions of which they are the 
temporary embodiment.10 Living traditions on the other hand, are not-yet-completed 
narratives that continue and confront their future and adapt themselves to changing 
circumstances and needs of the practitioners.11 Within the practices that are part of 
these living traditions the relevant standards of excellence are aspired at; the maxims of 
which are articulated in the virtues. In short, in MacIntyre’s view a tradition always 
involves practices of which virtues are an integral part. 
 
8.2.3.   MacIntyre’s view on traditions as not-yet-completed narratives corresponds with 
his conviction that narrative is an essential part in constructing human life, and this 
narrative does not start from nothing. The narrative of one’s life cannot be seen without 
the social setting and the constraints and opportunities this involves.12  We are ‘thrown’ 
into a community with its own peculiarities and its own history and its own idea of the 
good which is to be pursued. This context, this past, in which we start and live our lives, 
constitutes also a moral starting point.13 MacIntyre articulates this pointedly: ‘Without 
those moral peculiarities to begin from, there would never be anywhere to begin…’14  
 
8.2.4.   The last issue which MacIntyre addresses is language. Every tradition is 
embodied in some particular set of utterances and actions, and is therefore part of a 
unique culture with its own language.15 Some of the notions about the language used in a 
specific cultural tradition are not translatable because the concept has a specific 
meaning even to the extent that there is no equivalent in another language. To 
understand these alien concepts requires submerging in that specific tradition rather 
                                                          
6 MacIntyre, A. (2003). Whose justice? Which rationality? Notre Dame (Indiana), University Press. P 326-
327, 350 - 355. See also MacIntyre, A. (1990). Three rival versions of moral inquiry. Notre Dame (Indiana), 
University Press. P 116. 
7 MacIntyre, A. (2007). After Virtue. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P222. 
8 ibid. 
9 Ibid, P 222, 223. 
10 Ibid, P 223. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid, P 215. 
13 Ibid, P 220. 
14 Ibid, P 221. 
15 MacIntyre, A. (2003). Whose justice? Which rationality? Notre Dame (Indiana), University Press. P 371. 
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than in a dictionary.16 This means that there are certain limits in understanding specific 
traditions in all its aspects. This is at odds with the intuition of modern cosmopolitism 
that all cultural phenomena can be translated into the language in which the adherents 
of modernity speak to each other.17 However, in some aspects incommensurability of 
languages also implies that one should be very careful to transfer the language from one 
tradition into another. It would be unwise to assume that the language of the western 
economic tradition would be adequate to introduce and explain the benefits from the 
law of demand and supply in - for example - an Asian non-profit organisation geared to 
the proliferation of women rights.  
 
8.2.5.   MacIntyre’s concept of a tradition as a dynamic scheme sounds plausible.18 The 
notion of progress as a sometimes discontinuous and abrupt process is accepted by 
many and found its way in many theories, like: shifting attractor patterns; mutual 
causality; dialectical change; flux and transformation metaphor; etc.19 Also the 
observation that some practices flourish and others wither does not seem controversial, 
as is the idea that this process is in a large part the result of vigorous support by the 
practitioners or the lack of it. However, it is hard to pronounce a verdict on the 
flourishing or corruption of a tradition during the process. Often these evaluations are 
formulated after the event. Furthermore, the idea that we need some kind of prior 
orientation before we can argue about moral issues has the support of many as well. 
Taylor uses the very apt metaphor of  a moral map. The way we use a map to orient 
ourselves in a physical surroundings is similar to how we orient ourselves in a moral 
sense. In order to orient ourselves on a map - either physical or moral - we have to know 
where we are both, in reality, as well as on the map. When we aim to travel, we need 
some kind of orientation: the map and a compass provide this orientation. The map 
provides information on our location and the wider surroundings; the compass provides 
a way to establish the general direction  where we want to travel.20 In short, MacIntyre’s 
notions do not seem to divert from generally accepted arguments.  A number of these 
issues was were addressed in preceding chapters of this thesis as well. The only issue 
that may need some elaboration pertains to language and its limitations in conveying 
meaning between different traditions.  
 
Language 
8.3.1.   At first sight, it is difficult to see how language could constitute a barrier (or a 
bridge)  between the wider Dutch society and its national military. After all, the 
members of these entities are all Dutch. Although this is a correct observation, it is not 
complete. All Dutch soldiers are also Dutch citizens, but not every Dutch citizen is (or 
has been) a soldier. Therefore, reciprocal understanding is not a matter of course, even 
if they use the same terminology. However, the terminology often differs. This is for a 
large part due to the widely used military jargon, for a large part made up of 
abbreviations.21  However, these difficulties can be overcome by refraining from the use 
                                                          
16 Ibid, P372. 
17 Ibid, P 327, 328. 
18 See also: van Tongeren, P. (2012). Leven is een kunst. Zoetermeer, Klement. P 79-80, 140. 
19 Morgan, G. (2006). Images of organizations. London, Sage publications ltd. P 241 - 290. 
20 Taylor, C. (2007). Bronnen van het zelf. (Sources of the self) Rotterdam, Lemniscaat. P 86-88. 
21 An interesting example of the misunderstanding as a result of jargon is found in Millar, S. (2003). The 
language of war. The Guardian. London, Guardian Newspapers Limited. 
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of jargon. The real difficulties arise from the use of similar notions by both citizens and 
soldier but with a different meaning for each of the groups; a kind of homonyms. 
8.3.2.   I do not aim at presenting a comprehensive analysis based on a theory in the field 
of philosophy of language, but a short sidestep into semantics could illuminate my point.  
Frege uses the terminology of sense (‘Sinn’) and reference (‘Bedeutung’).22 He argued 
that expressions have two semantic aspects: a sense and a reference. The former notion 
pertains to the mode of presentation, the concepts used as an expression. The latter 
notion is the object or situation in reality, which is referred to.23 This approach enables 
to understand where misunderstandings occur.  For example, both citizens and soldiers 
use in their common language the word comradeship.  This word expresses a kind of 
intimate relationship between fellow human beings: this is the sense of the word that is 
shared by both citizens and soldiers. The reference, however, is radically different for 
citizens and soldiers. For most of the citizens, comradeship is a kind of synonym of 
friendship in general with a generic positive connotation, and that is it. For soldiers, on 
the other hand, comradeship pertains to a very special en strong bond shaped under 
duress, hardship and even danger. The value that is attached to this concept differs 
substantially: for the citizen, the term is more or less an abstraction and for the soldier, 
the term refers to a very real experience. The same argument can be used for concepts 
like resilience, discipline and courage. Misunderstanding occurs less if the concepts have 
a more similar reference, like with responsibility, competence and respect. 
8.3.3.   The question is then, how to overcome these difficulties and prevent 
misunderstandings? In this context, MacIntyre identifies two problems. First, it is 
possible that the some key notions of a community are strongly incompatible with those 
of  another community.24 For the military this does not seem to be the case. As the 
military is a purposive practice which serves the ends of the wider community, it is hard 
to imagine that in a democratic constitutional state, the key notions of the military do 
not reflect those of the wider community. The second problem MacIntyre identifies is 
the ‘translation’ of concepts. He argues that in order to maintain the identity of a 
practice, it is important to accept that certain notions are indeed, to some extent, 
untranslatable.25 For example, a military unit is responsible for achieving a designated 
result. From this perspective, some think that a military unit is comparable with a store 
which is part of a large commercial chain. The question is whether both can be denoted 
as ‘profit centres’.26 However, this does not mean that one should not try to explain the 
different content of a similar notion, but at the same time, it should be accepted that a 
different emotional connotation remains. This requires not only a lot of explanation, but 
also good will, if not empathy, by both communities involved. To support and sustain 
this kind of differences and their acceptance requires a special kind of relation between 
                                                          
22 Carnap uses the similar notions of intension and extension. He asserts that two sentences have the same 
extension if they are equivalent, i.e., if they are both true or both false regarding the subject they refer to. 
On the other hand, two sentences have the same intension if they are logically equivalent, i.e., their 
equivalence is due to the semantic rules of the language. Thus a citizen and a soldier talking about 
comradeship may have the same intension, but their extension differs. Carnap, R. (1988). Meaning and 
necessity: a study in semantics and modal logic. Chicago, University of Chicago Press. 
23 Textor, M., Ed. (2011). Frege on sense and reference. Routledge philosophy guidebooks. Cambridge, 
Routledge. P 149-154. 
24 MacIntyre, A. (2003). Whose justice? Which rationality? Notre Dame (Indiana), University Press. P 379. 
25 Ibid, P 379-388. 
26 Which is what happened in the 1994 MOD policy paper in which large units were defined as ‘Resultaat 
Verantwoordelijke Eenheden’ which means profit centre. 
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the nation and its citizens and the practices and those who participate in these practices. 
Especially in the case of the military practice and  its soldiers, this special relationship is 
important, as the military’s purpose is to protect the nation. Therefore, this special 
relationship should be reflected in the formal bonds between the military and the nation 
it serves.  
 
Interpreting Dutch moral tradition.  
8.4.1.   However, a question still remains that needs to be answered, and that is, how to 
analyse and describe the relationship between the military virtues, the military practice 
and (Dutch) moral tradition. In MacIntyre’s view virtues, practice and moral tradition 
are intertwined and influence each other in an iterative process. In order to provide a 
complete answer to my research question I cannot ignore the issue of moral tradition, in 
particular, Dutch moral tradition. On the other hand, there are some serious difficulties 
in addressing this issue.  First of all, Dutch moral tradition is a complex subject on which 
already many books have been written. Because of this complexity, other problems arise 
as well. The subject can be approached from many different angles and perspectives, 
which makes it very hard to provide a complete picture. Furthermore, the subject is 
sensitive to ideological bias, which adds to the difficulty - if not the impossibility - of 
providing a complete and - for everybody - satisfactory picture.  In short, how to 
approach this charged issue?  
 
8.4.2.    MacIntyre states that the concept of a virtue can only be understood from a 
historical multilayered perspective. These layers are practice, narrative and moral 
tradition. I will continue my argument by following MacIntyre’s argument that each later 
stage presupposes the earlier, but not vice versa.27 I already addressed the relationship 
between the virtues and the practice and between the virtues and narrative. In the next 
paragraphs I will investigate the relationship between the virtues and the moral 
tradition. After analyzing  the tenets of Dutch moral tradition, I will refer to the virtues of 
military character. In this reference, I will approach the nature of this relationship 
starting  from the virtues and not vice versa. This means that I will refer to the virtues of 
military practice and verify whether these virtues are reflected in Dutch moral tradition.  
 
8.4.3.   As the ‘contingent starting point’ of my investigation I  will use the Dutch war of 
independence against the feudal Spanish oppressors (1568 - 1648): the genesis of the 
present Dutch state. At the end of this war, the internationally accepted independent 
Dutch Republic was founded. Independence and liberty  and equality are long standing 
values in Dutch moral tradition.28 Religious freedom was one of the main issues over 
which the eighty-year war was fought. Not surprisingly religious tolerance and pluralism 
are a historical  characteristic of Dutch moral tradition.29 In the Dutch golden age, 
religious tolerance and mercantile developments found a match that was beneficiary to 
both.30 Especially the tenets of Calvinism - then  the majority creed in the Netherlands - 
played an important part in this development.31 In this age, the dichotomy of the 
                                                          
27 MacIntyre, A. (2007). After Virtue. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 186 - 187. 
28 Pleij, H. (2010). Cultuurgeschiedenis van Nederland. NRC Academie. Rotterdam, NRC. CD1 hoofdstuk 1 
en 2. 
29 von der Dunk, H. W. (1992). Sprekend over identiteit en geschiedenis. Amsterdam, Prometheus. P 54-
55. See also, Huijsen, C. (2013). Nederland en Oranje, 'rebels with a cause'. De Volkkrant. Amsterdam 
30 Schama, S. (1987). The embarrassment of richness. London, Fontana Press. 
31 Weber, M. (2002). The protestant ethic and the 'spirit' of capitalism. London, Penguin books. P106-109 
and 112-116 
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minister and the merchant was introduced, which still permeates present Dutch society. 
Based on the teachings of Calvin, the Dutch also tried to shape their worldly affairs in 
accordance with the covenant with God.  They sought to create an enduring society 
based on voluntarism, consent and the equality of men before their creator.32  
 
8.4.4.   The geographical situation of the Netherlands at the mouth of a large delta had its 
implications as well. Firstly,  being situated in a large delta, lead to the development of a 
large number of ‘independent’ administrative entities: towns, counties, provinces, 
polders, etc. In these circumstances, governing was primarily a matter of consulting, 
negotiating and compromise.33 The Dutch state and its culture is to a large extend based 
on the history of decentralized organisation.34 Dutch communities are largely 
independent: they can establish their own rates for communal taxation, the mayor is 
responsible for law and order, and the community council decides on the organisation of 
the public space.35 Second, being situated in a river delta implies a constant struggle 
against water; either from the sea or from the rivers. This struggle requires cooperation 
and mutual assistance, as an individual would be powerless against the watery forces of 
nature.36 The necessity of cooperation furthermore contributed to instil the traits of 
flexibility and compromise in the Dutch character.37 In the third place, the Netherlands 
have always been a mercantile nation. Due to its position in a large delta between large 
Anglo-Saxon, French and German powers, the Netherlands became a perfect trading 
partner and transit post.38 Its mercantile interest combined with its smallness also 
required political flexibility and a liberal attitude toward others. These liberal standards 
made the Netherlands also a haven for all those who were religiously or politically 
prosecuted elsewhere, and both the Dutch Republic as its citizens benefitted from the 
influx of (mostly well-educated) foreigners.39 Over time, religious tolerance was 
extended to political tolerance, which found its confirmation in the 1848 revision of the 
constitution and in consequence, the step by step introduction of general franchise, 
which was achieved in 1917.  
 
8.4.5.   From this description of the formative period of Dutch moral tradition emerges a 
picture of several values, traits and dispositions that seems to dominate early Dutch 
moral tradition. These dominant notions are: independence, liberty and equality, 
flexibility, tolerance and pluralism,  striving for cooperation based on consulting, 
consent and compromise. The question is whether these originally dominant notions are 
still a part of modern Dutch moral tradition.  
                                                          
32 Allen, B. (2005). Tocqueville, covenant and the democratic revolution. Lanham, Lexington books. P 14-
19. 
33 Wessels, M. (1998). De Nederlandse traditie van vrijheid. Assen, Van Gorcum. P 9-14. 
34 Ibid, P 47 - 61. See also: Dooren, v., R, (2000). Traditie en transformatie: politiek en staatsinrichting in 
Nederland. Amsterdam, Instituut voor publiek en politiek.  P13-19; and Pleij, H. (2010). 
Cultuurgeschiedenis van Nederland. NRC Academie. Rotterdam, NRC. CD3 hoofdstuk 9. 
35 (1992). Gemeentewet. BWBR0005416. Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties. Den 
Haag, Ministerie van Justitie. 
36 Pleij, H. (2010). Cultuurgeschiedenis van Nederland. NRC Academie. Rotterdam, NRC. CD2 hoofdstuk 5. 
37 de Nijs, T., Beukers, E., Ed. (2003). Geschiedenis van Holland, deel III a:van 1795 tot 2000. Hilversum, 
Verloren. P156-161. 
38 Wessels, M. (1998). De Nederlandse traditie van vrijheid. Assen, Van Gorcum. P 93-101. 
39 Schama, S. (1987). The embarrassment of richness. London, Fontana Press. P 590 - 596. See also: 
Wessels, M. (1998). De Nederlandse traditie van vrijheid. Assen, Van Gorcum. P 80-84. 
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8.4.6.   In order to answer this question, I will again refer to Hofstede and his analysis of 
national cultures.40 Hofstede uses four different dimensions in interpreting national 
cultures. This is the degree of inequality within a society measured on a scale on low or 
high-power distance, the degree of individualism within a society measured on a scale 
between collectivism and individualism, the role of gender measured on a scale between 
masculinity and femininity and last the tolerance of ambiguity measured on a scale of 
high or low uncertainty avoidance. Hofstede investigated 53 nations, including the 
Netherlands. His analysis refers to differences among the institutions like, family, school 
and the community and differences in organisations, the workplace and in relation to 
the state.41 It turned out that mostly the analysis of both institutions and organisations 
produced similar results. Hofstede presents a large-scale investigation and powerful 
analysis of a highly complex subject. A concise description of his results regarding the 
four different dimensions of culture is inserted in the following paragraphs (8.4.7. - 
8.4.10.). 
8.4.7.   Power distance is defined as the extent to which the less powerful members of 
institutions expect and accept that power is distributed unequally. On the scale of power 
distance, the Netherlands are on the 40th place of the 53 nations investigated, which 
indicates a low power distance. This means that people see and treat each other as 
equals regardless of differences in power, status and wealth. It implies also a 
consultative style of decision-making. Hierarchy in organisations is seen as to pertain to 
inequality of roles established for convenience; hierarchy is not a matter of class or 
birth. Decentralisation is popular. The use of power should be legitimate and the use of 
violence in politics is rare.42  
8.4.8.   Individualism - as opposed to collectivism - pertains to societies in which the ties 
between individuals are loose: everyone is free to make his or her own choices and is 
expected to look after him- or herself. On the individualism index, the Netherlands 
occupies the 5th place, which indicates a high score on individualism. This means that 
identity is understood to be based in the individual. People speak their mind and expect 
to be treated as individuals; one is expected to have a private opinion. Tasks prevail over 
relationships. Individual responsibility is expected, and self-actualisation by every 
individual is seen as an ultimate goal.43  
8.4.9.   Differences in gender refer to the extent in which gender roles are clearly distinct. 
In masculine societies these roles are clearly distinct with typical role attributions, while 
in feminine societies, gender roles are less distinct and even overlapping. In the 
masculinity index, the Netherlands is 51st out of 53 nations, which indicates a feminine 
society in which the gender differences are small. This implies that everybody is 
supposed to be modest. It means also an emphasis on equality, a strong willingness to 
cooperate, striving for consensus while violence is rejected as a means to solve conflicts. 
The latter is also visible in  
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 state policy in which a large proportion of the state budget is spent on development and 
international assistance and a relatively small part on defence and armament.44  
 
8.4.10.   The last dimension pertains to tolerance for ambiguity; to what extent do the 
members of a society feel threatened by uncertainties or unknown situations. With this 
index, the Netherland has the 35th position out of 53 nations. This position indicates a 
relative high tolerance which means that uncertainty is accepted as a fact of life. People 
feel comfortable in ambiguous situations and unfamiliar risks. Tolerance is expected and 
there should be no more rules than strictly necessary. Esteem by others and a sense of 
belonging are important factors in the motivation of agents. Some of these 
characteristics are also found in policies, which focus on internationalism and a belief in 
human rights.45 
8.4.11.   The overall picture that emerges on the tradition of Dutch society includes the 
following conclusions and observations. First, it seems that the modern ideal of equality 
and the related notions of tolerance and room for self-realisation are very much in line 
with early Dutch tradition. The same applies for  the willingness to cooperate, the notion 
that task prevails over relationship,  a consultative style of decision-making and striving 
for consensus and compromise. It seems justified to conclude that Dutch moral tradition 
has remained relatively stable, albeit its manifestation in day-to-day life will have 
changed since the founding days of the Dutch state. According to MacIntyre, the moral 
tradition should reflect the virtues of the practices which constitute that tradition. This 
means that the virtues of military character  should also fit with this tradition. 
Moral tradition and military virtues 
8.5.1.   MacIntyre states that the concept of a  virtue: ‘always requires for its application 
the acceptance for some prior account of certain features of social and moral life in 
terms of which to has to be defined and explained.’46 The description of Dutch moral 
tradition, in the preceding paragraph 8.4., provides such a prior account of features of 
social and moral terms. In paragraph 7.3., I argued that the military as a purposive 
practice should embrace the moral standards of the constitutional democracy which it 
serves. The above description of the main features of Dutch moral tradition is in line 
with the concept of responsible citizenship that Galston introduces. 47 Galston argues 
that responsible citizenship requires civic virtues.48  In the same paragraph 7.3., I argue 
that military virtues could be seen as a particular expression of civic virtues. As the 
tenets of Dutch moral tradition do not run counter to the concept of responsible 
citizenship, the conclusion is warranted that the concept of military virtues is indeed 
supported by the acceptance of certain features of  social and moral life. This means that 
from the perspective of Dutch moral tradition, there are no restraints on the application 
of those military virtues which I discerned in chapter 4: sense of responsibility, 
competence, comradeship, respect, courage,  resilience and discipline. According to 
MacIntyre this also means also that the exercise of the military virtues sustains the 
wider moral tradition which in turn provides the necessary historical background which 
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makes the practice and the life of those involved intelligible.49 It is worthwhile to 
investigate to what extent tradition and the concept of military practice in which the 
military virtues are displayed are indeed mutually supportive. 
 
Moral tradition and the military, an institutional perspective 
8.6.1.   In this paragraph I will address the relationship between the practice and moral 
tradition. As I explained in chapter 7, military practice is a purposive practice which 
cannot exist without an institution that provides legitimacy and continuity to the 
practice. From this perspective, the military is necessarily also - and for many  primarily 
- an institutional entity. The moral tradition as a ‘historically extended, socially 
embodied argument, precisely in part about the goods which constitute that tradition’ is 
embodied in society, which is made up of practices and institutions.50  Of these 
institutions, the state is the most encompassing. The state plays an important role in 
maintaining and supporting moral tradition by establishing  and promulgating rules and 
regulations regarding the goods and values that constitute the tradition.  Therefore, I 
will address the issue of the relationship between moral tradition and the military from 
these institutional perspectives.  To what extent are the state and the military ‘essential 
constituents’ of each other?51 
 
8.6.2.   In the Dutch context, the relation between the people, the government and the 
armed forces during the last two centuries has mostly been somewhat problematic. As a 
small nation - which depends on trade and commerce as its primary means of existence - 
war and armed conflict were seen as a political liability rather than an asset. From the 
founding of the Dutch kingdom in 1813, the foreign policy aimed at avoiding getting 
involved in international conflict. The Netherlands succeeded in staying neutral in many 
European conflicts, including WW I. This prolonged period of peace resulted in a ‘non-
military’ attitude.52 The system of conscription added to the overall lack of popular 
support for its armed forces. Nevertheless, sometimes serious efforts were undertaken 
to improve on the Dutch defensive effort, but these seldom achieved their goals. The 
general attitude was one of disinterest in the armed forces and parsimony in military 
spending. It was a shock when in 1940, the Netherlands policy of neutrality failed and 
the Dutch territory was attacked and occupied by the military forces of the German 
Third Reich. The Dutch army was defeated after a campaign that lasted only one week. 
In 1942, the Dutch colony of Indonesia was attacked and occupied by the Japanese, 
which got the Netherlands involved in the war in the Pacific as well. 
 
8.6.2.   Immediately after the war, the armed forces enjoyed a short-term on popularity. 
However, after some time, this popularity faded. The Dutch had other things on their 
minds: rebuilding their severely damaged country. And albeit the political alliance with  
NATO and Europe lead to an initial  increase in the defence budget, the relation between 
the nation and the armed forces remained a distant one. Van Doorn argues that the 
Dutch armed forces are a respected institution and its aim - defence against aggression - 
is well respected too. However, the consequence that violence could be used is rejected. 
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53  In Dutch tradition, violence is not a means to solve problems.54 Thus the military and 
war are disconnected. The armed forces are transformed into an abstract entity en thus 
made - partly- invisible. Van Doorn makes the comparison with the appreciation of 
marriage and sex in the Victorian era. Marriage then was a social accepted and 
appreciated institution, but the issue of sex was under a taboo. Van Doorn observes a 
similar - troubled - relation between the armed forces and violence.55 The distance 
between the armed forces and the nation increased in the wake of the effort of 
conscripts to ameliorate their national service, and the political support their efforts 
had. In the course of the post-war developments, political support for a conscript army 
dwindled further and in 1997, conscription was formally suspended, effectively cutting 
the only practical bond between the Dutch population and its armed forces. The Dutch 
military became an all-volunteer force.  However, the record of the first units of the new 
all-professional army was seriously blemished by the events in Srebrenica and its 
aftermath, adding to the already low esteem of the armed forces.  
8.6.3.   The deployment of Dutch troops to Iraq and afterwards to Afghanistan and their 
performance there, including the losses they suffered, lead to a serious re-orientation in 
Dutch society. The respect and esteem for the members of the armed forces increased 
considerably.56  However, this did not mean that the Dutch came to love their armed 
services. The Dutch self-image, which was established over a long history, remained; 
based on tolerance, freedom and right over might; leaving little room for military 
elements.57 In spite of recent operational deployments, the Dutch in general still lacks 
awareness of the implications of the use of force and misses knowledge of military 
action; they have no idea of the dynamics of international military operations.58 In 
parliament too, this perfunctory expertise and alienation of the armed forces is 
demonstrated.  Domestic political considerations seem more important than the 
inherent purpose of the armed forces. But not only in parliament,  in the media as well, 
repeatedly vehement discussions took place whether  the mission in Uruzgan was a 
fighting mission or a development mission; a distinction which was completely 
meaningless for many of the soldiers who were deployed in Uruzgan.59 A similar debate 
took place in 2011 in relation to the subsequent deployment of a police-training mission 
to Kunduz.60 
 
8.6.4.   This seemingly lack of awareness of the dynamics of the use of military force and 
the wanting knowledge of military affairs in almost all branches of Dutch society, could 
put serious pressure on the relationship between the military and the nation. After all,  
this relationship also has a moral dimension which aims nurturing bonds of trust in an 
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affectionate reciprocity that exists within this special heterogeneity.61 The budget cuts 
decided on in parliament in 2011 and the consequent plans for the dismissal of 
approximately 5000 soldiers is a recent example in which ‘affectionate reciprocity’ 
seems to be wanting.  Especially the way in which so many soldiers were dismissed, 
fuelled a feeling of being deserted.62 The soldier’s uncomfortable feelings seem to grow 
not from any reluctance to accept reducing the cost of the military, thus contributing to a 
nation-wide effort to cope with the effects of the international financial crisis, but rather 
a perceived lack of interest in which political expediency rather than analysis and 
careful consideration determined the outcome of the debate. This kind of suspicion - 
whether it is based on facts or fiction - undermines the relationship between the nation 
and the military. It seems that both the political leadership as well as the departmental 
military  advisors  are not fully aware of  the vulnerability of this relationship.63   
 
8.6.5.   The conclusion seems warranted that the institutional relation between the 
Dutch nation and its military is rather weak in several aspects.  First, the relation is 
hampered by a general ‘non military’ attitude as the result of an enduring  peace. This 
attitude feeds on a strong historical tradition of deliberation and debate in seeking 
consensus and an aversion to authoritarian arrangements - such as the armed forces - 
and the use of violence to settle disputes. From this general feeling of embarrassment 
follows a second difficulty which impedes an adult relationship and that is the general 
lack of knowledge of the military and its capacities as well as the complexities involved 
in committing these capacities. The suspension of conscription put an end to the system 
in which the male part of the population at least gained some perfunctory knowledge of  
military affairs. From these two circumstances follows a third  distinctive feature of the 
relationship between the Dutch nation and its military, which pertains to the  
questioning of  the overall  utility and necessity of the armed forces. Not that the soldiers 
are not respected, but the relevance of the armed forces as such cannot count on much 
support. This is the result of a traditional aversion of violence as a means to solve 
conflicts. This lack of support is mirrored in the public and political debate. It seems that 
these views are largely based on an instrumental and institutional appreciation of the 
military as an expensive ornament of the state. A feature of this debate is that the notion 
of the military as a practice receives only little attention, if at all. This reflects the 
generally widening gap between praxis and poiesis in many branches of Dutch society, 
as described in paragraph 7.5.3. In these branches, there is a growing emphasis on goods 
of effectiveness rather than goods of excellence, and in this development, the military is 
no exception. This means also that the virtues of these practices are under some 
pressure. According to MacIntyre, living traditions involve practices in which the tenets 
of the tradition are embodied; and the standards of excellence of a practice find their 
anchorage in the virtues.  The extent to which the virtues relevant to the practice are 
exercised, determines whether a tradition remains living or gets corrupted.64 A lack of 
virtues corrupts both the practice as well as the institution, which derives their 
existence from the traditions of which they are the temporary embodiment.65   
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Moral tradition and the military, an obligatory perspective 
8.7.1.   In chapter 7 I elaborated on the political relation between the nation and the 
military. The question then is how this generic relation is shaped within the context of a 
democratic constitutional state. In which way are mutual obligations of the nation and 
the military shaped? An obvious candidate is the contract, which the soldier signs on 
entering the armed forces. However, there are many kinds of contracts. O’Gorman 
discerns seven contract theories:  reliance and restitution theory; will theory; consent 
theory; bargain theory; efficiency theory; substantive fairness theory and the multi value 
theory.66 The reliance and restitution theory is based upon the notion that the 
promisee’s reliance on the promisor’s promise should be protected. If the party, who 
made the promise, fails in fulfilling the obligations made under the promise, the party 
duped by this failure can claim retribution. The main question is then, how to ascertain 
the promise was not (completely) fulfilled and to what extent the responsible party is 
liable. The other issue is that this approach is hardly two sided. The will theory is based 
on the assumption that the parties freely assume - in a so-called ‘meeting of the minds’- 
the reciprocal obligations set in the contract. Given the inequality of the parties involved 
in a contract between the state and a soldier, this theory does not seem appropriate. The 
consent theory postulates that the contractual obligation is based on the consent to 
transfer an entitlement.  This consent is considered a manifestation of an intention to 
alienate rights. This theory seems more appropriate because that is what happens when 
a citizen signs on as a soldier. By his signature, he does alienate some of his rights, like 
the right to strike, to choose his own doctor, etc. The boundaries of protected domains 
are clearly discerned. However, there still is the matter of the inequality of the 
contracting parties. The bargain theory emphasizes the process in which the agreement 
is reached. If the process is correct, the obligations of the contract are too.  However, 
adhering to a correct process may enhance the force of the contract, but does not in any 
way define the nature of the contract. The efficiency theory focuses on how to achieve 
the best deal. It is based on a utilitarian approach and this theory, therefore allows for 
bargaining. This approach does not seem appropriate to settle the arrangement between 
the state and its soldiers as the contract partners face substantial inequalities, which 
may be reflected in the result as well. The substantive fairness theory assumes that it is 
possible to ascertain the fairness of a contract between parties. However, this theory 
does not address the question on what criteria the fairness of a deal should be 
established. This is left to experts and ultimately, the rule of law. Apart from introducing 
an expert opinion, this theory does not add much to the other theories. The final theory - 
the multi value theory - does not try to base contracts on a single starting point, but 
allows for a synthesis. In this theory, the freedom of contract is tempered by legal and 
traditional rules and regulations. However, the question is how to enforce these legal 
rules and regulations as laws are neither self-enforcing nor self-interpreting.67 
Nevertheless, this theory allows for diminishing the inequality between the state and the 
soldier, and creates clearer boundaries as to the reciprocal obligations, including 
alienation of rights. Nevertheless, even in this approach it is unclear how to embed in a 
contract that a soldier is liable with his life. Besides, these theories do not explain the 
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nature of the bond between the soldier and the state over time. It seems that classical 
contract theories fail in this respect. Another approach is needed.   
 
8.7.2.   A starting point for this other approach could be found in history when there 
were soldiers and states, but not yet the present formal contracts.  The covenant could 
be characterized as the pre-contractual ground of our modern contracts.68 Especially in 
the Netherlands and its predominantly Calvinist culture, covenantal thinking was 
strongly developed.69 A covenant signifies a partnership in which persons or groups 
regarded as moral equals voluntary consent to unite for common purposes.70 This 
purpose can be limited or comprehensive. Furthermore, by entering into a covenant the 
partners do not surrender their fundamental rights of identity.71 The difference between 
a contract and a covenant is that parties can disengage from a contract when it is no 
longer in their interest to continue with it; however, a covenant binds them even - 
perhaps especially - in difficult times. The reason is that a covenant is predicated not 
only on interest, but rather on loyalty and fidelity.72 A covenant is maintained by an 
internalized sense of identity, kinship, loyalty, obligation, duty, responsibility, and 
reciprocity. A covenant - the instrument of man as a social animal - gives rise to 
institutions, like: families, communities, traditions, and voluntary associations. It is the 
basis of civil society. A social contract, on the other hand - the instrument of man as a 
political animal - gives rise to the instrumentalities of the state: governments, parties, 
and the mediated resolution of conflict. It is the basis of political society.73 The most 
important dimension of a covenant, in contrast to a contract, is a moral imperative to 
uphold the covenant by going beyond the letter of the law in order to observe the spirit 
of the law. After all, as stated before, laws are neither self-enforcing nor self-
interpreting. This moral dimension is crucial not only for sustaining the covenant but 
also for nurturing bonds of affectionate reciprocity that exists within covenantal 
heterogeneity.74 A covenant depends upon parties willing to respect the rights of others. 
This obligation of one partner toward another must be reciprocal.75 We know that 
communities fail without bonds of fellowship and the obligations that flow from fellow 
feeling. Neither the free market nor the liberal- democratic state can survive without 
internalized constraints that prevent us from doing certain things, which may be in our 
advantage to do. These are moral relationships. They are covenantal rather than 
contractual. The covenant belongs to a different narrative, one primarily told by our 
traditions. In short, founding, upholding and strengthening a covenant, a civil bond, 
means also maintaining and strengthening the narrative of our social life in terms of 
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mutuality, the mutuality that precedes identity.76 A covenant is conceived not just as 
enabling relationships with individuals, but also as communal.77 
 
8.7.3.   The soldier is a proto-servant of the community, the state which he serves. 
Hackett states: ‘Living in a group demands some subordination of the interest of self to 
the interests of the group. The military contract stands out here as almost unique. It 
demands the total and almost unconditional subordination of the interests of the 
individual if the interest of the group should require it. This can lead to the surrender of 
life itself. If not infrequently does.’78 The essence of the relation between the soldier and 
the state is of a twofold nature. On the one hand is the soldier licensed to use violence 
and if necessary to kill, albeit within the constraints of legitimate orders. This license is 
prohibited to all other servants of the state.79 On the other hand, soldiers have an 
unlimited liability in giving their lives in doing so.80 The former element - the legitimacy 
of the use of violence - is to a large extend defined by law: the Jus ad Bellum and the Jus 
in Bello. The latter  element - the liability of soldiers - can be defined by law to only a 
very limited extend; for example, in the case of cowardice in the face of the enemy, 
treason or defection to the enemy. Therefore, the element of unlimited liability, which 
binds the soldier to kill or be killed for a purpose in which he may have no personal 
interest whatever,  is primarily a matter of a covenant.81  A covenant binds the 
community and the individuals over time and implies a strong moral obligation even in 
difficult times and in the face of danger. The covenant appeals to loyalty and fidelity. 
However, a covenant implies reciprocity and therefore, in exchange for surrendering 
various rights (by swearing an oath), soldiers who serve the community may expect fair 
treatment as human beings.82 Sir John Hackett articulated this as follows: ‘The essential 
basis of military life is the ordered application of force under an unlimited liability. It is 
this unlimited liability, which sets the man who embraces this life somewhat apart. He 
will be, (or should be) always a citizen. So long as he serves he will never be a citizen.’83  
As a citizen the soldier shows allegiance to the state;  he pays his taxes and abides by the 
state’s rule of law. In return, he reaps the benefits of the state, including protection from 
harm. However, as a soldier he is expected to put himself in harm’s way for the sake of 
the community, but what does the soldier get in return? Some say it is dismally little: 
‘soldiers have across the army’s history, been subjected to treatment  that has fallen far 
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short of that to which they have been reasonably entitled, and is not enough to maintain 
that this all happened in a distant land where things were done differently. We have 
done it in recent memory and, given half a change, would still do it again.84 
 
8.7.4.   In discussing this issue, Mileham introduces the terminology of a ‘fiduciary 
relationship’. This kind of relationship is built on trust and confidence. 85 This kind of 
relationship permeates the military practice. ‘Military leadership and the imperatives of 
teamwork require a willing and continuous display of trust, confidence and loyalty.’86 
The ensuing display of good faith enhances moral good-sense, self-discipline, respect 
and restraint, which cannot be achieved by military regiment and the rule of law. The 
same kind of relation exists (or should exit) between the soldier and the state. The 
soldier must be confident that the risks he is exposed to are worthwhile and within the 
legitimate power of the state. He must also be able to trust the state to do everything in 
its power to provide the appropriate means, personnel, organization and training  to 
allow the soldier a fair chance (perhaps even more than that) to achieve victory and 
survive. And in the case, the soldier does not return or returns seriously injured, the 
soldier must be confident that the nation will not abandon him nor his family. To a 
soldier the whole military organisation and society could be viewed as an upturned 
pyramid, with him at the bottom; but like a man dangling beneath a parachute, 
everything above him is actually supported.87  
 
8.7.5.   However, in modern terms, the responsibilities of the state are primarily of a 
political nature.  This political responsibility requires, first of all a political strategy with 
a clearly articulated end, a political goal. Next a clear view of the way to achieve that 
goal, a policy is needed. Lastly there have to be available the appropriate means 
necessary to realize the required ways, a budget. However, in keeping its end of the 
covenant it is essential that the state realizes that it has a wider responsibility than 
merely a political one.  As a partner in a covenant the state is expected to act in good 
faith as well. The covenant must be honoured in order to preserve the reciprocal 
fiduciary relationship between the soldier and the state. Preserving this relationship is 
not only a matter of material means but is also in showing respect (and sometimes 
gratitude) for the sacrifices soldiers (are willing to) make. If this relationship is thrown 
out of balance, if the fiduciary relationship is damaged it can result in serious 
consequences; both in terms of the covenant as the mutual relation in Clausewitz’s 
trinity: people, state and army.88 
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40. P 28. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Schlaefli, R. (1992). Emergency Sahib: Of Queen's, Sikhs and Dagger Division London, R.J. Leach military 
publishers. P 29. 
88 Clausewitz, von, C (1984). On War. Howard, M., Paret, P. Ed. Princeton, University Press. P 89. 
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Living morality, practices and virtues. 
8.8.1.   The aim of my thesis is to establish whether MacIntyre’s theory provides a 
suitable instrument to identify, develop, instil and uphold the required moral standards 
in the military. However, MacIntyre  in his theory argues that the virtues are closely 
connected to the practices, the narrative order of human life and moral tradition. As I 
have investigated all constitutive elements of his theory, it is now time to see whether 
application of his theory creates a coherent and logical story which underpins the 
validity of his theory. As I elaborated on in paragraph 8.4., Dutch moral tradition has 
several characteristics, which are firmly embedded in its culture. These are first the 
notions of equality of man, that all men are entitled to respect and the ensuing aptitude 
to strive for consensus rather than conflict. Freedom is a second important element of 
Dutch traditions and is expressed in an attitude of tolerance and the overall willingness 
to  compromise. In the third place there is widely held consensus on the need for 
solidarity and the notion of cooperation as an effective means to achieve common and 
otherwise unattainable goals. In MacIntyre’s idiom this indicates that Dutch moral 
tradition seems to be alive. 
 
8.8.2.   However, according to MacIntyre, the liveliness of moral traditions is expressed 
through the exercise of the virtues that are relevant to the practices that constitute 
society. In paragraph 7.5., I elaborated on the growing gap between praxis and poiesis, 
between the practice and the institution, between goods of excellence and goods of 
effectiveness. Institutional instrumentalism seems to gain importance at the cost of the 
interests of the practice. At the same time, it becomes increasingly obvious that an 
instrumental approach has its limits: ‘stick and carrot’ are not particularly suited to 
promote effectiveness let alone excellence. Furthermore,  the institutional approach also 
seems to deny the special relationship, a covenant, based on mutual duty and trust that 
are required. Some kind of discomfort is noticeable: how to maintain standards of moral 
excellence in an institutional and instrumental environment. Moreover, how to make 
sense of a shared idea on the morally good in a complex situation?  
 
8.8.3.   When we look at the Aristotelian telos of mankind - being a virtuous citizen of the 
Greek polis - it is obvious that such a general overarching telos is an illusion in the 
present complex nation state: there are just too many differences within the people, 
their ethnical backgrounds their religious and political convictions, their prosperity, 
lifestyle, etc. However, this does not mean that the underlying idea of Aristotle has also 
lost its relevance, which is that man aspires at giving full scope to one’s natural gifts. 
This human flourishing entails aspiring at meeting she standards of excellence that are 
relevant to the practice(s) one participates in. This kind of flourishing is not only 
beneficial to the practice and the practitioner but also to his fellow practitioners, the 
community of which he is a part and the wider society as well. The question is how to 
mobilize these forces to the benefit of society and to avoid that a lack of virtues will 
corrupt both the practices as well as the institutions which derive their existence from 
the traditions of which they are the temporary embodiment.89 
 
8.8.4.   This kind of revival cannot be organized top-down. This would require a common 
consent over transcendental ‘truths’. Given the already mentioned complexity of society, 
that would amount to cry for the moon. This kind of revival can only be achieved in a 
                                                          
89 MacIntyre, A. (2007). After Virtue. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P 222, 223. 
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bottom-up process. This means that practices should reclaim their standards of 
excellence and their priority over, or at least their being at par with, the institutional  
goods of effectiveness. This would result in greater involvement in the practices and the 
ensuing goods of excellence: at first at a small scale, but possibly ever widening and 
eventually this could encompass the social fabric of society as a whole. Thus, 
universalising of virtues could be achieved without recurring to transcendent ideas.90 Of 
course this process requires time, thus immediate results cannot be expected. However, 
it is tempting to speculate that  if this process could start in the sporting and other clubs 
and in education, and we would be able to hold on to this approach for a sustained 
period, much could be achieved!91 All in all, the conclusion seems warranted that the 
application of MacIntyre’s theory on some aspects of Dutch society creates a coherent 
and logical story, which underpins the validity of his theory. 
 
A living military practice  
8.9.1. A number of the conclusions articulated in the preceding paragraphs are based 
on a specific interpretation of some social developments and how to cope with these. 
However, the argument is relevant, in answering the question whether MacIntyre’s 
theory provides a suitable instrument to identify, develop, instil and uphold the required 
moral standards in the military.  By accepting the perspective in which the military is 
primarily seen as a practice rather than an institution, would help in recognizing and 
addressing some of the problems I identified in the preceding chapters. First of all, it 
would be beneficial to military further (moral) education. The relevance of the seven 
virtues of military character is easily explained as they follow logically from the 
characteristics of military practice and contribute to satisfy the internal goods for the 
sake of which the armed forces are joined. The necessity of the virtue of intellect, 
practical wisdom, is from a military point of view obvious as well. It is required to make 
often tough decisions in difficult and complex situations. All of these virtues, combined 
in a framework of virtues, can be made part and parcel of military education, training 
and exercise.  As these  virtues are directly related to military practice, they will be 
readily accepted as relevant. Narrative can play an important role in developing and 
instilling these virtues in the character of soldiers. As I explained identity is for a large 
part based on stories, which create the unity of a single life. Narrative will also be an 
                                                          
90 Gabriels, R. (2000). "Simsalbimbambasaladusaladim." Krisis - tijdschrift voor actuele filosofie 20(1): 89 
-107.  
91 Support for this assumption can be found in the efforts in the filed of sport to try and halt further 
coarsening of behaviour on and around the pitches. Already in 2002 the Royal Netherlands Field Hockey 
League (KNHB) started a campaign to improve sportsmanship and to promote mutual respect. The 
campaign proved a success as the number of incident decreased and the atmosphere on and off the 
playing grounds improved. The campaign is continued. See: (2010). Samen voor sportiviteit en respect. 
Actieplan sportiviteit & respect van de Koninklijke Nederlandse Hockey Bond. Nieuwegein, KNHB. 
Because of its success, in 2009 this initiative was followed up by a national campaign in which the 
government (Ministerie van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport) and 11 other sports leagues participated. 
In 2012 a report was published on the results.  See: Lucassen, J., Kalmthout, van, J., Steenbergen, J., Werff, 
van der, H., Smits, F., Jong, de, M. (2012). Je gaat het pas zien als je het door hebt...: conclusies en 
slotbeschouwing van de monitor voor sportiviteit en respect 2009 - 2012. Nieuwegein, Arko sports media: 
73. The authors concluded that measurable progress was achieved but stressed the importance of a 
sustained campaign. They also mentioned a moral paradox which complicates the efforts: increased action 
for improvements generates an increased attention for the issue and also an increased critical perception 
which results in the paradox that although the number of incidents decreases, the public image does not 
improve. This paradox underpins the need for a sustained effort. 
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important instrument in explaining and assisting in creating an ‘esprit de corps’ which 
adds to identity as well as cohesion. Cohesion is an important asset as it greatly 
contributes to effectiveness of military units. Tradition is important in upholding the 
required moral standards. The wider moral tradition provides the background in which 
the virtues are embedded. Military tradition and ‘esprit de corps’ could serve as means 
to clarify and these moral standards in a military context.  Thus, tradition could 
contribute in upholding these required moral standards.  
 
8.9.2.   Replacing - or adapting - the present code of conduct by the proposed framework 
of virtues would solve several other problems as well. It would create a theoretical 
unified framework in contrast to the present code, which rests on several ethical 
theories. It would also solve the problem of how to convey the content of the present 
code: the content of the proposed framework of virtues is closely related to operational 
military practice and the usefulness of the standards of excellence expressed within the 
framework is all part of an obvious military truth. The framework would not hamper 
military effectiveness, on the contrary! The framework provides guidance, both practical 
as well as moral, while leaving room for practical solutions required in the often 
complex situations that are characteristic of military practice . The framework meets the 
criteria as articulated by Birnbacher.92 Furthermore, the framework provides a closer 
link with regard to the international practice of military codes.  
 
8.9.3.  Furthermore, applying the framework in moral education aims at building 
character. This military character  that is aimed at, is the same for all soldiers of all 
services thus creating a common consent on what is appropriate. Once these 
characteristics are instilled in the identity of the soldier successfully, it will be hard to 
discard these. This could  well enhance the overall moral awareness and reduce the 
number of reports and incidents as presently monitored by COID. Furthermore, this also 
means that those soldiers (especially senior NCO’s and officers) who - in the course of 
their career - are posted to institutional positions, bring their moral dispositions, their 
virtues and values along. These personal characteristics will play their part in the way 
these soldiers will fulfil their - at the higher levels primarily institutional - job.  
Institutional instrumentality could be met with personal involvement. Operational 
relevance and practicality will probably play a more important role, rather than mere 
instrumental considerations and political expediency. This could add to the quality of 
decision-making at the higher level staffs.  It would contribute to diminish the gap 
between military praxis and institutional poiesis. However, it must be recognized that 
instilling virtues, building character, is  a complex affair and requires a long-lasting 
effort. It is not something which can be achieved in a six-month basis training. In basis 
training a foundation can be laid, which creates the prerequisites for successful further 
education. Instilling and upholding the virtues requires attention throughout  the entire 
term of service of all soldiers. Not an opportunity should be lost to dwell on the practical 
relevance of the virtues and the connected standards of excellence. This requires that 
military leaders at all levels are educated and trained in recognizing opportunities for 
contributing to the building of military character. Furthermore they must be equipped 
with the knowledge, skills and the will to make the best use of these opportunities. Only 
                                                          
92 Birnbacher, D. (1999). "Ethics and social science: which kind of cooperation?" Ethical theory and moral 
practice. 2(4): 319 - 336. 
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a consistent and continuous effort will produce the required results. This would require 
a strong conviction, a clear policy and a lot of energy.    
 
8.9.4.   Another consequence could be that by positioning the military as a practice 
rather than an instrument could foster a different attitude toward the military. 
Positioning the military as a practice provides opportunities to emphasize the 
importance and value of inherent involvement typical of a practice. Openly aspiring at 
the standards of excellence of the practise and displaying the relevant virtues could well 
add to a better understanding  and appreciation of the military. Emphasizing the utility 
of the military, on the contrary, would at the best lead to an appreciation of the 
instrumental value of the military, which is vulnerable for the demands of (political) 
expediency. By positioning the military as a practice also the idea of the covenant - based 
on mutual duty and trust - will be accepted more readily.  Communication would be 
based more on empathy and diminish the communicative problems of  using ‘different 
languages’. Such a development will enhance the reciprocal esteem of the parties to the 
covenant and strengthen the fiduciary nature of the bond between the partners. Duty 
and trust will be evenly met. The nation trusts the soldier to do their duty, which 
includes their complete liability. The soldier trusts the nation that they will do theirs, 
which includes legitimate deployment, adequate equipment and training and 
appropriate care for themselves if wounded and for their relatives if the soldier is killed. 
 
8.9.5.   Not every citizen is a soldier, but every soldier is also a citizen. This simple fact 
has also a further consequence. A citizen brings his prior moral education with him, 
when he joins the armed forces as a soldier. Serving in the military for a number of years 
will change a soldier physically and mentally: a number of his moral outlooks will 
change. Some of the disposition inherent to a virtue will stay with him. As the virtues are 
related to standards of excellence, a soldier will probably develop an increased 
awareness of the importance of excellence. As soldiers are also citizens and they will 
bring their moral outlooks with them in their activities in society; whether they are still 
on active duty or have left the military. As I explained in paragraph 7.3.6., military 
virtues also have civil relevance, and some military virtues actually coincide with civic 
virtues. This pertains especially to responsibility, competence and respect as well as 
comradeship. The link between the military virtues of resilience, courage and discipline 
and their civic counterparts might be  less obvious, but these also have civilian 
relevance. However, within the military soldiers are stimulated to aspire at achieving 
the appropriate standards of excellence. In many civilian practices, on the contrary, this 
kind of aspiration is not often displayed openly. In some respects therefore, civilians 
with a background as soldiers often seem to play an important role in improving other 
practices.93 In this sense the soldier’s active notion of the virtues adds to the quality of 
other more civilian practices. They thereby contribute also to keep the wider moral 
traditions alive. 
Conclusion 
8.10.1.   In this final conceptual chapter, I addressed the final constituent element of 
MacIntyre’s theory: the relation between the wider moral tradition of society and the 
practices and the virtues that constitute society. According to MacIntyre, a moral 
                                                          
93 This observation is partly speculative as data on military personnel active in civilian practices are not 
available. On the other hand as a sports official I very often met fellow soldiers acting as officials in sports 
and other clubs, thus contributing to the fabric of society.  
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tradition is an extended argument through time about the very goods that are part of the 
tradition. This tradition - when it is to be kept alive - should maintain a fruitful relation 
with the practices, and the virtues involved.  A living moral tradition goes through a 
continuous process that has three phases. In the first phase the tenets of tradition are 
established and accepted. From this acceptance grows the second phase in which the 
tradition is criticized. The third phase accommodates the criticisms, and the tradition is 
re-formulated. If the reciprocal relation between the tradition and its practices and 
virtues loses its impetus, the tradition will change and practices and virtues could 
whither away and eventually die.  
 
8.10.2.   When MacIntyre’s theory is applied in the Dutch context, I concluded that Dutch 
moral tradition is alive and also with regard to the military. The main tenets of wider 
Dutch moral tradition - freedom and equality as well as  solidarity and tolerance - are 
reflected in the military virtues. However, the perspective from the moral tradition 
allows for some other observations. The emphasis on the military as an institution, an 
instrument, rather than a practice could cause some problems. It could affect the 
necessarily reciprocal relationship between the nation and the armed forces and 
between the soldier and the state. The latter is based on a covenant in which the soldier 
accepts total liability in exchange for the trust in the nation that it will fulfil its duty 
towards the soldier and his relatives. This covenant is a fiduciary relation, based on 
mutual trust.    
 
8.10.3.   Putting more emphasis on the military as a practice rather than a mere 
instrument could improve mutual understanding and prevent a possible erosion of the 
covenant. It would enable to give ample room for military virtues related to the practice, 
rather than an institutional code. Military virtues embedded in the soldier’s character 
could provide a more stable moral guidance and could add to the prevention of 
derailments. The effects of a military character could also better be represented in 
institutional decision making, which could also result in a more balanced policy that 
reflects the covenant. The realisation that the relationship between the nation and its 
soldiers is based on a covenant could improve the relationship between the two, based 
on empathy and accepting that language has its limitations. Finally, yet importantly, the 
virtuous soldier is also a citizen and from that perspective the soldier’s role in keeping 
the moral traditions alive, extends well beyond the military practice. However, these 
changes will not be created by itself, they will need a continuous effort based on a clear 
policy. 
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Annex A to chapter 8: ‘A fairytale’94 
Once upon a time there was a director of city affairs (prince) in a large city (a 
prosperous country far away). He was a successful director! He was young (and 
beautiful) and managed city affairs well. He was sure to become a mayor (king) some 
day. This was not only the opinion of the other directors and the members of the city 
council, the director himself thought so too. For that reason, he worked hard and took 
great care to avoid mistakes. One of the city services over which the director had 
supervision was the Fire brigade The director of city affairs had a good working 
relationship with the commandant of the fire department. The commandant in his turn 
thought the director is a capable manager and a nice fellow. 
One day the commandant was asked to report to the director. After they had a cup of 
coffee and exchanged gossip, the director told the commandant the city had a budgetary 
problem, and the question was how to find  a solution for this financial deficit. However, 
he developed a wonderful scheme to solve the financial problem without hurting the 
citizens. What if the fire department would focus on the prevention of fires breaking 
out? In the long run, he then would be able to implement budget cuts and trim the size of 
the fire department without endangering the interests of the citizens! On the contrary, in 
the end, the city would be a safer place to live in! 
The commandant thought it was, in principle, a good idea and promised to look into it. 
And so the fire department became the leading agency in initiating and implementing a 
serious fire-prevention-plan. The program was received with great enthusiasm. 
Especially the elder fire-fighters were strongly motivated to participate: they knew all 
too well what havoc and tragedy fires could bring. And due to the effective prevention 
programme, the number of fires declined. As a result, the director and the commandant 
agreed to a reduction on the number of  fire-stations and as a result the strength of the 
fire department could be reduced by an impressive 50%. Everybody was happy. The 
mayor was happy, the director was happy, the commandant was happy and even most of 
the fire-fighters (at least those who could stay on the force) were happy. 
In the mean time, the prevention programme continued and with great success! The 
number of fires declined further. At one time, there were even young fire-fighters that 
had never fought a real fire. When more veterans retired even the number of wild 
stories of terrible fires and how they had fought these, diminished. That did not mean 
that the fire-fighters did nothing, on the contrary. They were active in the prevention 
programme, they trained and exercised, and they polished their fire-engines. The 
commandant was well pleased with his men; his hose-men as he called them 
affectionately. 
Then, one day the commandant was once again invited by the director of city affairs. The 
director asked whether the strength of the fire department could be reduced further. 
The commandant protested vehemently: the risks for the citizens would be too high! The 
director nodded thoughtfully. ‘I see your point.’ he said. ‘But how am I going to explain 
this to the town council?  When there are no fires, the people do not see fire-engines 
racing through the streets. Then politicians start asking questions. They haven’t a clue 
                                                          
94 This annex contains a translated and edited version of an earlier  publication by: de Vries, P. H. (2000). 
"Sprookje." Carré 23(5): 6-9. 
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what instant availability means in terms of capabilities.’ The director fell silent. The 
commandant understood the nature of the problem and did not speak either. But 
suddenly the director jumped up from his chair and cried: ‘Eureka!’ The commandant - 
lacking a classical education - looked bewildered. The director noticed the bewilderment 
and said:  ‘That means I’ve got it.’ He continued: ‘Your men must turn out more often! 
We must invest in civil support! We will get more visibility and fewer difficult 
questions!’ The commandant immediately grasped what the director meant, and he felt 
much relieved. He promised the director to take prompt action and left in a hurry.  
Soon after the citizens saw fire-engines racing through the streets, sometimes even with 
their loud horns at full blast. Not that there was a fire somewhere but to deliver civil 
support: they drained cellars, they assisted in fixing Christmas decorations throughout 
the city, and they helped the elderly to move and saved kittens from trees. The citizens 
were proud of their fire department and no questions were asked in the town council. 
Also the fire-fighters were proud: at last they were able to show what they were capable 
of. And they wanted to do things even better! The training programme with ladder-
engines was intensified and fire-fighters with a fear of heights were sent to therapy. In 
the newspapers there were glowing stories about the excellent cooperation between the 
fire department and the society for the prevention of cruelty to animals, the town 
transport services, the homes for the elderly, etc. Everybody seemed happy. However, 
the idea of fire and the dangers involved slowly disappeared into the background and 
from the collective memory.  
Then, one day the commandant went to visit the director. The director was very happy 
to see the commandant. The commandant explained the reason for his visit. It had been 
coming for some time, but now his fire-engines really needed replacement. They were 
not used as often as they used to be, but nevertheless, they were now at the end of their 
life.  It was very expensive to keep them running and by investing in new engines, they 
could reduce the running costs.  The director was dismayed. He thought it not fair to ask 
for new fire-engines. They were silent. The director said sullenly: ‘Fire-engines, you 
never use them anyway. Why not ask for ladder-engines?’ The commandant said noting. 
Than the director started speaking; ‘OK, I see your point. But this is not the moment to 
ask for extra budget. My suggestion is that you take half of your fire-engines out of 
service and use these to keep the other half running. I know it is not what you want, but 
it is the best I can offer.’ The commandant looked surprised and disappointed and 
started to protest, but the director cut him short: ‘It really is the best at this moment. 
Maybe some time later on we will be able to create a real solution. But now I have got to 
go as I have an appointment with the mayor.’ and the director left the room. The 
commandant left as well and did as the director had suggested.  
Some time later the commandant again went to see the director to ask for serious 
investments. The director seemed irritated. ‘Tell me,’ he said, ‘what was the last time we 
had a serious fire in this city?’ The commandant thought hard and long, but he could not 
come up with the appropriate date. ‘You see!’ the director said, ‘Fires are obsolete and so 
are fire-engines. We will skip these altogether.  We will make an arrangement with our 
neighbour cities to come to our support in case of an emergency  I will see to that. 
However, I do recognize the need for investments, so I will take care you can buy 
another ladder-engines. Those you use at least. Sorry, but I have got to go.’ And of was 
the director.  Therefore the commandant put the remaining fire-engines out of service 
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and bought a new ladder-engine, and as new material was scarce, there was a lot of 
commotion about in which station this brand new engine was to be posted. 
Then, one day, a fire broke out. Due to the prevention programme in which every 
building was fitted with a fire-detection system which was connected to the central 
operations centre, the fire was spotted immediately, and the fire stations reacted 
promptly. In no less than three minutes, several engines were at the location of the fire, a 
small industrial zone at the outskirts of the city. Unfortunately, they were all ladder-
engines. The fire could not be stopped and spread. Finally, the only remaining fire-
engine arrived, but nobody knew exactly how to operate the machine. However, thanks 
for the efforts of some old hands they were able to get water pressure on the sprayer. 
But then what? Nobody knew what to do. Surely they had been trained, but that was 
long ago, and they missed proficiency. Fortunately, the commandant arrived in person 
and took command. ‘Come on hosiers keep the adjacent premises soaked!’ After some 
explanation the other fire-fighters understood what was expected, but they had only one 
engine, with two sprays, insufficient to fight the conflagration and they could not 
prevent the fire from spreading further to a residential building. Suddenly someone 
cried out: ‘There are people on the top floor!’  And indeed, on the balcony of the top floor 
a mother was visible with two small children, who clung to her skirt and cried for help. 
Now the ladder-engines came pat to the purpose. After a few seconds the first was 
deployed. But nothing happened. One after the other fire-fighter refused to go up. Not 
that they were afraid of the height; they all had therapy and extensive experience from 
getting kittens out of trees. It was the fire that prevented their action. They knew you 
could get terribly burned by fire. However, they intuitively sensed that something was 
amiss, so they discussed the situation: ‘Look here , we are not trained for this kind of 
dangerous work.’ said one. ‘And not paid either!’ said another. ‘I do not even know those 
people.’ said a third, ‘How can I be expected to run serious risks for people I do not even 
know!’ Another said: ‘We have only one fire-engine. This is useless.’ And no matter what 
the commandant did; he implored, he begged, he even ordered! No fire-fighter mounted 
the ladder.  
That night a large part of the city was reduced to ashes and hundreds of citizens 
perished. The director of city affairs was not there to share in the sorrow; he had been 
promoted to mayor of another city a few weeks before the disaster struck. Some time 
after the disaster, the commandant was promoted too; he became a director in the 
international organisation on the prevention of fires. However, in a few years the city is 
rebuild and one of the first buildings that was completed was a fire-station with brand 
new fire-engines. And after a while the citizens forgot what happened and lived happily 
ever after.  
The moral of the story 
The fairytale carries morals at different levels. The first concerns the extend in which the 
covenant is honoured. Fire-fighters are willing to run serious risks for the benefit of 
society as a whole: risks that cannot be computed in terms of contracts and salary. In 
this context, mutual trust is the core of the bond between the town and its citizens and 
those who protect them. The citizens should be able to trust their protectors that they 
will do their duty when required, even at great liability. In return, the protectors should 
be able to trust their citizens and the institutions they build to provide the appropriate 
means with which they have to operate and the appropriate context in which they are 
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deployed. Failure to maintain the covenant can have serious consequences. Short-term 
political expediency can seriously undermine the mutual trust on which the covenant 
rests. Especially when this expediency concerns capabilities that requires long-term 
investments in both material and personnel.  
The second point is that we must keep a sharp focus on the ultimate purpose of 
capabilities. Short-term benefits often are to the detriment of long-term effectiveness. In 
this fairytale, the purpose of the fire department, which is fire-fighting, was ultimately 
lost. Not that the fire-department cannot rescue kittens from trees, but it is not their 
core-business! An appropriate focus on its primary purpose gives direction to the 
organisation of the capabilities required to fulfil that purpose: in structure, in 
procedures, in equipment and in its culture. Of course the capabilities can be deployed 
for other purposes as well, but this must not lead to a reversal of priorities.  
A third issue is that a clear purpose; creates a clear focus for selecting of personnel and 
the further process of education, training and exercising. The importance of this issue 
cannot be overestimated: the men and women in an organisation are the key to its 
overall effectiveness. Furthermore, a clear purpose provides direction to the institution 
and creates the prerequisites for the flourishing of the practices involved. This means a 
culture in which aspiration for excellence is accepted, if not stimulated. In such case the 
goods of excellence and the goods of effectiveness are mutually stimulating resulting in 
better effectiveness and better performances.  
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Chapter 9: general discussion and conclusions 
 
Introduction 
9.1.   MacIntyre in his book ‘After Virtue’ uses the concept of a quest: ‘The unity of 
human life is the unity of a narrative quest… The only criteria for success or failure in 
human life as a whole are the criteria of success or failure in a narrated or to be narrated 
quest.’1 He discerns two key features of a quest. The first is that there must be, at least 
some, determinate conception of a final telos: an ultimate goal. But secondly a quest is 
not a search for something already adequately characterized. He states: ‘It is in the 
course of the quest and only through encountering and coping with the various 
particular harms, dangers, temptations and distractions which provide any quest with 
its episodes and incidents that the goal of the quest is finally to be understood.’2  The 
conception of this thesis can also be defined as a quest, as: ’A quest is always an 
education both as to the character of that which is sought and in self-knowledge.’3 
  
Motivation and justification 
9.2.1.   I started this thesis by arguing that ‘new’ wars require more moral strengths 
from soldiers than ‘old’ wars did. First of all the challenges to morality have grown and 
changed. The ‘new’ wars are fought mostly on the level of small units which means that 
junior soldier (OR, NCO’s and officers) have to bear the brunt of moral decision-making. 
Furthermore, these small units operate in relative isolation, as generally speaking there 
is only a limited number of troops in an extended area of operations. Often there is no 
direct support from the higher echelons available, both material as well as moral. The 
unpredictability of armed confrontations and the variety in intensity adds to the 
pressure on small units and their soldiers. Also the moral complexity of ‘new’ wars has 
increased: the opposing fighters are mostly in civilian attire which makes it hard to 
distinguish them from peaceable civilians and they can also ignore the rule of 
international rule of law. In short, in ‘new’ wars soldiers face far more morally complex 
situations than in ‘old’ wars.  
 
9.2.2.   At the same time the soldier’s moral conduct has become more important. 
Nowadays democratic constitutional states are not involved in an armed struggle in 
which the survival, the continuous existence, of the nation state is in jeopardy. When 
these states get involved in an armed conflict it is mostly by contributing to an 
international intervention in order to restore the international rule of law. As 
‘defenders’ of the rule of law it is of paramount importance that their forces adhere to 
this rule. Otherwise they would lose their moral high ground. Any breach of these rules 
would seriously damage the image of the intervening forces and could impede their 
public and international political support. And when such a breach occurs it would be 
very hard to organize a cover-up, because of the wide spread ‘open source’ media 
coverage of any armed intervention. Therefore the modern democratic constitutional 
state has a vested interest in deploying morally responsible soldiers; not only from a 
political perspective, but also to avoid compromising their mental health.4 The question 
is how to create morally responsible soldiers. 
                                                          
1 MacIntyre, A. (2007). After Virtue. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. P219. 
2.Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 This motive  has two perspectives. It is a matter of concern and care  for the soldiers as well as a case of 
self-interest to avoid disablement and claims for incurred personal injuries like PTSS, etc. 
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9.2.3.   My assumption is that an approach based on virtue ethics would be best suited to 
enhance the morality of soldiers. My first argument is that the notion of virtue ethics is 
closely connected to the concept of a practice. It is in the practice that the relevant 
virtues are acquired and demonstrated. This means that the virtues are attainable for all 
participants, which in military practice means for all soldiers: private soldiers, non-
commissioned officers and officers. Furthermore, it is possible to develop virtues which 
are suited to the requirements of practices, the military practice included. These virtues 
can be further developed and maintained by education, training and emulating 
exemplary fellow humans. However, it is important to realize that embedding virtues in 
character is not a simple matter. It requires a consistent and enduring effort by skilled 
instructors and  leaders, backed by a strong policy . Furthermore, this policy must be 
based on a thorough investigation on the appropriate ways and means required to 
achieve the policy’s end.  Eventually the virtues are embedded in a soldier’s character, 
and thereby are relatively stable moral dispositions; an important asset in complex 
situations in which rules are difficult to apply. Embedded virtues are an important 
advantage given the burden resting on small units which often operate in isolation. 
Being virtuous also implies that the virtuous aspire to achieve the standards of 
excellence of the practice. From this perspective virtue ethics is particularly suited to 
military practice, as excellence in handling the implements of war, abiding by the rules 
and close cooperation between soldiers and the resulting cohesion within units are 
essential parts of the military practice. This also means that being virtuous contributes 
to the overall effectiveness of military activities. Participating in a practice together with 
others, fuels cohesion, which is another asset of effective military operations. Lastly, 
virtue ethics allows for a multiple interpretation of moral experience. Not only reason, 
but also the other capabilities of the individuals involved are taken into account: which 
options are feasible, which options are within the agent’s grasp?  Situational elements 
are also considered a part of the moral equation. This feature is especially relevant in a 
practice in which the unexpected seems to be the norm. These arguments provide strong 
indications that virtue ethics is indeed especially suitable to develop, impose, support 
and maintain a military framework of ethics. The next question was how to proceed. 
 
Research question and outline 
9.3.1.  I aimed at developing a practical framework of military ethics using the theory of 
virtue ethics as elaborated by Alasdair MacIntyre in his book ‘After Virtue’. My 
hypothesis was that this theory would provide a suitable instrument to identify, develop, 
instil and uphold the required moral standards in the military.5 My central aim was to 
develop a framework that could serve as the outline of a policy on how to apply virtue 
ethics in military practice in order to ensure that individual soldiers will uphold 
adequate moral standards in their actions in ‘new’ wars. My secondary aim was to 
contribute to the body of theory on virtue-ethics and its practical application. My third 
aim was to assist the Royal Netherlands Armed Forces - in which I served for 35 years - 
in upholding the moral character of their military personnel. It was for this reason that 
the Dutch armed forces were my primary frame of reference. These are well suited for 
my research as the Netherlands are a traditional democratic constitutional state which 
frequently deploys its armed forces in international expeditionary operations. 
                                                          
5 MacIntyre, A. (2007). After Virtue. London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. 
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9.3.2.   MacIntyre’s theory promises a clear understanding of a specific practice and the 
related virtues. It also explains the role of institutional structures in supporting 
practices. The theory further relates the role of narrative in imbuing virtues and 
provides arguments to maintain a close link between the practices and their virtues and 
the wider morality. My overall aim was to come forward with a framework that provides 
tangible means to address practical issues in military ethics. In order to ascertain the 
applicability of my framework, I interviewed a number of veteran soldiers who had 
proven operational experience; as it is in operations that the real nature of the military 
practice is found. In order to validate my findings I also interviewed members of two 
other professions:  one with clear characteristics of a practice (medical care) and one 
with a less apparent resemblance to a practice (municipal civil servants). In order to 
provide  a further yardstick  on military morality, I not only investigated the Dutch 
policy but also those of other democratic constitutional states with which the 
Netherlands maintains close ties and cooperates militarily: France,  the German Federal 
Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States. Finally, I investigated to what 
extent a specific framework of military ethics could be part of the wider moral traditions 
of Dutch society.  
 
9.3.3.   I started my research with elaborating on virtue ethics and how the concepts 
used in this theory could be interpreted. From this wider perspective I then looked into 
MacIntyre’s theory and the concepts he uses. From this analysis sprung one conclusion 
which pertained to the concept of a practice. MacIntyre claims that a practice is autotelic 
and serves only the activities which are constituent of the practice and the related 
standards of excellence and none other. I found convincing arguments that some 
practices have a wider purpose. In his theory MacIntyre also claims a direct relationship 
between practices, the reasons why practices are attractive and the appropriate virtues. 
I therefore made an analysis of these concepts in the military context. Next, I 
investigated MacIntyre’s use of the concept of narrative and its relevance in imbuing 
virtues. These investigations resulted in specific ‘translations’ of these concepts in a 
(Dutch) military context. Next, I conducted the interviews in order to validate my 
findings.  I found that the framework I developed could count on considerable support. 
Also, the international comparison provides a positive view as to the relevance of my 
framework. 
 
9.3.4.   In the second part of my thesis I focussed on the role of the institution, the armed 
forces, and their relation to society in general and the nation’s wider moral traditions. I 
conclude that there are no discrepancies between the morality of the ethical framework 
I proposed and wider Dutch moral tradition; even in the face of the non-military attitude 
of the larger part of the Dutch public. However I did argue that there is a potential risk 
which pertains to the quality of the relations between the military practice and the 
military institution, the armed forces. This reflects a wider development in Dutch society 
in which institutions claim an increasingly bigger role in shaping practices. As a result 
the institutional goods of effectiveness seem to infringe on the goods of excellence of the 
practices. My conclusion is that practices need to (re) claim their role and their goods of 
excellence in order to maintain the virtuous character of their practices. If they fail in 
this respect, they will eventually lose their virtues which will mean the loss of their 
characteristics as a practice as well. In the end there will only be institutional 
instrumentality to the detriment of the quality of practices and of society as a whole. 
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Main findings 
9.4.1.   MacIntyre defines a practice as: ‘any coherent and complex form of socially 
established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of 
activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence 
which are appropriate to, an partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result 
that human powers to achieve excellence and human conceptions of the ends and goods 
involved are systematically extended.’  Looking at the first part I concluded that military 
activities are conducted within an institutional setting that is part of the larger state 
institution. As such the military is socially established. Military activities are complex 
because of the many aspects that are involved in the activity: mission, men, material, 
time, space and doctrine. Coherence is required in order to produce the overall aspired 
to result. Because of the complexity of the activities, cooperation between the members 
of the military is a ‘conditio sine qua non’. From these perspectives, military activities do 
qualify as a practice. I proceeded by analyzing the practice and identifying the 
constitutive elements of military practice: task, arms, cooperation, enemies, danger and 
an undetermined time and place as well as rules that govern the practice.  
 
9.4.2.   I also found convincing arguments that practices are not necessarily autotelic; 
some serve a purpose beyond merely participating in the activities of the practice. These 
purposive practices also serve wider goals. Healthcare is not only a practice in which 
practitioners aim at achieving standards of excellence in helping their patients; the 
practice also serves the wider goal of ensuring public health. Similar relations can be 
found in education, justice, the police and of course the military. Without such a wider 
purpose military activities would be mere banditry. 
 
9.4.3.   Next, I looked at the second part of the definition and undertook a first attempt to 
identify which internal goods are inherent to the military practice: the reasons why 
people want to join the military. The goods I identified are based on the constitutive 
elements - the defining characteristics - of military practice and the expectations of 
those who join the military. These are: satisfaction in accomplishing tasks, pride in 
wearing an uniform and bearing arms, a feeling of belonging as a result of close 
cooperation in a primary group, contentment in overcoming the enemy, excitement and 
thrill in facing danger, the challenge and adventure of strange places, the structure and 
stability provided by clear rules. Almost always there is a combination of some internal 
goods that appeal to those who want to join the military. However, MacIntyre’s 
assumption of a direct relation between some internal goods and specific virtues could 
not be corroborated. I did not find conclusive evidence of a one on one relation between 
a specific characteristic of military practice and a particular internal good; these 
connections are more complex.  
9.4.4.   In my further analysis of the last part of MacIntyre’s definition I identified seven 
virtues of military character. These are: sense of responsibility, military competence, 
courage, comradeship, respect - for fellow soldiers, civilians and even the enemy - 
resilience, and discipline.  These virtues of military character are a prerequisite to 
establish what needs to be done. How to achieve what needs to be done is a matter of 
deliberation which requires the virtue of intellect: practical wisdom. These seven virtues 
of military character and the virtue of practical wisdom cover all aspects of military 
practice, and their number needs no extending. If I would delete one of these seven 
virtues, I would ignore one of the constitutive parts of military practice and possibly the 
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internal goods that are closely related with it. The number of virtues is also a matter of 
establishing the right mean: not too many and not too few. The virtues I identified are 
tangible; they accommodate the pursuit of excellence and provide clear goals - and also 
yardsticks - for military education and training and personal development. The 
acquisition of these, allow a soldier to be truly virtuous. I thereby created a body of 
military professional ethics that could provide guidance on morally responsible conduct 
under the specific - and sometimes extreme - circumstances in which the military has to 
operate, while keeping within the bounds of the rule of law.  
9.4.5.   Narrative is an important feature of MacIntyre’s theory. It provides the necessary 
context in practices, supports the development of the virtues and creates a unified 
identity. The first two functions can be easily understood. Stories provide practical clues 
on what to expect and what is appropriate to do in a specific context. Especially in a 
military context - which in many respects is very different from ordinary life - stories are 
an indispensable tool to convey the abstract ideas as well as the concrete consequences 
of being a member of the military. Over time - by instruction, training, exercising, 
education and experience, all activities involving stories - being a member the military 
will evolve in a typical military bearing, an attitude that cannot be limited to the 
barracks nor to duty hours only: this bearing becomes part of one’s identity. Narrative 
shapes the relevant context, supports the imbuing of the military virtues, eventually 
resulting in an overall military bearing. Narrative also creates flexibility for 
interpretations which suit specific ‘tribes’ within the military: services, corps, regiments, 
units etc. 
 
9.4.6.    The reality check I conducted showed wide support for my findings which were 
recognized and acknowledged as relevant. The conclusion seems justified that the 
theory of MacIntyre enables the development of a virtue ethical framework of military 
ethics. However, there was one element in MacIntyre’s theory that seemed problematic 
and that was the assumed connection between internal goods and virtues. There were 
indications that such a generic relationship does exist, but I have not been able to 
particularize this generic relationship on the level of specific internal goods and related 
virtues. On all the other subjects the interviews gave a strong indication that the virtues 
I discerned were indeed recognized, acknowledged and accepted by soldiers with 
proven operational experience. The consistent and strong support further indicated that 
the outcomes have representative value. This indication was validated by the parallel 
survey among civil servants and healthcare workers. The overall idea of the military as a 
practice was supported by the similarities with healthcare workers regarding the strong 
evaluation of internal goods and virtues and the absence of a primary interest in 
external goods (job security, salary, status, etc.). Municipal civil servants on the other 
hand did mention and appreciate these external goods. Nevertheless civil servants 
acknowledged the virtues I discerned as relevant for their professional activities. This 
seems to foreclose the necessity to insert ‘typical’ civil concepts in a moral guideline for 
the MOD. 
 
9.4.7.   The overall outcome of my practical survey did provide support for my 
assumption that: ‘…the theory of virtue ethics as elaborated by Alasdair MacIntyre in his 
book ´After Virtue´ provides a suitable instrument to identify, develop, instil and uphold 
the required moral standards in the military.’ The description of the military virtues I 
identified are listed below. 
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Responsibility  
 
 
 
Investigating a cache of  Improvised Explosive Devices, vicinity Tarin Kowt (Uruzgan, 
Afghanistan) 2008, August 12. Photo: Audiovisuele Dienst Defensie. 
 
 
 
Sense of responsibility is the disposition to try to accomplish allotted tasks as well as 
possible. This disposition requires the right balance between on the one hand a negative 
attitude of shirking and scraping through and on the other hand an equally negative 
attitude of blind zeal and fanatically pursuing a mission when circumstances have 
changed. It also implies being prepared to account for one’s actions.  
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Competence 
 
 
 
F 16 pilot on a training mission. 2011, July 19. Foto Audiovisuele Dienst Defensie. 
 
 
 
Competence is the disposition to acquire the knowledge and skills to serve (weapon) 
systems as well as the ability to perceive the effects these systems can produce. This 
disposition requires the right balance between, on the one hand, an attitude of  thinking 
that a rough general knowledge will do and that this won’t come to serious problems 
and on the other hand, an attitude of exaggerated  attention for material and rules and 
wanting to do everything by the book and so hampering practical operations.  
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Comradeship 
 
 
 
Reconnaissance crew in front of their vehicle. Operation Bagchi Baaz, vicinity Mazar , 
(Uruzgan, Afghanistan) 2010, June 16. Photo: Audiovisuele Dienst Defensie. 
 
 
 
Comradeship is the disposition to share moral and practical support with fellow soldiers 
with whom one shares hardship and duress. This disposition requires a right balance 
between, on the one hand, a negative attitude of egotism, without any concern for others 
and on the other hand, an attitude of an exaggerate attention for other group members 
and their opinions and uncritical support of group actions. 
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Respect  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paying respect to other soldiers: a last 
salute in a ramp ceremony.  
Kamp Holland (Uruzgan, Afghanistan) 
2009 September 9.  
Photo: Mark Leijsen. 
 
 
 
 
 
Communicating respectfully with civilians.  
Vicinity Chora (Uruzgan, Afghanistan)  
2007, April 17.   
Photo: Audiovisuele Dienst Defensie. 
 
 
 
 
 
Suspected enemy fighters behind bars 
treated with respect.   
As Samawah (Iraq)  
2004, September 12.  
Photo: Ruud de Mol, Koninklijke Marine. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Respect is the disposition to value people as fellow human beings. This disposition 
requires a right balance between, on the one hand, a negative attitude of contempt and 
authoritarian behaviour toward others and on the other hand, an attitude of blind 
infatuation and exaggerated concern for any others. Respect does not only pertain to the 
members of the same group but also to other soldiers; military subordinates and 
superiors, as well as to civilians and even the enemy is entitled to a respectful treatment 
when fallen into our hands. 
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Courage 
 
 
 
Major Royal Netherlands Air Force, J.N. Mulder is awarded the Military order of William 
by her Majesty Queen Juliana in The Hague, 1948. Photo: Nederlands Instituut voor 
Militaire Historie. 
 
 
 
Courage is the disposition to take personal risks in order to achieve an important goal. 
This disposition requires a right balance between, on the one hand, an attitude of 
avoiding risks and cowardice and on the other hand, an attitude of recklessness and 
taking unnecessary risks for yourself and others. Courage is not only displayed in taking 
physical risks but also in showing moral vigour. 
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   Resilience 
 
 
 
Dutch Marine of the Netherlands UN Detachment during an operation in the Korean War 
(1953-1956). Photo: Nederlands Instituut voor Militaire Historie. 
 
 
 
Resilience is the disposition to persevere in the face of adverse conditions and physical 
exhaustion and mental distress. This disposition requires the right balance between, on 
the one hand, an attitude of weakness, self pity and resignation at the smallest 
misfortune and on the other hand, an attitude of  overestimating  ones capabilities and 
not taking human limits into account, eventually resulting in collapse. Resilience has 
both a physical and a mental component.   
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Discipline  
 
 
 
Commissioning of Royal Netherlands Navy’s submarine HMS K 17, 1933,December 19. 
Photo: +. 
 
 
 
Discipline is the disposition to abide by rules and regulations. This disposition requires a 
right balance between, on the one hand, a negative attitude resulting in a neglect of rules 
by which one might endanger oneself and others and on the other hand, an attitude of 
strict adherence by rules and taking these literally which frustrates the progress of the 
work at hand. 
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Practical wisdom 
 
 
 
Leadership of the Kings company,11 Guards Battalion Grenadiers & Rifles deliberating 
in the vicinity of Kandahar (Afghanistan), 2006 January 6. Photo: Audiovisuele Dienst 
Defensie. 
 
 
 
Practical wisdom is the disposition that enables a person to perceive a situation, to 
deliberate on what is appropriate and to act accordingly.  The virtues of character 
identify the need for action, the virtue of practical wisdom enables a person to 
determine  how to act. This disposition requires a right balance between, on the one 
hand, a wavering conduct and inconclusive action in case of pressure or any other 
emergency and on the other hand, immediate and impulsive action at the first hint of 
difficulties. Practical wisdom entails keeping a clear head, taking full account of the 
situation and taking decisive action. When displayed in leading others it also entails 
strong directive guidance while leaving room for initiative and displaying strong 
personal commitment. 
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9.4.8.   When compared with the virtue-ethical framework I developed, the present 
Dutch code of conduct has some problematic features. First of all the framework has a 
coherent theoretical foundation which the present (rather eclectic) code lacks. In the 
second place the framework addresses issues relevant of military operational practice, 
while the present code primarily addresses institutional values. It is precisely the lack of 
operational relevance that impedes conveying the practical essence of the code. The 
present code is rule-based, and rules invite circumvention and this eventually erodes the 
code and could affect the moral standards of the soldiers. A framework which aims at 
character building will create a more stable disposition to adhere not only to the rules as 
such, but also to the spirit of the rules and the values embedded in those rules. 
Furthermore a code based on the virtue-ethical framework will be better comparable 
with other international codes which could contribute to improving international 
military cooperation. Introducing civil concepts in a code in order to address the civilian 
employees of the MOD seems to be superfluous.  
 
9.4.9.   After investigating the military as a purposive practice, I next directed my 
attention at the military as an institution. The military is a purposive practice; to defend 
the interests of the Dutch constitutional state. This means that the values which are 
embedded in the Dutch constitution should be part of the standards upheld by the 
practice. This obligation is captured in the oath all Dutch soldiers take on entering the 
institution of the armed forces. The institution provides - beside continuity and stability 
for the practice - also the means to acquire external goods: money, status and power. At 
the institutional level these external goods provide little attractiveness. However, at the 
individual level these external goods do provide interesting incentives, including: job 
security, educational development and opportunities for promotion, resulting in an 
increase in salary and internal power and status.  
Some argue that these external goods gain in importance due to the increasing 
appreciation of material benefits as a prerequisite for individual flourishing.  
 
9.4.10.   The institutional emphasis on goods of effectiveness, rather than goods of 
excellence - in the military as well as in other sectors -  results in introducing regulations 
and norms to secure the institutional goods of effectiveness, but which often are alien to 
the practice and its standards of excellence. In order to prevent a possible slipping of 
standards, including moral, a code of conduct was introduced in the Dutch armed forces. 
Consequently this code was inspired primarily by institutional values rather than virtues 
pertaining to the practice. And although it appears that the overall integrity of the 
personnel of the armed forces has improved, the code has little appeal and fails to 
convey practical relevance.  
 
9.4.11. The relationship between the military practice and the institution of the armed 
forces could also be perceived from the perspective of praxis and poiesis These concepts 
provide a tool, an angle of refraction, to look at military reality. In the praxis the soldier 
is the pivot while in poiesis it is the institution. Practices cannot survive without 
institutional support. However, a balance is required. Without the appropriate 
institutional support the practice would have difficulties in sustaining continuity and 
providing the means necessary for the activities of the practice as well as developing its 
standards of excellence. On the other hand, too much institutional interference with its 
ensuing emphasis on goods of effectiveness could encumber the practice and its goods of 
excellence. In the Netherlands there is widespread feeling that in certain sectors 
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institutional interests seem to prevail over those of the practice. These sectors include - 
among others - medical care and education, but also in the military this development is 
noticeable.  It is particularly manifest in the code of conduct which reflects institutional 
interests rather than practical virtues. It can also be detected in the instrumental 
approach of the military in a wider context. The military seems to be seen as a mere 
instrument of state, comparable with the service of internal revenue, public transport, 
healthcare and the like. However, the virtue ethical approach of the military practice can 
also have a positive influence on the performance of the institution that supports the 
practice, the armed forces. A virtue-ethical framework could provide the armed forces 
with a unified and coherent code with obvious relevance to the practice. It could 
contribute to achieving higher standards of excellence which would also improve the 
operational effectiveness of the armed forces. As the armed forces have a closed 
personnel system, eventually the virtues would play a role in the governance of the 
armed forces as well. This could prevent a further widening of the gap between military 
practice and institutional poiesis; perhaps even contribute to diminishing this fissure.  
 
9.4.12.   The last element of MacIntyre’s theory pertains to moral tradition. He argues 
that ‘the past is never something to be discarded, but that the present is intelligible only 
as a commentary upon and response to the past…’ In this moral traditions the argument 
centres characteristically in part around the question how to sustain and improve a 
practice and the goods involved. Living traditions involve practices in which the tenets 
of the tradition are embodied; and the standards of excellence of a practice find their 
anchorage in the virtues. I conclude that the gist of Dutch moral tradition has remained 
remarkably stable. The characteristics of this living Dutch moral tradition are: freedom 
and equality; political and religious tolerance; cooperativeness and solidarity; both 
internal and in its international orientation. I did not find any contradiction between the 
military virtues and this wider Dutch moral tradition; on the contrary the military 
virtues of character reflect the tenets of wider moral tradition, albeit in a specific 
manner. 
 
9.4.13.   Another feature of Dutch moral tradition is its non-military character. This is a 
long-standing fact and it is not feasible to want to change this characteristic of tradition, 
which has such an enduring and deeply rooted origin. A  side effect of this tradition is a 
generic lack of knowledge of the military. This pertains to the capacities of the military 
and what these can achieve, to the complexities involved in the deployment of the 
military and bringing to bear its ultimately lethal power, and to the nature of the bond 
between the nation and its military in which the soldiers might have to face a complete 
liability for their actions: being killed in action. However, this does not mean that it 
would be unattainable for the military to improve on the relationship between the 
military and wider society. This could be achieved if the military were to reclaim their 
status as a practice, rather than an institutional instrument of state. This would first of 
all affect the internal culture: goods of excellence would be reinstated as at least at par 
with goods of effectiveness. Such a change would not go unnoticed by the wider public 
and this could create a different and more positive attitude towards the military.  It 
would be relatively easy to emphasize the ‘obvious’ link between civic virtues and the 
corresponding military virtues and vice versa. This link would enhance an appropriate 
wider frame of reference for soldiers and for citizens it could promote a better 
understanding of the military. The virtuous soldier would probably be a virtuous citizen 
as well. If the military would be able to emphasise its virtuous character and its 
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aspiration at excellence, the public perception could improve as well. Consequently it 
could revive the awareness of the bond between the nation and the military. It is even 
possible that the military would provide a model for other practices suffering from to 
much institutional infringement.  Also the role of the virtuous soldier in the wider 
society - in clubs, sports, schools, etc. - could be emphasised in order to show that a 
virtuous military has wider social benefits as well. Such a development would take time 
to produce tangible results, but what is a decade compared to the enduring tradition in 
which the Dutch nation and its military stands. 
 
9.4.14.   Then there remained only one issue and that pertains to the relation between 
the nation-state and its military: how to shape that bond? This relationship is under 
pressure form both an institutional as an obligatory perspective. The institutional 
perspective underestimates the nature of the military as a practice which hampers 
communication and mutual understanding. The obligatory perspective shows a lack of 
understanding of the bond between the nation and the military. This bond is peculiar as 
soldiers who join the armed forces accept an unlimited liability. I concluded that this 
kind of bond cannot be captured in a modern contract, but is primarily a matter of a 
covenant.  A covenant binds the community and the individuals over time and implies a 
strong moral obligation even in difficult times and in the face of danger. A covenant is a 
‘fiduciary relationship’ which rests on mutual trust and confidence. To maintain a 
covenant the parties must stay aware of the obligations a covenant entails. In the Dutch 
case the present awareness of the covenant and its consequences seems weak. This 
could be the result of the ‘non-military’ nature of the Dutch nation, a general lack of 
knowledge of the military and the consequences of military action as well as the 
increasing emphasis on the goods of effectiveness based on a primarily institutional and 
instrumental approach of the military. 
 
Conclusions 
9.5.1.   The ethical framework based on military virtues of character and the virtue of 
intellect, practical wisdom, addresses military operational practice. This feature, the 
practical value the framework of military virtues, is indeed recognized, acknowledged 
and accepted by soldiers as relevant and important in military practice. This conclusion 
is based on the interviews I conducted and the ensuing comparison with other 
professional activities, the research of other sources and an international comparison. 
Many of those whom I interviewed supported the idea that virtues can be developed by 
(further) education, training, exercising, living up to exemplary professionals, role 
models, and of course experience. This pertains to all soldiers: private soldiers non-
commissioned officers and officers. Narrative provides an important element in imbuing 
these virtues. Narrative creates a shared frame of reference and provides the necessary 
links to wider society. However, narrative while contributing to a common consent on 
what is important, leaves room for specific interpretations that fit the requirements of 
specific services, corps and regiments. The virtue-ethical framework I developed could 
create a tangible link with the (operational) reality and thus it would be easier to 
incorporate the tenets of the framework in education, training and exercise.  
 
9.5.2.   As the framework based on virtues is founded on internal dispositions to act in 
accordance with the standards of excellence, the overall technical and moral quality of 
the soldiers - and as a result the quality and the effectiveness the armed forces in general 
- could increase. The virtues embedded in the military character promote that virtuous 
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soldiers will act in accordance with the rules. When the complexity of a situation refutes 
the strict application of rules, the virtuous soldier will act in accordance with the overall 
spirit of the rules that apply.  However building a military character will require a strong 
and continuous effort in the field of education and training, based on the exertions of a 
vigorous  leadership backed by a clear policy.  
  
9.5.3.   My findings largely confirmed my hypothesis that MacIntyre’s theory indeed 
provides a suitable instrument to identify, develop, instil and uphold the required moral 
standards in the military. Some of my findings gave reasons to adjust some elements of 
MacIntyre’s theory (e.g. in the case of internal goods), but these adaptations did not 
disavow his theory. Based on his theory I developed a framework of military ethics that 
found support by those experienced soldiers I interviewed and also by other sources 
and by international comparison. At the same time I found that applying the framework 
in the Dutch armed forces would contribute to overcoming some of the shortcomings in 
the present Dutch policy on morality . 
 
Theoretical implications 
9.6.   In this thesis I did not only elaborate on the theory of virtue ethics in general and 
its specific interpretation by Alasdair MacIntyre but I also reflected on other theories 
and not only philosophical theories. Van Tongeren uses the term hermeneutical ethics, 
which aims at using a variety of theories, traditions and concepts in ethical reflection.6 
Hermeneutical enquiry tries to enhance understanding of the whole by investigating the 
constitutive parts and vice versa. From a hermeneutical point of view reflecting on 
morally appropriate behaviour is not only a matter of theory, but is also an affair of 
character and behaviour influenced by situational circumstances, moral intuitions and 
the culture and the nature of men. All should be taken into account in order to interpret 
facts and to come to a more complete picture of a specific situation or concept. Empirical 
ethics has a similar aim. Empirical ethics seeks to enhance the context sensitivity of 
moral rules and regulations, thus enhancing the practical value of these rules and their 
applicability. This approach aims at achieving this goal by describing and analyzing the 
cultural and organisational aspects of practices and institutions and their context, 
including the procedures and processes and the relations between those involved in the 
practice and the institution. Thus it wants to establish the relevant aspects in judging the 
practical applicability of moral rules and regulations.7 Thus this approach does not focus 
only on normative theory and its broad principles which should govern human conduct.  
Empirical ethics takes seriously how people, active in specific practices and institutions 
think and act, how they shape their standards by which they act and what their 
convictions are.  Empirical ethics explicitly takes on the responsibility to provide 
tangible means to provide practical guidance on morally appropriate conduct. This 
requires not only philosophy but also the use of other social sciences as well as 
empirical research.8 This thesis could provide an example on what can be achieved by an 
approach based on hermeneutical enquiry and empirical philosophy. 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 Tongeren, v., P. (2012). Leven is een kunst. Zoetermeer, Klement. P 62-64, 75, 221-224. 
7 Musschenga, B. (2004). "Empirische ethiek: contextsensitiviteit of contextualiteit." Ethische 
perspectieven 14(1): 27- 41. P 27 – 28. 
8 Ibid, P 39. 
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Practical implications 
9.7.1.   As to the practical implications I already made some observations. The method I 
developed could serve as a frame of reference and used as a tool to investigate other 
practices and which standards of excellence would be appropriate. Furthermore the 
notions of praxis and poiesis could help in clarifying the relation between a practice and 
the institution by which it is supported.  As to the military, I am convinced that 
application of the framework of military virtues of character and the virtue of practical 
wisdom could lead to several improvements pertaining to the military practice and its 
supporting institution. Ideally the Dutch MOD would adopt the scheme I developed, as a 
groundwork for its moral policy, in which case the following consequences or practical 
implications could occur. 
- The virtues are the central feature of the MOD’s moral policy. They are closely related 
to the constituent elements of military practice and the internal goods for which young 
people join the armed forces. These circumstances enhance their relevance and improve 
acceptance by the soldiers.  
-   The virtue-ethical policy aims at all ranks and categories and will be instilled by 
education, training, exercises and experience. Narrative and role models play an 
important part in this process of building a military character.  
-   The virtue-ethical policy is flexible in its application and will be easily adopted 
throughout the Dutch armed forces. The virtues will remain the same while the context 
may differ. This makes the framework of virtues perfectly suited to be introduced 
defence wide. It will create a common consent while leaving room for differences. Each 
service, corps or regiment can insert their own narrative, their own traditions, to 
elaborate on the importance of the virtues.  
-   Because of the inherent flexibility in applying the virtue ethical framework it is also 
valid for the civilian employees of the MOD. The close link with military practice will 
promote awareness of this feature in a civil job in the MOD.   
-   The virtuous person, soldiers and civil employees of the MOD, will demonstrate a 
more stable moral outlook than those who merely abide by rules. The sometimes very 
demanding circumstances in which especially soldiers have to perform their tasks, 
requires men of character. Also in more favourable circumstances the virtuous person 
will act in a morally appropriate way. 
-    The virtue-ethical policy will enhance effectiveness by promoting cohesion and 
setting appropriate standards of excellence.  
-   The framework of virtues will improve international military understanding and 
cooperation.  
-  The virtuous soldier and also the virtuous civil employee posted on a primarily 
institutional job will still keep in mind the requirements of the practice. 
-   The virtuous soldier and civil employee will also be a virtuous citizen. Thus they will 
contribute to the social fabric of wider society and promote the reputation of the armed 
forces. 
-   Emphasising the nature of the military as primarily a practice will enhance the status 
of the military and facilitate communication on military affairs. 
-   Positioning of the military as a practice will revive the relevance of the covenant 
between the military and the people whom it serves. 
-   The framework of virtues could act as an example for other sectors in which goods of 
effectiveness of the institution infringe on the standards of excellence of the practice. 
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9.7.2.   However, to what extent this idealistic picture will be (partially) realised is a 
matter of policy. The leadership at the MOD will have to decide whether they will give 
the virtues a chance. Even then, it will require substantive research on the methods and 
means that could be used in building military character and establishing which 
prerequisites are required to achieve that goal. Nevertheless, in my opinion 
implementation will not incur substantial cost. Introducing the concept of virtue-ethics 
would be largely a matter of rearranging the focus and efforts of military education and 
training. However, it will take serious effort over a substantial time before it will 
produce tangible effects. In my opinion it would be well worth the effort. 
 
Epilogue 
9.8.   ‘Assuming then, that we have given (in outline) a sufficient account of happiness 
and the several virtues, and also of friendship and pleasure, may we regard our 
undertaking as now completed? Or is the correct view (as we have been saying) in the 
case of conduct, the end consists not in gaining theoretical knowledge of the several 
point at issue , but rather putting our knowledge into practice? In that case it is not 
enough to know about goodness; we must endeavour to possess and use it, or adopt any 
other means to become good ourselves.’9  
                                                          
9 Aristotle (2004). The Nicomachean ethics. London, Penguin books. Par. 1179a33-1179b4 
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The good: 
Rear –admiral Karel Willem Frederik Marie Doorman ( 1889 - 1942) 
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time. Although lacking intelligence the Japanese fleet was attacked 
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Japanese fleet was not much larger, but better trained and equipped 
and the allied fleet was annihilated. The allies lost approximately 
1000 sailors, the Japanese fleet a mere ten. Rear-admiral Doorman 
choose to go down with his ship. Posthumously he was awarded the 
Military order of William for valour. 
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civilians were killed, many by Westerling’s  own hand. Being a 
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war of liberation, he was never brought to justice. He died in 
Amsterdam at the age of 70. 
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